No end to US's war budget woes
The cost of all United States Department of Defense funds appropriated thus far for its three "war on terror" operations - Iraq, Afghanistan and enhanced security - now equals about 90% of the 12-year war in Vietnam ($670 billion) and about double the cost of the Korean War ($295 billion), with little relief in sight. All this is accompanied by a frightening lack of auditing standards and accountability. Even the human cost of US causalities is in dispute. - David Isenberg (Oct 29, '07)
Full Version: Snuffymith's Blog-Sept. 17 - Nov. 29, 2007
Common Ground Common Sense > National & International News > Op-Ed Articles from the Mainstream Media > Op-Ed Articles from the Mainstream Media Archive
Pages: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42
THE ROVING EYE
The Turks are coming
The United States military commander in northern Iraq has made it clear that he will do "absolutely nothing" about reining in Turkish Kurd rebels in the area. This leaves Turkey with no option but to take matters into its own hands. The major plot, though, is the future of Iraq, or more precisely, the partition of Iraq. - Pepe Escobar (Oct 29, '07)
The Turks are coming
The United States military commander in northern Iraq has made it clear that he will do "absolutely nothing" about reining in Turkish Kurd rebels in the area. This leaves Turkey with no option but to take matters into its own hands. The major plot, though, is the future of Iraq, or more precisely, the partition of Iraq. - Pepe Escobar (Oct 29, '07)
Turkey determined to turn the screws
A Turkish invasion of northern Iraq appears inevitable unless something concrete is done to appease the Turks before their Prime Minister, Recep Tayyep Erdogan, meets US President George W Bush on November 5. All the reassuring words are merely making the Turks more angry and impatient. Ankara, meanwhile, has raised the possibility of economic sanctions against Iraq to force it to do something about the Kurdish rebels operating from its soil. - Sami Moubayed (Oct 29, '07)
A Turkish invasion of northern Iraq appears inevitable unless something concrete is done to appease the Turks before their Prime Minister, Recep Tayyep Erdogan, meets US President George W Bush on November 5. All the reassuring words are merely making the Turks more angry and impatient. Ankara, meanwhile, has raised the possibility of economic sanctions against Iraq to force it to do something about the Kurdish rebels operating from its soil. - Sami Moubayed (Oct 29, '07)
29 October SWJ Op-Ed Roundup
by Dave Dilegge
Al Qaeda's Quagmire - New York Post editorial
Learning the Right Lessons in Iraq – Michael Gerson, Newsweek Magazine
War, Like Life, Is Not a Movie – Mark Steyn, Orange County Register
Taking Down Terrorist Web Sites – James Zirin, Washington Times
Holy Land Trial: Evil Exposed - Steven Emerson, New York Post
Trash Talking World War III - New York Times editorial
Rein in the Rush to a War in Iran – Chicago Sun-Times editorial
Iran Continues to Meddle - James Lyons, Washington Times
Iran: Sanctions Smanctions – David Warren, Real Clear Politics
A Choice for the Ayatollahs - Ofer Bavly, Miami Herald
Don't Alienate Ankara – Gidon Remba, Jerusalem Post
Can Bhutto Survive? – Robert Novak, Washington Post
The Importance of a Failed Israeli-Arab Summit – Gideon Levy, Haaretz
Israeli-Arab Conflict Not Ripe for Resolution Yet – Richard Haass, Real Clear Politics
Corruption's Cost in the Arab World, Beyond – John Cooley, Christian Science Monitor
Don't Expect US to Push Egypt Democracy - Hrach Gregorian, Daily Star
Jordan: Elections without Surprises - Oraib Al-Rantawi, Daily Star
Be Decisive in Darfur – London Daily Telegraph editorial
NATO: Saying Yes to France – Ronald Asmus, Washington Post
Return to Bamiyan - Roger Cohen, New York Times
A World Overwhelmed with Hungry Little Mouths – Melanie Reid, London Times
America's March of Folly - Francis Fukuyama, Canberra Times
Castro's Last Hurrah - USA Today editorial
More Cuba Fulminations – Boston Globe editorial
Cuba's Regime Deserves No Oxygen - Carlos Gutierrez, USA Today
Burma: Monks and the Military – Charles London, The Nation
Clinton: Foreign Policy Grownup – Sebastian Mallaby, Washington Post
Act on the Shield Law – Washington Post editorial
The Politics of Interrogation - Wall Street Journal editorial
Troubling Questions for Judge Mukasey - Miami Herald editorial
Mukasey: More Answers Needed - Carl Tobias, Batlimore Sun
Inspecting the CIA - Los Angeles Times editorial
PMCs: A Job for Uncle Sam - Baltimore Sun editorial
LOST at Sea - John Fonte, National Review
Annan: No Knight in Shining Armor - Nile Gardner, National Review
by Dave Dilegge
Al Qaeda's Quagmire - New York Post editorial
Learning the Right Lessons in Iraq – Michael Gerson, Newsweek Magazine
War, Like Life, Is Not a Movie – Mark Steyn, Orange County Register
Taking Down Terrorist Web Sites – James Zirin, Washington Times
Holy Land Trial: Evil Exposed - Steven Emerson, New York Post
Trash Talking World War III - New York Times editorial
Rein in the Rush to a War in Iran – Chicago Sun-Times editorial
Iran Continues to Meddle - James Lyons, Washington Times
Iran: Sanctions Smanctions – David Warren, Real Clear Politics
A Choice for the Ayatollahs - Ofer Bavly, Miami Herald
Don't Alienate Ankara – Gidon Remba, Jerusalem Post
Can Bhutto Survive? – Robert Novak, Washington Post
The Importance of a Failed Israeli-Arab Summit – Gideon Levy, Haaretz
Israeli-Arab Conflict Not Ripe for Resolution Yet – Richard Haass, Real Clear Politics
Corruption's Cost in the Arab World, Beyond – John Cooley, Christian Science Monitor
Don't Expect US to Push Egypt Democracy - Hrach Gregorian, Daily Star
Jordan: Elections without Surprises - Oraib Al-Rantawi, Daily Star
Be Decisive in Darfur – London Daily Telegraph editorial
NATO: Saying Yes to France – Ronald Asmus, Washington Post
Return to Bamiyan - Roger Cohen, New York Times
A World Overwhelmed with Hungry Little Mouths – Melanie Reid, London Times
America's March of Folly - Francis Fukuyama, Canberra Times
Castro's Last Hurrah - USA Today editorial
More Cuba Fulminations – Boston Globe editorial
Cuba's Regime Deserves No Oxygen - Carlos Gutierrez, USA Today
Burma: Monks and the Military – Charles London, The Nation
Clinton: Foreign Policy Grownup – Sebastian Mallaby, Washington Post
Act on the Shield Law – Washington Post editorial
The Politics of Interrogation - Wall Street Journal editorial
Troubling Questions for Judge Mukasey - Miami Herald editorial
Mukasey: More Answers Needed - Carl Tobias, Batlimore Sun
Inspecting the CIA - Los Angeles Times editorial
PMCs: A Job for Uncle Sam - Baltimore Sun editorial
LOST at Sea - John Fonte, National Review
Annan: No Knight in Shining Armor - Nile Gardner, National Review
Will History Repeat Itself?
by M. Shahid Alam / October 29th, 2007
In January 2002, when President Bush named Iraq, Iran and North Korea as the first targets in his ‘global war against terror’ — the putative ‘axis of evil’ — few noticed a curious omission. Pakistan was not on the list. (Full article …)
October 28, 2007
Did Syria Have Visible WMD Program Prior to US Invasion of Iraq?
By Jonathan Winer
The New York Times has published a remarkable piece on October 27 suggesting that satellite imagery which is now available commercially showed the construction of a nuclear facility in Syria that was well-developed as early as the summer of 2003, and which had been initiated as early as 2001.
In the measured prose of the Times, the informnation "is likely to raise questions about whether the Bush administration overlooked a nascent atomic threat in Syria while planning and executing a war in Iraq, which was later found to have no active nuclear program."
The issue of whether the U.S. invaded the wrong country has lately been focused on suggestions that the real nuclear threat in 2003 and now, has been Iran, not Iraq, an issue highlighted by the increasing focus of the Administration on Iran. There is little doubt that Iran is a serious proliferation threat and reportedly the Administration is considering a "surgical strike" on suspect Iranian WMD facilities, notwithstanding European concerns about Iranian military retaliation, perhaps first in Europe and Latin America.
But if in fact Syria was well along the way to constructing its own nuclear facility, and this reality was actually missed by senior U.S. policy-makers, the apparent failure to recognize this and respond to it years ago is to say the least, disturbing.
The satellite imagery and initial comments suggest that the U.S. simply failed to notice Syria's WMD program, a kind of nuclear negligence. One would hope that there is a different story behind the public facts.
Public hints about the Syrian program by U.S. government officials go back to 2003, appearing amid a fight between then Under Secretary of State John Bolton and intelligence analysts regarding Mr. Bolton's contention that Syria was actively pursuing nuclear capabilities, which the CIA reportedly viewed to be "inflated." The now available satellite imagery raises the question of whether Mr. Bolton may have been right on this issue, without making it clear whether his views were related to knowledge about the existence of the now-eradicated Syrian site.
We need to know more -- a lot more -- about Syria's apparent nuclear program, our intelligence on the program, the U.S. government's handling of that intelligence since 2001, the circumstances that led to the Israeli bombing of the site, and the relationship of any Syrian nuclear program not only to North Korea's program but to the AQ Khan network. Previously, it had been assumed that while Khan had had contacts with Syria, they were preliminary and had not resulted in substantive activities. Failure by Pakistan to provide the U.S. information on any such relationship would raise further questions about the accuracy of State Department public assessments that Pakistani cooperation with the U.S. in addressing the global security consequences of Khan's activities has been "good."
October 28, 2007 10:27 AM Link
Hornberger’s Blog
Monday, October 29, 2007
A Roll of the Dice against Iran
by Jacob G. Hornberger
As most everyone knows, President Bush has now placed that dreadful label — “Terrorist!” — on the government of Iran — well, actually on a piece of the government. That’s the magic word that enables the U.S. government to attack, kill, torture, incarcerate, or destroy the recipient of the label. Unfortunately, it’s also the word that is almost guaranteed to get the knees a’knocking of many Americans, including adult men and women, causing them to support whatever bombs, missiles, torture, incarceration, destruction, and loss of liberty that comes with waging the “war on terrorism.”
Meanwhile, the Associated Press reported yesterday “The head of the U.N. nuclear watchdog said he had no evidence Iran was working actively to build nuclear weapons and expressed concern that escalating rhetoric from the U.S. could bring disaster.”
But, hey, why let truth get in the way of another war of aggression? If the WMD/mushroom-cloud scare could be used to aggress against Iraq, why not use it again, this time against Iran? Anyway, surely President Bush can find people in the State Department and Pentagon who would be willing to issue a report or two stating that Iran is definitely about to fire nuclear weapons at the U.S. Surely he can get the CIA to leak some information from a “credible” secret source about Iran’s smoking nuclear guns to favored journalists in the mainstream press. If all else fails and WMDs are not found in Iran, Bush and his people could always say they’re just engaged in another round of “democracy-spreading,” a process in which killing hundreds of thousands of foreigners, including women and children, is considered “worth it” to U.S. officials.
It’s all enough to remind one of the words of Joseph Goebbels, the National Socialist Party’s propaganda chief:
“If you tell a lie big enough and keep repeating it, people will eventually come to believe it. The lie can be maintained only for such time as the State can shield the people from the political, economic and/or military consequences of the lie. It thus becomes vitally important for the State to use all of its powers to repress dissent, for the truth is the mortal enemy of the lie, and thus by extension, the truth is the greatest enemy of the State.” —Joseph Goebbels
The most brilliant propagandist technique will yield no success unless one fundamental principle is borne in mind constantly — it must confine itself to a few points and repeat them over and over.” —Joseph Goebbels
It doesn’t take a rocket scientist to predict that a war on Iran could have quite large adverse effects on the U.S., including more out-of-control federal spending, more crashing of the dollar, higher expenses at the grocery store and gas pump, retaliatory terrorist strikes, and increased deaths of U.S. soldiers in Iraq.
So, why would Bush do it? Because he knows that the Iraq invasion has produced an ongoing monumental debacle, including the installation of a pro-Iran regime and, now, the prospect of a Turkish invasion of northern Iraq. Bush knows that there is only one way out for the U.S. — an end to the U.S. occupation of Iraq by withdrawing all U.S. forces from the country. But since Bush isn’t about to permit himself to be a president who started a war against a country that never attacked the United States and then “cut and run” from it, he might well conclude that his only hope is to double his bet (after driving the nation even more into hock) and throwing the dice in the desperate hope that a war on Iran would produce pro-U.S. regimes in both Iran and Iraq.
But if a war on Iran doesn’t work out well for Bush and the U.S., his throw of the dice could well be the swan song of the pro-empire, pro-intervention pro-militarist paradigm that has unfortunately held our nation in its grip for so long. As things stand now, increasing numbers of Americans are finally thinking about and reflecting on U.S. foreign policy. Another war of aggression — this time on Iran — might well focus people’s attention on the importance of restoring a limited-government republic to our land.
Mr. Hornberger is founder and president of The Future of Freedom Foundation.
http://fff.org/blog/index.asp
Monday, October 29, 2007
A Roll of the Dice against Iran
by Jacob G. Hornberger
As most everyone knows, President Bush has now placed that dreadful label — “Terrorist!” — on the government of Iran — well, actually on a piece of the government. That’s the magic word that enables the U.S. government to attack, kill, torture, incarcerate, or destroy the recipient of the label. Unfortunately, it’s also the word that is almost guaranteed to get the knees a’knocking of many Americans, including adult men and women, causing them to support whatever bombs, missiles, torture, incarceration, destruction, and loss of liberty that comes with waging the “war on terrorism.”
Meanwhile, the Associated Press reported yesterday “The head of the U.N. nuclear watchdog said he had no evidence Iran was working actively to build nuclear weapons and expressed concern that escalating rhetoric from the U.S. could bring disaster.”
But, hey, why let truth get in the way of another war of aggression? If the WMD/mushroom-cloud scare could be used to aggress against Iraq, why not use it again, this time against Iran? Anyway, surely President Bush can find people in the State Department and Pentagon who would be willing to issue a report or two stating that Iran is definitely about to fire nuclear weapons at the U.S. Surely he can get the CIA to leak some information from a “credible” secret source about Iran’s smoking nuclear guns to favored journalists in the mainstream press. If all else fails and WMDs are not found in Iran, Bush and his people could always say they’re just engaged in another round of “democracy-spreading,” a process in which killing hundreds of thousands of foreigners, including women and children, is considered “worth it” to U.S. officials.
It’s all enough to remind one of the words of Joseph Goebbels, the National Socialist Party’s propaganda chief:
“If you tell a lie big enough and keep repeating it, people will eventually come to believe it. The lie can be maintained only for such time as the State can shield the people from the political, economic and/or military consequences of the lie. It thus becomes vitally important for the State to use all of its powers to repress dissent, for the truth is the mortal enemy of the lie, and thus by extension, the truth is the greatest enemy of the State.” —Joseph Goebbels
The most brilliant propagandist technique will yield no success unless one fundamental principle is borne in mind constantly — it must confine itself to a few points and repeat them over and over.” —Joseph Goebbels
It doesn’t take a rocket scientist to predict that a war on Iran could have quite large adverse effects on the U.S., including more out-of-control federal spending, more crashing of the dollar, higher expenses at the grocery store and gas pump, retaliatory terrorist strikes, and increased deaths of U.S. soldiers in Iraq.
So, why would Bush do it? Because he knows that the Iraq invasion has produced an ongoing monumental debacle, including the installation of a pro-Iran regime and, now, the prospect of a Turkish invasion of northern Iraq. Bush knows that there is only one way out for the U.S. — an end to the U.S. occupation of Iraq by withdrawing all U.S. forces from the country. But since Bush isn’t about to permit himself to be a president who started a war against a country that never attacked the United States and then “cut and run” from it, he might well conclude that his only hope is to double his bet (after driving the nation even more into hock) and throwing the dice in the desperate hope that a war on Iran would produce pro-U.S. regimes in both Iran and Iraq.
But if a war on Iran doesn’t work out well for Bush and the U.S., his throw of the dice could well be the swan song of the pro-empire, pro-intervention pro-militarist paradigm that has unfortunately held our nation in its grip for so long. As things stand now, increasing numbers of Americans are finally thinking about and reflecting on U.S. foreign policy. Another war of aggression — this time on Iran — might well focus people’s attention on the importance of restoring a limited-government republic to our land.
Mr. Hornberger is founder and president of The Future of Freedom Foundation.
http://fff.org/blog/index.asp
The Hakim-Sadr Pact: A New Era in Shiite Politics?
Oct. 29, 2007 - By Babak Rahimi (from Terrorism Monitor, October 25) - The recent "pact of honor" made by two of Iraq's most influential Shiite clerics, Moqtada al-Sadr and Abdul Aziz al-Hakim—aimed at preventing violence and helping to maintain the "Islamic and national interest" of Iraq—appears to signal a significant shift toward stability in Iraq. The two leaders have pledged to enhance relations between their respective groups, merging media and cultural projects, and to refrain from launching negative propaganda against each other (Fars News Agency, October 6). Yet, more importantly, the pact calls for promotion of the legal-political order of post-Baathist Iraq, a major move that could give new life to Nuri al-Maliki's government and curtail potential violence in the south. As the first official agreement between these two prominent leaders, the forged pact can also be recognized as a huge step in improving intra-Shiite relations. Not since the formation of the United Iraqi Alliance, which brought together a number of Shiite political parties under the spiritual leadership of Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani in 2003, has Shiite politics seen such a unified front. The struggle for domination between rival Shiite groups has caused huge problems in the south, especially after the December 2005 elections. Despite a number of attempts for reconciliation, the enmity between al-Hakim and al-Sadr and their militias has remained a major security problem, especially in the provinces of Basra and Maysan, where the two factions are vying for control over oil and territory.
Shame on Them: Republicans and Top Dems Missing at Arab American Leadership Summit 
(But for how much longer?)
I have to give credit to Senator John Sununu. He showed up at the Arab American Institute's National Leadership Conference in Dearborn, Michigan this weekend and openly talked about his search for his Palestinian grandfather's home in old Jerusalem.
Sununu also talked about his attempts to hold back the loss of civil liberties -- to a large degree aimed at Arabs and Arab Americans -- embedded in the Patriot Act.
And then Sununu talked about his work on a Senate Resolution calling for firm resolve in achieving a two-state solution in the Israel-Palestine stand off and said explicitly that America must help engineer the conditions that will lead to the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state.
Sununu was saying things before the 600-plus audience that I couldn't imagine any Republican presidential contenders saying -- with the sole exception of Ron Paul who also spoke at the conference (though I was still flying back from India and missed his comments). But I couldn't really imagine most of the Dems saying what he said as boldly either. Perhaps I'm wrong on that -- but I got a quick sample in Hillary Clinton's "videotaped" message to the Arab American summit.
Hillary seemed genuinely interested in the importance of Arab Americans and sent one of her National Campaign Co-Chairs Lebanese-American William Shaheen (husband of Jeanne and a legend in New Hampshire Democratic politics) to represent her at the conference.
Shaheen was great and connected with the audience and did a great job trying to assure the Arab Americans there that she really does care about the rights of Palestinians and the value of Arab and Arab-American lives as much as she does about Israeli security.
But odd thing about Hillary's commentary -- unlike Sununu, Hillary just did not say "Palestine" or "Palestinian state" in her taped message.
Continue Reading "Shame on Them: Republicans and Top Dems Missing at Arab American Leadership Summit"
05:46 PM | Permalink
(But for how much longer?)
I have to give credit to Senator John Sununu. He showed up at the Arab American Institute's National Leadership Conference in Dearborn, Michigan this weekend and openly talked about his search for his Palestinian grandfather's home in old Jerusalem.
Sununu also talked about his attempts to hold back the loss of civil liberties -- to a large degree aimed at Arabs and Arab Americans -- embedded in the Patriot Act.
And then Sununu talked about his work on a Senate Resolution calling for firm resolve in achieving a two-state solution in the Israel-Palestine stand off and said explicitly that America must help engineer the conditions that will lead to the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state.
Sununu was saying things before the 600-plus audience that I couldn't imagine any Republican presidential contenders saying -- with the sole exception of Ron Paul who also spoke at the conference (though I was still flying back from India and missed his comments). But I couldn't really imagine most of the Dems saying what he said as boldly either. Perhaps I'm wrong on that -- but I got a quick sample in Hillary Clinton's "videotaped" message to the Arab American summit.
Hillary seemed genuinely interested in the importance of Arab Americans and sent one of her National Campaign Co-Chairs Lebanese-American William Shaheen (husband of Jeanne and a legend in New Hampshire Democratic politics) to represent her at the conference.
Shaheen was great and connected with the audience and did a great job trying to assure the Arab Americans there that she really does care about the rights of Palestinians and the value of Arab and Arab-American lives as much as she does about Israeli security.
But odd thing about Hillary's commentary -- unlike Sununu, Hillary just did not say "Palestine" or "Palestinian state" in her taped message.
Continue Reading "Shame on Them: Republicans and Top Dems Missing at Arab American Leadership Summit"
05:46 PM | Permalink
YALE CHIEF WARNS OF US LEADERS' 'INSULARITY' - DAVID TURNER (FINANICAL TIMES, OCTOBER 29): http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f10d28d0-8649-11...?nclick_check=1
THE MEGA-BUNKER OF BAGHDAD: THE NEW AMERICAN EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD NOVEMBER 2007): The new embassy is not about leaving Iraq, but about staying on 'for whatever reason, under whatever circumstances, at whatever cost.'
http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/feature...1?currentPage=1
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/artic.../11/1803/0.html
STATE DEPARTMENT TO ORDER 250 TO IRAQ POSTS - REUTERS (NEW YORK TIMES, OCTOBER 27)
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/27/washingt...agewanted=print
WINNING ONE BATTLE, FIGHTING THE NEXT: AMERICA NEEDS TO BE HEARTENED BY OUR SUCCESS IN IRAQ, AND SEIZE A VICTORY - FREDERICK W. KAGAN (WEEKLY STANDARD, NOVEMBER 5): America must not try to pocket the success we have achieved in Iraq and declare a premature and meaningless victory. Instead, let us be heartened by success.
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Publ...9rizcg.asp'
A MISSED MOMENT IN IRAQ - HENRI J. BARKEY (WASHINGTON POST, OCTOBER 27): The Bush administration has only itself to blame for the quandary it faces with Turkish forces poised to intervene in northern Iraq.
http://www.counterpunch.org/fantina10272007.html
SLIPPING IN AFGHANISTAN: AS THE VIOLENCE WORSENS, NATO STRUGGLES TO RAISE TROOPS EDITORIAL (WASHINGTON POST, OCTOBER 27): http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...2601955_pf.html
FEARING FEAR ITSELF - PAUL KRUGMAN (NEW YORK TIMES, OCTOBER 29): .
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/29/opinion/...agewanted=print
DEFINING TORTURE - CLIFFORD D. MAY (WASHINGTON TIMES, OCTOBER 28): How much must we tell al Qaeda and other terrorists about what to expect? http://www.washingtontimes.com/apps/pbcs.d...mplate=printart
WATERBOARDING IS TORTURE ... PERIOD (UPDATED) ? MALCOLM NANCE (SMALL WARS JOURNAL, OCTOBER 29:ttp://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/10/waterboarding-is-torture-perio/
THE SMART WAY TO SHUT GITMO DOWN - MATTHEW WAXMAN (WASHINGTON POST, OCTOBER 28): http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...2601761_pf.html
WAR COSTS SPIRAL OUT OF CONTROL - ROBERT SCHEER (TRUTHDIG, OCTOBER 23): http://www.truthdig.com/report/item/200710...ericas_pockets/
TAKING DOWN TERRORIST WEB SITES - JAMES D. ZIRIN (WASHINGTON TIMES, OCTOBER 29): It is next to impossible to shut down a terrorist Web site. Terrorist Web sites are no laughing matter.
http://www.washingtontimes.com/apps/pbcs.d...mplate=printart
A WAR ON EVERY SCREEN - A. O. SCOTT (NEW YORK TIMES, OCTOBER 28): http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/28/movies/2...agewanted=print
WHAT BECAME OF THE REALIST? A CLOSE OBSERVER TRACES THE RISE AND FALL OF CONDI RICE'S STAR [REVIEW OF THE CONFIDANTE: CONDOLEEZZA RICE AND THE CREATION OF THE BUSH LEGACY BY GLENN KESSLER] - RICH LOWRY (WASHINGTON POST, OCTOBER 28): http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...2502627_pf.html
RICE LOOKS TO HISTORY FOR PEACE EFFORT - MATTHEW LEE, ASSOCIATED PRESS (WASHINGTON POST, OCTOBER 28): http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...2700215_pf.html
BLOOD ON HER HANDS - ANN WRIGHT (COMMON DREAMS, OCTOBER 29): http://www.commondreams.org/archive/2007/10/29/4877/
Taiwan's Chen promises not to develop nukes
Taipei (AFP) Oct 29, 2007 - Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian on Monday pledged that his government would not develop nuclear weapons, but said the island needed to boost its defences to counter China's military might. "On behalf of my countrymen, I hereby want to promise to you that Taiwan will by no means develop, introduce nor use nuclear weapons," Chen said in a speech to members of the Taiwan Foreign Correspondents' ... more
Taipei (AFP) Oct 29, 2007 - Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian on Monday pledged that his government would not develop nuclear weapons, but said the island needed to boost its defences to counter China's military might. "On behalf of my countrymen, I hereby want to promise to you that Taiwan will by no means develop, introduce nor use nuclear weapons," Chen said in a speech to members of the Taiwan Foreign Correspondents' ... more
Russia test fires inter-continental missile
Moscow (AFP) Oct 29, 2007 - Russia test fired an inter-continental ballistic missile on Monday from a cosmodrome in neighbouring Kazakhstan, Russian news agencies reported. The RS-18 missile, known under Western classification systems as an SS-19 Stiletto, was aimed at a test ground in the Kamchatka peninsula in far eastern Russia, said a spokesman for Russia's strategic missile forces. The test was intended to che ... more
Moscow (AFP) Oct 29, 2007 - Russia test fired an inter-continental ballistic missile on Monday from a cosmodrome in neighbouring Kazakhstan, Russian news agencies reported. The RS-18 missile, known under Western classification systems as an SS-19 Stiletto, was aimed at a test ground in the Kamchatka peninsula in far eastern Russia, said a spokesman for Russia's strategic missile forces. The test was intended to che ... more
Czech-US radar talks resume in aftermath of Gates bombshell
Prague (AFP) Oct 29, 2007 - Czech and US experts will start a third round of negotiations Tuesday over the siting of a US anti-missile radar on Czech soil, officials from both sides told AFP Monday. "The talks will only deal with the legal framework for US soldiers being at the base, not at all with Russians," Czech defence ministry spokesman Jan Pesek told AFP. He referred to previous suggestions by US Defence Secreta ... more
Prague (AFP) Oct 29, 2007 - Czech and US experts will start a third round of negotiations Tuesday over the siting of a US anti-missile radar on Czech soil, officials from both sides told AFP Monday. "The talks will only deal with the legal framework for US soldiers being at the base, not at all with Russians," Czech defence ministry spokesman Jan Pesek told AFP. He referred to previous suggestions by US Defence Secreta ... more
US mulls North Korea meeting at Beijing nuclear talks
Washington (AFP) Oct 29, 2007 - Chief US negotiator Christopher Hill could meet his North Korean counterpart Kim Kye-Gwan in Beijing this week, the State Department said Monday amid new talks on the Stalinist state's nuclear program. Hill, the assistant secretary of state for East Asian affairs, is due to hold bilateral contacts with Chinese officials from Wednesday regarding international efforts to dismantle North Korea' ... more
Washington (AFP) Oct 29, 2007 - Chief US negotiator Christopher Hill could meet his North Korean counterpart Kim Kye-Gwan in Beijing this week, the State Department said Monday amid new talks on the Stalinist state's nuclear program. Hill, the assistant secretary of state for East Asian affairs, is due to hold bilateral contacts with Chinese officials from Wednesday regarding international efforts to dismantle North Korea' ... more
Six nations resume talks on energy aid for NKorea
Seoul (AFP) Oct 29, 2007 - A ship with heavy fuel oil provided by the United States was headed to North Korea Monday as nations involved in disarmament talks resumed talks on energy aid for the communist country. The two-day meeting at Panmunjom, on the heavily fortified inter-Korean border, came after the North agreed to disable by December 31 its plants producing material for atomic weapons. "We are gathered her ... more
Seoul (AFP) Oct 29, 2007 - A ship with heavy fuel oil provided by the United States was headed to North Korea Monday as nations involved in disarmament talks resumed talks on energy aid for the communist country. The two-day meeting at Panmunjom, on the heavily fortified inter-Korean border, came after the North agreed to disable by December 31 its plants producing material for atomic weapons. "We are gathered her ... more
Turkey Says Military Option Still On Table To Fight Kurd Rebels
Teheran (RIA Novosti) Oct 29, 2007 - Turkey said on Sunday that a military option was still on the table to deal with Iraq-based separatist Kurdish rebels. The Turkish-Iraqi talks, held to discuss measures to prevent a cross-border military operation into northern Iraq to hunt down the rebels who keep their bases there, failed on Friday as Turkey rejected Iraqi proposals, saying they did not satisfy it. The Turkish parliament ... more
Teheran (RIA Novosti) Oct 29, 2007 - Turkey said on Sunday that a military option was still on the table to deal with Iraq-based separatist Kurdish rebels. The Turkish-Iraqi talks, held to discuss measures to prevent a cross-border military operation into northern Iraq to hunt down the rebels who keep their bases there, failed on Friday as Turkey rejected Iraqi proposals, saying they did not satisfy it. The Turkish parliament ... more
U.S. Stands in the Way of International Pipeline DealAbbas Maleki, MIT Center for International Studies
ForeignPolicy: A major natural gas pipeline that would stretch from Iran to Pakistan and India faces serious hurdles, including fierce opposition from the U.S.
Bill Moyers: Cheney Has Been Fighting to Spy On You For Over 30 Years [VIDEO]
Post by Nicole Belle
Video: Moyers looks at the undoing of Congress' checks and balances put in place following the Church Committee hearings and the unprecedented expansion of Executive authority in the wake of 9/11. More »
US: Iran seeks nuclear weapons
Mon Oct 29, 1:38 PM ET
The United States on Monday brushed aside the UN nuclear watchdog agency chief's warning that there was no proof Iran seeks atomic weapons, and invited him to stay out of diplomacy with Tehran.
Mohamed ElBaradei, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), told CNN Sunday that he had no evidence Iran was building nuclear weapons and accused US leaders of adding "fuel to the fire" with their warlike rhetoric.
"He will say what he will. He is the head of a technical agency," US State Department spokesman Sean McCormack told reporters. "I think we can handle diplomacy on this one."
"We appreciate the work that the IAEA is performing but it is the member states of the international community that are going to be responsible of the diplomacy with respect to Iran and its nuclear program," said McCormack.
At the White House, spokeswoman Dana Perino said there was no doubt about Iran's plans because "this is a country that is enriching and reprocessing uranium and the reason that one does that is to lead towards a nuclear weapon."
Uranium enrichment and reprocessing produces fuel for nuclear reactors, but can also be a key step to creating the core of an atomic bomb. Iran says it wants a civilian energy program, not an atomic arsenal.
Asked whether any country enriching uranium seeks nuclear weapons, US National Security Council spokesman Gordon Johndroe clarified Perino's remarks.
"I would say that we're concerned about Iran doing this because they could have the capability to have a nuclear weapon. Each country is different, but obviously Dana was asked and was talking about Iran," he said.
Iran's leaders have repeatedly said they will never suspend enrichment, in flagrant defiance of repeated UN Security Council resolutions calling on Tehran to suspend the process.
"We have put on the table for Iran a path for them to get a civil nuclear program. And all they have to do to get there is to suspend its enrichment of reprocessing of uranium and they can come to the table and we can have a further discussion," said Perino.
"It's the Iranians who have decided not to be at that table," she said.
The United States has sharply escalated its rhetoric against the Islamic Republic, while slapping a new set of sanctions on its Revolutionary Guards, accused of spreading weapons of mass destruction, and its elite Quds Force, which was designated as a supporter of terrorism.
"Iran is the largest national security challenge we have in regards to nuclear weapons today," said Perino, who contrasted Tehran's approach to North Korea's agreement to dismantle its nuclear weapons program.
"We are in discussions with North Korea, through the six-party talks, and that is because North Korea agreed to give up its weapons and make a full declaration of activities that they've been pursuing," she said.
She was referring to negotiations grouping China, Japan, Russia, North and South Korea and the United States, and a deal offering Pyongyang economic and diplomatic rewards if it gives up it nuclear weapons program.
"Iran could have the same option, but they've chosen not to," the spokeswoman said.
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20071029/pl_af...3ww8.BsVdCtOrgF
SECRECY NEWS
from the FAS Project on Government Secrecy
Volume 2007, Issue No. 107
October 30, 2007
Secrecy News Blog: http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/
Support Secrecy News:
http://www.fas.org/static/contrib_sec.jsp
** DNI DISCLOSES NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM BUDGET
DNI DISCLOSES NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM BUDGET
As required by law, the Director of National Intelligence today
disclosed that the budget for the National Intelligence Program in
Fiscal Year 2007 was $43.5 billion.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2007/10/dni103007.pdf
The disclosure was strongly resisted by the intelligence bureaucracy,
and for that very reason it may have significant repercussions for
national security classification policy.
Although the aggregate intelligence budget figures for 1997 and 1998
($26.6 and $26.7 billion respectively) had previously been disclosed in
response to a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit brought by the
Federation of American Scientists, intelligence officials literally
swore under oath that any further disclosures would damage national
security.
"Information about the intelligence budget is of great interest to
nations and non-state groups (e.g., terrorists and drug traffickers)
wishing to calculate the strengths and weaknesses of the United States
and their own points of vulnerability to U.S. intelligence and law
enforcement agencies," then-DCI George J. Tenet told a federal court in
April 2003, explaining his position that disclosure of the intelligence
budget total would cause "serious damage" to the United States.
Even historical budget information from half a century ago "must be
withheld from public disclosure... because its release would tend to
reveal intelligence methods," declared then-acting DCI John E.
McLaughlin in a 2004 lawsuit, also filed by FAS.
Deferring to executive authority, federal judges including Judge Thomas
F. Hogan and Judge Ricardo M. Urbina accepted these statements at face
value and ruled in favor of continued secrecy.
But now it appears that such information may safely be disclosed after
all.
Because the new disclosure is so sharply at odds with past practice, it
may introduce some positive instability into a recalcitrant
classification system. The question implicitly arises, if intelligence
officials were wrong to classify this information, what other data are
they wrongly withholding?
Some historical background on U.S. intelligence spending may be found
here:
http://www.fas.org/irp/budget/index.html
And see "2007 Spying Said to Cost $50 Billion" by Walter Pincus,
Washington Post, October 30:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...7102902062.html
_______________________________________________
Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the
Federation of American Scientists.
The Secrecy News Blog is at:
http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/
from the FAS Project on Government Secrecy
Volume 2007, Issue No. 107
October 30, 2007
Secrecy News Blog: http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/
Support Secrecy News:
http://www.fas.org/static/contrib_sec.jsp
** DNI DISCLOSES NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM BUDGET
DNI DISCLOSES NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM BUDGET
As required by law, the Director of National Intelligence today
disclosed that the budget for the National Intelligence Program in
Fiscal Year 2007 was $43.5 billion.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2007/10/dni103007.pdf
The disclosure was strongly resisted by the intelligence bureaucracy,
and for that very reason it may have significant repercussions for
national security classification policy.
Although the aggregate intelligence budget figures for 1997 and 1998
($26.6 and $26.7 billion respectively) had previously been disclosed in
response to a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit brought by the
Federation of American Scientists, intelligence officials literally
swore under oath that any further disclosures would damage national
security.
"Information about the intelligence budget is of great interest to
nations and non-state groups (e.g., terrorists and drug traffickers)
wishing to calculate the strengths and weaknesses of the United States
and their own points of vulnerability to U.S. intelligence and law
enforcement agencies," then-DCI George J. Tenet told a federal court in
April 2003, explaining his position that disclosure of the intelligence
budget total would cause "serious damage" to the United States.
Even historical budget information from half a century ago "must be
withheld from public disclosure... because its release would tend to
reveal intelligence methods," declared then-acting DCI John E.
McLaughlin in a 2004 lawsuit, also filed by FAS.
Deferring to executive authority, federal judges including Judge Thomas
F. Hogan and Judge Ricardo M. Urbina accepted these statements at face
value and ruled in favor of continued secrecy.
But now it appears that such information may safely be disclosed after
all.
Because the new disclosure is so sharply at odds with past practice, it
may introduce some positive instability into a recalcitrant
classification system. The question implicitly arises, if intelligence
officials were wrong to classify this information, what other data are
they wrongly withholding?
Some historical background on U.S. intelligence spending may be found
here:
http://www.fas.org/irp/budget/index.html
And see "2007 Spying Said to Cost $50 Billion" by Walter Pincus,
Washington Post, October 30:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...7102902062.html
_______________________________________________
Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the
Federation of American Scientists.
The Secrecy News Blog is at:
http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/
Lt. Michael Murphy 'The Protector' - San Francisco Chronicle editorial
US Military: Asking Too Much of Too Few – Joseph Galloway, McClatchy Newspapers
New Threat Stirs Iraqi Nationalism – Richard Gwyn, Toronto Star
Kurdish Terror and the West - Tulin Daloglu, Washington Times
Will Bush Really Bomb Iran? – Sarah Baker, London Times
The Cost of Bellicosity Towards Iran - Kaveh Afrasiabi, Christian Science Monitor
Iran: “Murder with Impunity” – Paul Marshall, Weekly Standard
Mainstream Mosques: Studies in Hate – London Times editorial
How to Build Trust at Annapolis Summit – Alon Ben-Meir, Jerusalem Post
Saudis: Uncongenial, But Trustworthy – Amir Taheri, London Times
Upbeat Indicators – Donald Lambro, Washington Times
Restoring Habeas Corpus – Bruce Fein, Washington Times
The Waterboarding Dodge – Washington Post editorial
Is Mukasey Willing to be a 'No' Man in the White House? – USA Today editorial
Yes, It's Clearly Torture - Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel editorial
Bearing Witness to Torture - Clyde Haberman, New York Times
Reassess America's 'Idealism' – Janet Daley, London Daily Telegraph
Bush's Speech at Castro's Grave - Carlos Alberto Montaner, Miami Herald
Argentina: All in the Family – London Times editorial
Argentinians Elect Woman President - Pittsburgh Post-Gazette editorial
Kirchners: Two for the Price of One - Roberto Guareschi, Miami Herald
How Argentina Jump-Started its Economy - Mark Weisbrot, Los Angeles Times
Amazonian Swindle – Bret Stephens, Wall Street Journal
Uganda: Bush, Museveni: Step Up! - Carolyn Davis, Philadelphia Inquirer
Prosecuting Our Friends – Mona Charen, Washington Times
The Dalai Lama’s Plea – Toronto Star editorial
Australia: New Jet Fighters Buy Us Leverage – Nicholas Stuart, Canberra Times
German Soldiers and Toilet Paper – London Times editorial
LOST Runs Silent, Runs Deep – Frank Gaffney Jr., Washington Times
US Military: Asking Too Much of Too Few – Joseph Galloway, McClatchy Newspapers
New Threat Stirs Iraqi Nationalism – Richard Gwyn, Toronto Star
Kurdish Terror and the West - Tulin Daloglu, Washington Times
Will Bush Really Bomb Iran? – Sarah Baker, London Times
The Cost of Bellicosity Towards Iran - Kaveh Afrasiabi, Christian Science Monitor
Iran: “Murder with Impunity” – Paul Marshall, Weekly Standard
Mainstream Mosques: Studies in Hate – London Times editorial
How to Build Trust at Annapolis Summit – Alon Ben-Meir, Jerusalem Post
Saudis: Uncongenial, But Trustworthy – Amir Taheri, London Times
Upbeat Indicators – Donald Lambro, Washington Times
Restoring Habeas Corpus – Bruce Fein, Washington Times
The Waterboarding Dodge – Washington Post editorial
Is Mukasey Willing to be a 'No' Man in the White House? – USA Today editorial
Yes, It's Clearly Torture - Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel editorial
Bearing Witness to Torture - Clyde Haberman, New York Times
Reassess America's 'Idealism' – Janet Daley, London Daily Telegraph
Bush's Speech at Castro's Grave - Carlos Alberto Montaner, Miami Herald
Argentina: All in the Family – London Times editorial
Argentinians Elect Woman President - Pittsburgh Post-Gazette editorial
Kirchners: Two for the Price of One - Roberto Guareschi, Miami Herald
How Argentina Jump-Started its Economy - Mark Weisbrot, Los Angeles Times
Amazonian Swindle – Bret Stephens, Wall Street Journal
Uganda: Bush, Museveni: Step Up! - Carolyn Davis, Philadelphia Inquirer
Prosecuting Our Friends – Mona Charen, Washington Times
The Dalai Lama’s Plea – Toronto Star editorial
Australia: New Jet Fighters Buy Us Leverage – Nicholas Stuart, Canberra Times
German Soldiers and Toilet Paper – London Times editorial
LOST Runs Silent, Runs Deep – Frank Gaffney Jr., Washington Times
New Report from NEFA Foundation: "The Muslim Brotherhood in the United States"
By Evan Kohlmann
An exclusive new report is now available for download from the NEFA Foundation website focusing on "The Muslim Brotherhood in the United States" by NEFA Senior Investigator Douglas Farah, NEFA Director of Research Ron Sandee, and NEFA Senior Analyst Josh Lefkowitz. The report is based upon a final, exhaustive review of exhibits from the recent criminal investigation targeting the Holy Land Foundation (HLF). On Oct. 22, 2007, a federal judge in Dallas declared a mistrial on most counts in the federal case against HLF. Despite this outcome, the case still offers an unprecedented inside look into the history of the Muslim Brotherhood in the United States, as well as its goals and structure... (For more, visit the NEFA Foundation website)
October 29, 2007 11:22 PM Link
Did Syria Have Visible WMD Program Prior to US Invasion of Iraq?
By Jonathan Winer
The New York Times has published a remarkable piece on October 27 suggesting that satellite imagery which is now available commercially showed the construction of a nuclear facility in Syria that was well-developed as early as the summer of 2003, and which had been initiated as early as 2001.
In the measured prose of the Times, the informnation "is likely to raise questions about whether the Bush administration overlooked a nascent atomic threat in Syria while planning and executing a war in Iraq, which was later found to have no active nuclear program."
The issue of whether the U.S. invaded the wrong country has lately been focused on suggestions that the real nuclear threat in 2003 and now, has been Iran, not Iraq, an issue highlighted by the increasing focus of the Administration on Iran. There is little doubt that Iran is a serious proliferation threat and reportedly the Administration is considering a "surgical strike" on suspect Iranian WMD facilities, notwithstanding European concerns about Iranian military retaliation, perhaps first in Europe and Latin America.
But if in fact Syria was well along the way to constructing its own nuclear facility, and this reality was actually missed by senior U.S. policy-makers, the apparent failure to recognize this and respond to it years ago is to say the least, disturbing.
The satellite imagery and initial comments suggest that the U.S. simply failed to notice Syria's WMD program, a kind of nuclear negligence. One would hope that there is a different story behind the public facts.
Public hints about the Syrian program by U.S. government officials go back to 2003, appearing amid a fight between then Under Secretary of State John Bolton and intelligence analysts regarding Mr. Bolton's contention that Syria was actively pursuing nuclear capabilities, which the CIA reportedly viewed to be "inflated." The now available satellite imagery raises the question of whether Mr. Bolton may have been right on this issue, without making it clear whether his views were related to knowledge about the existence of the now-eradicated Syrian site.
We need to know more -- a lot more -- about Syria's apparent nuclear program, our intelligence on the program, the U.S. government's handling of that intelligence since 2001, the circumstances that led to the Israeli bombing of the site, and the relationship of any Syrian nuclear program not only to North Korea's program but to the AQ Khan network. Previously, it had been assumed that while Khan had had contacts with Syria, they were preliminary and had not resulted in substantive activities. Failure by Pakistan to provide the U.S. information on any such relationship would raise further questions about the accuracy of State Department public assessments that Pakistani cooperation with the U.S. in addressing the global security consequences of Khan's activities has been "good."
October 28, 2007 10:27 AM Link
http://www.counterpunch.org/price10302007.html
Pilfered Scholarship Devastates General Petraeus's Counterinsurgency Manual
By DAVID PRICE
* Core Chapter a Morass of "Borrowed" Quotes
* University of Chicago Press Badly Compromised
* Counterinsurgency Anthropologist Montgomery McFate's Role Under Attack
Last December, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps published a new Counterinsurgency Field Manual (No. 3-24). In policy circles, the Manual became an artifact of hope, signifying the move away from the crude logic of "shock and awe" toward calculations that rifle-toting soldiers can win the hearts and minds of occupied Iraq through a new appreciation of cultural nuance.
Editors' note: This expose of the stolen scholarship in the Army's new manual on counterinsurgency to which General David Petraeus has attached his name also runs in our current newsletter sent by US mail or as a pdf to our newsletter subscribers. Normally material in our newsletter does not run on the CounterPunch website. In the belief that David Price's story merits the widest and swiftest circulation, not only as regards the "borrowings" from unacknowledged sources but also the prostitution of anthropology in evil military enterprises we re making an exception in this case. AC / JSC
If I could sum up the book in just a few words, it would be: "Be polite, be professional, be prepared to kill."
--John Nagl, The Daily Show.
Some view the Manual as containing plans for a new intellectually fueled "smart bomb," and it is being sold to the public as a scholarly based strategic guide to victory in Iraq. In July, this contrivance was bolstered as the University of Chicago Press republished the Manual in a stylish, olive drab, faux-field ready edition, designed to slip into flack jackets or Urban Outfitter accessory bags. The Chicago edition includes the original forward by General David Petraeus and Lt. General James Amos, with a new forward by Lt. Col. John Nagl and introduction by Sarah Sewell, of Harvard's JFK School of Government. Chicago's republication of the Field Manual spawned a minor media orgy, and Lt. Col. Nagl, a counterinsurgency expert, became the Manual's poster boy, appearing on NPR, ABC News, NBC, and the pages of the NYT, Newsweek, and other publications, pitching the Manual as the philosophical expression of Petraeus' intellectual strategy for victory in Iraq.
The media buzz surrounding the Manual maintains it is a rare work of applied scholarship. Robert Bateman writes in the Chicago Tribune that it is "probably the most important piece of doctrine written in the past 20 years," crediting this success to the high academic standards and integrity that the Army War College historian, Conrad Crane, brought to the project. Bateman touts Crane's devotion to using an "honest and open peer review" process, and his reliance on a team of top scholars to draft the Manual. This team included "current or former members of one of the combat branches of the Army or Marine Corps". As well as being combat veterans, "the more interesting aspect of this group was that almost all of them had at least a master's degree, and quite a few could add 'doctor' to their military rank and title as well. At the top of that list is the officer who saw the need for a new doctrine, then-Lt. Gen. David Petraeus, Ph.D."
The Manual's PR campaign has been extraordinary. In a Daily Show interview, John Nagl hammed it up in uniform with Jon Stewart, but amidst the banter Nagl stayed on mission and described how Gen. Petraeus collected a "team of writers [who] produced the [Manual] strategy that General Petraeus is implementing in Iraq now." When Jon Stewart commented on the speed at which the Manual was
produced, Nagl remarked that this was "very fast for an Army field manual; the process usually takes a couple of years"; but for Nagl this still was "not fast enough". The first draft of each chapter was produced in two months before being reworked at an Army conference at Ft. Leavenworth. Most academics know that bad things can happen when marginally skilled writers must produce ambitious amounts of writing in short time periods; sometimes the only resulting calamities are grammatical abominations, but in other instances the pressures to perform lead to shoddy academic practices. Neither of these outcomes is especially surprising among desperate people with limited skills -- but Petraeus and others leading the charge apparently did not worry about such trivialities: they had to crank out a new strategy to calm growing domestic anger at military failures in Iraq.Last year, the anthropologist Roberto González determined that anthropologists Montgomery McFate and David Kilcullen authored sections of the Manual and contributed to new Iraq counterinsurgency programs, relying on embedded military ethnographers in "Human Terrain System" teams, using anthropologists to assist troops making judgments in the field, employing cultural knowledge as a weapon of "pacification." Drs. McFate and Kilcullen have become media darlings. Kilcullen took on warrior-anthropologist status in last year's uncritical New Yorker profile by George Packer; profiles of McFate in the New Yorker, the S.F. Chronicle Magazine, and More (a glossy women's magazine "celebrating women 40+") sculpt images of Kilcullen and McFate as heroic soldier-thinkers, uncompromisingly harnessing knowledge for the state's agenda. This media campaign provides McFate with frequent opportunities to characterize her critics publicly (as she recently did in the Wall Street Journal) as having no ideas about the military beyond "waving a big sign outside the Pentagon saying, 'you suck.'" While such outbursts make Dr. McFate seem like a character right out of Team America, the military and intelligence community takes her and her work very seriously.
Montgomery McFate holds a Harvard law degree and a Yale anthropology Ph.D. and has worked for various organizations linked to U.S. military and intelligence agencies, including RAND, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Institute for Defense Analysis' Joint Advanced Warfighting Program. She is currently the U.S. Army's Human Terrain System's Senior Social Science Adviser. McFate's current role as Senior Social Science Adviser for the Human Terrain program demonstrates how the military is implementing the Manual's approach to the use of culture as a battlefield weapon. Human Terrain Teams are now embedding anthropologists with troops operating in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some Human Terrain anthropologists have publicly identified themselves (the anthropologist Marcus Griffin even writes a blog on limited elements of Human Terrain work while working in Iraq), while others do not disclose their identity. Human Terrain anthropologists use ethnographic knowledge to advise and inform troops in the field while traveling with armed escorts and are, in some instances, themselves armed and wearing uniforms, yet McFate maintains that these anthropologists are in compliance with basic anthropological ethical standards, mandating that participants in research projects participate under conditions of voluntary informed consent.
In a recent exchange with Dr. McFate, Col. John Agoglia and Lt. Col. Edward Villacres on the Diane Rehm Show, I pressed McFate for an explanation of how voluntary ethical informed consent was produced in environments dominated by weapons. In response, McFate assured me that was not a problem because "indigenous local people out in rural Afghanistan are smart, and they can draw a distinction between a lethal unit of the U.S. military and a non-lethal unit." It also remains unclear how Human Terrain Teams comply with basic ethical standards, mandating that their research does not result in harm coming to the individuals they study as a result of their work.
Human Terrain research gathers data that help inform what Assistant Undersecretary of Defense John Wilcox recently described as the military's "need to map Human Terrain across the Kill Chain". The disclosure that anthropologists are producing knowledge for those directing the "kill chain" raises serious questions about the state of anthropology.
The Secrets of Chapter Three
Montgomery McFate and an unnamed "military intelligence specialist" co-wrote the Manual's chapter 3, the Manual's longest and the key chapter on "Intelligence in Counterinsurgency." Chapter 3 introduces basic social science views of elements of culture that underlie the Manual's approach to teaching counterinsurgents how to weaponize the specific indigenous cultural information they encounter in specific theaters of battle. General Petraeus is betting that troops working alongside
Human Terrain System teams can apply the Manual's principles to stabilize and pacify war-torn Iraq.When I read an online copy of the Manual last winter, I was unimpressed by its watered-down anthropological explanations, but having researched anthropological contributions to the Second World War, I was familiar with such oversimplifications. But some in the military found the Counterinsurgency Manual to be revolutionary. McFate claims the Manual is so radical that it "is considered 'Zen tinged' not just by the media, but also by many members of the military who felt that the Manual, and chapter 3 in particular, was 'too innovative' and 'too politically correct.'" Like any manual, the Counterinsurgency Field Manual is written in the dry, detached voice of basic instruction. But as I re-read Chapter 3 a few months ago, I found my eye struggling through a crudely constructed sentence and then suddenly being graced with a flowing line of precise prose:
"A ritual is a stereotyped sequence of activities involving gestures, words, and objects performed to influence supernatural entities or forces on behalf of the actors' goals and interest." (Counterinsurgency Manual, 3-51)The phrase "stereotyped sequence" leapt off the page. Not only was it out of place, but it sparked a memory. I knew that I'd read these words years ago. With a little searching, I discovered that this unacknowledged line had been taken from a 1972 article written by the anthropologist Victor Turner, who brilliantly wrote that religious ritual is:
"a stereotyped sequence of activities involving gestures, words, and objects, performed in a sequestered place, and designed to influence preternatural entities or forces on behalf of the actors' goals and interests." (See full citation in the concluding "comparison" section of this article.)The Manual simplified Turner's poetic voice, trimming a few big words and substituting "supernatural" for "preternatural". The Manual used no quotation marks, attribution, or citations to signify Turner's authorship of this barely altered line. Having encountered students passing off the work of other scholars as their own, I know that such acts are seldom isolated occurrences; this single kidnapped line of Turner got me wondering if the Manual had taken other unattributed passages. While I did not perform exhaustive searches, with a little searching in Chapter 3 alone I found about twenty passages showing either direct use of others' passages without quotes, or heavy reliance on unacknowledged source materials.
In the concluding "comparison" section of this article are listed some of the unattributed passages I identified in the Manual's third chapter, along with the unacknowledged sources that I tracked down. These examples show a consistent pattern of unacknowledged use in this chapter. Any author can accidentally drop a quotation mark from a work during the production process, but the extent and consistent pattern of this practice in this Manual is more than common editorial carelessness. The cumulative effect of such non-attributions is devastating to the Manual's academic integrity.
The inability of this chapter's authors to come up with their own basic definitions of such simple sociocultural concepts as "race," "culture," "ritual," or "social structure" not only raises questions about the ethics of the authors but also furnishes a useful measure of the Manual and its authors' weak intellectual foundation.
Other sections of the Manual have unacknowledged borrowings from other sources. The anthropologist Roberto González found that the Manual's Appendix A was "inspired by T.E. Lawrence, who in 1917 published the piece 'Twenty-seven articles' for Arab Bulletin, the intelligence journal of Great Britain's Cairo-based Arab Bureau." González compared several passages of Lawrence with Kilcullen's Appendix A, and found parallel constructions where paragraphs were reworded but followed set formations between the two texts . González observed that while these parallel constructions can be seen, "Lawrence is never mentioned in the appendix. González shows that Kilcullen's other written work makes a passing reference, but does not acknowledge the degree to which Lawrence's ideas and style have been influential."
Sources for the Manual's pilfered passages range from the British sociologist Anthony Giddens' introductory level sociology textbook to the writings of American symbolic anthropologist (and World War Two conscientious objector) Victor Turner, to an online study guide for an MIT anthropology course, to Fred Plog and Daniel Bates' anthropology textbook Cultural Anthropology, to the writings of Max Weber.
Chapter Three's hidden debt to the great German sociologist Max Weber is intriguing. Weber had his own armchair dalliance with counterinsurgency when he supported the military's suppression of German radicals' 1919 uprising, proclaiming, "Liebknecht belongs in the madhouse and Rosa Luxemburg in the zoological gardens!" Weber's views on "power and authority" are reproduced in the body of the Manual, without quotation marks, as if they were the words of Petraeus' staff (see Comparisons section at the end of this artilcle), while section 3-63 is organized following Weber's tripartite division of authority structures: "Rational-Legal Authority," "Charismatic Authority" and "Traditional Authority."
In some sentences, the Manual so directly follows the vocabulary and structure of sentences in other works that the sources can easily be identified. For example, the Manual's (3-26) entry for "ethnic groups" says:
"An ethnic group is a human community whose learned cultural practices, language, history, ancestry, or religion distinguish them from others. Members of ethnic groups see themselves as different from other groups in a society and are recognized as such by others."Elements of this definition closely echo a passage in Anthony Giddens' 2006 Introduction to Sociology text (5th ed, p. 487), discussing ethnicity:
"Different characteristics may serve to distinguish ethnic groups from one another, but the most usual are language, history, or ancestry (real or imagined), religions and Members of ethnic groups see themselves as culturally distinct from other groups in a society, and are seen by those other groups to be so in return."Several sections of the Manual are identical to entries in online encyclopedia sources like www.answers.com. For example, the Manual's definition of "language" is the same as that on http://www.answers.com/topic/duration-poem-4).
The most damning element of the Manual's reliance on unattributed sources is that the Manual includes a bibliography listing of over 100 sources, yet not a single source I have identified is included. My experience with students trying to pass off the previously published work of others as their own is that they invariably omit citation of the bibliographic sources they copy, so as not to draw attention to them. Even without using bibliographic citations, the Manual could have just used quotes and named sources in the same standard journalistic format used in this article, but no such attributions were used in these instances.
The few published critical examinations of the Manual focus on the text's provenience and philosophical roots. In The Nation, Tom Hayden links the Manual to the philosophical roots of U.S. Indian Wars, reservation policies, and the Vietnam War's Phoenix Program. In the Royal Anthropological Institute's journal Anthropology Today, Roberto González criticizes McFate and Kilcullen's contributions to the Manual, observing that the Manual "reads like a manual for indirect colonial rule." That a press as drenched in "reflexive" critiques of colonialism as Chicago would publish such a manual is an ironic testament to just how depoliticized postmodernism's salon bound critiques have become; and a recent New York Times op-ed by Chicago anthropologist Richard Shweder indicates a stance of inaction from which the travesties of Human Terrain can be lightly critiqued while anthropologists are urged not to declare themselves as being "counter-counterinsurgency".
Role of the Chicago University Press
The role of University of Chicago Press in bringing the Manual to a broader audience is curious. That such shoddy scholarship passed so easily and so briskly through the well-guarded gates of this press raises questions concerning Chicago's interest in rushing out this faux academic work. Ramming a book through the production process at an academic press in about half a year's time is a blitzkrieg requiring a serious focus of will. There was more than a casual interest in getting this book to market -- whether it was simply a shrewd recognition of market forces, or reflected political concerns or commitments. The Press is enjoying robust sales of a hot title (it was one of Amazon's top 100 in September); but it did not consider the damage to the Press' reputation that could follow its association with this deeply tarnished service manual for Empire.
To highlight the Manual's scholarly failures is not to hold it to some over-demanding, external standard of academic integrity. However, claims of academic integrity are the very foundation of the Manual's promotional strategy. Somewhere along the line, Petraeus' doctorate became more important than his general's stars, touted by Petraeus' claque in the media as tokening a shift from Bush's "bring 'em on" cowboy shoot-out to a nuanced thinking-man's war.
The University of Chicago Press acquisitions editor, John Tryneski, told me the Manual went through a peer review process, but there are unusual dynamics in reviewing an already published work whose authors are not just unknown (common in the peer review process), but essentially unknowable. Tryneski acknowledged that peer reviewers came from policy and think tank circles. When I asked Tryneski if there had been any internal debate over the decision by the Press to disseminate military doctrine, he said there were some discussions and then, without elaboration, changed the subject, arguing that the Press viewed this publication more along the lines of the republication of a key historic document. This might make sense if this was an historic document, not a component of a campaign being waged against the American people by a Pentagon, surging to convince a skeptical American public that Bush hasn't already lost the war in Iraq.
The significance of the University of Chicago Press' republication of the Manual must be seen in the context of the Pentagon's domestic propaganda campaign to generate support for an indefinite U.S. presence in Iraq. Here is an "independent" academic press playing point guard in the production of pseudo-scholarly political propaganda. As the Middle East scholar Steve Niva recently suggested to me, "General Petraeus' counterinsurgency in Iraq has failed, but his domestic campaign for American hearts and minds is succeeding in textbook fashion; the strategy is to weaken the demand for withdrawal by dividing insurgents (anti-war activists) from the general population (American public)."
That militaries commandeer food, wealth, and resources to serve the needs of war is a basic rule of warfare -- as old as war itself. Thucydides, Herodotus and other ancient historians record standard practices of seizing slaves and food to feed armies on the move; and the history of warfare finds similar confiscations to keep armies on their feet. But the requirements of modern warfare go far beyond the needs of funds and sustenance; military and intelligence agencies also require knowledge, and these agencies commandeer ideas for use to their own purposes in ways not intended by their authors.
Pressganging scholars to fight dirty wars
The requisitioning of anthropological knowledge for military applications has occurred in colonial contexts, world wars and proxy wars. After World War II, the Harvard anthropologist Carleton Coon recounted how he produced a 40-page text on Moroccan propaganda for the OSS by taking pages of text straight from his textbook, Principles of Anthropology. "[He] padded it with enough technical terms to make it ponderous and mysterious, since [he] had found out in the academic world that people will express much more awe and admiration for something complicated which they do not quite understand than for something simple and clear."
The most egregious known instance of the military's recycling of an anthropological text occurred in 1962, when the U.S. Department of Commerce secretly, and without authorization or permission from the author, translated into English from French the anthropologist Georges Condominas' ethnographic account of Montagnard village life in the central highlands of Vietnam, Nous Avons Mangé la Forêt. The Green Berets weaponized the document in the field. The military's uses for this ethnographic knowledge were obvious, as assassination campaigns tried to hone their skills and learn to target village leaders. For years, neither publisher nor author knew this work had been stolen, translated, and reprinted for militarized ends. In 1971, Condominas described his anger at this abuse of his humanistic work, saying:
"How can one accept, without trembling with rage, that this work, in which I wanted to describe in their human plenitude these men who have so much to teach us about life, should be offered to the technicians of death -- of their death! ...You will understand my indignation when I tell you that I learned about the 'pirating' [of my book] only a few years after having the proof that Srae, whose marriage I described in Nous Avons Mangé la Forêt, had been tortured by a sergeant of the Special Forces in the camp of Phii Ko.'"Today, anthropologists serving on militarily "embedded" Human Terrain Teams study Iraqis with claims that they are teaching troops how to recognize and protect noncombatants. But as Bryan Bender reports in the Boston Globe, "one Pentagon official likened [Human Terrain anthropologists] to the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support project during the Vietnam War. That effort helped identify Vietnamese suspected as communists and Viet Cong collaborators; some were later assassinated by the United States." This chilling revelation clarifies the role that Pentagon officials envision for anthropologists in today's counterinsurgency campaigns.
McFate's Anthropology
The military and intelligence community loves McFate and her programs not because her thinking is innovative -- but because, beyond information on specific manners and customs of lands they are occupying, the simplistic views of culture she provides tell them what they already know. This has long been a problem faced by anthropologists working in such confined military settings. My research examining the frustrations and contributions of World War II era anthropologists identifies a recurrent pattern in which anthropologists with knowledge flowing against the bureaucratic precepts of military and intelligence agencies faced often impossible institutional barriers. They faced the choice of either coalescing with ingrained institutional views and advancing within these bureaucracies, or enduring increasing frustrations and marginalized status. Such wartime frustrations led Alexander Leighton to conclude in despair that "the administrator uses social science the way a drunk uses a lamppost, for support rather than illumination." In this sense, Montgomery McFate's selective use of anthropology -- which ignores anthropological critiques of colonialism, power, militarization, hegemony, warfare, cultural domination and globalization -- provides the military with just the sort of support, rather than illumination, that they seek. In large part, what the military wants from anthropology is to offer basic courses in local manners so that they can get on with the job of conquest. The fact that military anthropologists appear disengaged from questioning conquest exposes the fundamental problem with military anthropology.
I'm sure that Chapter Three's authors had no idea the Manual would receive such public scrutiny; and that notions of University of Chicago Press distribution were not on the horizon when these identified passages were lifted. It remains unclear how these unattributed passages entered the Manual. If the Army or the Chicago Press care about scholarship, they will conduct an investigation and make public their findings. There's plenty of blame to go around. It would be simple to blame Gen. Petraeus and the University of Chicago Press for running such a sloppy operation, but Montgomery McFate's areas of expertise are those consistently coinciding with the chapter's pilfered passages. I have such high respect for Jon Nagl's academic work and sense of propriety that I cannot imagine his knowing involvement in such sloppy work, but his name, as a significant element in the public face of this project, is sullied. These commandeered passages make curious McFate's insistence that "it is the nature of knowledge to escape the bonds of its creator; to believe otherwise is to persist in a supreme naivety about the nature of knowledge production and distribution." We are left to wonder how much unattributed "escaped" knowledge appears in classified documents, now sequestered beyond the public's view.
In one sense, the particular details of how the Manual came to reprint the unacknowledged writings of scholars do not matter. If quotation marks and attributions were removed by someone other than the chapter's authors, the end result is the same as if the authors intentionally took this material. The silence on the reproduction of these passages, the lack of any authorial erratum, and the failure to add quotation marks even when Chicago Press republished the Manual seems to argue against the likelihood of a simple editorial mix-up, but who knows. The ways that the processes producing the Manual so easily abused the work of others inform us of larger dynamics in play, when scholars and academic presses lend their reputations, and surrender control, to projects mixing academic with military goals.
With hindsight, Dr. McFate replies to queries and critiques of the Manual's scholarship seem odd. In response to González's critique in Anthropology Today of the Manual's weak anthropological base, McFate framed the Manual as "military doctrine, not an academic treatise" and inexplicably proclaimed that "doctrine does not have footnotes." But McFate knows that the Manual has both footnotes and citations where it suits its purpose (for example see footnote on Pages 53, 151, 188, of the Chicago Press printing; and see citations on 6-85, 6,87, etc.; and attributions for use of copyright materials on Chicago version, Pages 151, 188). One measure of the Manual's status as an extrusion of political ideology rather than scholarly labor is that when quotes and attributions are used, they are frequently deployed in the context of quoting the apparently sacred words of generals and other military figures -- thereby, denoting not only differential levels of respect but different treatment of who may and may not be quoted without attribution. Last August, I emailed McFate in Afghanistan to confirm that she had co-authored the Manual's Chapter 3. Unprompted, she replied, "Words, phrases and concepts that I was attached to were removed by other authors or the editors to make it more accessible to general readers. Also, all my footnotes were removed (naturally)." McFate listed words, phrases, concepts, and footnotes as removed elements of text, with no mention made of the removal of quotation marks or narrative attributions. Rather than providing shielding, Dr. McFate's disclaimers make me wonder if she was aware that somewhere along the line unacknowledged academic texts had been pilfered for reasons of state.
In recent years, McFate and other militarized anthropologists have been demanding more academic respectability. While some in this group are producing interesting quality studies of the military and intelligence community, the Manual shows the sort of low quality work that can pass as "innovative" uses of anthropology for the military. Chapter three reads like the work of lazy C students, taking phrases and sentences promiscuously from various sources, cobbling them together into a sort of Cliffs Notes version of anthropology, which the University of Chicago Press has now laundered into a book posing as an object of academic respectability.
Considering the Manual's importance for Iraq, perhaps it is only fitting that American strategists are now trying to win a war based on lies with the stolen words and thoughts of others.
Comparisons of Unacknowledged Sources for Passages in The Counterinsurgency Field Manual
Here are specific examples of portions of the Counterinsurgency Field Manual, derived from other unacknowledged sources. The hyphenated numbers preceding passages indicate the citation used in the Counterinsurgency Manual. Bold writing indicates the portion of the passage that has been used without attribution from another source; indented passages present the original unacknowledged source passage (references for source passages appear in parenthesis).
Counterinsurgency Manual, section 3-20: Society
"...sociologists define society as a population living in the same geographic area that shares a culture and a common identity and whose members are subject to the same political authority."Unacknowledged Source:
"Formally, sociologists define society as a population living in the same geographic area that shares a culture and a common identity and whose members are subject to the same political authority." (Newman, David. Sociology. 6th ed. Pine Forge Press, 2006. P. 19.)Counterinsurgency Manual, section 3-24: Group