Full Version: Snuffymith's Blog-Sept. 17 - Nov. 29, 2007
Common Ground Common Sense > National & International News > Op-Ed Articles from the Mainstream Media > Op-Ed Articles from the Mainstream Media Archive
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Communism Reemerges in the Midwest
by E.B. Patton / September 18th, 2007
NORTH PLATTE, Neb. (AEP) — Communism is making a dangerous reappearance in the Midwest, says the United States Government. (Full article …)
Greenspan, Kissinger: Oil Drives US in Iraq, Iran
by Robert Weissman / September 18th, 2007
Alan Greenspan had acknowledged what is blindingly obvious to those who live in the reality-based world: The Iraq War was largely about oil. (Full article …)
New Day in the Anti-War Movement?
by Mike Ferner / September 18th, 2007
Other demonstrations against the war in Iraq have been larger, but the one that happened in Washington, DC this past Saturday was significant in another way because of a very different feel about it. (Full article …)
It Really Is About the Oil–And Not Only in Iraq
by Ron Jacobs / September 18th, 2007
So, the secret is finally out. The Iraq war and occupation is about oil! Alan Greenspan, the man on whom the capitalist press has conferred the title of sage numerous times, says exactly that in his memoirs released this week. Of course, many folks around the world have assumed this for years but, even so, it’s nice to hear it from one of Washington’s own. It was the concern of those that pull the strings on Wall Street and in DC that Saddam Hussein represented a severe threat to their access to oil that prompted the war. According to George Bush and his henchmen, it is the concern that anti-US “extremists” also threaten that access that causes the war and occupation to continue. Of course, these so-called extremists seemed to be primarily composed of Iraqi nationalists who simply want to control their own destinies and not leave them up to a small handful of men with offices in the Green Zone whose lives and livelihood depend on the continued presence of US forces on Iraqi soil. (Full article …)
Debt Addiction's Price
by John F. Ince, AlterNet
Market evangelists created the wreckage, but working people will suffer the most.
Misreading Poverty Data
by Robert Greenstein, The Washington Post
Latino immigration is being unfairly blamed for increases in poverty under Bush.
Bush Won't Admit Wrong
by Joseph L. Galloway, McClatchy Newspapers
Leaving aside all the happy talk, the fact is Bush's war policy has failed utterly.
by John F. Ince, AlterNet
Market evangelists created the wreckage, but working people will suffer the most.
Misreading Poverty Data
by Robert Greenstein, The Washington Post
Latino immigration is being unfairly blamed for increases in poverty under Bush.
Bush Won't Admit Wrong
by Joseph L. Galloway, McClatchy Newspapers
Leaving aside all the happy talk, the fact is Bush's war policy has failed utterly.
Alan Greenspan and His Bubbles
By Dean Baker
Alan Greenspan now says that we are seeing a housing bubble. He expects a large single-digit price decline "as a minimum" and would not be surprised by a double-digit decline in house prices nationwide.
This is a huge deal. A 15 percent fall in prices over the next three years implies a loss of almost $3 trillion dollars in housing wealth. After adjusting for inflation, the loss would be close to $4 trillion, more than $50,000 for every homeowner in the country.
Since the bubble was unevenly spread across the country the impact will be much worse in some areas. A 15 percent nationwide decline in house prices almost certainly means declines on the order of 30 percent in the most affected markets. People who paid $600,000 for a home last year will find that it's worth $400,000 next year.
And, house prices are not coming back. The meaning of a bubble is that the bubble prices don't make sense. The Nasdaq may have regained some ground from its 2002 lows, but its not going back to its bubble peak of 5000 any time soon. Once home prices stop falling from their bubble peaks, they can be expected to rise in step with inflation, just as they did for the hundred years prior to the bubble.
This decline in prices will have a huge impact on the economy. Most immediately, the housing sector will continue the contraction it has already begun. We will likely lose more than a million jobs in construction, real estate, mortgage banking and other housing related sectors.
Collapsing house prices will also lead to more turmoil in the huge secondary mortgage market and the market for mortgage backed securities. The crisis will go far beyond the subprime sector. We have only seen the beginning of the financial turmoil from the collapse of the housing bubble.
However, the biggest effect will be the impact that the loss of housing wealth will have on consumption. As the bubble expanded, people borrowed against housing equity almost as rapidly as it was created. The Fed estimated that a dollar of housing wealth translates into 5 cents of additional consumption. This story works in reverse also. A loss of $4 trillion in housing wealth will lead to a reduction of approximately $200 billion in annual consumption. This drop in consumption, coupled with the downturn in the housing sector, virtually guarantees a recession, and quite likely a very severe recession.
In short, by acknowledging that we face a housing bubble, Greenspan is acknowledging that we face some extremely difficult economic times ahead and that tens of millions of homeowners will lose much of their life's savings.
This raises the obvious question, if Greenspan saw this train wreck coming, why didn't he do anything to stop it while he was chairman of the Fed. Greenspan's position seems to be that there was nothing that the Fed could have done to contain the housing bubble or the stock bubble before it.
In fact, the Fed has enormous power to reign in financial bubbles. First, it has regulatory authority. For example, it could have written regulations that prohibited the banks under its control from writing predatory mortgages, as it has actually done this year. The Fed also can raise interest rates, a policy that would hurt growth, but is likely preferable to the dangers of a housing bubble, if not a stock bubble.
Most importantly, the Fed and its chairman can provide information. If Greenspan had carefully documented the evidence that there was a housing bubble when he was Fed chairman, rather than dismissing those of us who made this argument, it is likely that the bubble never would have grown to such dangerous levels. Clear warnings from the Fed chair might have made potential homebuyers more careful and made investors less anxious to throw away money making bad mortgage loans.
Perhaps Greenspan really could not have prevented the housing bubble, as he seems to believe. But the fact that he never tried was an enormous failure, which more than offsets all the successes of his tenure, which will become clear as the meltdown continues.
Dean Baker is Co-Director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research, in Washington, D.C. (www.cepr.net).
Center for Economic and Policy Research, 1611 Connecticut Ave, NW, Suite 400, Washington, DC 20009
Phone: (202) 293-5380, Fax: (202) 588-1356, Home: www.cepr.net
By Dean Baker
Alan Greenspan now says that we are seeing a housing bubble. He expects a large single-digit price decline "as a minimum" and would not be surprised by a double-digit decline in house prices nationwide.
This is a huge deal. A 15 percent fall in prices over the next three years implies a loss of almost $3 trillion dollars in housing wealth. After adjusting for inflation, the loss would be close to $4 trillion, more than $50,000 for every homeowner in the country.
Since the bubble was unevenly spread across the country the impact will be much worse in some areas. A 15 percent nationwide decline in house prices almost certainly means declines on the order of 30 percent in the most affected markets. People who paid $600,000 for a home last year will find that it's worth $400,000 next year.
And, house prices are not coming back. The meaning of a bubble is that the bubble prices don't make sense. The Nasdaq may have regained some ground from its 2002 lows, but its not going back to its bubble peak of 5000 any time soon. Once home prices stop falling from their bubble peaks, they can be expected to rise in step with inflation, just as they did for the hundred years prior to the bubble.
This decline in prices will have a huge impact on the economy. Most immediately, the housing sector will continue the contraction it has already begun. We will likely lose more than a million jobs in construction, real estate, mortgage banking and other housing related sectors.
Collapsing house prices will also lead to more turmoil in the huge secondary mortgage market and the market for mortgage backed securities. The crisis will go far beyond the subprime sector. We have only seen the beginning of the financial turmoil from the collapse of the housing bubble.
However, the biggest effect will be the impact that the loss of housing wealth will have on consumption. As the bubble expanded, people borrowed against housing equity almost as rapidly as it was created. The Fed estimated that a dollar of housing wealth translates into 5 cents of additional consumption. This story works in reverse also. A loss of $4 trillion in housing wealth will lead to a reduction of approximately $200 billion in annual consumption. This drop in consumption, coupled with the downturn in the housing sector, virtually guarantees a recession, and quite likely a very severe recession.
In short, by acknowledging that we face a housing bubble, Greenspan is acknowledging that we face some extremely difficult economic times ahead and that tens of millions of homeowners will lose much of their life's savings.
This raises the obvious question, if Greenspan saw this train wreck coming, why didn't he do anything to stop it while he was chairman of the Fed. Greenspan's position seems to be that there was nothing that the Fed could have done to contain the housing bubble or the stock bubble before it.
In fact, the Fed has enormous power to reign in financial bubbles. First, it has regulatory authority. For example, it could have written regulations that prohibited the banks under its control from writing predatory mortgages, as it has actually done this year. The Fed also can raise interest rates, a policy that would hurt growth, but is likely preferable to the dangers of a housing bubble, if not a stock bubble.
Most importantly, the Fed and its chairman can provide information. If Greenspan had carefully documented the evidence that there was a housing bubble when he was Fed chairman, rather than dismissing those of us who made this argument, it is likely that the bubble never would have grown to such dangerous levels. Clear warnings from the Fed chair might have made potential homebuyers more careful and made investors less anxious to throw away money making bad mortgage loans.
Perhaps Greenspan really could not have prevented the housing bubble, as he seems to believe. But the fact that he never tried was an enormous failure, which more than offsets all the successes of his tenure, which will become clear as the meltdown continues.
Dean Baker is Co-Director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research, in Washington, D.C. (www.cepr.net).
Center for Economic and Policy Research, 1611 Connecticut Ave, NW, Suite 400, Washington, DC 20009
Phone: (202) 293-5380, Fax: (202) 588-1356, Home: www.cepr.net
"Syria, N.Korea Deny Nuclear Cooperation," By Albert Aji, The Washington Post
• "An Indispensable Irritant to Iran and Its Foes," By Elaine Sciolino and William J. Broad, The New York Times
• "Jordan, U.S. Sign Nuclear Agreement," By Dale Gavlak, Associated Press
• "Does the United States Really Need to Build a New Nuclear Weapon?" Op-Ed by Bennett Ramberg, Baltimore Sun
• "North Korea Open to Nuclear Disablement Plan," Global Security Newswire
• "Kouchner's Latest Outburst Focuses Badly Needed Attention on the Iran Crisis," Op-Ed by The Daily Star
• "Important for India to Negotiate with IAEA: U.S.," The Hindu
• "An Indispensable Irritant to Iran and Its Foes," By Elaine Sciolino and William J. Broad, The New York Times
• "Jordan, U.S. Sign Nuclear Agreement," By Dale Gavlak, Associated Press
• "Does the United States Really Need to Build a New Nuclear Weapon?" Op-Ed by Bennett Ramberg, Baltimore Sun
• "North Korea Open to Nuclear Disablement Plan," Global Security Newswire
• "Kouchner's Latest Outburst Focuses Badly Needed Attention on the Iran Crisis," Op-Ed by The Daily Star
• "Important for India to Negotiate with IAEA: U.S.," The Hindu
Curt Day: Who Hurts America more, Guiliani or Moveon.org? When first comparing the advertisements by Guiliani and Moveon.org, we are tempted to like the positive ad and hate the negative one. Yet the positive support that Guiliani's ad gives Petraeus just might be a wolf in sheep's clothing.
State Dept. in crisis mode after Blackwater accused in deaths The State Department moved quickly to tamp down anger and possible repercussions after the alleged killing of eight Iraqi civilians in an incident involving a private security firm based in North Carolina that was hired to protect U.S. diplomats in Iraq. The moves appeared unlikely to forestall a congressional inquiry into not just Sunday's events but the government's increasing reliance on on the use of contractors in Iraq.
Iran threatens missile attacks on US targets "Today the Americans are around our country but this does not mean that they are encircling us. They are encircled themselves and are within our range," said Gen Mohammed Hassan Koussechi.
<h3 class="entry-header">AJ: Ibrahim Shammari (Islamic Army of Iraq)</h3> Al-Jazeera just aired a half-hour interview with Ibrahim al-Shammari, spokesman of the Islamic Army of Iraq (which is one of the largest of the "nationalist-jihadist" Sunni insurgency factions). I'd been seeing discussions about the interview in the Iraqi-oriented forums for a couple of days before it aired, suggesting considerable interest in what the IAI would have to say about the Crocker-Petraeus report. I'm not sure when it was recorded, but no mention was made of the murder of Sattar Abu Risha, so if I had to guess I'd say it was done September 12- after the Congressional hearings but before the assassination. I didn't notice any particular innovations in his discourse, but it's worth pointing out his major arguments and themes.
Ibrahim al-Shammari, screen capture from al-Jazeera.
In response to a question about the Petraeus report and the role of the surge in Anbar, Shammari replied that the Islamic Army of Iraq saw nothing new in the report. It claims to see progress in the tribal areas, but, he said, the American forces haven't done anything in those areas. What happened in Anbar is the al-Qaeda Organization turned itself into a state, and terrorized anyone who had a different opinion, and this caused great unhappiness among the tribes and the factions who turned against it. Then the US intervened and tried to exploit the differences, spreading money around and trying to buy support, but the troops they sent didn't accomplish anything. This narrative actually doesn't deeply conflict with the Petraeus narrative about what happened last year in the Sunni areas, but of course diverges sharply when you get to the end about the significance of the US role and the nature of Sunni cooperation. He didn't seem particularly concerned about the Anbar Salvation Council or its counterparts elsewhere, treating them as perfectly compatible with the resistance's agenda and a response to al-Qaeda's transgressions but not a threat to the role of the factions.
The interviewer interrupted to say that the operations against the Americans did go down, a claim which Shammari rejected. Attacks against American forces have not gone down, he said, operations against the Americans continue ever day (he claimed over 50 a day for the IAI alone). Shammari acknowledged that some "sons of the tribes" were cooperating with the Americans, but insisted that the cooperation was strictly limited to self-defense and to fighting against al-Qaeda - nothing more, nothing less. The street remains with the resistance, he claimed, and it was absurd to try to distinguish between the resistance and the tribes. When pressed on the nature of Sunni-American cooperation, he responded by harping on the levels of US-Shia cooperation through the Iraqi state, and military and police forces.
Shammari talked a lot about the Sunni-Shia conflict, trying to draw a sharp distinction between the Shia - with whom there could be no conflict since at the societal level there were no differences - and the Iranian-backed Shia forces. The two problems facing Iraq, he said, are Iran and the occupation, and in the absence of the occupation the Shia would turn back to their natural affinity with other Iraqi Arabs rather than to Iran. Iraq is not a sectarian (ta'ifi) society, he argued, and it was only the occupation which had sowed the seeds of sectarianism (which led to a lengthy argument over Iraqi history). He insisted that the IAI and other factions were Sunni, but fought in defense of all Iraqis whether Sunni or Shia - liberation from occupation was the goal of all, he claimed. He rejected the suggestion that Sadr's Mahdi Army might be a partner in this fight, however, claiming that the Mahdi Army's only problems with the occupation were over Iran and not over liberating Iraq.
On al-Qaeda, Shammari took a rather calmer tone than in past IAI statements (forum discussions had suggested that he was going to be far more aggressive, so it's interesting that he wasn't). He acknowledged that the IAI had worked with al-Qaeda in the past - back then all the factions cooperated against the occupation, he said. But then al-Qaeda changed, he said, and began pursuing a private secret agenda which nobody could understand. He called for all factions to come back to a clear agenda of national liberation. In a line singled out already in the forums, he rejected insults to al-Qaeda, instead calling for it to come back to the shared agenda of the resistance. At the same time, as befits the "nationalist" in "nationalist-jihadist", Shammari stressed the Iraqi national interest and put the jihad in service of national liberation - which has for almost a year been the argument at the core of the doctrinal arguments between the IAI allies and the al-Qaeda allies.
Finally, he repeated the IAI's frequently articulated position of refusing to negotiate or sit with the Americans until there was a clear and binding commitment to withdrawal - at which point, the IAI would naturally be willing to talk to the Americans about the terms of the withdrawal. He said that there was no political process in Iraq to join right now, anyway. It had come to its end, collapsing on itself, and everyone was looking past the failed institutions. He decried all plans for federalism and partition as an American long-term agenda to weaken and divide Iraq, and went on at some length appealing for a united Iraq. He looked forward to an Iraq ruled by all the nationalist-jihadist factions, which would seem to suggest an expansive rather than limited agenda on their part.
No particular further comment here, just wanted to pass on info about a fairly important intervention in the Iraqi Sunni political field. I'll update if/when I see interesting discussion of it. One point I did want to make, though: you'll notice that Shammari in the screen capture above is still veiled in shadows to protect his identity. If these insurgency factions ever expect to advance an effective public political agenda, they are going to have to start putting forth some spokesmen who are not veiled in shadows.
UPDATE: just heard through a source that Shammari's interview was recorded in Qatar, not in Amman as I had assumed - and not in Damascus, as others might have assumed. If my source is right, that raises some very interesting questions about the relationship between the "nationalist-jihadist" factions and various regional governments - especially, given that Shammari complained in the interview that the Sunni Arab governments were not adequately supporting the resistance.
Posted on September 17, 2007 at 04:30 PM | Permalink
Ibrahim al-Shammari, screen capture from al-Jazeera.
In response to a question about the Petraeus report and the role of the surge in Anbar, Shammari replied that the Islamic Army of Iraq saw nothing new in the report. It claims to see progress in the tribal areas, but, he said, the American forces haven't done anything in those areas. What happened in Anbar is the al-Qaeda Organization turned itself into a state, and terrorized anyone who had a different opinion, and this caused great unhappiness among the tribes and the factions who turned against it. Then the US intervened and tried to exploit the differences, spreading money around and trying to buy support, but the troops they sent didn't accomplish anything. This narrative actually doesn't deeply conflict with the Petraeus narrative about what happened last year in the Sunni areas, but of course diverges sharply when you get to the end about the significance of the US role and the nature of Sunni cooperation. He didn't seem particularly concerned about the Anbar Salvation Council or its counterparts elsewhere, treating them as perfectly compatible with the resistance's agenda and a response to al-Qaeda's transgressions but not a threat to the role of the factions.
The interviewer interrupted to say that the operations against the Americans did go down, a claim which Shammari rejected. Attacks against American forces have not gone down, he said, operations against the Americans continue ever day (he claimed over 50 a day for the IAI alone). Shammari acknowledged that some "sons of the tribes" were cooperating with the Americans, but insisted that the cooperation was strictly limited to self-defense and to fighting against al-Qaeda - nothing more, nothing less. The street remains with the resistance, he claimed, and it was absurd to try to distinguish between the resistance and the tribes. When pressed on the nature of Sunni-American cooperation, he responded by harping on the levels of US-Shia cooperation through the Iraqi state, and military and police forces.
Shammari talked a lot about the Sunni-Shia conflict, trying to draw a sharp distinction between the Shia - with whom there could be no conflict since at the societal level there were no differences - and the Iranian-backed Shia forces. The two problems facing Iraq, he said, are Iran and the occupation, and in the absence of the occupation the Shia would turn back to their natural affinity with other Iraqi Arabs rather than to Iran. Iraq is not a sectarian (ta'ifi) society, he argued, and it was only the occupation which had sowed the seeds of sectarianism (which led to a lengthy argument over Iraqi history). He insisted that the IAI and other factions were Sunni, but fought in defense of all Iraqis whether Sunni or Shia - liberation from occupation was the goal of all, he claimed. He rejected the suggestion that Sadr's Mahdi Army might be a partner in this fight, however, claiming that the Mahdi Army's only problems with the occupation were over Iran and not over liberating Iraq.
On al-Qaeda, Shammari took a rather calmer tone than in past IAI statements (forum discussions had suggested that he was going to be far more aggressive, so it's interesting that he wasn't). He acknowledged that the IAI had worked with al-Qaeda in the past - back then all the factions cooperated against the occupation, he said. But then al-Qaeda changed, he said, and began pursuing a private secret agenda which nobody could understand. He called for all factions to come back to a clear agenda of national liberation. In a line singled out already in the forums, he rejected insults to al-Qaeda, instead calling for it to come back to the shared agenda of the resistance. At the same time, as befits the "nationalist" in "nationalist-jihadist", Shammari stressed the Iraqi national interest and put the jihad in service of national liberation - which has for almost a year been the argument at the core of the doctrinal arguments between the IAI allies and the al-Qaeda allies.
Finally, he repeated the IAI's frequently articulated position of refusing to negotiate or sit with the Americans until there was a clear and binding commitment to withdrawal - at which point, the IAI would naturally be willing to talk to the Americans about the terms of the withdrawal. He said that there was no political process in Iraq to join right now, anyway. It had come to its end, collapsing on itself, and everyone was looking past the failed institutions. He decried all plans for federalism and partition as an American long-term agenda to weaken and divide Iraq, and went on at some length appealing for a united Iraq. He looked forward to an Iraq ruled by all the nationalist-jihadist factions, which would seem to suggest an expansive rather than limited agenda on their part.
No particular further comment here, just wanted to pass on info about a fairly important intervention in the Iraqi Sunni political field. I'll update if/when I see interesting discussion of it. One point I did want to make, though: you'll notice that Shammari in the screen capture above is still veiled in shadows to protect his identity. If these insurgency factions ever expect to advance an effective public political agenda, they are going to have to start putting forth some spokesmen who are not veiled in shadows.
UPDATE: just heard through a source that Shammari's interview was recorded in Qatar, not in Amman as I had assumed - and not in Damascus, as others might have assumed. If my source is right, that raises some very interesting questions about the relationship between the "nationalist-jihadist" factions and various regional governments - especially, given that Shammari complained in the interview that the Sunni Arab governments were not adequately supporting the resistance.
Posted on September 17, 2007 at 04:30 PM | Permalink
Bush: I'd Like to Fight In Iraq, But I'm "Too Old" and Terrorists "Would Notice Me"
Faiz Shakir: Bush has never put himself in harm's way but he has no problem trivializing the lives of those who do.
None Dare Call It Genocide
By Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr.
How comfy we are all in the United States, as we engage in living-room debates about the US occupation of Iraq, whether "we" are bringing them freedom and whether their freedom is really worth the sacrifice of so many of our men and women. We talk about whether war aims have really been achieved, how to exit gracefully, or whether we need a hyper-surge to finish this whole business once and for all. Continue
By Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr.
How comfy we are all in the United States, as we engage in living-room debates about the US occupation of Iraq, whether "we" are bringing them freedom and whether their freedom is really worth the sacrifice of so many of our men and women. We talk about whether war aims have really been achieved, how to exit gracefully, or whether we need a hyper-surge to finish this whole business once and for all. Continue
This is the full length 90 min. version of Bill Moyer's 1987 scathing critique of the criminal subterfuge carried out by the Executive Branch of the United States Government.
Host Bill Moyers exposes the inner workings of the secret government. Though originally broadcast in 1987, it is even more relevant today. Interviews with respected, top military, intelligence, and government insiders reveal both the history and secret objectives. Continue
Host Bill Moyers exposes the inner workings of the secret government. Though originally broadcast in 1987, it is even more relevant today. Interviews with respected, top military, intelligence, and government insiders reveal both the history and secret objectives. Continue
Greenspan: Euro Gains As Reserve Choice
By AP
Former U.S. Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan said it is possible that the euro could replace the U.S. dollar as the reserve currency of choice. Continue
By AP
Former U.S. Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan said it is possible that the euro could replace the U.S. dollar as the reserve currency of choice. Continue
Muqtada al-Sadr demands all foreign security contractors leave Iraq: We are not intending to stop them and revoke their license indefinitely but we do need them to respect the law and the regulation here in Iraq," al-Dabbagh told CNN.
Shooting shines light on murky world of Iraq security: The Iraqi government might find it difficult to prosecute the case, and even harder to revoke Blackwater's licence because it most probably does not have a current one.
Locked up in the green zone: U.S. Bans Overland Travel by Diplomats in Iraq: The United States on Tuesday suspended all land travel by U.S. diplomats and other civilian officials throughout Iraq, except in Baghdad's heavily fortified Green Zone.
Shooting shines light on murky world of Iraq security: The Iraqi government might find it difficult to prosecute the case, and even harder to revoke Blackwater's licence because it most probably does not have a current one.
Locked up in the green zone: U.S. Bans Overland Travel by Diplomats in Iraq: The United States on Tuesday suspended all land travel by U.S. diplomats and other civilian officials throughout Iraq, except in Baghdad's heavily fortified Green Zone.
Kurds declare "oil independence": Iraqi Kurds fed up with the bickering in Baghdad and the failure of the central government to pass a comprehensive hydrocarbons law have virtually declared their independence signing new oil contracts with western companies and legislating their own oil law in August in the Kurdistan Regional Parliament.
Basra oil fuels fight to control Iraq's economic might: The province sits on as much as 20 percent of the Middle East's oil reserves
Basra oil fuels fight to control Iraq's economic might: The province sits on as much as 20 percent of the Middle East's oil reserves
The Iran offensive builds: Subtly last week as they were making the case for more war in Iraq, Bush, Petraeus et al. were also dropping strong hints about bombing Iran.
Drift into war with Iran out of control, says UN: The UN's chief nuclear weapons inspector yesterday warned against the use of force against Iran, in what UN officials said was an attempt to halt an "out of control" drift to war.
Former U.S. Commander Downplays Nuclear Iran: Retired Gen. John Abizaid, the former U.S. commander in Iraq, said all efforts should be made to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, but if Tehran did the world could live with it.
Iran cuts foreign dollar assets to 30 percent: Iran has massively cut down its dependence on the dollar in the face of US pressure over its nuclear programme and now 70 percent of its foreign assets are saved in other currencies or in gold, an official said on Monday.
Drift into war with Iran out of control, says UN: The UN's chief nuclear weapons inspector yesterday warned against the use of force against Iran, in what UN officials said was an attempt to halt an "out of control" drift to war.
Former U.S. Commander Downplays Nuclear Iran: Retired Gen. John Abizaid, the former U.S. commander in Iraq, said all efforts should be made to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, but if Tehran did the world could live with it.
Iran cuts foreign dollar assets to 30 percent: Iran has massively cut down its dependence on the dollar in the face of US pressure over its nuclear programme and now 70 percent of its foreign assets are saved in other currencies or in gold, an official said on Monday.
Federal Reserve cuts interest rate : Stock markets in the US have soared after the Federal Reserve cut interest rates by half a percentage point to 4.75 per cent in an attempt to reduce the risk of a recession.
Rogers, Faber Say Fed Rate Cuts Will Spur a Recession: Interest rate cuts by Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke will spur inflation, cause the U.S. dollar to collapse and push the world's largest economy into recession, investors Jim Rogers and Marc Faber said.
US home foreclosures soar 36 percent in August: survey : Home foreclosures in the United States surged 36 percent in August from the prior month and more than doubled from a year ago, a leading foreclosure data firm said Tuesday.
Prepare for prolonged turmoil, says US Treasury Secretary: Investors should brace themselves for a prolonged period of market turmoil, Henry Paulson, the US Treasury Secretary, said yesterday as he held emergency meetings with the Chancellor and the French Finance Minister.
Greenspan: Euro Gains As Reserve Choice: : Former Fed Boss Says Euro Could Replace U.S. Dollar As Favored Reserve Currency
Canada Dollar Dominance Shows Break With U.S. Dollar: - Currency traders are concluding that there's nothing the U.S. economy can do that Canada's can't do better. Much better.
Black day for shares as €4.5bn lost : ON a black day for Irish shares a total of €4.5 billion was wiped off the value of the Irish Stock Exchange yesterday.
Credit fears spread, Australia quashes rumours: Credit fears flared in Asia on Tuesday prompting Australia's central bank to quash speculation that one or more regional banks had asked for emergency funding, a day after savers rushed to withdraw deposits from a British lender
Rogers, Faber Say Fed Rate Cuts Will Spur a Recession: Interest rate cuts by Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke will spur inflation, cause the U.S. dollar to collapse and push the world's largest economy into recession, investors Jim Rogers and Marc Faber said.
US home foreclosures soar 36 percent in August: survey : Home foreclosures in the United States surged 36 percent in August from the prior month and more than doubled from a year ago, a leading foreclosure data firm said Tuesday.
Prepare for prolonged turmoil, says US Treasury Secretary: Investors should brace themselves for a prolonged period of market turmoil, Henry Paulson, the US Treasury Secretary, said yesterday as he held emergency meetings with the Chancellor and the French Finance Minister.
Greenspan: Euro Gains As Reserve Choice: : Former Fed Boss Says Euro Could Replace U.S. Dollar As Favored Reserve Currency
Canada Dollar Dominance Shows Break With U.S. Dollar: - Currency traders are concluding that there's nothing the U.S. economy can do that Canada's can't do better. Much better.
Black day for shares as €4.5bn lost : ON a black day for Irish shares a total of €4.5 billion was wiped off the value of the Irish Stock Exchange yesterday.
Credit fears spread, Australia quashes rumours: Credit fears flared in Asia on Tuesday prompting Australia's central bank to quash speculation that one or more regional banks had asked for emergency funding, a day after savers rushed to withdraw deposits from a British lender
Why Bush won't attack Iran
Despite saber-rattling, and the Washington buzz that a strike is coming, the president doesn't intend to bomb Iran. Cheney may have other ideas
By Steven Clemons
-
Hillary Clinton's healthcare 2.0 - She has a pitch-perfect new ad and a grand plan for healthcare reform. How much will it matter in the campaign -- and beyond?
By Walter Shapiro
Opinion
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Harry Reid talks tough on Iraq - With polls showing the Petraeus performance made no difference to voters, the Democrats say they won't compromise on timelines after all
By Joan Walsh
Opinion
Scott Ritter: Calling Out Idiot America By Scott Ritter —
The former weapons inspector and military intelligence officer plumbs the depths of American ignorance and offers this history of Iraq, the Mideast and Islam. When so few of our politicians, and even fewer of the citizens who elect them, understand the forces at work in Baghdad and beyond, is it any wonder the occupation has been a disaster?
The former weapons inspector and military intelligence officer plumbs the depths of American ignorance and offers this history of Iraq, the Mideast and Islam. When so few of our politicians, and even fewer of the citizens who elect them, understand the forces at work in Baghdad and beyond, is it any wonder the occupation has been a disaster?
Inside the Data Mine
By Onnesha Roychoudhuri —
The Bush administration's domestic spying program has depended on the willing participation of America's telecommunications giants, and all but one, Qwest, were willing to comply. Truthdig contributor Onnesha Roychoudhuri investigates the complex world of national security and regulation to find out whether Qwest's extraordinary bad luck in recent years has been more than a coincidence—and what it means for what's left of your privacy.
By Onnesha Roychoudhuri —
The Bush administration's domestic spying program has depended on the willing participation of America's telecommunications giants, and all but one, Qwest, were willing to comply. Truthdig contributor Onnesha Roychoudhuri investigates the complex world of national security and regulation to find out whether Qwest's extraordinary bad luck in recent years has been more than a coincidence—and what it means for what's left of your privacy.
Bhutto Fires Back 
Last week I published an article in Foreign Policy.com titled "Why We'd Miss Musharraf" that has generated pushback from Benazir Bhutto's political party and the PR firm she hired, none other than Mark Penn's Burson-Marsteller.
They write:
The purpose of my piece was twofold: first to dispel the presumption that civilian government will be Pakistan's democratic savior; and second to show how the military has played a pivotal role in Pakistan's historical trajectory and how it is primed to continue this legacy as one of if not the most important institution for governance and strategic rationale even if a civilian government were to take the helm. (Another good article that takes a more critical look at the military but essentially concludes my way on its importance in Pakistan is Joshua Hammer's "After Musharraf" in The Atlantic). It is the first one the PPP spokespersons take issue with -- the second contention is never disputed.
It is certainly in the interests of the PPP and it's hired lobbyists, for which it pays a handsome quarter of million dollars, to perpetrate the myth that its tenure over the country was inherently less corrupt, more democratic, and more apt to cooperate with US strategic interests in the region by virtue of being run by civilians. After all, American politicians and the public are more inclined to believe this given our own history. But taking more than a cursory glance at the evidence in Pakistan reveals this notion to be patently false, and sometimes the opposite.
On Poverty
Though the lobbying firm alleges poverty has increased in recent years, it was under civilian governments in the 1990s that exacerbated Pakistani poverty. The executive summary of a 2002 Asian Development Bank report begins:
On Human Rights
And the PPP can campaign all it wants on democracy and preserving the fabric of society but they can't bury the Amnesty International reports such as the one published towards the end of Bhutto's rule in May 1996 titled "Pakistani Government Fails to Live Up to Human Rights Rhetoric" that reveals severe human rights abuses, extra-judicial killings, torture, and most importantly genuine disinterest of Bhutto's government in these issues.
On Corruption
I'll concede corruption cuts both ways and, as documented by Ayesha Siddiqa's Military Inc., the military has in recent years sought to lay a firmer hold on the economy, disproportionately enriching itself. But a dose of perspective must be offered.
The spokesperson for the PPP claims the perception of corruption was the highest ever in 2006 but neglects to mention that there was no Pakistan specific survey done during the Bhutto and Sharif years (the reports specific to Pakistan only date back to 2002) or it might have inconveniently probed in greater depth what Transparency International's flagship index revealed -- that Pakistan ranked near the bottom of the corruption perceptions index during Bhutto and the PPP's rule in 1995 and 1996 (actually second from the bottom, just above Nigeria).
And the corruption charges against Bhutto were proven. The New York Times ran a special report in early 1998 by John F. Burns titled "House of Graft: Tracing the Bhutto Millions -- A special report.; Bhutto Clan Leaves Trail of Corruption." It traces the money trail of the Bhutto family corruption that eventually culminated in her trial and conviction for money laundering in a Swiss Court. (Though the Times Select requires a password, the series is also posted here.) Further charges still await her in Pakistan.
At least under the military corruption that Siddiqa explores, the money still circulates inside the national economy amongst the rank and file unlike the capital flight witnessed under Bhutto to finance London and Beverly Hill estates.
The evidence does not even support the claim that civilian government would do more to distribute resources away from the military. Based on World Bank data (world development indicators), during the Bhutto years, the government spent 6-7% of GDP and 30-35% of central government funds on military expenditure. Under the Musharraf government, these figures have dropped to averages of 4% and 25% respectively. This might have something to do with this military government presiding over a growing economy averaging an annual 7% a year as I mentioned in my article or it might have to do with bloated procurement costs so that Bhutto's husband-- Asif Ali Sadari or "Mr. 10%" as he was known -- could skim off the top.
On Madrassas
Because madrassas are an effective boogeyman (though their significance has been challenged), the PPP's lobbyists don't hesitate to deploy it. But the madrassa boogeyman has been continually invoked and found to be quite dubious, again with a look at the data as some World Bank and Harvard scholars sought to do. The degree of hyperbole is shocking given that the data shows madrassas only constitute 1% of enrollment in Pakistan and no evidence of dramatic increase in recent years. Moreover, madrassas are a byproduct of an institutional deficit -- that is the government's inability to provide good universal education -- and this is something that pre-dates military rule.
If Musharraf should fall, the point is the military will prevail as a critical institution. Bhutto's PR firm might be able to create a climate that gets her back in power but she cannot simply buy her way out of the strategic quandaries that surround Pakistan nor the straitjacket of incompetence and corruption that has plagued her party and feudal politics. In order to govern, she will need to depend heavily on the military (not to mention the US's own strategic dependence on them). More than democratic charlatans and feudal politics, Pakistan needs a healthier civil-military balance and perhaps a power-sharing deal can pave the way for this.
--Sameer Lalwani
Last week I published an article in Foreign Policy.com titled "Why We'd Miss Musharraf" that has generated pushback from Benazir Bhutto's political party and the PR firm she hired, none other than Mark Penn's Burson-Marsteller.
They write:
Every democratically elected official has been overthrown by the military, not out of the army's sense of loyalty to the state, as Mr. Lalwani suggests, but because of the army's thirst for power. In fact, the dictatorship in Pakistan has used any and all mechanisms, including discrediting past government work, and manufacturing fallacious corruption charges against anyone who opposes them - be it Mrs. Bhutto or most recently, Chief Justice Chaudhry. It is no wonder that none of these charges have ever been proven. Despite consistently overthrown by military regimes, democratic governments have seen marked successes in Pakistan. Under PPP leadership, for example, Pakistan became one of the ten emerging capital markets of the world: the World Health Organization praised government efforts in the field of health; and tens of thousands of primary and secondary schools were built; these are only some examples.When I wrote this piece, I did not seek to defend the Pakistani military and the Musharraf government every step of the way. I agree from the outset that the political climate has made it untenable for the Musharraf government to continue in its current form and a power sharing deal may be the best interim step.
Compare that to the current situation where the author claims that regime has succeeded. Poverty has increased, with 60 percent of Pakistanis living on $2 or less per day; there is rampant government corruption (now at 67 percent, and according to Transparency International, higher than any previously elected government); and the drastic resurgence of political madrassas.
The purpose of my piece was twofold: first to dispel the presumption that civilian government will be Pakistan's democratic savior; and second to show how the military has played a pivotal role in Pakistan's historical trajectory and how it is primed to continue this legacy as one of if not the most important institution for governance and strategic rationale even if a civilian government were to take the helm. (Another good article that takes a more critical look at the military but essentially concludes my way on its importance in Pakistan is Joshua Hammer's "After Musharraf" in The Atlantic). It is the first one the PPP spokespersons take issue with -- the second contention is never disputed.
It is certainly in the interests of the PPP and it's hired lobbyists, for which it pays a handsome quarter of million dollars, to perpetrate the myth that its tenure over the country was inherently less corrupt, more democratic, and more apt to cooperate with US strategic interests in the region by virtue of being run by civilians. After all, American politicians and the public are more inclined to believe this given our own history. But taking more than a cursory glance at the evidence in Pakistan reveals this notion to be patently false, and sometimes the opposite.
On Poverty
Though the lobbying firm alleges poverty has increased in recent years, it was under civilian governments in the 1990s that exacerbated Pakistani poverty. The executive summary of a 2002 Asian Development Bank report begins:
It is generally accepted that the declining trend in poverty in Pakistan during the 1970s and 1980s was reversed in the 1990s. The incidence of poverty increased from 26.6 percent in FY1993 to 32.2 percent in FY1999 and the number of poor increased by over 12 million people during this period.Meanwhile, as a leading Pakistani daily DAWN reports, according the World Bank's most recent development report, it was in fact this military dictatorship managed to bring down poverty by five percentage points earning the title of "one of the top 10 global reformers."
On Human Rights
And the PPP can campaign all it wants on democracy and preserving the fabric of society but they can't bury the Amnesty International reports such as the one published towards the end of Bhutto's rule in May 1996 titled "Pakistani Government Fails to Live Up to Human Rights Rhetoric" that reveals severe human rights abuses, extra-judicial killings, torture, and most importantly genuine disinterest of Bhutto's government in these issues.
On Corruption
I'll concede corruption cuts both ways and, as documented by Ayesha Siddiqa's Military Inc., the military has in recent years sought to lay a firmer hold on the economy, disproportionately enriching itself. But a dose of perspective must be offered.
The spokesperson for the PPP claims the perception of corruption was the highest ever in 2006 but neglects to mention that there was no Pakistan specific survey done during the Bhutto and Sharif years (the reports specific to Pakistan only date back to 2002) or it might have inconveniently probed in greater depth what Transparency International's flagship index revealed -- that Pakistan ranked near the bottom of the corruption perceptions index during Bhutto and the PPP's rule in 1995 and 1996 (actually second from the bottom, just above Nigeria).
And the corruption charges against Bhutto were proven. The New York Times ran a special report in early 1998 by John F. Burns titled "House of Graft: Tracing the Bhutto Millions -- A special report.; Bhutto Clan Leaves Trail of Corruption." It traces the money trail of the Bhutto family corruption that eventually culminated in her trial and conviction for money laundering in a Swiss Court. (Though the Times Select requires a password, the series is also posted here.) Further charges still await her in Pakistan.
At least under the military corruption that Siddiqa explores, the money still circulates inside the national economy amongst the rank and file unlike the capital flight witnessed under Bhutto to finance London and Beverly Hill estates.
The evidence does not even support the claim that civilian government would do more to distribute resources away from the military. Based on World Bank data (world development indicators), during the Bhutto years, the government spent 6-7% of GDP and 30-35% of central government funds on military expenditure. Under the Musharraf government, these figures have dropped to averages of 4% and 25% respectively. This might have something to do with this military government presiding over a growing economy averaging an annual 7% a year as I mentioned in my article or it might have to do with bloated procurement costs so that Bhutto's husband-- Asif Ali Sadari or "Mr. 10%" as he was known -- could skim off the top.
On Madrassas
Because madrassas are an effective boogeyman (though their significance has been challenged), the PPP's lobbyists don't hesitate to deploy it. But the madrassa boogeyman has been continually invoked and found to be quite dubious, again with a look at the data as some World Bank and Harvard scholars sought to do. The degree of hyperbole is shocking given that the data shows madrassas only constitute 1% of enrollment in Pakistan and no evidence of dramatic increase in recent years. Moreover, madrassas are a byproduct of an institutional deficit -- that is the government's inability to provide good universal education -- and this is something that pre-dates military rule.
If Musharraf should fall, the point is the military will prevail as a critical institution. Bhutto's PR firm might be able to create a climate that gets her back in power but she cannot simply buy her way out of the strategic quandaries that surround Pakistan nor the straitjacket of incompetence and corruption that has plagued her party and feudal politics. In order to govern, she will need to depend heavily on the military (not to mention the US's own strategic dependence on them). More than democratic charlatans and feudal politics, Pakistan needs a healthier civil-military balance and perhaps a power-sharing deal can pave the way for this.
--Sameer Lalwani
Financial score card
The Federal Reserve's half-point cut in its benchmark short-term interest rate
will filter through financial markets and the economy, creating winners, losers
-- and uncertainty. Complete coverage, Bu
http://email.latimes.com/cgi-bin1/DM/y/eBY...Io30G2B0Iwxg0EZ
The Federal Reserve's half-point cut in its benchmark short-term interest rate
will filter through financial markets and the economy, creating winners, losers
-- and uncertainty. Complete coverage, Bu
http://email.latimes.com/cgi-bin1/DM/y/eBY...Io30G2B0Iwxg0EZ
Spy chief says wiretap powers needed
By Peter Spiegel
In addition fighting terrorism, Russian and Chinese spying is near Cold War
levels, he says. Democrats voice privacy concerns.
http://email.latimes.com/cgi-bin1/DM/y/eBY...Io30G2B0Iwxm0Ef
By Peter Spiegel
In addition fighting terrorism, Russian and Chinese spying is near Cold War
levels, he says. Democrats voice privacy concerns.
http://email.latimes.com/cgi-bin1/DM/y/eBY...Io30G2B0Iwxm0Ef
Clinton's healthy shot
By Ronald Brownstein
Much of the commentary on Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton's new healthcare proposal
has focused on what she learned from the collapse of the universal coverage plan
she designed during her husband's first term as president. But a larger legacy
of failure looms over her carefully constructed new initiative.
http://email.latimes.com/cgi-bin1/DM/y/eBY...Io30G2B0Iwx50Ej
By Ronald Brownstein
Much of the commentary on Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton's new healthcare proposal
has focused on what she learned from the collapse of the universal coverage plan
she designed during her husband's first term as president. But a larger legacy
of failure looms over her carefully constructed new initiative.
http://email.latimes.com/cgi-bin1/DM/y/eBY...Io30G2B0Iwx50Ej
Australia close to deal to supply uranium to Russia: FM
Sydney (AFP) Aug 17, 2007 - Australia is close to signing a deal to supply uranium to Russia for civilian purposes which could be completed next month, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer said Friday. Australia could be supplying the nuclear element to Russian reactors as early as next year, and a pact could be signed when Russian President Vladimir Putin visits Australia in September for a summit of the Asia-Pacific ... more
+ Indian uranium deal as good as NPT: Australia
Sydney (AFP) Aug 17, 2007 - Prime Minister John Howard on Friday defended Australia's landmark deal to sell uranium to nuclear power India, saying its safeguards were as strong as the international anti-proliferation treaty. The in-principle deal reached Thursday has been widely criticised, as India has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and has nuclear weapons. India is involved in a long-running nuclea ... more
Sydney (AFP) Aug 17, 2007 - Australia is close to signing a deal to supply uranium to Russia for civilian purposes which could be completed next month, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer said Friday. Australia could be supplying the nuclear element to Russian reactors as early as next year, and a pact could be signed when Russian President Vladimir Putin visits Australia in September for a summit of the Asia-Pacific ... more+ Indian uranium deal as good as NPT: Australia
Sydney (AFP) Aug 17, 2007 - Prime Minister John Howard on Friday defended Australia's landmark deal to sell uranium to nuclear power India, saying its safeguards were as strong as the international anti-proliferation treaty. The in-principle deal reached Thursday has been widely criticised, as India has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and has nuclear weapons. India is involved in a long-running nuclea ... more
US says cannot rework nuclear deal with India
New Delhi (AFP) Aug 18, 2007 - A top US official has said a controversial nuclear pact with New Delhi cannot be renegotiated amid demands from Indian critics for a radical reworking of the deal. "We cannot renegotiate it because the agreement is done. Neither government wishes it to be renegotiated because it is now complete," US under secretary of State Nicholas Burns told Outlook magazine in an interview published on th ... more
+ Yemen says foreign firms to build nuclear reactor
Sanaa (AFP) Aug 19, 2007 - Yemen's energy minister said on Sunday that international companies would build a nuclear reactor in the impoverished Arabian peninsula state, the official Saba news agency reported. "International companies will undertake building... the nuclear reactor that Yemen aspires to own for peaceful purposes of producing electricity," Mustafa Yahia Bahran said. He did not give details about the ... more
New Delhi (AFP) Aug 18, 2007 - A top US official has said a controversial nuclear pact with New Delhi cannot be renegotiated amid demands from Indian critics for a radical reworking of the deal. "We cannot renegotiate it because the agreement is done. Neither government wishes it to be renegotiated because it is now complete," US under secretary of State Nicholas Burns told Outlook magazine in an interview published on th ... more+ Yemen says foreign firms to build nuclear reactor
Sanaa (AFP) Aug 19, 2007 - Yemen's energy minister said on Sunday that international companies would build a nuclear reactor in the impoverished Arabian peninsula state, the official Saba news agency reported. "International companies will undertake building... the nuclear reactor that Yemen aspires to own for peaceful purposes of producing electricity," Mustafa Yahia Bahran said. He did not give details about the ... more
Analysis: Kazakhstan's nuclear future
Washington (UPI) Aug 14, 2007 - While Western attention focuses on the rising oil and natural gas potential of Caspian states, rising energy player Kazakhstan has another energy asset up its sleeve: uranium. Kazakhstan contains the world's second-largest uranium reserves, estimated at 1.5 million tons. In 2006 it produced 5,279 tons of uranium, 21 percent more than in 2005, and intends in 2007 to increase uranium prod ... more
Washington (UPI) Aug 14, 2007 - While Western attention focuses on the rising oil and natural gas potential of Caspian states, rising energy player Kazakhstan has another energy asset up its sleeve: uranium. Kazakhstan contains the world's second-largest uranium reserves, estimated at 1.5 million tons. In 2006 it produced 5,279 tons of uranium, 21 percent more than in 2005, and intends in 2007 to increase uranium prod ... more
Bush, Singh discuss US-India nuke pact
Crawford, Texas (AFP) Aug 14, 2007 - US President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on Tuesday discussed the controversial US-India civilian nuclear energy agreement, the White House said. Their telephone conversation came as US officials look for ways to overcome stiff opposition in India and in the US Congress to the pact, which the embattled Bush sees as a key foreign policy victory. "What I would p ... more
+ Indian PM defends controversial US nuclear deal
New Delhi (AFP) Aug 13, 2007 - Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on Monday defended a controversial civilian nuclear accord with the United States, saying it would not affect the nation's military programme or any plans to test atomic weapons. The accord, which covers civil nuclear technology and seeks to bring India into the loop of global atomic commerce after a gap of three decades, was rejected almost immediately b ... more
+ US congressman's response to Indian PM on nuclear deal
Washington (AFP) Aug 13, 2007 - A veteran congressman on Monday branded a landmark US civilian nuclear deal with India as a "capitulation" to New Delhi and demanded details on Indian ties with Iran. Representative Ed Markey released a statement following Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's defense of the accord in a speech to parliament. "The Bush administration claims it is seeking nuclear cooperation, but in reali ... more
Crawford, Texas (AFP) Aug 14, 2007 - US President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on Tuesday discussed the controversial US-India civilian nuclear energy agreement, the White House said. Their telephone conversation came as US officials look for ways to overcome stiff opposition in India and in the US Congress to the pact, which the embattled Bush sees as a key foreign policy victory. "What I would p ... more+ Indian PM defends controversial US nuclear deal
New Delhi (AFP) Aug 13, 2007 - Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on Monday defended a controversial civilian nuclear accord with the United States, saying it would not affect the nation's military programme or any plans to test atomic weapons. The accord, which covers civil nuclear technology and seeks to bring India into the loop of global atomic commerce after a gap of three decades, was rejected almost immediately b ... more+ US congressman's response to Indian PM on nuclear deal
Washington (AFP) Aug 13, 2007 - A veteran congressman on Monday branded a landmark US civilian nuclear deal with India as a "capitulation" to New Delhi and demanded details on Indian ties with Iran. Representative Ed Markey released a statement following Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's defense of the accord in a speech to parliament. "The Bush administration claims it is seeking nuclear cooperation, but in reali ... more
Analysis: Al-Qaida's Achilles' heel
Washington (UPI) Sep 18, 2007 - Since President Bush's Labor Day visit to Iraq's Anbar province, questions have been raised regarding the pacification of what was not too long ago considered the most rebellious and dangerous of provinces in the country. Understandably, the Bush administration is trying to claim credit for the political and military turnaround in Anbar, asserting it was the "surge" of additional U.S. ... more
+ Russia warns against Iran war
Moscow (AFP) Sept 18, 2007 - Russia expressed apprehension Tuesday over the possibility of a war with Iran evoked by French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, who again urged tougher sanctions to halt Tehran's nuclear programme. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov emphasised Russia's "concern" over "multiple reports that military action against Iran is being seriously considered. It's hard to imagine what that could do to ... more
Washington (UPI) Sep 18, 2007 - Since President Bush's Labor Day visit to Iraq's Anbar province, questions have been raised regarding the pacification of what was not too long ago considered the most rebellious and dangerous of provinces in the country. Understandably, the Bush administration is trying to claim credit for the political and military turnaround in Anbar, asserting it was the "surge" of additional U.S. ... more+ Russia warns against Iran war
Moscow (AFP) Sept 18, 2007 - Russia expressed apprehension Tuesday over the possibility of a war with Iran evoked by French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, who again urged tougher sanctions to halt Tehran's nuclear programme. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov emphasised Russia's "concern" over "multiple reports that military action against Iran is being seriously considered. It's hard to imagine what that could do to ... more
Analysis: Iraq, oil and Greenspan's Gospel
Washington (UPI) Sep 18, 2007 - History and reality cap the fallout from former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan's one-liner in his new book that the war in Iraq is "largely about oil." The mere 20 words in the 500-plus page memoir elicited much media hype and a prompt defense from the Bush administration. Greenspan used the media circuit to qualify -- though not contradict -- what he originally wrote. "I am ... more
Washington (UPI) Sep 18, 2007 - History and reality cap the fallout from former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan's one-liner in his new book that the war in Iraq is "largely about oil." The mere 20 words in the 500-plus page memoir elicited much media hype and a prompt defense from the Bush administration. Greenspan used the media circuit to qualify -- though not contradict -- what he originally wrote. "I am ... more
Adm. Fallon Presses Case Against Iran
By BRIAN MURPHY, Associated Press Writer
Tuesday, September 18, 2007
(09-18) 13:11 PDT MANAMA, Bahrain (AP) --
The top U.S. military commander for the Middle East is pressing Arab allies to form a more united front against Iran, seen by Washington as the region's long-term threat.
At military compounds and royal reception halls across the Persian Gulf, Adm. William Fallon is delivering personal appeals to Arab leaders to counter Iran's ambitions to expand its regional influence and move ahead with its nuclear program.
Fallon has carefully avoided publicly discussing any war contingency plans or making any direct threats against Iran, which sits in his sphere of operations. As head of U.S. Central Command, he oversees forces in Central Asia, the Middle East and the Horn of Africa.
His current 10-day trip, which began Saturday in Bahrain, was more about seeking to quietly galvanize Gulf leaders while letting others sharply escalate pressure on Tehran. On Sunday, French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner said the world should prepare for war if Iran obtains nuclear weapons.
"We are not looking for a new NATO-type alliance against Iran," Fallon told The Associated Press after talks with Bahrain's defense minister, Sheik Khalifa bin Ahmad Al Khalifa.
But the U.S. wants that "when they (Iran) look to the Gulf, they see a group united in response to Iranian hegemonic behavior," Fallon said.
That's not such a simple task.
Many of the small Gulf nations, including Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, have deep cultural, historical or business ties to Iran and increasingly look to Iran as a crucial source for oil and gas as their own fields begin to dwindle in coming decades. They also worry about angering local Shiite communities with affinity to Shiite heavyweight Iran.
In May, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was allowed by authorities in Dubai — the economic dynamo of the Emirates — to lead a rare anti-American rally a day after a visit by Vice President Dick Cheney aimed at countering Tehran's influence.
Still, strong forces pull Gulf states in Washington's direction.
The Gulf's main power, Saudi Arabia, worries about its regional rival Iran increasing its influence among Shiite Muslims, who form a majority in Iraq and have significant communities among the Sunni-dominated nations of the Gulf.
Washington also has forged close military alliances across the Gulf with about 40,000 U.S. troops on land bases — including Kuwait as a key staging ground for Iraq and an expanding presence in Bahrain as host of the U.S. 5th Fleet headquarters.
"These governments realize that they cannot make an enemy of Iran because they have to live with Iran right across the Gulf. On the other hand, they don't want to harm their ties with the United States, which has many interests in the neighborhood," said Ali al-Ahmed, director of the Institute for Gulf Affairs in Washington. "It's a very difficult spot."
Fallon carries the message that the Gulf states are an important front-line deterrent to Iran, which controls the entire northern coastline of the Gulf and could threaten critical oil tanker routes through the Strait of Hormuz.
Military officials with knowledge of Fallon's meetings also suggested that pressure from Gulf nations could dissuade Iranian naval forces from challenging U.S. and allies watching over Iraqi oil platforms and shipping lanes into Kuwait and Iraq. The officials spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to speak to the media.
They said small vessels of Iran's Revolutionary Guard — operating independently from the regular Iranian navy — have apparently been increasing patrols just inside Iran's maritime borders near Iraq's tiny Gulf coast. This is the area where 15 British soldiers and marines were seized in March and held for 13 days by Iran, which claimed the Britons strayed into its waters.
The United States and other nations, led by Britain and Australia, currently have more than two dozen ships in the Gulf region, including the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise and two amphibious ships with their strike groups.
The Enterprise arrived last month shortly after the departure of two carriers, USS John C. Stennis and USS Nimitz, which had been in the Gulf since February in a show of force against Iran.
Fallon's predecessor, retired Gen. John Abizaid, said in Washington on Monday that U.S. forces have the power to "deter Iran should it become nuclear."
"We want to send Iran a message that there are no cracks between the U.S. and its allies here," Fallon said.
His views have the ear of some of the top members of the Gulf's royal families.
In Bahrain, Fallon expressed support for a possible $300 million upgrade for the nation's F-16 fleet and met with Crown Prince Sheik Salman bin Hamad Al-Khalifa, who also serves as commander in chief of the nation's military forces.
Fallon was in the United Arab Emirates on Tuesday. Later in the day, he headed to Oman, and his tour will also take him to Qatar, Kuwait, Afghanistan and Iraq.
http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/n.../i100002D02.DTL
Rice swipes at IAEA, urges bold action on Iran 19 Sep 2007 03:34:04 GMT Source: Reuters
By Sue Pleming SHANNON, Ireland, Sept 19 (Reuters) -
Political directors from the major powers are to meet in Washington on Friday to discuss what could be included in a third U.N. resolution, said Rice, without elaborating.U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice scolded the U.N.'s atomic watchdog agency on Wednesday over its Iran strategy and called for diplomacy with "teeth" to end Tehran's nuclear plans. While repeating the U.S. stand that "all options" remained on the table -- a reference to military action against Tehran -- Rice sought to ease fresh concerns over talk of war. "We believe the diplomatic track can work but it has to work both with a set of incentives and a set of teeth," said Rice. The United States has been critical of a deal International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) chief Mohamed ElBaradei has made with Iran to answer long-standing questions about its nuclear activities. Rice, who has previously accused ElBaradei of "muddying the message" to Iran, voiced strong irritation with the IAEA chief. "The IAEA is not in the business of diplomacy. The IAEA is a technical agency that has a board of governors of which the United States is a member," Rice told reporters traveling with her to Israel and the Palestinian Territories. Washington and its European allies argue that IAEA moves divert attention away from U.N. Security Council demands that Iran suspend uranium enrichment and grant broader inspections. "It is not up to anybody to diminish or to begin to cut back on the obligations that the Iranians have been ordered to take," Rice told reporters before a refueling stop in Shannon. MILITARY ACTION The U.N. Security Council has passed two sanctions resolutions against Iran. The United States is pushing for a third, harsher round of measures, which China and Russia oppose, arguing that the IAEA should be given more time before either further sanctions or military action are considered. ElBaradei has urged Western powers to be patient and has been critical of talk of future military action by the United States and others against Tehran, telling nations opposed to his efforts to learn from the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. France's Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner raised the spectre of war with Iran this week but has since played down his comments, saying they were meant as a warning against military action and not to incite it. Rice declined to comment on Kouchner's statements but said: "The key here is that we are committed to a diplomatic track but the president has not taken any of his options off the table." Aside from U.N. action, The United States and its European allies are considering a range of unilateral measures against Iran. U.S. officials say Washington may soon sanction a unit of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps, among other punitive steps. Tehran says its nuclear programme is for civilian power generation while Washington and others say it is geared towards building a bomb. Western powers point to Iran's past secrecy over nuclear research as cause for concern.
By Sue Pleming SHANNON, Ireland, Sept 19 (Reuters) -
Political directors from the major powers are to meet in Washington on Friday to discuss what could be included in a third U.N. resolution, said Rice, without elaborating.U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice scolded the U.N.'s atomic watchdog agency on Wednesday over its Iran strategy and called for diplomacy with "teeth" to end Tehran's nuclear plans. While repeating the U.S. stand that "all options" remained on the table -- a reference to military action against Tehran -- Rice sought to ease fresh concerns over talk of war. "We believe the diplomatic track can work but it has to work both with a set of incentives and a set of teeth," said Rice. The United States has been critical of a deal International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) chief Mohamed ElBaradei has made with Iran to answer long-standing questions about its nuclear activities. Rice, who has previously accused ElBaradei of "muddying the message" to Iran, voiced strong irritation with the IAEA chief. "The IAEA is not in the business of diplomacy. The IAEA is a technical agency that has a board of governors of which the United States is a member," Rice told reporters traveling with her to Israel and the Palestinian Territories. Washington and its European allies argue that IAEA moves divert attention away from U.N. Security Council demands that Iran suspend uranium enrichment and grant broader inspections. "It is not up to anybody to diminish or to begin to cut back on the obligations that the Iranians have been ordered to take," Rice told reporters before a refueling stop in Shannon. MILITARY ACTION The U.N. Security Council has passed two sanctions resolutions against Iran. The United States is pushing for a third, harsher round of measures, which China and Russia oppose, arguing that the IAEA should be given more time before either further sanctions or military action are considered. ElBaradei has urged Western powers to be patient and has been critical of talk of future military action by the United States and others against Tehran, telling nations opposed to his efforts to learn from the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. France's Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner raised the spectre of war with Iran this week but has since played down his comments, saying they were meant as a warning against military action and not to incite it. Rice declined to comment on Kouchner's statements but said: "The key here is that we are committed to a diplomatic track but the president has not taken any of his options off the table." Aside from U.N. action, The United States and its European allies are considering a range of unilateral measures against Iran. U.S. officials say Washington may soon sanction a unit of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps, among other punitive steps. Tehran says its nuclear programme is for civilian power generation while Washington and others say it is geared towards building a bomb. Western powers point to Iran's past secrecy over nuclear research as cause for concern.
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Private Security Companies in Iraq Under Fire
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White House Keeps Distance From Blackwater Iraq Row
Investigate Blackwater Incident Before Assigning Blame: US
Blackwater Defends Action in Iraq
Iraqi Civilian Deaths Unlikely to Hurt Blackwater
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Sunni World 
The cheerleaders for the surge have constructed a Disney-esque fantasy of Iraq which might as well be in Orlando for all it has to do with the grim reality on the ground. And Abu Risha's assassination isn't likely to dim that fantasy.
Marc Lynch | September 13, 2007 | web only
During his visit to Iraq last week, President Bush carved out an hour to sit down with Shaykh Abd al-Sattar Abu Risha, the controversial head of the Anbar Salvation Council who had become a symbol of America's Anbar strategy. The pictures from that photo-op were likely the Shaykh's death warrant: Abu Risha was assassinated today, even as Bush prepared to use the Anbar strategy's "success" to justify our continued involvement in Iraq.
David Petraeus was quick to blame al-Qaeda for the stunning murder, a leap to judgment emblematic of all which is wrong with America's current views of the Sunnis of Iraq. In reality there are a plethora of likely suspects, reflecting the reality of an intensely factionalized and divided community which little resembles the picture offered by the administration's defenders. Leaders of other tribes deeply resented Abu Risha's prominence. Leaders of the major insurgency factions had for weeks been warning against allowing people such as Abu Risha to illegitimately reap the fruits of their jihad against the occupation. The brazen murder of America's closest Sunni ally in Iraq was as predictable as it was shocking, and carries a powerful message to both Iraqis and Americans about the real prospects for the long-term success of the American project.
- - - Iraq's Sunnis must be amazed at the role they are playing in today's Washington. A year ago, they were "dead-enders," brutal killers disgruntled over their expulsion from power and nostalgic for the return of Saddam Hussein. The suggestion that Americans might productively talk to Sunni insurgents would have met with as much Beltway scorn as do calls today to engage in talks with Iran or Syria.
The best way to deal with these Sunni throwbacks, we were told back then, was to unleash American firepower and pummel them until they surrendered or died. America's failures were failures of timidity and political correctness. Arabs only understood force, and America needed to beat them into submission and forget about "struggling to win hearts and minds which can't be won." The rubble of Fallujah and the prisons of Abu Ghraib bear silent testimony to the influence of such thinking.
How times have changed. Since their turn against al-Qaeda which began last year, the Sunnis have become the foundation of the administration's case for staying in Iraq. Good thing we didn't kill them all.
Alas, while the president's men may have discovered Iraq's Sunnis, they still show little sign of actually understanding them. The cheerleaders for the surge have constructed a Disney-esque fantasy of an Iraqi "Sunni World" which might as well be in Orlando for all it has to do with the grim realities of today's Iraq.
The Sunni turn against al-Qaeda had very little to do with American diplomacy or military efforts, and far more to do with local power struggles and preparations for the widely-expected coming war with the Shia. The origins of this shift in Sunni politics date back to last year's attempt by al-Qaeda in Iraq to impose its hegemony over the Sunni insurgency and to establish physical and political control in a variety of locales.
Al-Qaeda's attacks on Iraqi Shia had always been controversial among the insurgency's factions, many of which preferred to keep a tight focus on attacking American forces and Iraqi government personnel. Al-Qaeda made many enemies with its grandiose rhetoric, attacks on local political figures, attempts to enforce Islamic morality, and decisions to muscle in on tribal smuggling routes. When it declared the "Islamic State of Iraq" as an umbrella for the insurgent groups, the major "nationalist" factions which make up the overwhelming majority of the insurgency decided they had seen enough. The Islamic Army of Iraq released the first public denunciation, other factions followed suit, and nasty fighting (both verbal and military) ensued. The root of the conflict was a struggle for power within the Sunni community -- not attitudes towards the United States or even the central Iraqi government. The turn against al-Qaeda did not mean abandoning the insurgency, even if some of the groups are willing to use American support for their current tactical needs.
- - - General Petraeus worked creatively and effectively to encourage this trend, and soldiers and diplomats on the ground seem to be aware of the complexities of the new "cooperative" mission. The same can't be said for surge cheerleaders in the United States. Much of the conventional wisdom about the Sunni areas now seems to come from the impressions formed by politicians and journalists on stage-managed visits to Iraq, or by carefully crafted press interviews with "former insurgents" hand-picked by American military handlers. But we don't need such a mediated view. Leaders of the major Iraqi Sunni groups actually speak quite often and quite candidly to their own people, though: in open letters, in official statements posted on internet forums, in the Arab and Iraqi press, and in statements released on al-Jazeera and other satellite television stations. What they say in such statements, in Arabic, when addressing their own constituencies, might be considered a more reliable guide to their strategy and thinking. So what are the major Iraqi Sunni leaders saying?
In their literature and public rhetoric, the Sunni insurgency has already defeated the American occupation -- which is why the Americans stopped fighting them and came to them for help in fighting al-Qaeda. One discovers virtually nothing in this literature of the American conceit that our forces wore them out or forced them to come to the table. During his meeting with President Bush in Anbar last week, Abu Risha, reportedly joked that his people had achieved in four months what the American military could not achieve in four years. It was one of the few claims made by Abu Risha with which most Iraqi Sunnis would agree, and one which should probably have infuriated more Americans than it seems to have.
Most of these statements are already looking past the question of al-Qaeda, and are instead in preparation for the aftermath of an American withdrawal. The overwhelming theme of recent Sunni discourse is the need to achieve political unity to prepare for a post-occupation Iraq. While Americans celebrate their cordial relations with certain tribal shaykhs, the insurgency's leaders publicly fumed that the fruits of their victory might be snatched by undeserving interlopers. The widely disseminated pictures of President Bush shaking hands with Sattar Abu Risha, the epitome of such illegitimate bon vivantes, were likely his death warrant.
Meanwhile, certain tribes worry that the groundwork is being laid for the domination of Sunni politics by other tribes, and that this is in fact the American plan -- to leave behind a divided, suspicious, and compromised array of tribes which will be unable to act politically. An important recent open letter from the highly influential Association of Muslim Scholars powerfully invoked the experience of the Afghan jihad, which collapsed upon itself after defeating the Soviet Union. The famously fractious insurgency has been trying hard to put forward a public political front to fill this perceived void, though at this point the various projects still seem to exist mostly on paper.
Partition, soft or hard, has far fewer fans in Anbar than in Washington. Most Sunnis continue to support a unified Iraqi state, and have exaggerated expectations about the role they should play in such a state. A recent letter from the "Amir" of the Islamic Army of Iraq claimed that Sunnis made up 60 percent of the population of Iraq, and few Sunnis seem ready to accept the status of "tolerated minority" within a Shia-dominated state. The Maliki government is almost universally denounced as sectarian, culpable for sectarian cleansing, and an Iranian puppet.
There is absolutely nothing in current Sunni discourse to suggest that any sort of "bottom up reconciliation" with the Shia is taking place or that the tactical cooperation with American forces against al-Qaeda is producing any kind of meaningful integration into the Iraqi state. Far more common is the need to prepare for future conflict with the Shia and, increasingly, the Kurds (see Kirkuk and Mosul). Resentment over the sectarian 'cleansing' of Baghdad runs exceptionally high, and few Sunnis seem prepared to accept any political settlement which does not include their return to Baghdad -- something that the Shia militias (which continue to dominate the Iraqi Police) seem rather unlikely to accept.
Finally, the alliance of convenience with American forces has not translated into support for the United States at the mass level. A public opinion survey conducted last month -- well into the surge -- found that only 1 percent of Sunnis say they have confidence in American forces and only 1 percent of Sunnis support the American presence in Iraq. Rather, 72 percent of Sunnis say that the US forces should leave immediately, 95 percent say that the presence of U.S. troops makes security worse, and 93 percent still see attacks on coalition forces as acceptable. Such results should make obvious the vacuity of claims that the turn against al-Qaeda was a victory for American diplomacy.
These Iraqi views throw into sharp relief the point I made in early August that the American strategy of empowering Sunnis at the local level actually worked against the goal of strengthening the national Iraqi state. This contradiction emerged as a key theme in this week's congressional hearings, and forced the president's team to concoct a gerry-rigged strategic argument linking the developments at the local and national levels. But these scenarios are almost impossibly utopian and astonishingly divorced from the messy realities of politics. The idea that the current strategy will produce bottom-up reconciliation, develop a political constituency for moderation, and push political development on the national level is deeply misleading. Does anybody really believe that handing these angry young Sunnis jobs in a police force dominated by the most sectarian Shia militias will give them a stake in the current political system?
Abu Risha's murder demonstrates the strategic naivete of these arguments. The Anbar strategy relies on a series of best-case scenarios in which virtually nothing can go wrong -- and when, in Iraq, has nothing gone wrong? Other powerful players were always going to be willing and able to take steps against a process which threatened their interests: not just al-Qaeda, but competing tribes, insurgency groups, and Iraqi Shia, all of whom fear that the guns will soon be aimed at them. The murder of Abu Risha exposes realities which should have been obvious, and offer a grim context for Bush's attempts to rest the case for America's war in Iraq on Anbar's "success."
http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?articl..._as_peacemakers
Marc Lynch is associate professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University, and author of the popular Middle East politics blog Abu Aardvark. His most recent book, Voices of the New Arab Public: Al-Jazeera, Iraq, and Middle East Politics Today, was published last year by Columbia University Press.
The cheerleaders for the surge have constructed a Disney-esque fantasy of Iraq which might as well be in Orlando for all it has to do with the grim reality on the ground. And Abu Risha's assassination isn't likely to dim that fantasy.
Marc Lynch | September 13, 2007 | web only
During his visit to Iraq last week, President Bush carved out an hour to sit down with Shaykh Abd al-Sattar Abu Risha, the controversial head of the Anbar Salvation Council who had become a symbol of America's Anbar strategy. The pictures from that photo-op were likely the Shaykh's death warrant: Abu Risha was assassinated today, even as Bush prepared to use the Anbar strategy's "success" to justify our continued involvement in Iraq.
David Petraeus was quick to blame al-Qaeda for the stunning murder, a leap to judgment emblematic of all which is wrong with America's current views of the Sunnis of Iraq. In reality there are a plethora of likely suspects, reflecting the reality of an intensely factionalized and divided community which little resembles the picture offered by the administration's defenders. Leaders of other tribes deeply resented Abu Risha's prominence. Leaders of the major insurgency factions had for weeks been warning against allowing people such as Abu Risha to illegitimately reap the fruits of their jihad against the occupation. The brazen murder of America's closest Sunni ally in Iraq was as predictable as it was shocking, and carries a powerful message to both Iraqis and Americans about the real prospects for the long-term success of the American project.
- - - Iraq's Sunnis must be amazed at the role they are playing in today's Washington. A year ago, they were "dead-enders," brutal killers disgruntled over their expulsion from power and nostalgic for the return of Saddam Hussein. The suggestion that Americans might productively talk to Sunni insurgents would have met with as much Beltway scorn as do calls today to engage in talks with Iran or Syria.
The best way to deal with these Sunni throwbacks, we were told back then, was to unleash American firepower and pummel them until they surrendered or died. America's failures were failures of timidity and political correctness. Arabs only understood force, and America needed to beat them into submission and forget about "struggling to win hearts and minds which can't be won." The rubble of Fallujah and the prisons of Abu Ghraib bear silent testimony to the influence of such thinking.
How times have changed. Since their turn against al-Qaeda which began last year, the Sunnis have become the foundation of the administration's case for staying in Iraq. Good thing we didn't kill them all.
Alas, while the president's men may have discovered Iraq's Sunnis, they still show little sign of actually understanding them. The cheerleaders for the surge have constructed a Disney-esque fantasy of an Iraqi "Sunni World" which might as well be in Orlando for all it has to do with the grim realities of today's Iraq.
The Sunni turn against al-Qaeda had very little to do with American diplomacy or military efforts, and far more to do with local power struggles and preparations for the widely-expected coming war with the Shia. The origins of this shift in Sunni politics date back to last year's attempt by al-Qaeda in Iraq to impose its hegemony over the Sunni insurgency and to establish physical and political control in a variety of locales.
Al-Qaeda's attacks on Iraqi Shia had always been controversial among the insurgency's factions, many of which preferred to keep a tight focus on attacking American forces and Iraqi government personnel. Al-Qaeda made many enemies with its grandiose rhetoric, attacks on local political figures, attempts to enforce Islamic morality, and decisions to muscle in on tribal smuggling routes. When it declared the "Islamic State of Iraq" as an umbrella for the insurgent groups, the major "nationalist" factions which make up the overwhelming majority of the insurgency decided they had seen enough. The Islamic Army of Iraq released the first public denunciation, other factions followed suit, and nasty fighting (both verbal and military) ensued. The root of the conflict was a struggle for power within the Sunni community -- not attitudes towards the United States or even the central Iraqi government. The turn against al-Qaeda did not mean abandoning the insurgency, even if some of the groups are willing to use American support for their current tactical needs.
- - - General Petraeus worked creatively and effectively to encourage this trend, and soldiers and diplomats on the ground seem to be aware of the complexities of the new "cooperative" mission. The same can't be said for surge cheerleaders in the United States. Much of the conventional wisdom about the Sunni areas now seems to come from the impressions formed by politicians and journalists on stage-managed visits to Iraq, or by carefully crafted press interviews with "former insurgents" hand-picked by American military handlers. But we don't need such a mediated view. Leaders of the major Iraqi Sunni groups actually speak quite often and quite candidly to their own people, though: in open letters, in official statements posted on internet forums, in the Arab and Iraqi press, and in statements released on al-Jazeera and other satellite television stations. What they say in such statements, in Arabic, when addressing their own constituencies, might be considered a more reliable guide to their strategy and thinking. So what are the major Iraqi Sunni leaders saying?
In their literature and public rhetoric, the Sunni insurgency has already defeated the American occupation -- which is why the Americans stopped fighting them and came to them for help in fighting al-Qaeda. One discovers virtually nothing in this literature of the American conceit that our forces wore them out or forced them to come to the table. During his meeting with President Bush in Anbar last week, Abu Risha, reportedly joked that his people had achieved in four months what the American military could not achieve in four years. It was one of the few claims made by Abu Risha with which most Iraqi Sunnis would agree, and one which should probably have infuriated more Americans than it seems to have.
Most of these statements are already looking past the question of al-Qaeda, and are instead in preparation for the aftermath of an American withdrawal. The overwhelming theme of recent Sunni discourse is the need to achieve political unity to prepare for a post-occupation Iraq. While Americans celebrate their cordial relations with certain tribal shaykhs, the insurgency's leaders publicly fumed that the fruits of their victory might be snatched by undeserving interlopers. The widely disseminated pictures of President Bush shaking hands with Sattar Abu Risha, the epitome of such illegitimate bon vivantes, were likely his death warrant.
Meanwhile, certain tribes worry that the groundwork is being laid for the domination of Sunni politics by other tribes, and that this is in fact the American plan -- to leave behind a divided, suspicious, and compromised array of tribes which will be unable to act politically. An important recent open letter from the highly influential Association of Muslim Scholars powerfully invoked the experience of the Afghan jihad, which collapsed upon itself after defeating the Soviet Union. The famously fractious insurgency has been trying hard to put forward a public political front to fill this perceived void, though at this point the various projects still seem to exist mostly on paper.
Partition, soft or hard, has far fewer fans in Anbar than in Washington. Most Sunnis continue to support a unified Iraqi state, and have exaggerated expectations about the role they should play in such a state. A recent letter from the "Amir" of the Islamic Army of Iraq claimed that Sunnis made up 60 percent of the population of Iraq, and few Sunnis seem ready to accept the status of "tolerated minority" within a Shia-dominated state. The Maliki government is almost universally denounced as sectarian, culpable for sectarian cleansing, and an Iranian puppet.
There is absolutely nothing in current Sunni discourse to suggest that any sort of "bottom up reconciliation" with the Shia is taking place or that the tactical cooperation with American forces against al-Qaeda is producing any kind of meaningful integration into the Iraqi state. Far more common is the need to prepare for future conflict with the Shia and, increasingly, the Kurds (see Kirkuk and Mosul). Resentment over the sectarian 'cleansing' of Baghdad runs exceptionally high, and few Sunnis seem prepared to accept any political settlement which does not include their return to Baghdad -- something that the Shia militias (which continue to dominate the Iraqi Police) seem rather unlikely to accept.
Finally, the alliance of convenience with American forces has not translated into support for the United States at the mass level. A public opinion survey conducted last month -- well into the surge -- found that only 1 percent of Sunnis say they have confidence in American forces and only 1 percent of Sunnis support the American presence in Iraq. Rather, 72 percent of Sunnis say that the US forces should leave immediately, 95 percent say that the presence of U.S. troops makes security worse, and 93 percent still see attacks on coalition forces as acceptable. Such results should make obvious the vacuity of claims that the turn against al-Qaeda was a victory for American diplomacy.
These Iraqi views throw into sharp relief the point I made in early August that the American strategy of empowering Sunnis at the local level actually worked against the goal of strengthening the national Iraqi state. This contradiction emerged as a key theme in this week's congressional hearings, and forced the president's team to concoct a gerry-rigged strategic argument linking the developments at the local and national levels. But these scenarios are almost impossibly utopian and astonishingly divorced from the messy realities of politics. The idea that the current strategy will produce bottom-up reconciliation, develop a political constituency for moderation, and push political development on the national level is deeply misleading. Does anybody really believe that handing these angry young Sunnis jobs in a police force dominated by the most sectarian Shia militias will give them a stake in the current political system?
Abu Risha's murder demonstrates the strategic naivete of these arguments. The Anbar strategy relies on a series of best-case scenarios in which virtually nothing can go wrong -- and when, in Iraq, has nothing gone wrong? Other powerful players were always going to be willing and able to take steps against a process which threatened their interests: not just al-Qaeda, but competing tribes, insurgency groups, and Iraqi Shia, all of whom fear that the guns will soon be aimed at them. The murder of Abu Risha exposes realities which should have been obvious, and offer a grim context for Bush's attempts to rest the case for America's war in Iraq on Anbar's "success."
http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?articl..._as_peacemakers
Marc Lynch is associate professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University, and author of the popular Middle East politics blog Abu Aardvark. His most recent book, Voices of the New Arab Public: Al-Jazeera, Iraq, and Middle East Politics Today, was published last year by Columbia University Press.
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