William R. Polk's superb study: "
Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism & Guerrilla War from the American Revolution to Iraq" is just out. In the days to come, there should be reviews of it to be posted. In the interim, here is a talk that he gave that relates to the topic.
WHAT HAPPENS IN INSURGENCIES
(Talk before the National Arts Club, September 21, 2007)
The people who have fought insurgencies in the last few hundred years have spoken various languages, followed different religions, been motivated by diverse ideologies, made their livings in dissimilar occupations and lived apart from one another all over the world.
So are there common features from which we can construct a rough model that will help us to understand what is now happening in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Chechnya, Colombia, the Philippines and other countries?
This is a question that began to puzzle me back in 1962 when I began to observe the Vietnam war. But Vietnam was not the first guerrilla war I had seen. I was in the Palestine Mandate in 1946 and Greece in 1947. Over the years, I have had the opportunity to study, sometimes uncomfortably closely, several other insurgencies. It was Vietnam, however, that challenged me to try to understand.
I was then fortunate in being a Member of the Policy Planning Council of the U.S. Department of State whose Chairman, Walt Rostow, has been called the "architect" of American policy on Vietnam. Rostow was a true believer in the war. I was not. And our differences more or less forced me to begin the process that has led me to write
Violent Politics. The first major task to which I was assigned in Government was the chairmanship of the interdepartmental task force charged with helping to bring to an end the guerrilla war the Algerians were fighting against the French.
The American role in Algeria was only peripheral: General de Gaulle did not want outside interference (although he was happy to take the money we provided to pay for his army ) and he refused to share his thoughts or information with us.
Thus, we were somewhat blind, but we got ready to act if our action was demanded – the CIA thought that we might be asked to evacuate the 1 million 200 thousand Europeans then living in Algeria from the beaches like the British at Dunkirk. Fortunately, the French and Algerians reached agreement to give Algeria its freedom. So, while the whole pro-French population got out with all deliberate speed, as the lawyers say, their leaving was not a rout. Our Sixth Fleet, which was standing by, was not needed.
Vietnam was quite a different story. Almost every branch of the American government – even the Department of the Interior – became deeply involved. And, whereas few Americans could have placed Algeria on a map, Vietnam (in Michael Arlen's famous phase) was our "living room war." Every American experienced it at least on TV. No country was ever so reported upon as was Vietnam by Americans.
Consequently, I spent a part of each day perusing a deluge of cables, intelligence reports, summaries, and policy papers in addition to myriad press dispatches.
In all the mass of materials, thousands upon thousands of pages, one looked in vain for a penetrating definition of guerrilla warfare. Indeed, there was little coherent analysis of what was happening in Vietnam. The single exception was the work done by the small team that functioned under the leadership of my friend and colleague Tom Hughes in the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Although its voice was usually drowned out, it was consistently right about what was happening and what was not happening in Vietnam. Almost everything else was episodic, short on questions but quick on answers.
In 1962 and 1963, the brilliant work on the war done by Frankie FitzGerald, Neil Sheehan, Chalmers Johnson, Joseph Buttinger and a few others was still far in the future. As the months passed, I came to believe that our lack of criteria – lack of what came to be called a paradigm or model -- to make sense of the rush of daily events was immensely dangerous. So, with Walt Rostow's permission -- and tolerance -- I took six weeks off from my regular duties on the Council and immersed myself in Vietnam
Learning about my study, the National War College invited me to summarize my findings for its graduating class of the "best and brightest" Navy captains and Army, Air Force and Marine colonels who were headed for senior command – and for combat in Vietnam.
I knew they would be a highly critical audience but one whose lives rode on an understanding of insurgency.
The gist of what I told them was that I had found that guerrilla warfare was made up of three parts that fell roughly in a sequence and which could be weighted in impact.
The first component was politics. In that phase, the principal task of the guerrillas was to establish their claim to speak for their people, that is, to establish their legitimacy. Generally, they did this by portraying themselves as the only true nationalists.
The second component was administration. The guerrillas had first to destroy the institutions and mechanisms by which the existing government interfaced with the population – how it delivered essential services, kept the peace, adjudicated disputes and prevented starvation. Then, the guerrillas had to step in to do what government had been doing.
The third component was combat. The guerrillas had to show that they could defeat the government, drive it away from the population, and force it to surrender, withdraw or collapse.
* * *
Applying these criteria or stages to the Vietnam conflict, I argued that
Ho Chi Minh had embodied Vietnamese nationalism already by the end of the Second World War. He had long opposed French colonialism and the French forces who collaborated with the hated Japanese occupation. His leadership of the nation was symbolized when the French puppet ruler, the Emperor Bao Dai, turned over rule to him in a ceremony in Hanoi on August 25, 1945. Thereafter, fighting the French who were determined, despite initial American opposition, to reimpose their rule on Vietnam, his prestige increased to the point that President Eisenhower believed that Ho could have won any election for president with an 80% landslide victory. No other Vietnamese figure or group could challenge Ho and the Viet Minh. It wasn't so much that Ho was carried to power by Communists as that Communists rode on the coat tails of nationalism as embodied in Ho.
In those days, political scientists loved statistics and I guessed that this,
the political component of insurgency, was about 80% of the whole effort.
In administration, the Viet Minh were less active, at least in the south, for a decade. Many of the cadres of what was then known as
Giai Phong Quan , the
Viet Minh of the southern area, had gone north in a population swap that brought the Catholics south.
When the Viet Minh cadres returned and became active, they systematically murdered government-appointed village officials. The astute French journalist Bernard Fall estimated that the
Giai Phong Quan killed about 700 officials during 1957-1958, 2,500 from 1959 to 1960 and 4,000 from 1960 to 1961. But it was not just the officials who were liquidated. As George Carver of the CIA wrote in 1966 in
Foreign Affairs, "The terror was directed not only against officials but against all whose operations were essential to the functioning of organized political society, school teachers, health workers, agricultural officials, etc."
Thus,
by about 1960 the South Vietnamese government had virtually ceased to function. It could not collect taxes or even deliver mail much beyond downtown Saigon. Its officials could move only during daylight. Even in Saigon, as I witnessed one night standing next to Henry Cabot Lodge on from the roof of our embassy, government patrols avoided the streets when darkness fell because they were apt to be ambushed. The one we saw was.
Disruption is followed by replacement. Having killed or chased away the representatives of the regime, the insurgents immediately begin to create an alternative administration or "anti-state." That happened in Vietnam where the Viet Minh set up a variety of local government institutions in which virtually the whole southern population became involved.
My guess was that this second stage of the insurgency amounted to about 15% of the total effort leading to Viet Minh "victory."
Thus, 95% of the insurgency was lost before the Americans became active in Vietnam. From 1963 to 1974, we grasped the short end of the lever.
So I told my War College audience in 1963 that we had already lost the war.
The War College audience in 1963 was no more receptive to that analysis than at least some of our senior generals are today. The idea that we would – or even could – lose the war to a rag-tag bunch of what we regarded as mere hooligans was then regarded as rank heresy.
So we plunged ahead militarily, "surging" from a few thousand to half a million troops and turning our whole economy toward fighting the war. Despite graphic body counts and glowing proofs of success, casualties mounted. Finally the public would take no more. Lyndon Johnson gave up and America began to wind down the war. Many of the phrases we hear today were coined then. More time was needed. We were near success. Conditions were improving. If we left, Vietnam would collapse into chaos. So, trying to be statesmanlike and not wishing to do anything precipitous or rash or radical or to appear unpatriotic, we moved slowly. It took 4 years to get out. And in those 4 years we lost an additional 21,000 young Americans.
* * *
I had resigned from government in 1965 and became professor of history at the University of Chicago. In 1967, I also became president of the Adlai Stevenson Institute of International Affairs. That position enabled me to encourage others to work on Vietnam. It was there that David Halberstam wrote
The Best and the Brightest and Neil Sheehan began the study on counterinsurgency that became
A Bright and Shining Lie. To bring out all the viewpoints, the Institute also held a conference of hawks, doves and those who thought of themselves as owls that resulted in a book called
No More Vietnams? When I left Chicago, I changed the focus of my research to the problems of the Middle East. It was partly Afghanistan and partly Iraq that pulled me back into the study of insurgency.
* * *
Both to test what I had proposed in 1963 and to deepen my knowledge, I decided to study other insurgencies. The first I picked is not one that is usually described as insurgency, the American Revolution.
Somewhat to my surprise, I found the same elements as in Vietnam.
From roughly 1760, the American colonists began the process that would lead to the Revolution. They were very reluctant insurgents. Virginia's ties were with England, not with New York or Massachusetts. The colonists were widely scattered and hardly knew one another. It took the British to help them do what they could not do themselves, unify them in opposition.
Ironically, they remained loyal to the
monarchy. It was
Parliament that they opposed. Today we look back on that period and see the rise of democracy as Parliament asserted itself against royal tyranny, but our ancestors did not see it that way. For them, Parliament was the tyrant usurping their by-then "traditional" rights as free-born Englishmen. They were the conservatives; Parliament was the innovator. And its representatives in the Colonies were corrupt and greedy. Why did they think these things?
To stop the drain on the Treasury caused by wars with the Indians, Parliament sought to prevent the colonists from expanding into Indian territory, thus thwarting their desire for free or cheap land and, sensitive to the demands of the leaders of the Industrial Revolution, Parliament enacted laws that made what the colonists thought was their right to commerce into felonies – blockade running, customs evasion and dealing in prohibited goods.
Consequently,
avoiding British administration was both common and popular. Only if the colonists evaded the authorities could they get the goods they needed to live; John Hancock was said to have had about 500 indictments against him for smuggling, which led his contemporary John Adams to remark that it was the British attempt to curtail his smuggling that made him a patriot.
But
flouting the law was dangerous; only if they disrupted the British-sponsored colonial governments could the merchants move safely and only if they made impossible the implementation of British laws could they avoid paying the price for disobedience.
So, in the decade after the end of the French and Indian wars, what amounted to an unarticulated
strategy of avoidance turned increasingly into insurgency.
Both the colonists and the British more or less
stumbled into combat. In part the Colonists were pushed by
agitators, mainly the small group headed by Sam Ad