CIVIL NUCLEAR The Iran Nuke Industry Row

The IAEA experts' visit to Arak is cause for optimism. But no expert predicts an early settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue. It will take a lot of time to find a solution acceptable to all sides, all the more so since Washington at one time included Iran in the "axis of evil." The United States carries a lot of weight in the IAEA, both as a great nuclear power and the source of a quarter of its budget. This is a serious lever that Washington is using to further its own interests. The stubborn discussions with the IAEA brought the Iranian issue to the U.N. Security Council, which was ready to pass a new resolution slapping sanctions on Tehran, but Russia and China intervened on Iran's behalf. Photo courtesy AFP.

Israel Considers Building Nuclear Power Plant
Jerusalem (AFP) Aug 08 - Israel is considering the construction of what would be its first nuclear power plant, a senior official said Friday. "Infrastructure Minister Benjamin Ben Eliezer has been advancing the issue of building a nuclear reactor for producing electricity," the official said, speaking on condition of anonymity. "In view of Israel's low reserves of electricity and energy sources, the forecasts as well as the growing demand, (Ben Eliezer) is examining the idea, which requires the approval of the government," he told AFP. Israel's electricity sector heavily relies on imported coal and oil. Several governmental bodies have been discussing the feasibility of the project, he said. Israel's atomic agency confirmed such talks were underway, although the infrastructure ministry refused to comment. Israel is considered the sole but undeclared nuclear power in the Middle East. Throughout the years it has kept a policy of "ambiguity" over its nuclear capabilities, although it does acknowledge having two nuclear research centres. by Tatyana Sinitsyna
Moscow (RIA Novosti) Aug 07, 2007
A group of inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency arrived in Iran to visit a heavy-water reactor being built near Arak, in the center of the country. This time, the Iranians are ready to give the IAEA exhaustive answers to questions about their experiments with plutonium and their uranium-enrichment program. This is a real breakthrough in Tehran's long-running dispute with the nuclear watchdog. In the middle of July, Iran announced its readiness to resume contacts with the IAEA. Foreign Ministry spokesman Muhammad Ali Hosseini explained, "Our dialogue with the West on this problem has become more realistic and rational." Iran-IAEA relations can be likened to nuclear fission and fusion. Both release enormous amounts of energy, which acts as a catalyst for either severing relations or moving toward dialogue.

The IAEA has many grievances against Iran. In late 2003 the IAEA Board of Governors passed a resolution stating Iran concealed its nuclear program from the world for 18 years. This fact called into doubt the civilian nature of the program. The Iranians are out to prove they have been developing peaceful nuclear energy in full compliance with the IAEA charter, but the skeptical nuclear watchdog demands that its experts should see for themselves that Iran's nuclear program is not pursuing any military purposes.

The IAEA suspects Iran of developing nuclear weapons at no fewer than three secret installations. It is also worried about Iran's contacts with a clandestine network that is illegally trading in materials and spare parts for uranium-enrichment centrifuges. The IAEA believes that Iran is hiding them deep underground at some 30 different locations.

Now that the recent Vienna plan has eased tensions between the two sides, the IAEA wants Iran to disclose all the required information about its nuclear program. "Not a single question should remain unanswered," said Olli Heinonen, IAEA deputy director general.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov believes that at this point "it is important to achieve specific results and not to provoke a rupture in the relationship between the IAEA and Iran." He said that once the world is convinced that Iran's nuclear intentions are peaceful, it will step up comprehensive cooperation with Tehran, while the latter will be able to fully take advantage of its right to develop a civilian nuclear energy program.

The IAEA experts' visit to Arak is cause for optimism. But no expert predicts an early settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue. It will take a lot of time to find a solution acceptable to all sides, all the more so since Washington at one time included Iran in the "axis of evil." The United States carries a lot of weight in the IAEA, both as a great nuclear power and the source of a quarter of its budget. This is a serious lever that Washington is using to further its own interests.

The stubborn discussions with the IAEA brought the Iranian issue to the U.N. Security Council, which was ready to pass a new resolution slapping sanctions on Tehran, but Russia and China intervened on Iran's behalf.

The Iranian nuclear saga is turning out to be more of a hassle for Russia, which is building a two-unit nuclear power plant in Bushehr, than for any other country. There seems to be no end in sight for this project -- Iran has been trying to complete it for 30 years now. First, the Germans gave up on an almost finished installation because of Iran's war against Iraq from 1980 to 1988, and now the Russians are dragging it out.

Moscow has lamented more than once that it ever got involved in Bushehr. The project is without technical precedent, and Russian engineers have had to rack their brains trying to integrate the components left behind by Siemens, the German company that started work on the plant, with the Russian VVER-1000 reactor. Political tensions have made it even worse.

Iran was supposed to receive the keys to its first nuclear power plant in October 2007, but the launch has been delayed again, at least for a year. "The Bushehr plant will be assembled and commissioned no sooner than the fall of 2008 -- a year later than promised," said Ivan Istomin, head of Energoprogress, one of the companies involved in the project. He explained this delay by Iran's failure to pay for the project in full.

In turn, Iranian managers are accusing Russia of delaying nuclear fuel supplies. But the technical procedures require that fuel should be loaded into a completed plant six months before its physical commissioning and not a day earlier.

The solution is deceptively simple: Things will only improve if Iran pays the Russian builders and answers the IAEA's well-founded questions. In the meantime, the world can only watch and wait.

Ahmadinejad says Iran defiant over nuclear energy
ALGIERS, Aug 7 (AFP) Aug 07 - Algeria gave its support to Iran on Tuesday in the row over Tehran's nuclear programme, as his guest President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran insisted his country would stand firm on the issue. "Iran cannot talk to countries which do not recognise its right to produce nuclear energy for peaceful means," Ahmadinejad told a news conference on the second and final day of his visit.

He accused Western powers of mobilising all their energy to isolate Iran on this question but underlined Tehran's determination to continue efforts to acquire nuclear energy.

His host President Abdelaziz Bouteflika backed Iran in the row over its nuclear power programme, a day after US President George W. Bush again criticised Tehran over the issue.

Bouteflika said it was unacceptable that the legitimate right of a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Iran) to acquire nuclear technology for strictly peaceful means should be blocked.

Algeria itself has since 1995 had two experimental nuclear reactors, both of which are monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Bouteflika called for "generalised disarmament in the matter of arms of massive destruction, the total ban of nuclear tests and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons."

The Middle East should join Africa and Latin America and become a nuclear-free zone, he added.

Israel is considered the sole but undeclared nuclear power in the Middle East. It has maintained a policy of "ambiguity" over its nuclear capabilities, although it does acknowledge having two nuclear research centres.

The statements by the Iranian and Algerian presidents came just a day after Bush again criticised the government in Tehran over the nuclear issue.

"We will continue to work to isolate it because they're not a force for good as far as we can see, they're a destabilizing influence wherever they are," said Bush.

Iran is engaged in a standoff with the UN Security Council over its nuclear programme. The United States has led the accusations that Iran seeks a nuclear bomb and the Security Council has imposed sanctions demanding that Iran suspend its uranium enrichment.

Four International Atomic Energy Agency officials arrived in Iran Monday for talks aimed at agreeing a framework for future inspections of the uranium enrichment plant at Natanz in central Iran.

Iran has repeatedly refused to yield to the pressure despite two sets of UN Security Council sanctions.

In a hard-hitting new broadside against Israel, the Iranian leader also said "the whole of humankind today has been bruised by crimes perpetrated by Zionists in Palestine, in Lebanon, and in the whole world," Algeria's APS news agency reported.

"All those felled as martyrs in the streets of Palestine are our children, all those who are rotting in Israeli jails are our children and our mothers and fathers," he said, while visiting veterans of Algeria's independence war.

"We support all those Palestinians, Lebanese, North African Arabs and people in Africa, Asia and Latin America who today are fighting a battle with the global hegemonists," he added.

Ahmadinejad, who in 2005 made waves by calling for Israel to be "wiped from the map", continued his attacks in a hard-hitting interview published just ahead of his visit.

"Our support (for the Palestinian people) is unconditional. As for the Israelis, let them go find somewhere else (to live)," Ahmadinejad told several Algerian newspapers.

He provoked a storm in June by saying a "countdown" had begun that would end with Lebanese and Palestinian militants destroying Israel.

His government last year hosted a conference on the Holocaust that questioned the reality of the Nazis' genocide of the Jews during World War II.

(Tatyana Sinitsyna is a commentator for RIA Novosti. This article is reprinted by permission of RIA Novosti. The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.)



Source: RIA Novosti

Source: Agence France-Presse

The Saudi arms deal: Why now?
By Dan Smith

The headline-grabber read: "US plans new arms sales to Gulf allies". Nothing startling there. For decades the United States has routinely sold or transferred weapons and ammunition, sent military teams abroad or brought foreign military personnel to the United States for training, and transferred technology that allowed "friendly" governments to produce almost state-of-the-art copies of
US weapons.

What was a surprise were two details in the article's subheading. The main recipient of Uncle Sam's largesse was Saudi Arabia, and the value of the deal was said to be US$20 billion.

Saudi Arabia? Isn't that the country:
- from which came 15 of the 19 men responsible for the attack on the United States on September 11, 2001?
- that opposed the March 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq and whose king, this March, called the invasion an "illegal occupation"?
- that told the United States to remove its troops and find some other country for the US Central Command's (CENTCOM) forward command post?
- whose border is so poorly monitored that 75% of all foreign fighters crossing into Iraq do so from Saudi territory, far more than from Syria?
- whose autocratic government either will not or cannot prevent its youth from going to Iraq - an estimated 40% of all foreigners fighting US troops and Iraqi government forces are Saudi nationals - where they become bomb makers, snipers, and suicide bombers?
- that nearly 60 years after the creation of the modern State of Israel still refuses to extend diplomatic recognition to that country?

No matter how deft the White House "spin", there will be considerable congressional opposition to the sale. Previous Congresses have opposed sales of weapons to the Saudis on the grounds that the kingdom has never signed a peace agreement with Israel. This time, the opposition is fueled by the lack of sustained support from Riyadh for US aims in Iraq and in the "global war on terrorism".

Cost of oil
There is also the sense among some members of Congress that the Saudis have not acted to control the soaring costs of energy. In the run-up to the 2004 US elections, the Saudis allegedly promised they would increase production if necessary to preclude a price spike that might hurt the re-election prospects of the George W Bush-Dick Cheney ticket.

Once the US election was concluded, however, the Saudis did little if anything to curb higher prices - first to $40 and then to $50 per barrel - pleading market forces beyond their control. Coincidentally with the announcement of the proposed arms sale, the price of a barrel of oil hit $78. Yet there was only silence from the Saudis.

From the perspective of the hardliners in Bush's White House, the Saudis were undercutting every US goal in the Middle East, particularly the current president's vision of a democratic Iraq as the seedbed for transforming autocratic regimes to democracies.

How different from 1990-91, when president George H W Bush sent US troops to protect Saudi Arabia after Saddam Hussein seized Kuwait. In the first years after the 1991 Gulf War, the Pentagon willingly sold almost anything to the Saudis - with the stipulation, demanded by the Israelis, that Arab countries would not get equipment that technologically equaled the equipment provided Israel. Even so, based on these orders, the United States actually delivered $22.9 billion in weaponry to the Saudis in the period 1997-2004.

From Riyadh's perspective, however, it is George W Bush who is undercutting good governance in the Middle East, something more important yet more elusive than the type of government a country may have. Early 2006 was the turning point. As soon as it became clear that the Saudi-backed Hamas movement in the occupied Palestinian territories and not Fatah had won the January 2006 parliamentary election, the US and Israel - which regard Hamas as a terrorist organization - took steps to cut all financial, commercial and diplomatic contact with the incoming Palestinian government.

This set the Bush administration on a collision course with King Abdullah, who was pressuring Fatah and Hamas to overcome their past animosities and form a "unity government". By early this year, conditions were so dire that Hamas and Fatah agreed to the Saudi-sponsored "Mecca Accord" as the basis for a united government. The agreement intensified US and Israeli counteractions, and after three months fighting resumed between the factions.

Supporters of the Bush administration quickly saw Riyadh's effort to respect the election results as yet another instance in which Saudi Arabia was not pulling its weight in the "war on terror". In fact, Congress had already expressed its frustration about Riyadh's failure to be more actively engaged in furthering US (and therefore implicitly Saudi) objectives.

In fiscal years 2005 and 2006, Congress had directed that Saudi Arabia was not to receive any funds in the State Department's foreign-operations appropriation. But as usual, the legislation contained an escape clause: the ban against assistance became



moot if the president certified that the Saudis were cooperating in the "war on terror". Much to the dismay of many in Congress, Bush so certified each year.

Timing
An unanswered question about the proposed arms deal is: Why now? Had the administration moved before November 2003, the announcement would have been seen in the region as an audacious - given the "success" of US-led coalitions in Afghanistan and Iraq - but credible recommitment by Washington to the then-25-year-old policy of diplomatic, economic, and military (conventional and nuclear) containment of Tehran's ambitions in the Persian Gulf by increasing Riyadh's military stance.

But looking at the Saudi record and Riyadh's increasing propensity to act in its own interests without coordinating with Washington, there is the suggestion that the Bush administration is suddenly wary of its "other" flank in the Persian Gulf - the one occupied by the Saudi-dominated six-member Gulf Cooperation Council. Militarily overcommitted in midsummer, the White House has only two cards to play: pump up fear of Iran acquiring enough enriched uranium to build a nuclear weapon, or bribe the regional allies.

For a few months the nuclear fear factor seemed to work, but Tehran seems to have become "reasonable" enough in its position to defuse tensions with most of the main actors in this dispute. This left the Bush administration with bribery, spiced with a touch of traditional Sunni-Shi'ite sectarianism that underpins relations between Riyadh and Tehran even when they cooperate (eg, the just-formed Iraq security subcommittee that will consider steps to reduce the influx of weapons and fighters into Iraq from Iran).

This also explains the visit last week by the US secretary of state and the secretary of defense to the region on an old-fashioned, bribe-them-first-then-twist-arms, whistle-stop campaign to make sure regional "allies" - this time including the Saudis - are in line behind US policy.

Inconvenient inconsistencies
But the multibillion-dollar arms deal has some inconsistencies that could cause the two secretaries problems. The most immediate one is the policy message represented by the sheer size of the arms deal.

Washington has been insisting that there is no military solution to the region's trauma. Yet it is proposing not only $20 billion in weapons to the Saudis but another $13 billion to Egypt and $30 billion to Israel - a total of $63 billion for weapons in a part of the world already awash in modern arms. And this total apparently doesn't include $40 million in guns, bullets, rockets, missiles, small-arms ammunition, night-vision goggles, and spare parts for the Lebanese Army this year and another $280 million for 2008. Nor does it include the $3 billion Iraq is spending on weapons and ammunition - all of which are contributing to the current mayhem in these two countries.

Nonetheless, since Israel has already said it will not oppose the sale, it is unlikely that Congress will vote to block it or even to amend it. As for the Pentagon, it hopes to save money through economy of scale for items produced for either the Saudis or Israelis. And of course US companies that build weapons and munitions are pleased at the prospect of new contracts and new profits.

The irony in this whole affair is that Bush started the Iraq war over weapons that never existed and that have not been used since 1945. Now his administration seems to think the way to end the war is to make sure that there are more weapons - ones that kill thousands every day. Go figure!

Dan Smith is a military-affairs analyst for Foreign Policy In Focus, a retired US Army colonel, and a senior fellow on military affairs at the Friends Committee on National Legislation. His blog is The Quakers' Colonel.

(Posted with permission from Foreign Policy In Focus)

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/IH08Ak01.html

Congressional Memo
The Blogs Are Alive With the Sound of Angry Democrats

By CARL HULSE
Published: August 9, 2007

WASHINGTON, Aug. 8 — Progressive and liberal groups and left-leaning blogs are furious, tossing around fighting words like “spineless,” “craven” and “weak.”

So much for the hopes of Democratic leaders that they could avoid a withering political attack by clearing the way for Congress to approve an expansion of the Bush administration’s terrorist surveillance program before the August recess.

“Democratic leaders in Congress didn’t put up much of a fight and they didn’t stand up and say ‘no’ to Bush,” said an e-mail message that political operatives for the group MoveOn sent Tuesday to the organization’s members, urging them to sign an online petition calling on Congress to reverse the new law.

Activist groups were somewhat forgiving earlier this year when Democrats backed down in a fight with President Bush over war spending, but the concession on changes to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act seems to have touched a nerve.

From the perspective of liberal critics, Democrats again let themselves be hoodwinked into handing Mr. Bush substantial new power on the basis of White House warnings of an imminent threat. And they did so when Mr. Bush’s poll numbers are low.

“Ultimately, it was the Democratic leadership on the Hill that rolled over to this demand,” said Caroline Fredrickson, a top lobbyist for the American Civil Liberties Union. “Instead of standing strong and standing on principle, they panicked and gave the administration not only what it has been asking for, but more.”

Democratic officials in the House and the Senate say they understand the dismay that greeted the measure’s passage and point out that most Democrats opposed the bill, including the four senators seeking the party’s presidential nomination. But they say that given classified security briefings and the approach of the recess, Democrats had little choice.

“Everyone who heard the briefings from the administration agreed that the intelligence community did not have what it needed,” said Jim Manley, a spokesman for Senator Harry Reid of Nevada, the majority leader. “Both Democrats and Republicans alike agreed that going home without addressing this issue was not an option.”

And once the Senate left town after approving the Republican proposal making it possible to institute wiretaps without warrants, House members found themselves in the position of either acting or being the last roadblock to the changes sought by the White House.

“We agreed with the administration that there was a problem with FISA that needed to be fixed,” said Brendan Daly, a spokesman for Speaker Nancy Pelosi of California. “We thought we had a bill that protected civil liberties and addressed their problems, but it did not have the votes on its own.”

Still, many House Democrats argued Saturday both in private party meetings and again on the floor that Democrats should either prevent a vote on the Republican proposal or join together to defeat it no matter the political cost. They believed the measure went too far in handing surveillance power to the administration, particularly Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales, without sufficient judicial review.

“We should have stood our ground,” said Representative Jerrold Nadler, Democrat of New York. “We had a bill that did everything they said was necessary for national security. I think we could defend that.”

Progressive bloggers agreed. “Cowards,” said the headline on a post Tuesday on the Daily Kos Web site, which listed the 41 House Democrats and 16 Senate Democrats who sided with the White House and Republicans.

As they dealt with the political fallout, Democrats noted that Congressional aides were already drafting a revision of the bill, which expires in six months. But they also acknowledged that reaching agreement on changes would not be easy.

The A.C.L.U. wants to make sure that Congress and the country have all the information they need for the renewed debate. On Wednesday, the group filed an unusual request with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which operates in near-total secrecy, asking it to make public its recent opinions on the scope of the government’s ability to wiretap Americans.

The executive director of the A.C.L.U., Anthony D. Romero, said, “Unless the FISA court discloses the documents leading up to the recent law and shedding light on the government’s claimed surveillance authority, an informed and meaningful debate — the cornerstone of our democracy — cannot occur.”

Democrats and political analysts said they expected the long-term political consequences of last week’s votes to be minimal because most of those who are irate would not be inclined to back Republicans.

“At the end of the day, how many choices do they have?” asked Stuart Rothenberg, a nonpartisan political analyst, about liberal voters. “How many Democratic primaries are going to be determined by this? Base voters have a way of complaining, being angry, of holding their breath until they turn blue. But I don’t see it as having any real consequence.”

Others say frustration with the party over issues like the surveillance vote is at the heart of the dismal poll ratings for Congress.

Some are already talking about primary challenges for Democrats whom they consider enablers of Mr. Bush, like moderate Blue Dogs who formed the core of Democratic support for the eavesdropping proposal in the House. On the Web site Open Left, the blogger Matt Stoller accused the Blue Dogs of one of their “standard betrayals.”

“The upside,” Mr. Stoller wrote, “is that organizing is beginning already around fixing the FISA legislation, and a campaign to destroy the brand of the Blue Dogs is not far away.”

Eric Lichtblau contributed reporting.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/09/washingt...and&emc=rss

The Iran Attack That Wasn't

How reporters trumped up a story about Iranians killing Americans in Iraq.


Gareth Porter | August 2, 2007 | web only


On July 2 and 3, The New York Times and the Associated Press, among other media outlets, came out with sensational stories saying that either Iranians or Iranian agents had played an important role in planning the operation in Karbala, Iraq last January that resulted in the deaths of five American soldiers. Michael R. Gordon and John F. Burns of The New York Times wrote that "agents of Iran" had been identified by the military spokesman as having "helped plan a January raid in the Shiite holy city of Karbala in Iraq in which five American soldiers were killed by Islamic militants …"

Lee Keath of the Associated Press wrote an even more lurid lead, asserting that U.S. military spokesman Brig. Gen. Kevin Bergner had accused "Iran's elite Quds force" of having "helped militants carry out a January attack in Karbala that killed five Americans."

The story was a big break for the war-with-Iran faction in Washington. Within hours, Sen. Joe Lieberman issued a press release saying that the Iranian government "has declared war on us." That set the stage for the unanimous passage the following week of his amendment stating that "the murder of members of the United States Armed Forces by a foreign government or its agents is an intolerable act of hostility against the United States," and demanding the government of Iran "take immediate action" to end all forms of support it is providing to Iraqi militias and insurgents.

No one questioned the authenticity of the story at the time. But the official source -- Brig. Gen. Bergner -- offered no real evidence of Iranian involvement in planning the January attack in his press briefing on July 2. Even more remarkably, Bergner never even explicitly claimed such direct Iranian involvement in the planning. Instead, he used carefully ambiguous language that implied but did not state such an Iranian role.

It was not Bergner, in fact, but New York Times military reporter Michael Gordon who articulated the narrative of an Iranian-inspired attack on Americans. Gordon, readers may recall, played a key role, along with Judith Miller, in legitimizing a major theme of the Bush administration's Iraq propaganda -- the infamous aluminum tubes argument -- as the White House Iraq Group kicked off its campaign to prepare public opinion for war in September 2002. And in February 2007, Gordon enthusiastically embraced the administration's charge of official Iranian arms exports to Iraq in his coverage of that issue, despite a notable lack of evidence for the charge.

But at the Bergner press briefing on July 2, Gordon went even further in playing the role of transmission belt for the Bush administration line. The transcript of that briefing, obtained from the U.S. military command press desk in Baghdad, shows that when Bergner failed to claim a direct Iranian involvement -- or even through a Hezbollah operative in Iraq -- in the planning of the January raid in Karbala, Gordon pushed him to state clearly that the Iranians not only helped plan but actually "directed" the attack on Americans.

What Bergner said in his prepared statement was that both Hezbollah operative Ali Musa Daqduq, who was in liaison with the militia group which carried out the attack, and Kais Khazali, the Iraqi said to have been in charge of the group -- both of whom had been captured on March 22 -- "state that senior leadership within the Qods Force knew of and supported planning for the eventual Karbala attack …"

Using such indirect language -- "knew of and supported planning" -- is a far cry from claiming actual participation or assistance in planning the attack. Bergner gave no indication of when or how the Iranian Qods Force might have learned about the attack plans, for example, or how much they might have known about them. That vagueness implied that the prisoners had not implicated Iran in the planning of the operation.

Bergner also said Daqduq "contends that the Iraqi special groups could not have conducted this complex operation without the support and direction of the Qods Force." That statement was ambiguous: it could be interpreted as referring to support and direction of the Karbala operation, but if Bergner meant to flatly state that there was such "direction" of the operation from Iran, why would he have attributed such indirect language to the same prisoner?

These statements seem to be a deliberate tease by Bergner, who provided neither complete transcripts of the interrogations nor quotations from the prisoners.

Although Bergner provided a number of details in the briefing about Hezbollah training of Shiite militia groups in Iran, including the number of sites, their location, and the number of militiamen trained at any given time, he did not claim that the specific group in question had been trained by Hezbollah, either in Iran or anywhere else. And he stated that the attack was authorized not by the Hezbollah cadre or by the Qods Force, but by the group's Iraqi chief, Kais Khazali.

Bergner's failure to refer explicitly to an Iranian or Hezbollah role in the actual planning of the attack prompted Gordon to help formulate the story for the spokesman. "What's new here, as I understand it," said Gordon during the briefing, "is that you're asserting the Qods Force and the Iranians had specific knowledge of this attack in advance and helped guide and support it, not merely train the force." He then prodded Bergner to say that the purpose of Iranians was to try to "capture these American soldiers in the hope of trading them for the detained Iraqi officials."

Bergner refrained from addressing Gordon's restatement of the story as Iranian help and guidance of the January attack. Instead he responded to Gordon's thesis about the objective of the Karbala operation, saying, "The specific motivations behind these operations that I described, we're still learning more about that."

Frustrated by Bergner's unwillingness to be specific, Gordon pushed him once again. "But you're asserting essentially that the Qods Force directed and helped plan this attack in Karbala," he insisted.

Bergner responded, "That is what we learned from [K]ais Khazali," and said nothing more on the subject. If Bergner’s earlier failure to use such precise language had been due merely to incompetence, one might have expected him to take advantage of Gordon’s prompting to state the story more forcefully and even elaborate on it. But his use of the indefinite "that" and his failure to volunteer anything further indicate that Bergner was not prepared to be quoted as making an explicit allegation of direct Iranian -- or Hezbollah -- involvement in planning the Karbala raid – even though he did not discourage reporters from writing the story that way.

Another indication that the command had no evidence of Iranian involvement in the attack was the statements of the top commander in Iraq, Gen. David Petraeus, on the issue in an April 26 press briefing. Petraeus had referred to a 22-page memorandum captured with the Shiite prisoners that he said "detailed the planning, preparation, approval process and conduct of the operation that resulted in five of our soldiers being killed in Karbala." But he did not claim that either the document or the interrogation of Khazali had suggested any Iranian or Hezbollah participation in, much less direction of the planning of the Karbala assault.

Later in that briefing, a reporter asked whether Petraeus was "saying that there was evidence of Iranian involvement in that [Karbala] operation?" Petraeus responded, "No. No. No. That -- first of all, that was the operation that you mentioned, and we do not have a direct link to Iranian involvement in that particular case."

At the time Petraeus made this statement, Khazali, the chief of the militia group that had carried out the attack, had been in U.S. custody for more than a month. Despite nearly five weeks of intensive interrogation of Khazali, Petraeus's comments would indicate that U.S. officials had not learned anything that implicated Iran or Hezbollah in the planning or execution of the Karbala attack

The raid on the Karbala Provincial Joint Coordination Center on Jan. 20 was a serious embarrassment for the Bush administration. Some 30 gunmen traveled in a convoy of at least seven SUVs with tinted windows, just like those driven by top U.S. military officials, wearing uniforms similar to those worn by the U.S. military. By flashing fake identification cards, they gained access to the compound through three different checkpoints without a security screening.

Soon after the attack, U.S. officials speculated that it had been carried out by Iranians or "Iranian-trained operatives," arguing that it was "beyond what we have seen militias or foreign fighters do." Officials suggested that the raid -- coming a little over a week after Iranian officials had been seized by U.S. forces in Iraq -- was aimed at exchanging American prisoners for those Iranians. But it was also reported that some officials had concluded that it was an "inside job," which could not have been undertaken without help from someone working within the camp.

The revival of the charge of Iranian involvement in the Karbala attack, despite the earlier Petraeus denial, has the all the hallmarks of a White House decision. The alleged Iranian export of arms to Iraqi Shiites, on which the U.S. command briefed the media in Baghdad in February, reflected the administration's decisions in the preceding months to hold Iran responsible for the killing of U.S. troops in Iraq with armor-piercing explosives. After the replacement of the top commander in Iraq with a general who had pledged to carry out the surge strategy chosen by the White House, and the June arrival of a new U.S. command spokesman in Baghdad -- Gen. Bergner -- who had been special assistant to the president and senior director for Iraq, the command’s briefings were tied more closely to the White House propaganda machine than ever before.

But the success of this media operation also depended on journalists who would fill in the blanks cleverly left open by Bergner with their own imagination. As the transcript of the briefing shows, Michael Gordon was not just a passively recording the line presented by the administration. He was actively pushing the sensational -- and unsubstantiated and highly suspect -- story of "Iranians killing Americans" that would then become a mantra of the war-with-Iran crowd.

Gareth Porter, a historian and journalist, writes regularly on U.S. policy in Iran and Iraq for Inter Press Service. His most recent book is Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam (University of California Press, 2005).
http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?articl...tack_that_wasnt

How Bush Gained the Power To Spy on You Without Security Justifications

Aziz Huq, TheNation.com

Rights and Liberties: The Bush Administration has successfully forced on Congress a law that largely authorizes open-ended surveillance of Americans' overseas phone calls and e-mails. How did they do it?

FACT SHEET: COMBATING TERRORISM WORLDWIDE - (WHITE HOUSE NEWS, AUGUST 6): The White House released the following fact sheet which states, inter alia, that "[a] secure environment is necessary to help the Government of Afghanistan with reconstruction and development. We and our ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] Allies and partners are implementing a comprehensive approach in Afghanistan that integrates stability operations with economic revitalization, the development of infrastructure, better governance, public diplomacy, a sound approach to counter-narcotics, and cooperation with Pakistan."
http://usfederalnews.blogspot.com/2007/08/...-terrorism.html


GENERAL JAMES MATTIS - ATTACKING THE AL QAEDA "NARRATIVE" - JIM GUIRARD (SMALL WARS JOURNAL, AUGUST 7): In public statements and in several Small Wars Journal postings, Dr. Dave Kilcullen of General David Petraeus' senior staff in Baghdad entered very slowly, very prudently into the virtually verboten realm of attacking al Qaeda-style Terrorism in Islamic religious context, rather than in Western secular terms. But even these measured Kilcullen attacks on the terrorists' religious legitimacy were in conflict with the State Department's basic rule in such matters. As stated on page 25 of the US National Startegy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication, the official advisory is, in part, as follows: Use caution when dealing with faith issues. Government officials should be extremely cautious and, if possible, avoid using religious language, because it can mean different things and can be easily misunderstood...
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/08/g...ttis-attacking/
VIA
http://mountainrunner.us/2007/08/read_atta...lqaeda_nar.html

BOOKS: WHY DO THEY HATE US? STRANGE ANSWERS LIE IN AL-QAIDA'S WRITINGS - REZA ASLAN (SLATE, AUGUST 6): It seems the president of the United States talks more about al-Qaida's goals than al-Qaida itself does. Rarely, if ever, do Bin Laden and Zawahiri discuss any specific social or political policy. What al-Qaida does lay out, however, are grievances, a means of weaving local and global resentments into a single anti-American narrative, the overarching aim of which is to form a collective identity across borders and nationalities, and to convince the world that it is locked in a cosmic contest between the forces of Truth and Falsehood, Belief and Unbelief, Good and Evil, Us and Them.
http://www.slate.com/id/2171752/nav/tap1/

FIGHTING TERRORISTS REQUIRES UNDERSTANDING THEIR CONCEPT OF TIME: THE STRUGGLE AGAINST TERRORISM CAN BE IMPROVED ONLY WHEN THE PARTICULAR ISLAMIST VISION OF TIME IS FIRST RECOGNIZED, THEN CHALLENGED AND TRANSFORMED - LOUIS RENÉ BERES (CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, AUGUST 8): Before we can win the war on terror, the jihadist terrorists will first need to be convinced that they are not now living in profane time, and that every intended act of sacrificial killing would represent an authentic betrayal of Islam. The great majority of Islamic clergy all over the world may already accept this salutary view, however silently. We must now urge them to speak up -- to call extremists back from the brink.
http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0808/p09s01-coop.html

WHY TERRORISTS AREN'T SOLDIERS - WESLEY K. CLARK AND KAL RAUSTIALA (NEW YORK TIMES, AUGUST 8): The line between soldier and civilian has long been central to the law of war. Today that line is being blurred in the struggle against transnational terrorists. Since 9/11 the Bush administration has sought to categorize members of Al Qaeda and other jihadists as 'unlawful combatants' rather than treat them as criminals.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/08/opinion/...agewanted=print

KILL OR CONVERT, BROUGHT TO YOU BY THE PENTAGON - MAX BLUMENTHAL (NATION, AUGUST 8/COMMON DREAMS): Operation Straight Up (OSU) is an evangelical entertainment troupe that actively proselytizes among active-duty members of the US military. As an official arm of the Defense Department's America Supports You program, OSU plans to mail copies of the controversial apocalyptic video game, Left Behind: Eternal Forces to soldiers serving in Iraq.
http://www.commondreams.org/archive/2007/08/07/3045/

TOURISTS AND INVESTORS TO IRAQ? WHY NOT, SAY KURDS REUTERS (NEW YORK TIMES, AUGUST 7): The Kurds' main argument to persuade foreigners to visit and invest is security: there is no other place in Iraq where a foreigner can shop in local markets or walk the streets without fear of being killed or kidnapped.
http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/world/inter...agewanted=print

DESPERATE IRAQIS FLEE COUNTRY - JAMES PALMER (WASHINGTON TIMES, AUGUST 8): More than 2 million Iraqis are estimated to have left the country in the more than four years since the fall of dictator Saddam Hussein.
http://www.washingtontimes.com/apps/pbcs.d.../108080082/1001

TRIBAL CONNECTIONS: HOW COURTING SHEIKS SLOWED VIOLENCE IN IRAQ; MARINES TRY PAYMENTS, ALLIANCES IN ANBAR AREA; CHASING OUT AL QAEDA - GREG JAFFE (WALL STREET JOURNAL, AUGUST 8): The success in Anbar Province, which lies west of Baghdad, hasn't come easily. The key to the U.S. campaign has been recruiting, cultivating, and rewarding tribal leaders. But as remarkable as the turnaround here has been, it isn't clear how broad or lasting the gains will be.
http://online.wsj.com/article_print/SB1186...6614491198.html
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IN THE MIDDLE OF A CIVIL WAR - GIAN P. GENTILE (WASHINGTON POST, AUGUST 7): The nature of the violence in Iraq is civil war.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...id=opinionsbox1

THE MYTH OF MISTRUST: THE US BEMOANS THE LACK OF TRUST BETWEEN IRAQ'S SUNNIS AND SHIAS, WHICH ONLY SERVES TO HEIGHTEN THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THEIR OWN POLICY IN THE REGION - DILIP HIRO (GUARDIAN, AUGUST 8/COMMON DREAMS)
http://www.commondreams.org/archive/2007/08/07/3054/

A NEW TUNE: ANALYSTS SEE PROGRESS IN IRAQ ? EDITORIAL (CHICAGO TRIBUNE, AUGUST 5): There is enough good happening on the battlefields of Iraq today that Congress should plan on sustaining the effort at least into 2008.
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion...0,3723221.story

THE TENUOUS CASE FOR STRATEGIC PATIENCE IN IRAQ: A TRIP REPORT ANTHONY CORDESMAN (CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL & STRATEGIC STUDIES, AUGUST 6): The U.S. also now has a country team in Iraq that is far more capable than in the past, and which may be able to develop and implement the kind of cohesive plans for US action in Iraq that have been weak or lacking to date. If that team can come forward with solid plans for an integrated approach to a sustained US effort to deal with Iraq's plans and risks, there would be a far stronger and more bipartisan case for strategic patience.
http://www.csis.org/index.php?option=com_c...iew&id=3994
SEE ALSO
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/...option-in-iraq/

ANALYSIS: MILITARY SHOWS GAINS IN IRAQ - ROBERT BURNS, AP (BREIBART.COM, AUGUST 6): Magic is what it may take to turn US military gains in Iraq into the strategy's ultimate goal: a political process that moves Iraq's rival Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds from the brink of civil war to the threshold of peace --- and to get there on a timetable that takes account of growing war fatigue in the United States.
http://www.breitbart.com/print.php?id=D8QR...;show_article=1

ARMY OF ONE: THE OVERHYPING OF DAVID PETRAEUS - ANDREW J. BACEVICH (NEW REPUBLIC, AUGUST 7): In June, General Petraeus issued to all members of his command in Iraq his personal "Counterinsurgency Guidance"-- ten key points to guide their actions. In point nine in this decalogue, the commander charges his troops to "Be first with the truth." The guidance is something that Petraeus himself should take to heart. For the truth is that the time to implement the strategy that he has devised does not exist.
http://www.tnr.com/docprint.mhtml?i=200708...=bacevich080607

IRAQ'S HALL OF MIRRORS: BRITAIN AND US ARE MAINTAINING POSITIVE ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE SITUATION IN IRAQ, BUT THE UNVARNISHED TRUTH IS LESS COMFORTABLE - SIMON TISDALL (GUARDIAN, AUGUST 8/COMMON DREAMS): Iraq existed, unsteadily, warts and all, under Saddam Hussein. But now it is disintegrating before our eyes. It may reconstitute itself in time. But the old construct is dead, destroyed by shock and awe and four years of mind-boggling Bushian incompetence.
http://www.commondreams.org/archive/2007/08/07/3048/

A SURGE OF PHONY SPIN ON IRAQ: BUSH'S BACKERS ARE PEDDLING A SUNNY VIEW OF THE PRESIDENT'S STRATEGY -- DESPITE IRAQ'S POLITICAL CHAOS AND SOARING DEATH COUNTS - JUAN COLE (SALON, AUGUST 7)
http://www.salon.com/opinion/feature/2007/...urge/print.html

WHY THE SURGE HAS FAILED: EVEN IN BAGHDAD, VERY LITTLE HAS CHANGED - PATRICK COCKBURN (COUNTERPUNCH, AUGUST 7): The surge is now joining a host of discredited formulae for success and fake turning points that the US has promoted in Iraq over the last 52 months. US commanders are often cheery believers in their own propaganda even as the ground is giving way beneath their feet.
http://www.counterpunch.org/patrick08072007.html

IRAQI LEGISLATORS CAN'T TAKE THE HEAT - CYNTHIA TUCKER (AUGUST 6, BALTIMORESUN.COM): If the United States withdraws its troops, the Iraqis may tire of the bloodletting. Or maybe they won't. Either way, it's time to start bringing our soldiers and Marines home.
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/o...0,1706499.story

THE REAL DEBATE ABOUT IRAQ IS BETWEEN REAL, FAKE WAR FOES - IRA CHERNUS (DAILY CAMERA, AUGUST 5): The only way to stanch the loss of American blood is to end the war -- really, genuinely, completely.
http://www.dailycamera.com/news/2007/aug/0...ween-real-fake/

THE FOREIGN POLICY COMMUNITY - GLENN GREENWALD (SALON, AUGUST 8): The Foreign Policy Community -- our establishment "scholars" -- were almost unanimously supportive of George Bush's invasion, worked themselves into a lather over Saddam's WMDs and mushroom clouds over U.S. cities, stayed silent in the face of obvious Bush abuses and excesses, embraced the most manipulative and fictitious neoconservative doctrines, and they still continuously issue all sorts of theoretical constructs to justify America's increasingly militaristic and imperial role.
http://www.salon.com/opinion/greenwald/?la...7/08/08/powers/

MIDEAST TWO-STEP ? EDITORIAL (BALTIMORESUN.COM, AUGUST 8): If Mr. Bush wants to be remembered for something other than the dissolution of Iraq, an independent Palestinian state and a secure Israel would be a worthy challenge for a lame-duck president. He has nothing to lose.
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/e...0,2743687.story

WORKING-CLASS FIGHT: SOLIDARITY WITH IRANIANS - MICHAEL LEDEEN (NATIONAL REVIEW, AUGUST 8): If the West had the courage of its past convictions, every leader would denounce the terror in Iran, and every trade unionist would be shouting in front of Iranian embassies.
http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=NTFmM...Tc3OGNhZjVlYTI=

THE UNITED STATES AND 'REGIME CHANGE' IN IRAN - STEPHEN ZUNES (FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS, AUGUST 8/COMMON DREAMS): The dilemma for U.S. policy-makers is this: the most realistic way to overthrow the Iranian regime is through a process the United States cannot control. Freedom will some day come to Iran. When it does, however, it will be in spite of-rather than because of-the policies of the United States.
http://www.commondreams.org/archive/2007/08/07/3049/

KERNEL OF EVIL - BRET STEPHENS (OPINION JOURNAL FROM THE WALL STREET JOURNAL EDITORIAL PAGE, AUGUST 7): If containment is what the U.S. wants, Saudi F-15s will not be of much use against an Iranian bomb. But those fighters might ultimately find their use against Iraq's Shiite-led democratic government, whose air force consists mainly of junkyard Warsaw Pact equipment.
http://www.opinionjournal.com/columnists/b...s/?id=110010436

WHY SAUDI ARABIA? WHY NOW? - COL. DANIEL SMITH (FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS, AUGUST 7/COMMON DREAMS): The irony of the Bush administration's arms deal with Saudi Arabia is that George Bush started the Iraq war over weapons that never existed. Now his administration seems to think the way to end the war is to make sure that there are more weapons -- ones that kill thousands every day. Go figure!
http://www.commondreams.org/archive/2007/08/07/3016/

US TURKISH RELATIONS: RADIANT FUTURE OR DARK DAYS AHEAD? - PATRICIA KUSHLIS (WHIRLED VIEW, AUGUST 6): Change US policies, change our fearless leader and expect better relations with the Turkish government and improvement in Turkish anti-American poll numbers.
http://whirledview.typepad.com/whirledview...d-the-us-c.html

ARMING THE MIDDLE EAST: THE CHECKERED HISTORY OF AMERICAN WEAPONS DEALS - SIEGESMUND VON ILSEMANN (SPIEGEL INTERNATIONAL, AUGUST 6): The United States has upset its European allies with plans for a massive arms deal with several governments in the Middle East. Washington has been down this road before.
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/...-498421,00.html

AMERICAN GENOCIDE IN THE MIDDLE EAST: THREE MILLION AND COUNTING - DAVID GOODNER (COMMON DREAMS, AUGUST 8): The US caused death count in the Middle East is over three million people, and that?s not even counting fatalities in Afghanistan or Palestine.
http://www.commondreams.org/archive/2007/08/07/3059/

RUNNING OUT OF TIME, PATIENCE IN AFGHANISTAN - KARL F. INDERFURTH (BOSTON GLOBE, AUGUST 8): The battle for Afghan "hearts and minds" is in danger of being lost because of rising civilian casualties and war damage.
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial...anistan?mode=PF

THE BUSH AND KARZAI SHOW: CONTRADICTIONS, AND MORE QUESTIONS THAN ANSWERS EDWARD M. GOMEZ (WORLD VIEWS, SF GATE, AUGUST 7)
http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/blogs/sfgate/det...;entry_id=19234

POST-SOVIET MODERNITY - ROB SOBHANI (WASHINGTON TIMES, AUGUST 8): There are naive observers in Washington who argue that we ought to strike a "grand bargain" with the mullahs in Tehran, but, after spending an hour with the reformist president of this secular Muslim country, it is clear that Washington would do far better to enter into a long-term strategic "grand bargain" with Azerbaijan.
http://www.washingtontimes.com/apps/pbcs.d...mplate=printart

ANOTHER KOSOVO CRISIS? - MATTHEW KAMINSKI (WALL STREET JOURNAL, AUGUST 8): Unless the U.S. forcefully steps in to usher Kosovo to independence without any messy compromises, Southeast Europe could fall off track again, with nasty repercussions for everyone.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1186526568...days_us_opinion
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ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION IS OUR BEST FOREIGN AID PROGRAM - GREGORY CLARK (BALTIMORESUN.COM, AUGUST 6)
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/o...,0,983437.story

THE UNSEEN LIES: JOURNALISM AS PROPAGANDA JOHN PILGER (DEMOCRACYNOW.ORG, AUGUST 8/COMMON DREAMS): From right to left, secular to God-fearing, what so few people know is that in the last half century, United States administrations have overthrown 50 governments -- many of them democracies. In the process, thirty countries have been attacked and bombed, with the loss of countless lives. So what should we do? Real information, subversive information, remains the most potent power of all.
http://www.commondreams.org/archive/2007/08/07/3056/

THE TERROR AMERICA WROUGHT - ROBERT SCHEER (TRUTHDIG, AUGUST8/COMMON DREAMS): The U.S. played midwife to the birth of the nuclear monster, the ultimate terrorist weapon that presents a continuing and growing threat to the survival of human life on Earth.
http://www.commondreams.org/archive/2007/08/07/3043/

bitterlemons-international.org Middle East Roundtable

Edition 31 Volume 5 - August 09, 2007



Afghanistan and the Middle East • Kabul comes to Madison Avenue - Mark Perry

Why is it that Afghanistan is beginning to look a lot like Lebanon and Palestine, where national leaders are losing the support of their own people? • Afghanistan's lessons for Palestine - Waleed Sadi

Ever since the defeat of the Soviet Union, the Palestinian case has taken a turn for the unknown. • An endless war - Jasjit Singh

We may be on the threshold of the further spread of religious extremism and terrorism emanating from Pakistan-Afghanistan. • A pawn in Iran's nuclear ambitions? - Amin Tarzi

Iran's actions in Afghanistan give Tehran an advantage in its efforts to safeguard the regime and its aspirations.



Kabul comes to Madison Avenue
Mark Perry

It is August in America and so baseball, that greatest of all American games, has once again become the national obsession. Are hundreds dying in Iraq? Is Pakistan in chaos? Too bad: there's a home run record to be broken and a pennant race to be won. Still, the game has its uses, including the provision of tiresome political metaphors. George Herman "Babe" Ruth (for instance) was the greatest of all baseball players, but you would not have guessed it: he was overweight, out-of-shape and tipped forward when he ran. He regularly came to a game hung over, or worse, and no one would have confused him with a jogger. But he defined the game, was the "sultan of swat" and now every home run is either "Ruthian" or (more likely) not. How odd: Babe Ruth didn't look like a baseball player.

Hamid Karzai, on the other hand, is the anti-Ruth: he's our kind of Muslim. That is to say: he looks like a national leader and he's a knock- out in that funky Afghan coat. When Karzai became Afghanistan's leader in 2002 and presented himself at the UN, America was all agog at his sporting image: "People are watching Hamid Karzai," a prominent CNN news report said at the time. "He's the interim leader of a headline-grabbing nation and he looks good, at least that's the word on the street. Regal, chisel- cheeked and bronzed, Karzai captures gazes donned in his distinctive dress. The furry hats and five-foot-long sleeves led one fashion aficionado to label his look 'Karzai chic'." Tom Ford, the Gucci label's public relations whiz, called him "very elegant and very proud", while a Washington commentator said that it helped that he looked like Ben Kingsley, Hollywood's choice for the lead role in "Gandhi".

Of course, the question is not how Karzai looks in his Nehru coat, but whether he can "hit the long ball". In Karzai's case, that judgment seemed to come early. Just months after his first high-profile stroll down Madison Avenue, Council on Foreign Relations analysts Arthur Helton and Jennifer Whitaker were writing that "with his phalanx of American guards", Karzai looked a lot less like Ben Kingsley and a lot more like "the warlord of Kabul". One year later, American foreign policy analysts were already assessing his possible failure--the more he visited Washington, the easier it was for the Taliban "to make him look like just another western puppet". Now, with his latest visit to Washington, we've decided Karzai is everything we don't want him to be--a virtual prisoner of Kabul who is presiding over a failed nation--a model for those in the region viewed as American puppets: there's a "Lebanese Karzai" and a "Palestinian Karzai" and if Nouri al-Maliki weren't "an agent of Iran" (as noted television commentator Wolf Blitzer recently said) he'd probably be branded "an Iraqi Karzai".

To suppose that Americans care only about image, or really believe that perception is reality (after all, we glorified the lumpy Ruth having watched him swing the bat), is something of an exaggeration. But there is some truth in the claim: we caricature our enemies until they become our friends. The examples are legion: Yasser Arafat was "a man of peace" during the Clinton years, but "a serial liar" during the Bush years; Madeleine Albright once laughingly described her disgust at being kissed by him (though she had no trouble with his peck so long as he shook Yitzhak Rabin's hand). So too now, the once "chisel-cheeked and bronzed" Hamid Karzai is described as "haggard" and "showing his age". The mistake here is not simply that we caricature our enemies, but that we misperceive our own influence. The weakness we see in Karzai is the result of our inability to understand that legitimacy cannot be conferred, but must be earned.

So it is that Hamid Karzai's most recent visit to Washington was occasion for some unusual soul-searching among political commentators and foreign policy analysts. How is it that "this good man" has failed to gain the support of his people, while his enemies seem suddenly everywhere present? Why is it that Afghanistan is beginning to look a lot like Lebanon and Palestine, where national leaders, strongly supported by the United States, are losing the support of their own people? The sobering truth, as we in America (and in the West) are now beginning to understand, is that the two are not unrelated and that therefore it's time for us to face a simple if uncomfortable fact: that the people of Afghanistan (and so too people throughout the region) do not look on Islamist movements as representing fringe political currents bent on plunging their societies into a new dark age, or the leaders of these movements as religious fanatics who must be confronted at all costs. Nor do they look on us (we heavily armed Americans and our coalition of willing allies) as only temporary and indifferent visitors in their countries, intent on carrying the light of liberty into the dark corners of their world. Rather, we are viewed as an alien and unwanted presence, while those who support us are condemned as collaborators, as "Karzai's".- Published 9/8/2007 © bitterlemons-international.org

Mark Perry is co-director of Conflicts Forum and is based in Washington.

Afghanistan's lessons for Palestine
Waleed SadiThe search for a solution to the Palestinian question has been complicated by regional Arab rivalries ever since the genesis of the crisis during the British mandate over the country. This inter-Arab complication took a new turn when British rule was about to end in 1948 and the United Nations stepped in and adopted a series of non-binding UN General Assembly resolutions calling inter alia for the partition of the country into two states, one Arab and the other Jewish.

Since then, the major international powers, especially those occupying permanent seats at the UN Security Council, competed with each other through the United Nations to exert influence on the issue to further their own economic and geopolitical interests in the Middle East. This regional and international order of affairs for the Palestinian problem stayed almost static until the Cold War ended in 1990 and the communist order in the former Soviet Union and its satellite countries in East Europe suddenly collapsed.

The end of the former Soviet empire coincided of course with the forced withdrawal of the Soviet army from Afghanistan where it was dealt a devastating military defeat at the hands of relatively few Afghani insurgents supported by Arab and Muslim fighters from the Middle East and beyond. We all know by now that the defeat of the Soviet army at the hands of Afghani Islamists was made possible by both direct US military assistance and Saudi financial, political and military support. It was in Afghanistan that Osama Bin Laden founded his now infamous al-Qaeda organization ostensibly to drive out the communists from Afghanistan and weaken the Soviet empire by literally bleeding it to death on Afghan soil. Indeed, Washington marveled at the idea of having the mighty Soviet Union mauled by a "primitive militant" force.

Ever since that defeat of the Soviet Union both in Afghanistan and by dint of US military spending, the Palestinian case has taken a turn for the unknown. The change for the Palestinians was due in part at least to the added complications stemming from the injection of additional players into the Palestinian theatre and other regional fronts in the Middle East.

Al-Qaeda has been busy extending its clout and presence throughout the Middle East, including on the Palestinian scene, ever since its triumph in Afghanistan. Striking the deathblow to the Soviet army in Afghanistan was a huge victory for Bin Laden and his supporters and not just in military terms. It gave al-Qaeda the strength and conviction that the same tactic could be applied to the US and Israel. It is indeed, as has often been noted, ironic that Bin Laden's victory over Moscow was aided and abetted by Washington. Supporters of Bin Laden's stream of Islamism and the US army now face each other in Iraq in a much more even fight than it should be on paper.

Although there is no direct link between al-Qaeda and Hamas, there is little doubt that the hardline stance of al-Qaeda with regard to Israel and its principal ally Washington has succeeded in fueling similar postures within the Palestinian ranks. The Palestinians have over the past decades become gradually more self-confident, resilient and assertive when it comes to their national rights and aspirations and this is partly due to the successes achieved by small militant Islamic forces around the world. Palestinians have crossed the threshold of fear that had paralyzed them into submission throughout the three decades before and after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.

This increased Palestinian self-confidence in their ability to force Israel to withdraw from all occupied territories coincided with the rise of Islamic "power" in Afghanistan and its spread to other countries in the region. No doubt the Palestinians drew comfort from the ability of hitherto unknown militant Islamist factions to become a "power" that many countries including the world's remaining superpower now fear. This growing article of faith in the ability of small militant Islamist groups to wage wars against mighty nations and win, as indeed had happened in Afghanistan and is happening in Iraq, has instilled a conviction among Palestinians that they too can become a "force" to be reckoned with and therefore succeed in extracting from Israel major territorial concessions sooner rather than later. No wonder Hamas in particular seeks to drive a hard bargain with Israel and covets the liberation of the entire territory of former Palestine.

Hamas and its supporters believe that history is on their side and that as long as they stand steadfast they will surely recreate a new Palestine on all the territory of former Palestine. What we are witnessing therefore is a dramatic metamorphosis in the national Palestinian psyche triggered by a cycle of events and developments that started right in the heartland of Afghanistan..- Published 9/8/2007 © bitterlemons- international.org

Waleed Sadi is a former Jordanian ambassador to Turkey and the UN and other international organizations in Geneva. He is currently a columnist for the Jordan Times and Al Rai newspapers.

An endless war
Jasjit SinghIn a few weeks, the war in Afghanistan by one count will be six years old. By another, it has been going on for more than three decades. This war has made Afghanistan (especially its south-eastern region, along with western Pakistan) the epicenter of global Islamist-jihadi terrorism.

The war during the 1980s, directed, funded and waged for geopolitical reasons through irregular fighters often proudly praised as "Mujahideen", led to three significant influences: the propagation of irregular sub- conventional war through terrorism in the name of religion, a phenomenal spread and diffusion of military-specification sophisticated weapons to the jihadi groups, and important perceptions of the outcome of that war.

All these are dominant templates in the current war in Afghanistan, though at an enormously expanded scale that undermines security and stability in the Middle East and beyond. Perhaps the most difficult to deal with, with ramifications for the impact on the ongoing war in Afghanistan (and Iraq), are the perceptions of victory and defeat. The Soviet Union pulled out after a decade in a fairly organized manner, leaving behind a well- entrenched Afghan regime with a capable military force that successfully defended its outposts for years. But across the world, especially among Muslim populations, the perception rapidly grew that the jihad waged by Afghan Mujahideen had "defeated" a superpower and its surrogate regime in Afghanistan.

Radical jihadi terrorism erupted from the Balkans through Kashmir to the Philippines. An even more radical Taliban was created to unseat the Mujahideen regime in Kabul. The 1993 terrorist bombing of the World Trade Center in New York and other acts of Islamist terrorism were but some of the tragic consequences. Religious terrorism itself became an instrument of policy for many, promoted and propagated by an increasingly fundamentalist army in Pakistan that invoked holy scripture to legitimize terrorism after including "jihad" in its motto.

Unfortunately, despite its enormous military acumen and capability NATO has not, even after six years, succeeded in ensuring peace and security in Afghanistan. If anything, the Taliban show deeply disturbing signs of resurgence; Waziristan in West Pakistan appears to be slipping out of Islamabad's control (which was tenuous at the best of times). The political goals and military objectives of the global war against terrorism, whether achievable or not, appear to be increasingly irrelevant. The failure of NATO to achieve a recognizable "victory" over radical terrorist forces will have far reaching consequences for the region from the Mediterranean in the west to the South China Sea in the east, especially when this happens to coincide with the inability of the sole superpower, even after four years, to win the peace in Iraq.

There are already signs of a replay of the post-Soviet development of Islamic militancy and jihad now that it is clear that NATO (and the US) are unlikely to win the war on terrorism. Hizballah's semi-conventional war last year raining thousands of short-range rockets on the Israeli population is a recent example--in spite of the brilliant performance of the Israel Air Force.

Meanwhile, America's withdrawal of the bulk of its military forces from an Iraq on fire can only add to the two-decade old belief that Islamic militancy and jihad can defeat even a superpower. Pakistan, which has been playing a major role in the war in Afghanistan, contributing to its radicalization and militancy, is itself facing a defining point in its turbulent history. A weakened army regime, the forthcoming elections and a patchwork democracy that leaves the army (and its intelligence agencies) free to wield influence though not accountable for the further growth of terrorism will provide more space for expansion of Taliban and jihadi influence in Pakistan in the coming years.

We need a stable and non-radical Afghanistan if growth of global terrorism is to be reversed. This requires careful crafting and sustained policies to encourage moderate, albeit tribal cultures. The time may have come for a fundamental shift in strategy in Afghanistan from trying to defeat al- Qaeda to containing the Taliban and insulating the badlands from the rest of the country. But even this cannot be done without the full participation of Islamabad on one side and the cooperation of Iran on the other. Current trends read against the backdrop of past lessons indicate that both will be more difficult as time goes by. The US-Iran confrontation on nuclear issues has helped the hardliners in Tehran to move toward assertive chauvinism. As for Pakistan, a civil political government with little actual power would find it more difficult to curb religious extremism, as indeed was the case through the 1990s.

We may be on the threshold of the further spread of religious extremism and terrorism emanating from Pakistan-Afghanistan.- Published 9/8/2007 © bitterlemons-international.org

Jasjit Singh is director, Centre for Strategic & International Studies, New Delhi.

<a name="784">A pawn in Iran's nuclear ambitions?
Amin TarziThe guardians of the Islamic republican system in Iran are continuing their longstanding quest to ensure the existence of Iran's clerical regime. To eliminate potential existential threats, these guardians have gradually entered yet another arena in which to confront their adversaries: Afghanistan. While Iran has played a positive role in increasing Afghanistan's economic and political development, its underhanded and multidimensional meddling in Afghanistan's internal affairs is increasing. A brief look at key recent events provides insight into the motivations behind the Islamic Republic's current support, as well as the unspoken threat of further support, for the myriad insurgent groups--the neo-Taliban--opposing the current state of affairs in Afghanistan.

The appearance of traceable sophisticated weapons and Iranian-produced assault rifles, mortars and plastic explosives in Afghanistan provides evidence of Iran's direct support to the neo-Taliban. Until recently, the explosively-formed penetrators (EFPs) had primarily been seen in Iraq. These weapons, capable of piercing armor, are now being used against NATO forces in Afghanistan, compliments of Iran. If Iran did not want its involvement known it could have supplied untraceable weapons. The introduction of marked weapons into the Afghan theater was purposeful, sending a message of Iran's ability to destabilize western Afghanistan.

Reports of territorial violations also began surfacing earlier this year. Afghan officials accuse their western neighbor of repeatedly violating Afghan airspace as well as of conducting armed incursions into Afghan territory. Furthermore, a former Afghan provincial governor alleges that the Islamic Republic has been hosting a training camp, identified as Shamsabad, for opponents of the Afghan government. These infringements on Afghan sovereignty challenge the efficacy of the central authority in Kabul and its international backers.

These two examples provide insight into the hold Iran has over Afghanistan and why it has sought this position of influence. While most consider Pakistan to be Afghanistan's most troublesome neighbor, one would be remiss if Iran did not enter into the equation. Amid persistent claims of Pakistan's fingerprints all over the neo-Taliban, Afghan President Hamid Karzai could hardly afford another blow to his central authority. Yet Iran, the "exemplary" neighbor, removed any subtlety in its message to both the Karzai administration and the international community by revealing its hand in arms shipments and territorial violations. Although Iran has publicly denied all allegations and lamented the "unfortunate" resurgence of the Taliban, it knows the value of its actions.

One must remember that Iran's hold on Afghanistan is much stronger than Pakistan's. Iran has infiltrated much of the current power structure. In the 1980s, Iran cultivated strong political and military alliances with several fronts inside Afghanistan as well as with Afghan resistance groups based in Iran and Pakistan. Some of Iran's key Afghan assets hold principal posts in Karzai's administration, Afghanistan's parliament and the intelligence community. Because of this, Iran is capable of exerting pressure when it suits its needs.

The expulsion of approximately 100,000 Afghan refugees from Iran is an example of Iran's ability to apply political pressure. Iran claimed that it had the legal right to expel what it considered illegal refugees. This triggered a humanitarian nightmare for Afghanistan and prompted the parliament to sack two of Karzai's loyal cabinet ministers. After Karzai requested leniency, the Iranian authorities agreed to slow down repatriation efforts.

The refugee expulsion gave Iran three advantages. First, Tehran was able to demonstrate to Kabul that it can wreak havoc within reasonably legal grounds if it so desires; second, Iran was able to portray the refugee crisis as reflecting the inadequacy of western-sponsored democracy in Afghanistan. And third and perhaps most dangerous in tactical calculations, Iran may have slipped any number of its own agents into the throngs of returning refugees. These refugees lacked identity papers because, as some Afghan refugees have claimed, the Iranian authorities ripped up their documents even though some had identity cards that allowed them to stay in Iran legally. The sea of refugees without identity cards constituted the perfect cover for Iranian agents to penetrate into Afghanistan.

Iran's actions in Afghanistan appear to be part of a calculated plan to give Tehran an advantage in its efforts to safeguard the regime and its aspirations. As international pressure has mounted against the regime's nuclear ambitions, Iran has ramped up its campaign in Afghanistan, selecting a strange bedfellow--the staunchly Sunni neo-Taliban. Yet Shi'ite Iran has frequently established political alliances based on expediency. Consider its relationships with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Ahmad Shah Mas'ud. These have proved useful in Iran's efforts to control its environment.

The airspace violations, dispatch of traceable light weapons and EPFs to the neo-Taliban and possible presence of covert agents inside Afghanistan are further reminders to NATO and other international forces stationed in Afghanistan of Iran's ability to create instability. If Iran's nuclear facilities are attacked or if the country is brought under severe economic and political pressure because of its nuclear activities or other misdeeds, Iran can and will make life difficult for the foreign forces in Afghanistan.

In Iran's calculation, the current regime's security rests in having a nuclear capability. Until that time, Tehran has created pressure points to dissuade western powers, especially the United States, and other perceived enemies from challenging the authority of the regime. Iran is using Afghanistan to showcase its might and its ability to create a scenario worse than Iraq for the US and others. If we are not careful, Afghanistan may once again find itself the pawn in a "great game".- Published 9/8/2007 © bitterlemons-international.org

Dr. Amin Tarzi is director, Middle East Studies, Marine Corps University, Quantico, Virginia. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the individual author and do not necessarily represent the views of either the Marine Corps University or any other governmental agency. References to this paper should include the foregoing statement.





Bitterlemons-international.org is an internet forum for an array of world perspectives on the Middle East and its specific concerns. It aspires to engender greater understanding about the Middle East region and open a new common space for world thinkers and political leaders to present their viewpoints and initiatives on the region. Editors Ghassan Khatib and Yossi Alpher can be reached at ghassan@bitterlemons-international.org and yossi@bitterlemons- international.org, respectively.

---------------------------------------------------------------------- ----

The crisis under the ice
By Jeremy Rifkin
Global warming enabled Russia's Arctic land grab, and now it could get worse.
http://email.latimes.com/cgi-bin1/DM/y/eBV...Io30G2B0IpSq0Ef

FOIA PERFORMANCE IS DETERIORATING, JOURNALISTS SAY

If the Leahy-Cornyn bill to strengthen the Freedom of Information Act
that was adopted in the Senate last week becomes law, as expected, it
will not happen a moment too soon, because current government handling
of FOIA requests is deteriorating, according to a new analysis from the
Coalition of Journalists for Open Government (www.cjog.net).

"Over the past nine years, the number of FOIA requests processed has
fallen 20%, the number of FOIA personnel is down 10%, the backlog [of
pending requests] has tripled, and costs of handling a request are up
79%," the CJOG study reported.

In fact, "the cost of processing FOIA requests is up 40% since 1998,
even though agencies are processing 20% fewer requests."

Productivity of FOIA requests has dropped in other respects as well.

"The number of denials [of FOIA requests] increased 10% in 2006 and the
number of full grants, in which the requester got all the information
sought, hit an all-time low."

See "Still Waiting After All These Years: An in-depth analysis of FOIA
performance from 1998 to 2006," principally authored by Pete Weitzel,
Coalition of Journalists for Open Government, August 8, 2007:

http://www.cjog.net/documents/Still_Waitin..._and_Charts.pdf


ACLU SEEKS FOREIGN INTEL SURVEILLANCE COURT RECORDS

The American Civil Liberties Union filed an unusual motion with the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court this week seeking public
disclosure of recent Court orders interpreting the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA), the law that regulates warrantless surveillance
within the United States.

"Over the next six months, Congress and the public will debate the
wisdom and necessity of permanently expanding the executive's authority
to conduct intrusive forms of surveillance without judicial oversight,"
the ACLU motion stated, referring to the debate over the recent
amendments to the FISA that will sunset in six months if they are not
renewed.

"Unless this Court releases the sealed materials, this debate will take
place in a vacuum."

"Publication of the sealed materials would assist the public in
evaluating the significance of recent amendments to FISA and
determining for itself whether those amendments should be made
permanent," the ACLU argued.

A copy of the August 8 ACLU Motion for Release of Court Records is
posted here:

http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/aclu080807.pdf

An ACLU press release on the motion is here:

http://www.aclu.org/safefree/spying/31227prs20070808.html

The ACLU motion admitted that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court's docket "consists mainly of material that is properly
classified." However, it noted, "on at least two occasions in the
past, this Court has recognized the public interest in the Court's
[activities] and has accordingly published its rulings."

"Disclosure of the sealed materials, with redactions to protect
information that is properly classified, would be consistent with the
Court's past practice and procedural rules," the ACLU said.

The Great Middle East Peace Process Scam


Henry Siegman

When Ehud Olmert and George W. Bush met at the White House in June, they
concluded that Hamas's violent ousting of Fatah from Gaza – which
brought down the Palestinian national unity government brokered by the
Saudis in Mecca in March – had presented the world with a new 'window of
opportunity'. [*]
< http://www.lrb.co.uk/v29/n16/print/sieg01_.html#footnotes> (Never has a
failed peace process enjoyed so many windows of opportunity.) Hamas's
isolation in Gaza, Olmert and Bush agreed, would allow them to grant
generous concessions to the Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, giving
him the credibility he needed with the Palestinian people in order to
prevail over Hamas.

Both Bush and Olmert have spoken endlessly of their commitment to a
two-state solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict, but it is their
determination to bring down Hamas rather than to build up a Palestinian
state that animates their new-found enthusiasm for making Abbas look
good. That is why their expectation that Hamas will be defeated is
illusory. Palestinian moderates will never prevail over those considered
extremists, since what defines moderation for Olmert is Palestinian
acquiescence in Israel's dismemberment of Palestinian territory. In the
end, what Olmert and his government are prepared to offer Palestinians
will be rejected by Abbas no less than by Hamas, and will only confirm
to Palestinians the futility of Abbas's moderation and justify its
rejection by Hamas. Equally illusory are Bush's expectations of what
will be achieved by the conference he recently announced would be held
in the autumn (it has now been downgraded to a 'meeting'). In his view,
all previous peace initiatives have failed largely, if not exclusively,
because Palestinians were not ready for a state of their own. The
meeting will therefore focus narrowly on Palestinian
institution-building and reform, under the tutelage of Tony Blair, the
Quartet's newly appointed envoy.

In fact, all previous peace initiatives have got nowhere for a reason
that neither Bush nor the EU has had the political courage to
acknowledge. That reason is the consensus reached long ago by Israel's
decision-making elites that Israel will never allow the emergence of a
Palestinian state which denies it effective military and economic
control of the West Bank. To be sure, Israel would allow – indeed, it
would insist on – the creation of a number of isolated enclaves that
Palestinians could call a state, but only in order to prevent the
creation of a binational state in which Palestinians would be the majority.

The Middle East peace process may well be the most spectacular deception
in modern diplomatic history. Since the failed Camp David summit of
2000, and actually well before it, Israel's interest in a peace process
– other than for the purpose of obtaining Palestinian and international
acceptance of the status quo – has been a fiction that has served
primarily to provide cover for its systematic confiscation of
Palestinian land and an occupation whose goal, according to the former
IDF chief of staff Moshe Ya'alon, is 'to sear deep into the
consciousness of Palestinians that they are a defeated people'. In his
reluctant embrace of the Oslo Accords, and his distaste for the
settlers, Yitzhak Rabin may have been the exception to this, but even he
did not entertain a return of Palestinian territory beyond the so-called
Allon Plan, which allowed Israel to retain the Jordan Valley and other
parts of the West Bank.

Anyone familiar with Israel's relentless confiscations of Palestinian
territory – based on a plan devised, overseen and implemented by Ariel
Sharon – knows that the objective of its settlement enterprise in the
West Bank has been largely achieved. Gaza, the evacuation of whose
settlements was so naively hailed by the international community as the
heroic achievement of a man newly committed to an honourable peace with
the Palestinians, was intended to serve as the first in a series of
Palestinian bantustans. Gaza's situation shows us what these bantustans
will look like if their residents do not behave as Israel wants.

Israel's disingenuous commitment to a peace process and a two-state
solution is precisely what has made possible its open-ended occupation
and dismemberment of Palestinian territory. And the Quartet – with the
EU, the UN secretary general and Russia obediently following
Washington's lead – has collaborated with and provided cover for this
deception by accepting Israel's claim that it has been unable to find a
deserving Palestinian peace partner.

Just one year after the 1967 war, Moshe Dayan, a former IDF chief of
staff who at the time was minister of defence, described his plan for
the future as 'the current reality in the territories'. 'The plan,' he
said, 'is being implemented in actual fact. What exists today must
remain as a permanent arrangement in the West Bank.' Ten years later, at
a conference in Tel Aviv, Dayan said: 'The question is not "What is the
solution?" but "How do we live without a solution?"' Geoffrey Aronson,
who has monitored the settlement enterprise from its beginnings,
summarises the situation as follows:

Living without a solution, then as now, was understood by Israel as
the key to maximising the benefits of conquest while minimising the
burdens and dangers of retreat or formal annexation. This commitment
to the status quo, however, disguised a programme of expansion that
generations of Israeli leaders supported as enabling, through
Israeli settlement, the dynamic transformation of the territories
and the expansion of effective Israeli sovereignty to the Jordan River.

In an interview in /Ha'aretz/ in 2004, Dov Weissglas, chef de cabinet to
the then prime minister, Ariel Sharon, described the strategic goal of
Sharon's diplomacy as being to secure the support of the White House and
Congress for Israeli measures that would place the peace process and
Palestinian statehood in 'formaldehyde'. It is a fiendishly appropriate
metaphor: formaldehyde uniquely prevents the deterioration of dead
bodies, and sometimes creates the illusion that they are still alive.
Weissglas explains that the purpose of Sharon's unilateral withdrawal
from Gaza, and the dismantling of several isolated settlements in the
West Bank, was to gain US acceptance of Israel's unilateralism, not to
set a precedent for an eventual withdrawal from the West Bank. The
limited withdrawals were intended to provide Israel with the political
room to deepen and widen its presence in the West Bank, and that is what
they achieved. In a letter to Sharon, Bush wrote: 'In light of new
realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli
population centres, it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of
final status negotiations will be a full and complete return to the
armistice lines of 1949.'

In a recent interview in /Ha'aretz/, James Wolfensohn, who was the
Quartet's representative at the time of the Gaza disengagement, said
that Israel and the US had systematically undermined the agreement he
helped forge in 2005 between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, and
had instead turned Gaza into a vast prison. The official behind this, he
told /Ha'aretz/, was Elliott Abrams, the deputy national security
adviser. 'Every aspect' of the agreement Wolfensohn had brokered 'was
abrogated'.

Another recent interview in /Ha'aretz/, with Haggai Alon, who was a
senior adviser to Amir Peretz at the Ministry of Defence, is even more
revealing. Alon accuses the IDF (whose most senior officers increasingly
are themselves settlers) of working clandestinely to further the
settlers' interests. The IDF, Alon says, ignores the Supreme Court's
instructions about the path the so-called security fence should follow,
instead 'setting a route that will not enable the establishment of a
Palestinian state'. Alon told /Ha'aretz/ that when in 2005 politicians
signed an agreement with the Palestinians to ease restrictions on
Palestinians travelling in the territories (part of the deal that
Wolfensohn had worked on), the IDF eased them for settlers instead. For
Palestinians, the number of checkpoints doubled. According to Alon, the
IDF is 'carrying out an apartheid policy' that is emptying Hebron of
Arabs and Judaising (his term) the Jordan Valley, while it co-operates
openly with the settlers in an attempt to make a two-state solution
impossible.

A new UN map of the West Bank, produced by the Office for the
Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs, gives a comprehensive picture of
the situation. Israeli civilian and military infrastructure has rendered
40 per cent of the territory off limits to Palestinians. The rest of the
territory, including major population centres such as Nablus and
Jericho, is split into enclaves; movement between them is restricted by
450 roadblocks and 70 manned checkpoints. The UN found that what remains
is an area very similar to that set aside for the Palestinian population
in Israeli security proposals in the aftermath of the 1967 war. It also
found that changes now underway to the infrastructure of the territories
– including a network of highways that bypass and isolate Palestinian
towns – would serve to formalise the de facto cantonisation of the West
Bank.

These are the realities on the ground that the uninformed and/or cynical
blather in Jerusalem, Washington and Brussels – about waiting for
Palestinians to reform their institutions, democratise their culture,
dismantle the 'infrastructures of terror' and halt all violence and
incitement before peace negotiations can begin – seeks to drown out.
Given the vast power imbalance between Israel and the Palestinians – not
to mention the vast preponderance of diplomatic support enjoyed by
Israel from precisely those countries that one would have expected to
compensate diplomatically for the military imbalance – nothing will
change for the better without the US, the EU and other international
actors finally facing up to what have long been the fundamental
impediments to peace.

These impediments include the assumption, implicit in Israel's
occupation policy, that if no peace agreement is reached, the 'default
setting' of UN Security Council Resolution 242 is the indefinite
continuation of Israel's occupation. If this reading were true, the
resolution would actually be inviting an occupying power that wishes to
retain its adversary's territory to do so simply by means of avoiding
peace talks – which is exactly what Israel has been doing. In fact, the
introductory statement to Resolution 242 declares that territory cannot
be acquired by war, implying that if the parties cannot reach agreement,
the occupier must withdraw to the status quo ante: that, logically, is
242's default setting. Had there been a sincere intention on Israel's
part to withdraw from the territories, surely forty years should have
been more than enough time in which to reach an agreement.

Israel's contention has long been that since no Palestinian state
existed before the 1967 war, there is no recognised border to which
Israel can withdraw, because the pre-1967 border was merely an armistice
line. Moreover, since Resolution 242 calls for a 'just and lasting
peace' that will allow 'every state in the area [to] live in security',
Israel holds that it must be allowed to change the armistice line,
either bilaterally or unilaterally, to make it secure before it ends the
occupation. This is a specious argument for many reasons, but
principally because UN General Assembly Partition Resolution 181 of
1947, which established the Jewish state's international legitimacy,
also recognised the remaining Palestinian territory outside the new
state's borders as the equally legitimate patrimony of Palestine's Arab
population on which they were entitled to establish their own state, and
it mapped the borders of that territory with great precision. Resolution
181's affirmation of the right of Palestine's Arab population to
national self-determination was based on normative law and the
democratic principles that grant statehood to the majority population.
(At the time, Arabs constituted two-thirds of the population in
Palestine.) This right does not evaporate because of delays in its
implementation.

In the course of a war launched by Arab countries that sought to prevent
the implementation of the UN partition resolution, Israel enlarged its
territory by 50 per cent. If it is illegal to acquire territory as a
result of war, then the question now cannot conceivably be how much
additional Palestinian territory Israel may confiscate, but rather how
much of the territory it acquired in the course of the war of 1948 it is
allowed to retain. At the very least, if 'adjustments' are to be made to
the 1949 armistice line, these should be made on Israel's side of that
line, not the Palestinians'.

Clearly, the obstacle to resolving the Israel-Palestine conflict has not
been a dearth of peace initiatives or peace envoys. Nor has it been the
violence to which Palestinians have resorted in their struggle to rid
themselves of Israel's occupation, even when that violence has
despicably targeted Israel's civilian population. It is not to sanction
the murder of civilians to observe that such violence occurs, sooner or
later, in most situations in which a people's drive for national
self-determination is frustrated by an occupying power. Indeed, Israel's
own struggle for national independence was no exception. According to
the historian Benny Morris, in this conflict it was the Irgun that first
targeted civilians. In /Righteous Victims/, Morris writes that the
upsurge of Arab terrorism in 1937 'triggered a wave of Irgun bombings
against Arab crowds and buses, introducing a new dimension to the
conflict.' While in the past Arabs had 'sniped at cars and pedestrians
and occasionally lobbed a grenade, often killing or injuring a few
bystanders or passengers', now 'for the first time, massive bombs were
placed in crowded Arab centres, and dozens of people were
indiscriminately murdered and maimed.' Morris notes that 'this
"innovation" soon found Arab imitators.'

Underlying Israel's efforts to retain the occupied territories is the
fact that it has never really considered the West Bank as occupied
territory, despite its pro forma acceptance of that designation.
Israelis see the Palestinian areas as 'contested' territory to which
they have claims no less compelling than the Palestinians, international
law and UN resolutions notwithstanding. This is a view that was made
explicit for the first time by Sharon in an op-ed essay published on the
front page of the /New York Times/ on 9 June 2002. The use of the
biblical designations of Judea and Samaria to describe the territories,
terms which were formerly employed only by the Likud but are now de
rigueur for Labour Party stalwarts as well, is a reflection of a common
Israeli view. That the former prime minister Ehud Barak (now Olmert's
defence minister) endlessly describes the territorial proposals he made
at the Camp David summit as expressions of Israel's 'generosity', and
never as an acknowledgment of Palestinian rights, is another example of
this mindset. Indeed, the term 'Palestinian rights' seems not to exist
in Israel's lexicon.

The problem is not, as Israelis often claim, that Palestinians do not
know how to compromise. (Another former prime minister, Benjamin
Netanyahu, famously complained that 'Palestinians take and take while
Israel gives and gives.') That is an indecent charge, since the
Palestinians made much the most far-reaching compromise of all when the
PLO formally accepted the legitimacy of Israel within the 1949 armistice
border. With that concession, Palestinians ceded their claim to more
than half the territory that the UN's partition resolution had assigned
to its Arab inhabitants. They have never received any credit for this
wrenching concession, made years before Israel agreed that Palestinians
had a right to statehood in any part of Palestine. The notion that
further border adjustments should be made at the expense of the 22 per
cent of the territory that remains to the Palestinians is deeply
offensive to them, and understandably so.

Nonetheless, the Palestinians agreed at the Camp David summit to
adjustments to the pre-1967 border that would allow large numbers of
West Bank settlers – about 70 per cent – to remain within the Jewish
state, provided they received comparable territory on Israel's side of
the border. Barak rejected this. To be sure, in the past the Palestinian
demand of a right of return was a serious obstacle to a peace agreement.
But the Arab League's peace initiative of 2002 leaves no doubt that Arab
countries will accept a nominal and symbolic return of refugees into
Israel in numbers approved by Israel, with the overwhelming majority
repatriated in the new Palestinian state, their countries of residence,
or in other countries prepared to receive them.

It is the failure of the international community to reject (other than
in empty rhetoric) Israel's notion that the occupation and the creation
of 'facts on the ground' can go on indefinitely, so long as there is no
agreement that is acceptable to Israel, that has defeated all previous
peace initiatives and the efforts of all peace envoys. Future efforts
will meet the same fate if this fundamental issue is not addressed.

What is required for a breakthrough is the adoption by the Security
Council of a resolution affirming the following: 1. Changes to the
pre-1967 situation can be made only by agreement between the parties.
Unilateral measures will not receive international recognition. 2. The
default setting of Resolution 242, reiterated by Resolution 338, the
1973 ceasefire resolution, is a return by Israel's occupying forces to
the pre-1967 border. 3. If the parties do not reach agreement within 12
months (the implementation of agreements will obviously take longer),
the default setting will be invoked by the Security Council. The
Security Council will then adopt its own terms for an end to the
conflict, and will arrange for an international force to enter the
occupied territories to help establish the rule of law, assist
Palestinians in building their institutions, assure Israel's security by
preventing cross-border violence, and monitor and oversee the
implementation of terms for an end to the conflict.

If the US and its allies were to take a stand forceful enough to
persuade Israel that it will not be allowed to make changes to the
pre-1967 situation except by agreement with the Palestinians in
permanent status negotiations, there would be no need for complicated
peace formulas or celebrity mediators to get a peace process underway.
The only thing that an envoy such as Blair can do to put the peace
process back on track is to speak the truth about the real impediment to
peace. This would also be a historic contribution to the Jewish state,
since Israel's only hope of real long-term security is to have a
successful Palestinian state as its neighbour.

*Footnotes*

* Rashid Khalidi writes about Hamas and Fatah on p. 31.

*Henry Siegman* <http://www.lrb.co.uk/contribhome.php?get=sieg01>, the
director of the US/ Middle East Project, served as a senior fellow at
the Council on Foreign Relations from 1994 to 2006, and was head of the
American Jewish Congress from 1978 to 1994.
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•"The Taiwanese Nuclear Case: Lessons for Today," William Burr, Proliferation Analysis
• "Another false dawn?" Economist.com
•"Inter-Korea Summit Is Not A Political Myth," Lee Byong-chul, The Korea Times - Op-Ed
•"U.S. Central Commander Expects Nuclear Restraint From Pakistan," Elaine M. Grossman, Global Security Newswire
•"Left-Right, Left-Right," Times of India - Editorial
•"Officials: Russia Ups Pressure on Iran," George Jahn, The Guardian
•"Russia Threatens to Withdraw From INF Treaty," Andre de Nesnera, Voice of America

No, You May Not Live in Our Midst
The Hour
Leonard Fein | Wed. Aug 08, 2007
Forward.com
By the time in 1948 that my family bought our very first house, the restrictive covenant on the deed had been declared unenforceable by the United States Supreme Court. Soon after we moved in, two neighbors came by to ask whether they could count on us voluntarily to abide by the terms of the covenant.

I don't have the language of the covenant before me, but it wasn't very different from that adopted in parts of Seattle as late as 1947: "No person or persons of Asiatic, African or Negro blood, lineage or extraction shall be permitted to occupy a portion of said property, or any building thereon, except domestic servant or servants may be actually and in good faith employed by white occupants of said premises."

To our visitors' discomfiting surprise — this was Baltimore, where racial segregation was both the law and the norm — my father refused their "invitation." I no longer remember whether my father's explanation of the decision was spoken to our neighbors or just to us, his wife and sons.

But the gist of what he said remains: We, members of a people that has been so despised and oppressed — we should say that here in America, we will join the oppressors? We will say to these other groups — many of whom have been in this land much longer than we — "No, you may not live in our midst?" No sir, never!

What calls this to mind these days is the shameful case of the passage last month by Israel's Knesset of a law that would prohibit Jewish National Fund land from being leased to non-Jews — in context, from being leased to Arab citizens of Israel.

In a nutshell: The JNF, founded in 1901, owns about 13% of the land of Israel in the name of the Jewish people. About a third was acquired in pre-state days, principally from large (and often absentee) Arab land owners; the balance was purchased from the state itself after independence.

Now, neither state land (80% of the land of Israel) nor JNF land can be sold — not to Jews, not to Arabs, not to anyone. That is made explicit in the Basic Law adopted by the Knesset in 1960. Ownership of those lands can never be transferred. Both kinds of land are available only for lease, most leasing being for long term, 49 or 98 years. (The 7% of land not held by the state or JNF is privately owned.)

In 1961, the JNF contracted with the Israel Lands Authority, a government agency, for the ILA to manage its property. The contract provided that JNF land would be managed in accordance with the policies of the JNF, rather than the policies of the ILA, which was bound by the state's anti-discrimination laws.

The common understanding was that JNF land, having been purchased by the Jewish people, was available for lease only to Jews. But in 2004, Israel's Supreme Court ruled in favor of Adel Kaadan, an Israeli Arab who had sought to buy a home in Katzir, a moshav on the Mediterranean coast that had denied him on the grounds that Katzir was for Jews only.

The court ruling, limited to the Katzir case alone, was based on the Basic Law on human dignity and liberty, which opens: "The purpose of this Basic Law is to protect human dignity and liberty, in order to establish in a Basic Law the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state." "Equality," among the rights enumerated in the law, was deemed both a Jewish and a democratic value.

Now petitioners have come before the court to ask that the Katzir finding be generalized to govern all ILA transactions, including specifically those dealing with JNF land. The bill now before the Knesset, approved on first reading by a vote of 64-16, would specifically exempt JNF land from the requirement for non-discrimination, allocating JNF lands only to Jews. That means that if the ILA continues as manager of JNF land, it will be required to enforce a restrictive covenant.

How can such a prospect be justified? How can it be reconciled with the pledge of the State of Israel articulated in its Declaration of Independence, to "ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex."

One way: Forget the talk about Jewish and democratic. So, Russell Robinson, CEO of the JNF in the United States: "For 2,000 years, I don't remember that we were praying and dreaming that we can't wait to establish a democratic state in the Middle East, but we did say that we can't wait to reestablish a Jewish homeland." Or Morton Klein, president of the Zionist Organization of America: "Israel is not America. It was created first as a Jewish state, where America was created first as [a] democracy."

Or acknowledge the democratic imperative, as does the JNF Web site: "JNF's extensive activities are carried out in the name of the Jewish people for the benefit of the public as a whole and for all sectors of its population, whatever their religion or ethnicity."

But remember to add that because of the Holocaust, we deserve a minor exemption: There is, the Web site tell us, "no contradiction between the state's obligation to set a land-use policy based on equality as far as state land is concerned, and the right of the Jewish people to safeguard its assets."

But be sure, when the next critic claims that Israel practices apartheid, to hurry to accuse him of antisemitism.

No, sir, never!


Wed. Aug 08, 2007

<h2 style="display: inline;">Camp Kirsanow</h2>
Submitted by Rick Perlstein on August 7, 2007 - 3:50pm. I haven't seen this getting much attention. It should. On July 19, [ed.: July 19, 2002, I neglected to note originally] a man named Peter Kirsanow said that if Arabs staged another terrorist attack on American soil, the doors might swing open to new American concentration camps.

And who is Peter Kirsanow? A shrieking talk radio maniac? One of those right-wing bloggers who can't host comments on his site because the violent fantasies therein attract too much attention from the FBI?

No, he is a member of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission. A Bush appointee.

"I think we will have a return to Korematsu," was the exact quote.