Help - Search - Members - Calendar
Full Version: Foreign Policy Commentary
Common Ground Common Sense > Issues that Affect Our Lives > Foreign Policy and National Defense > Foreign Policy & National Defense Issues Archive
Pages: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31
Snuffysmith
Nuclear Proliferation -- What If...? by Immanuel Wallerstein
Suppose that the United States made no further attempt to stop either North Korea or Iran from becoming an established nuclear power and made it clear to other powers that they would not collude in or tolerate military action. What would then happen?
more...

Healthcare We Can Believe In by Katha Pollitt (The Nation)
Recent polls show most Americans still want healthcare reform. But polls don't mean much politically if everyone stays quiet. Never mind wonkery, we need a movement.
more...

No Cool Heads in the Summer Heat by Patrick Seale
The summer heat seems to have released a great deal of poisonous hot air. U.S. President Barack Obama’s policies of peace and reconciliation are beginning to seem in danger from warmongers of all stripes.
more...

Perpetual and Collective Failures by Rami G. Khouri
The trajectories of Palestinians seeking peace and Israelis perpetuating colonial occupation are so starkly contradictory that they clearly cannot persist as they are.
more...

More than One S in Resistance by Nadia Hijab
If Fatah wants to be effective, it must clearly and repeatedly articulate its goals -- and back them by a realistic strategy, a solid base, and sustained action. Otherwise, the Palestinian phoenix will arise elsewhere.
more...

Fighting Godzilla by Odaira Namihei (Le Monde diplomatique)
Japan’s defeat and disarmament by the United States left it feeling vulnerable -- even to UFOs. Popular science fiction productions manifest Japan’s reclamation of its own destiny. For many Japanese, the alien today is called Kim Jong-il.
more...

Walid Jumblatt, Lebanon’s Political Weathervane by Patrick Seale
On Sunday, 2 August, the Druze chieftain Walid Jumblatt, 60, exploded a bomb in the highly-inbred and bafflingly-complex world of Lebanese politics by announcing a major change in his political posture.
more...

http://www.agenceglobal.com/
Snuffysmith
It's Time to Leave Afghanistan - George Will, Washington Post

http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/200...stan_97118.html
Snuffysmith
The Firestorm Ahead by Immanuel Wallerstein
There is a firestorm ahead in the Middle East for which neither the U.S. government nor the U.S. public is prepared. The storm will go from Iraq to Afghanistan to Pakistan to Israel/Palestine, and in the classic expression "it will spread like wildfire."
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=2116

US Health Care Sham by Serge Halimi (Le Monde diplomatique)
Cradled in a political system that protects them -- and which they in turn protect -- both financial traders and medical insurance companies can pursue their parasitic ways.
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=2118

Nothing to Celebrate in Libya Today by Rami G. Khouri
Libya is a severe example of the self-inflicted distortions, waste and misfortunes that have defined much of the Arab region since independence.
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=2117

Mulling Mullen's Message by Nadia Hijab
Admiral Mullen seems to believe that if America builds trust and delivers, then it will earn respect and admiration -- and win its wars. But America’s wars are the problem.
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=2115

Arab Oil and Renewable Energy by Patrick Seale
Arab oil is not in any immediate danger of being pushed aside in favour of renewable energy, but there are plans in many countries to reduce dependence on fossil fuels.
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=2113

Sensible US Courage and Hapless US Imbecility by Rami G. Khouri
Since September 11, 2001, the United States as a whole has been blinded by the rage they experienced due to the 9/11 terror attacks. An exaggerated focus on “Islam” and “Muslim extremists” has been allowed to define intellectual analysis and foreign policy.
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=2114

Paranoia Strikes Deep by Michael Kazin (The Nation)
If Obama and his progressive allies hope to defeat the latest assault on federal power, they will need to go beyond the president's artful ambivalence about the subject. Like FDR, they will have to talk about government as the property of all the people and push through programs that make its benefits palpable to the great majority.
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=2112
Snuffysmith
Work to do on West-Middle East Relations by Rami G. Khouri
Three differing perspectives analyzing the tensions between the West and the Middle East/South Asia -- especially in Iraq, Israel-Palestine, Iran and Afghanistan.
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=2126

Settling for … Settlements by Nadia Hijab
Who would have thought the Palestinians might regret the passing of Condi & Co.? But no one ever had any expectations of the Bush Administration. George Mitchell and Barack Obama are losing credibility. And Palestinians are losing hope in them.
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=2125

Suggestions for Obama at the UN by Rami G. Khouri
When he addresses the opening of the General Assembly later this month, Obama could suggest that the core of a credible peace process can be extracted from existing UN General Assembly resolutions -- updated to take account of today’s realities.
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=2124

The Fallout from the Iraqi-Syrian Crisis by Patrick Seale
Iraq’s road to stability and prosperity is likely to be long and hard. Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki seems intent on consolidating his own personal power. His quarrel with Syria has increased his isolation.
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=2123

Food Without Fear by John Nichols (The Nation)
Bad peanuts and killer spinach: That's the food story of 2009. But in the coming months we may see a huge turning point in the fight for safety.
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=2120

The Firestorm Ahead by Immanuel Wallerstein
There is a firestorm ahead in the Middle East for which neither the U.S. government nor the U.S. public is prepared. The storm will go from Iraq to Afghanistan to Pakistan to Israel/Palestine, and in the classic expression "it will spread like wildfire."
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=2116

Nothing to Celebrate in Libya Today by Rami G. Khouri
Libya is a severe example of the self-inflicted distortions, waste and misfortunes that have defined much of the Arab region since independence.
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=2117
Snuffysmith
Commentary: Al-Qaida 360

Commentary: Al-Qaida 360
Washington (UPI) Sep 11, 2009 - Pity the al-Qaida analyst in the 16-agency, 100,000-strong U.S. intelligence community that spends $50 billion a year, much of it to track al-Qaida operatives the world over. President Obama made clear during last year's presidential campaign Afghanistan would be his war if elected. And since being sworn in, true to his word, the Afghan war is now a national security imperative because ... more

http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Commentary...da_360_999.html
Snuffysmith
Chavez announces Russian missile purchase
Caracas (AFP) Sept 12, 2009 - Amid rising tensions with neighboring Colombia, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez announced late Friday that his country would soon take delivery of Russian-made missiles with a range of 300 kilometers (185 miles). "We have signed some agreements with Russia. Soon we will begin receiving some missiles," Chavez said during a meeting with supporters in front of the presidential palace. ... more

http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Chavez_ann...rchase_999.html
Snuffysmith
Jimmy Carter: 'Hamid Karzai Has Stolen the Election' in Afghanistan
Aaron Glantz, New America Media
World: Former President Jimmy Carter called the election in Afghanistan "despicable," and that President Obama should not be sending more troops to that country.

http://www.alternet.org/world/142673/jimmy..._in_afghanistan
Snuffysmith
Video: "Martyrdom" Wills of Suicide Bombers Behind the Sept. 2008 Terrorist Attack on the U.S. Embassy in Yemen
By Evan Kohlmann
http://counterterrorismblog.org/

AQinyemen.jpgThe NEFA Foundation has obtained video-recorded "martyrdom" wills of the Al-Qaida suicide bombers responsible for the September 2008 terrorist attack on the U.S. embassy in Sanaa, Yemen. http://www.nefafoundation.org/multimedia-prop.html#AQinyemen

In his address to the camera, assailant Lufti Bahr--a former cleric at a local mosque--mocked, "O' American aggressors, we have come to know cowards, but we have never found any people more cowardly than you. For this reason, only a few of us are needed to fight you, efficiently, at a minimum cost… To further clarify and explain these words, we have decided to teach you a practical lesson with our suitable methods--suitable methods for people such as you who are in our land, by Allah. And this lesson will also be demonstrated in your own homeland-and soon, Allah-willing."

Another Al-Qaida suicide bomber, Walid al-Gharam, offered similar threats of further terrorist attacks: "We are coming for you, not just in the Arabian Peninsula, the peninsula of Mohammed, prayer and peace be upon him. But, Allah-willing, we will attack the infidels everywhere, on any land and under any sky. O' America, we will attack you both inside Yemen and outside Yemen. We will attack you in Qatar and the [United Arab] Emirates and everywhere else. We will attack you, so be aware, by Allah, that we are thirsty for your blood and flesh."

English-subtitled excerpts from the "martyrdom" wills can be viewed on the NEFA Foundation website.
http://www.nefafoundation.org/multimedia-prop.html#AQinyemen
September 15, 2009 11:52 PM Link
Snuffysmith
Contending with Iran's Sponsorship of Terrorism and Weapons Proliferation
By Matthew Levitt

Last week I had the opportunity to address the plenary session of the annual international conference of the Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) in Herzliya, Israel. The lecture highlighted the aggressive and proactive nature of Iran's support for terrorism, and concluded noting that this behavior should inform the world's analysis of and response to Iran's pursuit of a nuclear capability. I argued that were Iran to either have an actual nuclear weapon or the capacity to produce one quickly, the destabilizing impact on the region would be significant. Iran's proxies and allies throughout the Gulf, the Levant and beyond would be emboldened and empowered. And Iran, shielded by a nuclear deterrent, would likely increase its support for terrorist groups knowing other nations would be less likely to respond directly to a nuclear power with a proven track record of aggressive behavior.

One critical common denominator between Iran's support for terrorism and its pursuit of a nuclear weapon is the IRGC. As policymakers grapple with how to tackle Iran's aggressive behavior and the regional and international threats presented by such behavior, it is critical that all tools be on the table. "Smart power," today's preferred term of the trade, does not mean the absence of kinetic tools but the strategic use of such tools in tandem with all other elements of national power. Whatever tools are leveraged to deal with these threats, it is clear that we must refocus our attention on the IRGC, the Qods Force, and the front organizations, bonyads, affiliated companies and other entities that comprise its sophisticated, international support network.

Al-Qaeda, its affiliate groups and local groups inspired by al-Qaeda all continue to pose immediate threats to international security. The stability of both Pakistan and Afghanistan cannot be taken for granted, the international economic crisis is far from over, and health officials now expect another round of Swine Flu. There is no shortage of crises to distract our attention. But the international security threats posed by Iran's support for terrorism and pursuit of a nuclear weapon are at least as formidable as these other policy priorities, and perhaps even more immediate.

The complete lecture is available here.
September 15, 2009 11:58 AM Link
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC07.php?CID=477
Snuffysmith

Euro Peace: The Sounds of Silence

by Eric Walberg / September 16th, 2009 (1)

After being the playground for 20th century militarism, after finally uniting with no enemies in sight, you think that Europe would be the world’s bulwark for peace. But a continent that rejected the US war in Vietnam is in thrall to US militarism as never before. None of the European peoples support the current wars and arms race, yet Euro governments dutifully cough up troops to send to Afghanistan. Many sent forces to Iraq. All of them are happy members of NATO, which is unashamedly the forward presence of the US military around the world, having long ago cast aside …
(Full article …)
http://dissidentvoice.org/2009/09/euro-pea...nds-of-silence/
Snuffysmith
The Dreyfuss Report

"Safe Haven Myth" Bites the Dust | The Afghan dust, that is. Experts are challenging the bogus notion that the US must nation-build Afghanistan to prevent another 9/11.
Robert Dreyfuss

http://www.thenation.com/blogs/dreyfuss/47..._bites_the_dust
Snuffysmith
bitterlemons-international.org
Middle East Roundtable

We wish our Muslim readers Eid Mubarak and our Jewish readers Shana Tova. In view of the holiday season, bitterlemons-international will next be published on October 15.

Edition 36 Volume 8 - September 17, 2009

Hamas and the Jordan Muslim Brotherhood

• Jordan's Brotherhood schism presents a mirror of society - Saad Hattar
This internal rift may further widen ahead of any possible political settlement in the region.

• An Egyptian perception - Mohamed Abdel Salam
What happened in Jordan would not happen in Egypt.

• Could there be a "dovish" Hamas? - Reuven Paz
Hamas may become more pragmatic. Can Israel reciprocate?

• A hard triangle - Oraib Al Rantawi
Jordan and Hamas confront one another in two antithetical regional camps.

Jordan's Brotherhood schism presents a mirror of society
Saad Hattar

The hidden polarization that divides East Bank Jordanians from those of Palestinian origin has recently struck the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, which for years had been seen as a cross-border organization, immune to nationalist division.

The resulting schism between radical figureheads and moderates has only widened ahead of a long- awaited Middle East plan, expected to be launched by United States President Barack Obama at the United Nations at the end of September. In Jordan, the US initiative is expected to have severe domestic repercussions, not least because of the prospect of having to permanently settle nearly 1.8 million registered Palestinian refugees, one third of the kingdom's population. Anxiety over this issue persists even after King Abdullah vowed in August not to yield to any pressure regarding settling Palestinian refugees in Jordan.

Within Jordan's Muslim Brotherhood, the schism has resulted in four members of the Executive Bureau --all of them East Bank Jordanians--submitting their resignations. One of them is the movement's deputy spiritual leader, Erhayel Gharaybeh. The argument within the movement is over what kind of relations the Jordanian Brotherhood should have with the Palestinian Islamist movement, Hamas.

All attempts at patching up the differences between these four "moderates" and the rest of the Brotherhood have failed, and the four accused the Jordanian Brotherhood's spiritual leader Sheikh Hammam Said of maintaining administrative links with Hamas. Sheikh Said and other dominant figures within the movement have been pushing for an end to a recent segregation of Brotherhood and Hamas representatives in liaison offices in Arab Gulf states, the prime fundraising arena for Islamists across the Levant.

The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood's former spiritual leader, Salem Falahat, an East Bank Jordanian, had staged the separation by cutting from 12 to four the number of such representatives in the movement's 51-member Shura Council. The new pro-Hamas leadership is trying to reverse that ruling, a move seen by "moderates" as a kind of Trojan horse to strengthen Hamas' influence within the movement.

The "moderates" want other Brotherhood members with "dual allegiance" in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE and Kuwait to choose between belonging to the Hamas Shura Council in Gaza or the Brotherhood's council in Amman. They maintain that the decision of regional separation was taken after a request from Hamas itself three years ago when it charted an independent course from the Jordanian Brotherhood.

The Jordanian Brotherhood movement, which started in 1946, was the umbrella organization for the West Bank movement until 1967 and the Israeli occupation. In 1978, the Muslim Brotherhood in the West Bank, Gaza and Jordan merged under what was called the Levant organization.

In 2006, the Muslim Brotherhood Guidance Office, the international umbrella organization for all regional Muslim Brotherhood movements, unified the West Bank brotherhood with Hamas, which had grown stronger and wealthier since it was formed in 1987, during the first Palestinian intifada.

But relations between the Jordanian authorities and Hamas have been tense for a decade, ever since Jordan expelled leaders of the Palestinian Islamist movement in 1999. The pro-Hamas leaders inside the Jordanian Brotherhood movement have been pushing for their return and the authorities are carefully monitoring the arguments within the movement.

These tensions are having an effect on the Islamic Action Front, the most influential party in the Jordanian arena. The party is now facing an historic crossroads just at a time of regional uncertainty over American intentions vis-a-vis the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

A "reformist" wing is trying to develop the party into an Islamist Jordanian nationalist party, but is being resisted by a hard core that is instead trying to push it into Hamas' orbit. The latter derive their strength from the wealth and popularity of Hamas, notably among Palestinian camp dwellers, the natural constituency for the Jordanian brotherhood.

This internal rift may further widen ahead of any possible political settlement in the region. And if, as also seems likely, the Obama administration fails to push Israel to end settlement construction and accept the creation of a Palestinian state, Islamist pressure may shift toward Jordan, a cash-strapped country semi-dependent on foreign aid, especially from the US.

In a pre-emptive move, the authorities here have been trying to draw a line with the West Bank according to its "strategic interest", the creation of a viable Palestinian state west of the River Jordan. This move contradicts the Brotherhood's drive to maintain a dubious link between its Amman body and the Hamas movement in Gaza.- Published 17/9/2009 © bitterlemons- international.org

Saad Hattar is an Amman-based political analyst.

An Egyptian perception
Mohamed Abdel Salam

There are no specific indicators to denote how Egypt perceives the controversy involving Hamas and the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood. Lessons, however, must be derived from this controversy, particularly insofar as it impinges on a strict policy that Egypt has recently been following to ward off similar developments. Egypt regards both Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood from the same perspective: both are non-ignorable de facto actors. The former is not recognized as the legitimate authority in Gaza despite the frequent reception of its leaders in Cairo, while the latter is not recognized--in its religious capacity--as a legitimate group despite its 88 members in the Egyptian Parliament. Nonetheless, handling the two parties separately is very different from handling any relationship that arises between them.

Egyptians do not doubt that correlations exist between Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood and have an accurate sense of the nature of these correlations. Prior to Hamas' takeover of Gaza in 2007, Egyptian authorities occasionally appeared to allow limited MB-Hamas "public relations", such as public visits by Hamas leaders to the office of the MB chairman in Cairo within specified and long- term "rules of engagement". Those rules were vehemently breached in January 2008 when Palestinian crowds broke through the Egypt-Gaza border. The same mistake was repeated during the Hamas-Israel war in late 2008. The "Ikhwan" (members of the Muslim Brotherhood) almost repeated the breach a third time when a Hizballah cell was arrested in Egypt, pushing the authorities to radically change the rules.

Based on this description, we can grasp how Egypt perceives Hamas' relations with the Muslim Brotherhood of Jordan. Although no official statements or comments have been made in this regard and while the Egyptian media doesn't seem to be interested, we can assume that Cairo heeds and seriously monitors what is happening in Amman to a greater extent than meets the eye.

Egypt believes that although Egyptian Ikhwan are considered the leaders of the international MB organization and are depicted in the media as having the closest ties with Hamas--at least because of Hamas' repeated problems with Egypt--Hamas' relationship with the Jordanian Ikhwan has always been stronger. Hamas originally emerged as an extension of the Jordanian Ikhwan, with the interconnections between the Palestinian and Jordanian people forming the basis for links between the two groups.

Still, details of developments that took place recently in Jordan have taken many Egyptian circles by surprise. The very thought that Hamas-Jordanian Ikhwan linkages would rise to a level where Hamas, despite its financial relations with Iran, offers financial support to a new hawkish stream within the Jordanian Ikhwan, Hamas loyalists dominate Jordanian Ikhwan offices in four Gulf states and an internal report of the MB Shura Council slams the Jordanian state in a way that suggests an attempt by Hamas to take control of the Jordanian Ikhwan--seems unfathomable in Egypt.

Any analysis of the way Egypt deals with this intricate relationship easily recognizes that keeping it under control is a self-evident necessity. Hence some must be wondering why such interconnections were allowed to reach this level in a "survival savvy" state like Jordan that depends on an experienced political and security establishment and that suffered in an earlier historic stage from an attempt to dominate by Fateh that led to internal armed clashes.

Not enough statements have been made by official Egypt to allow for further analysis of the Egyptian stance. However, the recent treatment of Egyptian Ikhwan suggests that Egypt has never forgiven their apathy toward the national-security-threatening breach of its borders. Similarly, Egypt has apparently not forgiven the Ikhwan for their position on the campaign that was launched against Egypt during the Gaza war. Egyptian public opinion almost devoured the Ikhwan for hesitating to denounce Hizballah's establishment of a cell in Egypt under the cloak of resistance support.

Egypt understands that these groups would not hesitate to establish organizational connections or make special deals if they were allowed to. That's why the state has drawn a red line in this regard. As the well-informed Egyptian analyst Dr. Mustafa al-Fiqi puts it, Hamas has learned the lesson; Khaled Meshaal warned Hamas leaders not to visit the main Muslim Brotherhood office during their visits to Cairo.

In contrast, the MB hasn't learned the lesson well enough, and the result is yet another confrontation with the state, this time within the framework of the international Muslim Brotherhood Organization. Dr. Mohamed Habib, a Muslim Brotherhood leader and the main suspect in the recent case, said in his description of the current situation that the Egyptian state had no redlines for the Ikhwan to observe.

Still, what happened in Jordan would not happen in Egypt. The very concept of external correlations is very sensitive for everyone in Egypt, including at times the MB itself. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has repeatedly been warned not to consider Hamas as an external "military wing", and during the argument over the Hizballah cell it strenuously denied that two of its members had joined that cell. The question that remains is: why have events followed a different course in Jordan?- Published 17/9/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org

Mohamed Abdel Salam heads the Regional Security Program at Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo.

Could there be a "dovish" Hamas?
Reuven Paz

Over the past two years, we have witnessed a new development in the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood; the emergence of what the Jordanian media calls "dovish" and "hawkish" factions within the movement's leadership. The use of these terms does not necessarily indicate an immediate confrontation between moderates and hardliners, but more a generational internal struggle that is directly influenced by two external elements--the Jordanian government and Palestinian Hamas. Lurking in the background are the rivalry between Hamas and Fateh, which both the Jordanian government and the Palestinian majority in Jordanian society cannot ignore, issues concerning the fight against Israel, and Israeli-Jordanian relations. The "dovish" faction is closer to the Jordanian government, which demands the severing of the traditional and organizational linkage between the Brotherhood and Hamas.

Another background element of note is the complicated relationship between Jordan and Hamas. Here Jordanian decision-makers have two concerns. The first is the fact that Hamas has strongly positioned itself along the rejectionist axis in the Middle East. This contradicts Jordan's national interest in a two-state solution. Jordan publically sees eye-to-eye with the Palestinian Authority, with which relations might be harmed if Amman were to open a channel of dialogue with Hamas. Secondly, Jordan is concerned with the possible domestic implications of restoring relations with Hamas. Within the Islamic Action Front, the Brotherhood's front in the Jordanian Parliament, there is a strong dominant "hawkish" current that identifies with Hamas' positions and policies. Jordan recently allowed Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal to enter the country for the funeral of his father, but only for a few days and on a purely humanitarian basis, for the first time after a ten-year exile.

Israeli policy-makers are concerned over the possible implications for Hamas of the recent division in the Jordanian Brotherhood. Is there a chance a "dovish" current could develop among Hamas' rank- and-file and leadership? Would this require a change in Israel's policy?

Hamas rule in Gaza has created a kind of split that might lead to a three-state solution in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. None of the involved parties wants such a solution, but prolonged stagnation of the present political process might de facto lead to it. Hamas is also torn between hardliners who wish to create a true Islamic state in Gaza and pragmatists who understand that such a move would negatively affect the Islamist movement's chances of achieving Arab and international legitimacy.

Palestinian Hamas in Gaza is above all searching for legitimacy on all fronts. It strives to improve relations with Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia; it maintains the current de facto ceasefire with Israel; it brutally fights the growing pro-al-Qaeda camp in Gaza; and it emphasizes the democratic western-style elections that installed it at the head of the Palestinian Authority in 2006. Three additional background elements could be test cases for Hamas' efforts to achieve legitimacy: its relations with Iran; its ability to moderate its positions toward the Fateh-ruled PA; and its capacity to issue moderate policy statements that could open the way for change in Israel's perception of it.

The Israeli attack in Gaza in December 2008-January 2009 widely affected the main source of support for Hamas in the Strip: the Palestinian public. The latter does not want to experience another such operation, hence silently pressures Hamas to refrain from both terrorist operations inside Israel and rocket attacks across the border.

In the past year, too, Hamas has become aware of possible changes in the geopolitics of the Middle East. Iran may need to focus more on internal affairs or face harsh international sanctions. Syria might enter negotiations with Israel and change its attitude toward Hamas' presence there. Jordan may in future provide a better alternative for running Hamas' activities outside of Palestine.

Recent developments in Jordan, even if encouraged by the Jordanian government for mainly internal reasons, are not going to turn Hamas into regional doves. But they could affect and ease its pragmatic behavior as a typical movement of the Muslim Brotherhood and as a purely Palestinian actor disconnected from foreign pressures. These developments in Jordan should be carefully followed by Israel, too.

In the past two years since Hamas seized power in Gaza, it and Israel have initiated indirect talks regarding the abducted Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, financial issues and transport of goods from or through Israel. These steps were necessitated by a variety of circumstances. From Hamas' standpoint, they were both a function of taking over the government in Gaza and a continuation of the process of growing adaptation to the dictates of Palestinian nationalism, which increasingly dominates the movement's considerations and policy.

As an increasingly independent movement that determines its own policy and relations with Arab countries like Jordan and Egypt, Hamas may become more pragmatic. While Hamas is not going to recognize Israel in the near future (and vice versa), its continuing Palestinization through growing independence from the bonds of the Muslim Brotherhood may soften some of its policies and counter the demonization of its image among the Israeli public. This in turn may facilitate a slow but consistent process of some sort of indirect contacts between the two. The big question for Israel is whether its present government and Israeli society in general can reciprocate.- Published 17/9/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org

Reuven Paz is founder and director of the Project for the Research of Islamist Movements (PRISM) in Herzliya. He is a veteran researcher of Islamic radical movements and Palestinian society.

A hard triangle
Oraib Al Rantawi

The relationship between Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan is a high priority issue for the Islamic movement in Jordan and Palestine as well as for the Jordanian authorities. This is due to the large public space and high position the two movements occupy in both countries.

In fact, the Islamic movement in Jordan and Palestine is the object of controversy, questions and inquiries related to the Jordanian-Palestinian relationship much in the same way leftist and national trends were seen in recent years and even decades. It is very difficult to demarcate and delineate between Jordanian and Palestinian issues in the Jordanian context. There are registered and licensed Jordanian political parties that in origin are but an extension of nationalist and leftist Palestinian groups. Even organizational and financial relations among these groups are intricate.

The controversy between Hamas and the Brotherhood persistently demands government and popular attention for two reasons. First, both movements maintain a political approach that contradicts central directives of the regime in Jordan. Second, both movements enjoy widespread and dominant influence in both countries that parties and groups of more limited representation lack.

From the historic point of view, Hamas emerged from the "mother" Muslim Brotherhood. But it has grown rapidly and become a primary actor in the Palestinian arena, thereby yielding it a distinct popularity and influence on the Jordanian and regional levels. This means that the "daughter" is now leading the "mother" in terms of its political, moral, physical, financial and media position.

The current controversy within the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood has revealed the extent of Hamas' influence among Brotherhood members. Accusations exchanged among them have revealed that many members of the Political Bureau and the Shura (Advisory) Council of the Islamic Action Front (the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood) are members of Hamas and follow its directives.

Controversy related to four "administrative offices" that embrace members of both Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood working in the rich Arab Gulf countries has brought to the surface this issue of intertwined "membership". Attempts to dissolve these bonds between Hamas and the Brotherhood and resolve the controversy have failed. Brotherhood "doves" accuse Hamas of insisting that its representatives in these offices maintain their membership in the Shura Council of the Jordan Brotherhood.

The disagreement between the Brotherhood and Hamas is seen as an extension of a wider controversy that emerged in Jordan at the national level in the aftermath of the "disengagement decision" from the West Bank in 1988. The Islamic movement opposed that decision as "unconstitutional". This is the rationale for Brotherhood "hawks" refusing to break with Hamas.

Brotherhood doves who support "disengagement" with Hamas tend to give priority to the "Jordanian agenda" over the Muslim Brotherhood platform. They call for increased Brotherhood participation in local Jordanian affairs and accuse their colleagues, the hawks, of giving priority to the Palestinian agenda over the local Jordanian agenda. The hawks downplay these accusations and insist that the Jordanian-Palestinian relationship is a fait accompli dictated by factors such as geography, history and religion. They see no conflict between the Jordanian and Palestinian agendas.

The controversy within the Brotherhood has a "regional" aspect. Muslim Brothers of Palestinian origin are in general closer to the hawks. They are less enthusiastic regarding "disengagement" with Hamas and between the two banks. Brothers of Jordanian origin tend to give priority to the Jordanian agenda.

For its part, Hamas is at a crossroads: on the one hand, it does not want to support one Brotherhood group against another and seeks to neutralize the conflict. On the other, it does not want its strong and close relationship with the Brotherhood to generate a crisis in its relations--which are in any case not good--with the regime in Jordan. Then too, it also does not wish to give away the trump card of its influence among Brotherhood members and at the Jordanian national level in general.

A key concern of Jordanian decision-makers that affects their attitude toward Hamas in the Jordanian context is the "special and distinct" relationship between Hamas and Brotherhood members. In addition there is, according to the Jordanian security community, a security issue resulting from attempts by Hamas to store and smuggle arms on Jordanian soil. And of course there is the obvious political issue: Jordan and Hamas confront one another in two antithetical regional camps, Jordan among the so-called moderates and Hamas in the so-called resistance camp.

Recently, Hamas has been noticeably keen to improve its relations with Amman by taking its distance from local affairs. Head of the Hamas Political Bureau Khaled Meshaal, in Amman for his father's funeral two weeks ago, declared that his movement did not want to interfere in Jordanian affairs. He pointed out that Hamas does not have agents in Jordan and that the movement respects Jordan's sovereignty and security. He added that Hamas looks forward to maintaining good relations with Jordan.

Still, these messages have not sufficed. Jordanian officials remain reluctant to have any high level political or security contacts with Hamas since the resignation of Intelligence Department head Major General Mohammed Dhahabi. The growing controversy among Jordanian members of the Brotherhood is likely to continue for a long time and cause more disputes, fragmentation and resignations.- Published 17/9/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org

Oraib Al Rantawi, a political writer and analyst, is director of Al Quds Center for Political Studies in Amman.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------

Bitterlemons-international.org is an internet forum for an array of world perspectives on the Middle East and its specific concerns. It aspires to engender greater understanding about the Middle East region and open a new common space for world thinkers and political leaders to present their viewpoints and initiatives on the region. Editors Ghassan Khatib and Yossi Alpher can be reached at ghassan@bitterlemons-international.org and yossi@bitterlemons-international.org, respectively.
Snuffysmith
Dangerous Crossroads: Missile Defense and Washington’s Foolish Eurasia Strategy
The Obama Biden Policy of Denigration and Confrontation
- by F. William Engdahl - 2009-09-18

http://globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=15256
Snuffysmith
Netanyahu's Mysterious Moscow Visit by Patrick Seale
What is the political background to the secret visit which Benyamin Netanyahu paid to Moscow on Monday, 7 September? Did Netanyahu go to Moscow to secure the release of a Mossad team that had taken a Russian freighter?
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=2134

The World and Pittsburgh by John Nichols (The Nation)
At the G-20 summit in Pittsburgh, activists will push the United States to back proposals to regulate CEO compensation and require corporate responsibility.
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=2135

Sinking the Goldstone Report by Nadia Hijab
The UN's Goldstone Report is painstakingly even-handed. It finds evidence of war crimes and possibly crimes against humanity not just against Israel but also against Palestinian armed groups.
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=2133


Going All the Way with Iran by Rami G. Khouri
It would be a tragic wasted opportunity for the United States now to enter into talks with Iran using the same old approaches.
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=2132

U.S. Internal Politics and its Military Interventions by Immanuel Wallerstein
The Afghanistan War will go the way of the Vietnam War. Only the outcome for the United States will be worse, because there is no cohesive, rational opposing group to whom to lose the war -- one that will allow U.S. helicopters to withdraw the troops without shooting at them.
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=2131

Women in Trousers, Torture, and a Compassionate, Merciful God by Nadia Hijab
Sudanese journalist Lubna Hussein’s courage in challenging the absurdity of her trial, sentencing, and imprisonment for wearing trousers has spotlighted the penal codes still in force in many Arab and Muslim states.
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=2130


Thoughts While Flying to New York on September 11, 2009 by Rami G. Khouri
A moment to consider whether the “global war on terror” since late 2001 has achieved its aims, made the United States and the world safer, and reduced the number and capabilities of terror organizations around the world.
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=2129
Snuffysmith
NEFA Foundation: Afghan Taliban Release Ramadan Message from Mullah Omar
By Evan Kohlmann

nefadadullahsahab.jpgThe NEFA Foundation has obtained a new letter published by the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (the Taliban) from their shadowy leader, Amir al-Mumineen Mullah Mohammed Omar, to mark the Muslim holiday of Eid al-Fitr. In his letter, Mullah Omar blamed Western powers for "impos[ing] a corrupt and stooge administration on the people once again by the pretext of the so-called elections which were fraught with fraud and lies and which were categorically rejected by the people. It is very natural that the gallant and free people are not ready to accept the results of these illegitimate elections... The internal issues among the Afghans can be solved but in circumstances of occupation, (our) national and Islamic interests come under the shadow of the interests of the foreigners and our national and Islamic interests readily fall prey to the interests and conspiracies of global colonialism." The Taliban leader further threatened that "our ensuing aggressive operations will be characterized by effective tactics which will enter a phase where the enemy will have unparalleled casualties and constant defeats, if God wills."

An English-language version of the letter can be accessed on the NEFA Foundation website.
September 19, 2009 12:54 PM Link

http://counterterrorismblog.org/2009/09/ne...han_taliban.php
Snuffysmith
The world according to Gaddafi
Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi's epic 94-minute speech at the United Nations General Assembly touched on everything from swine flu and Western colonialism to the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan and an alleged failure by the UN to prevent 65 wars. The at times bizarre performance all but overshadowed the assembly's agenda of regional conflicts and climate change. (Sep 24, '09)

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/KI25Ak02.html
Snuffysmith
Obama makes a plea for Pakistan
Insurgency is spilling into Pakistan from the war in Afghanistan and experts fear a full-scale terror campaign that engulfs the whole country. In this scenario, American resources would be insufficient, so President Barack Obama is using this week's UN meeting to drum up international support. It's a tough sell, and the US could find itself increasingly alone in Islamabad. - Syed Saleem Shahzad (Sep 24, '09)

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KI25Df02.html
Snuffysmith
Netanyahu and Obama: Who's fooling who?
Israel is at ease following United States President Barack Obama's decision to shelve his demand for a freeze on Israeli settlements on the West Bank and East Jerusalem. This, however, could simply mean that the White House has decided to focus its efforts and engage directly in permanent-status talks between the Israelis and the Palestinians. - Jim Lobe (Sep 24, '09)

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/KI25Ak01.html
Snuffysmith


I Can’t Believe We Are Losing To These Guys
by Vegetius

I Can’t Believe We Are Losing To These Guys (Full PDF Article)

“The greatest threat to the Afghan government is the Afghan government.” This was the conclusion of a report on the Taliban compiled in the 2005 by the Defense Adaptive Red Team (DART) for the Department of Defense. The report further went on to say that the Taliban are the slow learners of the Islamic fundamentalist world. The report predicted that, if the Karzai government did not reform itself, and if the Taliban ever became a learning organization, the Afghan portion of the Global War on Terror could get very ugly indeed. It is 2009; the Karzai government has not reformed, but the Taliban have. We should not be losing this war, but it now appears that we are losing. One is reminded of John Lovett’s Michael Dukakis character in a Saturday Night Live sketch during the 1988 presidential election. The faux Dukakis listens to an inarticulate pronouncement by Dana Carvey’s faux George H.W. Bush, and exclaims, “I can’t believe that I’m losing to this guy.” That is a fair analogy about where we are in Afghanistan today.

This war is not lost, but we need to make some major changes if we are to turn it around. This was the clear message sent to President Obama by his commander in Afghanistan in August and leaked by The Washington Post on September 21st. General McChrystal was making a clear case for more troops in his report, but lost in the uproar was a strong statement that the Karzai government will have to mend its ways. All the king’s horses and men will not help in Afghanistan if the Taliban are allowed portray their equally flawed governance approach as a viable alternative to the increasingly corrupt kleptocracy that the Karzai government has become.

As this is being written, there are reportedly several options on the table as alternatives to General McChrystal’s recommended approach of sending more troops and fully employing the counterinsurgency doctrine that worked in Iraq (FM 23-4, Counterinsurgency). Some of these proposed alternatives are good supporting tools, but they won’t work by themselves. McChrystal is right; there will not be an easy way to end this war. If the war is worth fighting, which the President said it was during the 2008 campaign, it is worth fighting properly. This piece suggests some specifics for turning it around in the manner that McChrystal suggests.

I Can’t Believe We Are Losing To These Guys (Full PDF Article)
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/d...97-vegetius.pdf
Snuffysmith
Karzai Backers Want Troops - Yaroslav Trofimov, Wall Street Journal. Senior Afghan officials, alarmed by the Obama administration's reappraisal of its Afghanistan strategy, said an increased US military commitment is needed to roll back an emboldened insurgency. They also cautioned about what they said would be dire consequences of any US attempts to edge out President Hamid Karzai. Results from a presidential election last month gave Mr. Karzai a majority, but allegations of widespread ballot-stuffing have stalled the confirmation of his victory and undermined his credibility in the eyes of many Afghans. These admonishments come after the top US and allied commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, warned that the war here may become unwinnable unless troop levels are raised and the momentum of insurgents is reversed in the next 12 months. The Obama administration has yet to endorse these findings, and has called for a review of the US-led war effort before making a decision on troop levels. Vice President Joe Biden in particular has expressed skepticism about the proposed troop increase. Senior administration officials said the review was necessary because the war plan that President Barack Obama announced in March was based on the assumption that the election would give Mr. Karzai new legitimacy.
Snuffysmith

The Goldstone Report - Ian Williams, Foreign Policy In Focus: "Judge Richard Goldstone's report on the war in Gaza threatens the Obama administration's global public diplomacy options and its scrupulously graduated approach to whatever passes for a Middle East Peace process. State Department Spokesman Ian Kelly complained that Goldstone opted for 'cookie-cutter conclusions' about Israel's actions, while keeping 'the deplorable actions of Hamas to generalized remarks.' However, Kelly urged the Israeli government to investigate further."

http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/6437
Snuffysmith
ICC may try IDF officer in wake of Goldstone Gaza report - Yotam Feldman, Haaretz: "A senior prosecutor at the International Criminal Court in The Hague said Monday that he is considering opening an investigation into whether Lt. Col. David Benjamin, an Israel Defense Forces reserve officer, allowed war crimes to be committed during the IDF's three-week offensive in the Gaza Strip this winter. … Benjamin served for many years as legal adviser to the GOC Southern Command, and later headed the Military Advocate General's department on international law.

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1116647.html
Snuffysmith
A MANUFACTURED CRISIS, Part 3
The case for Iran
Fiery rhetoric aside, Iran's leaders are now being cautious, and their military intentions are defensive. They know all too well how sanctions would cripple the economy, and the Iranian people have no desire to replicate the horror of the defensive war they waged against Iraq for most of the 1980s. - Jack A Smith (Oct 1, '09)
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/KJ02Ak02.html

This concludes a three-part report.
PART 1: The facts of the matter
http://atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/KI30Ak01.html

PART 2: It's sanctions or bust
http://atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/KJ01Ak03.html
Snuffysmith
Iran Again: Is Everyone Bluffing? by Immanuel Wallerstein
Are we on the verge of further sanctions on Iran? or even more, of bombing Iran, either by the United States or by Israel with the tacit consent of the United States? Possibly, but I think that what is happening is a gigantic bluff by all and sundry.
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=2150

Iran-Bashing Will Serve No Purpose by Patrick Seale
A peaceable, wide-ranging approach must be the American posture at the talks which the United States, Russia, China, Britain, France, and Germany begin with Iran on 1 October. If they think otherwise, they should have stayed at home.
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=2151

The End of Middle East History by Richard Bulliet
(Part One: The Resolution of Palestine as Israel )
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=2148

The End of Middle East History by Richard Bulliet
(Part Two: Iran turns East while Turkey and North Africa turn European)
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=2149

Partnering for Progress in the Middle East by Rami G. Khouri
There are clear principles for collaboration or partnership between foreign and Middle Eastern organizations and how they will succeed -- or fail.
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=2147

Obama’s Intriguing J-Word by Nadia Hijab
Obama spoke of “a Jewish State of Israel, with true security for all Israelis; and a viable, independent Palestinian state with contiguous territory that ends the occupation that began in 1967.” Instead of achieving justice, this outcome would actually undermine it.
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=2144

Crunch Time Approaching in Afghanistan by Patrick Seale
Only a bold political plan which takes account of Afghanistan’s internal diversity as well as the interests of its neighbours can hope to bring this pointless, destructive and unwinnable war to an end.
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=2146
Snuffysmith
Obama pwns Bush-Cheney on Iran;
First day of Talks Yields Significant Confidence-Building Steps

For 8 years, Bush-Cheney practiced what I call "belligerent Ostrichism" toward Iran. They refused to talk to Tehran. They wanted to ratchet up sanctions on it. Bush sent 2 aircraft carriers to the Gulf to menace Iran. Bush's spokesmen professed themselves afraid of Iran's unarmed little speedboats in the Gulf. Aside from issuing threats to attack and destroy Iran the way they did Iraq, Bush-Cheney had nothing else to say on the matter. During the 8 years, Iran went from being able to enrich to .2% to being able to enrich to 3.8%, and increased its stock of centrifuges significantly. Bush-Cheney gesticulated and grimaced and fainted away at the horror of it all, but they accomplished diddly-squat.

Barack Obama pwned Bush-Cheney in one day, and got more concessions from Iran in 7 1/2 hours than the former administration got in 8 years of saber-rattling.

Delegates of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany met with representatives of Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei for 7 and a half hours on Thursday for talks on Iran's nuclear research program.

Amazingly, there were signs of significant progress even on the first day, which most seasoned observers had not expected.

1. Iran agreed to allow inspectors from the United Nations' International Atomic Energy Agency to visit the newly announced facility near Qom within the next two months.

2. Iran agreed to meet again at the end of October.

3. Iran agreed to send "most" of its stock of low enriched uranium (3.5%) to Russia for processing to the roughly 20% degree of enrichment needed to run its small reactor producing medical isotopes. Iran has about 3200 pounds of low-enriched uranium, and is willing to send 2600 to Russia. That is a little over a ton, or about what a single Ford Focus weighs.

Iran does not anyway have the ability to enrich to more than about 4.8% at the moment, and the medical reactor will be out of fuel in a little over a year, so if they continued to want the medical isotopes they would be forced to take this step anyway.

Russia Today has video:



The NYT report on all this adds in all kinds of extraneous and unproven allegations, of a network of secret enrichment plants or secret stores of low-enriched uranium or nefarious Iranian plans to make a bomb, or of Iran having enough nuclear material to make a bomb (irrelevant if they can't enrich to 90%), and what Israel thinks of all this (since the Israelis really have thumbed their nose at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and made a whole arsenal of bombs, thus further destabilizing the Middle East, why they aren't under UN sanctions I'll never understand; but they certainly don't have standing to dictate anything to other countries on the proliferation issue). It reminds me of all the NYT front page stories about aluminum tubes and Iraqi WMD of Judy Miller in 2002. Isn't it bad journalism to report completely unproven allegations for which there is no evidence?

Back to the real world: The steps outlined above are only pledges on Iran's part, of course, and we have to see if they are implemented.

President Obama made much the same points, demanding that Iran follow through on fuller IAEA inspections, a long-time demand of the US.

Presumably the regime is being so forthcoming because it needs a win on the international stage to shore up its flagging legitimacy at home, in the way of presidential elections widely viewed as fraudulent. It is possible that hard liners like the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps will attempt to torpedo these positive moves.

For further proof that Congress has numerous brain-dead people in it, its reaction to Iran's being forthcoming in Geneva was to authorize legislation that would try to punish companies for supplying gasoline to Iran. Somehow I think someone will take the contract, and anyway Iran will up its petroleum refining capacity in the coming couple of years. Congress should worry how the US is going to fuel its transportation in coming years.

The USG Open Source Center translated the remarks of Khamenei's secretary, Sa'id Jalili, on the Geneva negotiations:

"FYI -- Iran Nuclear Negotiator Jalili Says 5+1 Talks Positive
Islamic Republic of Iran News Network Television (IRINN)
Thursday, October 1, 2009
Document Type: OSC Summary

Tehran Islamic Republic of Iran News Network Television (IRINN) in Persian at 1636 GMT began a live relay of a news conference by Iran's Supreme Security Council secretary Sa'id Jalili in Geneva following the 5+1 nuclear talks. The news conference was also broadcast live by Press TV and Al-Alam TV.

Jalili said that today's talks concentrated on security, international developments, economy, and regional issues. He added that these talks could be a platform to resolve the regional and global issues. Jalili said that one of the most important issues is global security. Jalili added that some media try to create terror within their audience. He called it "media terrorism."

Jalili said: "One of the important issues we have proposed in the proposal package is to deal with some of the genuine threats which the human community suffers from and should be concerned about. One of these issues is the issue of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs). WMDs are a threat to the human community, which must definitely be dealt with through international cooperation. The issue of disarmament is the most important one."

Iran's nuclear negotiator asked for all nuclear arsenals to be destroyed. Jalili said that at the same time countries have the right to achieve peaceful nuclear technology. Jalili said that best method is to boost international regulations bodies, such as the IAEA and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Jalili then referred to the global financial crisis. He said that worldwide cooperation could be useful in resolving this matter. Jalili criticized the country's that support sanctions and said sanctions will not help the global financial crisis.

Jalili then talked about terrorism, narcotics, and organized crime. He said that if the public are not scared then a basis for mutual cooperation will be created.
Jalili called the Geneva talks constructive. He said: "Today we have agreed to continue these talks with a positive thinking. Hopefully next month we can reach an agreement on how to continue these talks so that cooperation would become reality."
Jalili then started answering questions.

In response to a question by an Egyptian correspondent, Jalili said: Worldwide and regional security is only possible through cooperation.

Jalili said that today's talks mainly concentrated on how to take these talks forward.

An Israeli correspondent asked Jalili about Ahmadinezhad's comments on Israel. Jalili refused to answer his question. Another correspondent asked the same question from Jalili. The Iranian official said that the Palestine problem is a 60 year-old issue. Jalili said that Iran wants a democratic solution to the Palestinian territories. He added that only a just solution could work for the people of this region.

A German correspondent asked if there are any unknown nuclear facilities in Iran. Jalili said that everything has to go through the IAEA. Iran's peaceful nuclear activities are in full cooperation with IAEA, Jalili said.

One correspondent asked about the outcome of talks with William Burns, the US representative. Jalili said that he was aware that the 5+1 countries had a united stance against Iran, but that the talks were productive.

Fars news agency, affiliated to Iran Revolution Guards Corps, asked if the talks with the 5+1 countries would continue and Jalili's response was positive."

http://www.juancole.com/
Snuffysmith
Arnaud de Borchgrave:

President Obama the juggler has been spinning too many plates. From unemployment at 15 million, to health care reform, God knows how or when; to the Middle East where the peace process has fizzled yet again; to Iran where the options are narrowing to what hawks say are "an Israeli or U.S. military strike now, or a nuclear Tehran soon"; to Afghanistan, where U.S. troops have heard their commander trigger a verbal bombshell to a worldwide television audience: Defeat is conceivable.

And this latter dire suggestion comes despite eight years of warfare with heavy bombers, gunships, artillery, drones, satellite surveillance, $250 billion in U.S. civilian and military assistance, a coalition of 40 nations, and some 100,000 troops, including 70,000 U.S. and 90,000 Afghan soldiers.

The new Afghan recipe, Gen. Stanley McChrystal told CBS’ David Martin on "60 Minutes," is fewer kinetic operations and more emphasis on hearts and minds. He conceded that things "are probably a little worse" since he took command three months ago. Two hundred and sixty-five civilians were killed in U.S. or coalition action in the past 12 months, according to Gen. McChrystal, a situation that would deny victory unless drastically curtailed.

Gen. McChrystal believes these Afghan civilian casualties are "literally how we lose the war, or in many ways how we win it." He is convinced that it’s more important to protect civilians than kill Taliban or al Qaeda fighters. The Taliban, by contrast, kill anyone who is believed to be cooperating with Americans.

And they don’t fear losing public opinion support. Overwhelming firepower, concludes Gen. McChrystal, is a surefire way of losing the support of the people. The 3,000 killed in the Twin Towers, the Pentagon and Flight 93 in Pennsylvania are now lost in the new calculus.

In Vietnam, a general once said, "once you’ve got them by the … , the hearts and minds follow." Didn’t work in ‘Nam. Probably won’t work in Afghanistan. U.S., Canadian, British, French and Dutch troops – the only ones authorized by their governments to fight – cannot cover a country the size of France or Texas with the world’s most inhospitable terrain. This would require approximately 400,000 troops.

And that’s why Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen says a much larger Afghan army is an urgent necessity. The target is 250,000. But the 80,000 recruited thus far are for the most part illiterate.

Their officers are 70 percent ethnic Tajiks. Pushtun recruits, the majority, don’t respect their Tajik commanders. Also, their ranks are assumed to be heavily infiltrated by Taliban agents. These, in turn, spread the word that Taliban insurgents will execute them after the Americans leave. Some go home after they get paid $80 monthly for the first time.

Forty years after Vietnam, few remember the lessons of that long-playing engagement. But, unlike Afghanistan, defeat did not mean the victorious North Vietnamese communists planned to continue attacking the United States with suicide volunteers.

In Afghanistan, there is little doubt a Taliban victory would bring al Qaeda back in a heartbeat to organize the next episode of their war against the heathen, decadent Western democracies.

Most of Mr. Obama’s plates will stop spinning as Iran and its nuclear ambitions take center stage. A tougher sanctions regime is to be agreed among the U.N. Security Council’s permanent members – the United States, Britain, France, Russia and China – but Moscow, Beijing, and Paris are expected to balk at the only sanction that could conceivably get the mullahs to cry uncle: a ban on the imported gasoline that keeps Iran’s cars and trucks on the road.

The next tableau in the unfolding Middle Eastern drama is Israeli air strikes against Iran’s key nuclear facilities. For the rest of the world, this could not take place without a wink and a nod from Mr. Obama himself.

For Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security adviser under President Carter, the only way to convince the world otherwise would be for Mr. Obama to inform Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that any Israeli fighter-bombers flying over Iraqi airspace on their way to bomb Iran would be shot down by U.S. aircraft.

As implausible as such a scenario may sound, Iran’s asymmetrical retaliatory capabilities would spread mayhem up and down the entire Persian Gulf, from the Strait of Hormuz (25 percent of the world’s daily oil needs) where Iran’s seaborne Revolutionary Guards could sink a supertanker, to hundreds of missiles and rockets aimed at U.S. warships in the Gulf, to skullduggery by Hamas and Hezbollah throughout the Middle East. This week, Iran’s well-publicized barrage of short- and medium-range missiles was designed to demonstrate the harm Iran could inflict on its own.

Alternatively, the United States could take Israel’s place. On its own, Israel cannot handle all the missions for a raid on Iran’s key and widely scattered installations (27 of them identified by satellite surveillance).

Air superiority and naval superiority against Iranian mine-laying and shore-based missile batteries could only be done from Iraq and carrier-based U.S. air power. Mr. Obama cannot afford to sit out the Iranian showdown, lest he be seen as weak and ineffectual. Middle East scuttlebutt also has the Saudi kingdom turning a blind eye to Israel aircraft bypassing Iraq and refueling over Saudi Arabia.

Mr. Obama may decide not to acquiesce in Gen. McChrystal’s request for 40,000 additional troops. In which case, failure in Afghanistan is – in the general’s own words – the likely outcome.

The president would then feel compelled to bare his talons. Three former CentCom commanders (Gen. Anthony C. Zinni, Gen. John P. Abizaid, Adm. William J. Fallon) with responsibility for a large slice of the globe from East Africa to the Middle East, including the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf, as well as Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan, have said publicly we must learn to live with an Iranian bomb, as we did with China’s when Mao Zedong boasted China would emerge victorious from a nuclear conflict with the United States, and with the Soviet bomb when Nikita Khrushchev bragged the Soviet Union would bury the United States.

If that should occur, the next set of $64,000 questions will be the quest for nuclear equivalency in Saudi Arabia, the seven Gulf countries, known as the United Arab Emirates and Egypt.

Arnaud de Borchgrave is editor at large of The Washington Times and of United Press International.

More…
http://www.washingtontimes.com/staff/arnaud-de-borchgrave/
Snuffysmith

The Indian approach to climate and energy policy
By Divya Badami Rao and M. V. Ramana | 3 July 2008
Article Highlights

* India won't commit to reducing its greenhouse gas emission targets unless developed nations such as the United States agree to pay for it.
* While India's emissions are relatively small when compared to the developed world, it should still develop much better energy policies.
* In particular, current Indian energy policies are completely inequitable, as they often focus on meeting the demands of the urban rich at the cost of poverty alleviation and rural development.
* Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has promised to keep the country's per-capita emissions below the global average, but he hasn't considered what that means for future energy planning.

At the end of the thirteenth meeting of the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change that took place in Bali last December, the Indian delegation was relieved, happy even. According to Kapil Sibal, India's minister for science and technology and head of the delegation, "India did not have to give any commitment on reduction of greenhouse gases to the world. We have achieved our goals." Such statements may explain the Economist's recent observation that "India has acquired an ugly reputation on the global front against climate change. Among big countries, perhaps only America and Russia are considered more obdurate."

Only a little while ago, China was viewed similarly. Like India, it had traditionally avoided any kind of emission-reduction commitments, citing the need to rely on cheap fossil fuels to meet its development goals. But this is no longer the case: "In the past couple of years, Chinese officials have begun sounding like converts to the climate-change cause," the same Economist article stated. China's target is to reduce its energy intensity (energy used per dollar of gross domestic product generated) to 20 percent below 2005 levels by 2010 and increase the share of renewable sources in its electricity generation capacity to 20 percent by 2020. In June 2007, the Chinese government released a National Climate Change Program that outlines the steps Beijing will take to meet these targets, as well as its plans to support adaptation.

Because of China's policy shift, India is finding itself somewhat isolated at international negotiations. More pressure is coming from the United States, which refuses to commit to any emission reductions without similar binding commitments from China and India. Along with China's newfound stewardship, this international pressure seems to have finally prompted the Indian government to establish its own Council on Climate Change--a high-level group of experts and senior government officials to advise New Delhi on measures it can take to mitigate and adapt to climate change.

On June 30, the council released India's National Action Plan on Climate Change PDF. The 47-page document primarily offers a list of eight technological efforts, the pride of place being given to research and development of solar energy. But staying true to India's stance at Bali, the report doesn't set any concrete numerical goals for emission reductions--or even for energy intensity.

A major point of contention in Bali was whether, in the absence of concrete funding by developed countries, developing countries would agree to commit themselves to any emissions reductions. Despite pressure from the United States, the final text of the Bali road map pledged developing country parties to the framework convention to "consider" nationally appropriate mitigation actions "in the context of sustainable development, supported and enabled by technology, financing, and capacity-building, in a measurable, reportable, and verifiable manner."

Note the use of the word "actions," as opposed to commitments, and the linkage between actions and "support" for such actions (implicitly by developed countries), especially financing. Indian diplomats played an important role in placing the clause "measurable, reportable, and verifiable" at the end--the implication being that any mitigation actions taken by India that are "measurable, reportable, and verifiable" should be supported by international funding. This position makes it difficult for India to commit to any such climate-mitigation actions--and emission targets would certainly fit that description--unilaterally.

Since the Bali meeting, members of India's climate council have argued publicly that the cost estimates of even modest emission reductions are so high that India would have to cut expenditures on traditional development activities such as building schools and hospitals to afford them--obviously, an unacceptable option within the country.

The other argument against taking on emission targets is that India emits just 4 percent of global emissions, and therefore, its actions shouldn't be of major concern. Prodipto Ghosh, a council member, wrote in the Indian Express, "If India were to eliminate all its [greenhouse gas] emissions, essentially by going back to the Stone Age, it would hardly matter for the climate change impacts on India, or indeed, anywhere else!"

That may be true today, but India's emissions are likely to become more significant in the coming decades. In its 2006 World Energy Outlook, the International Energy Agency (IEA) estimated that developing countries will overtake member nations of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, i.e. the wealthier nations, sometime around 2020 in annual carbon dioxide emissions. And from 2005 to 2030, the IEA projects PDF that India and China alone will contribute 56 percent of the increase in projected worldwide emissions. The United States believes that such projections are ample reason for India and other developing nations to commit to measures that would help them avoid reaching these emission levels.

But the Indian government's preference, as well as that of many other developing countries, is to measure accountability for climate mitigation in terms of the past. For example, between 1900 and 1999, carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel combustion in China, India, and other developing countries in Asia together accounted for only 12.2 percent of total global emissions, while the United States accounted for 30.3 percent, the European Union contributed 27.7 percent, and the former Soviet Union 13.7 percent, according to the World Resources Institute. Even when projected to 2030, the emissions ratio doesn't change much PDF. This difference was explicitly acknowledged in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which established "legally binding" reductions in greenhouse gas emissions for developed countries such as the United States and Japan but not developing countries, most notably India and China.

Delineating responsibility for climate mitigation by using an analysis of per-capita emissions makes developing countries less culpable still. Indian interlocutors also stress that while India's overall emissions will increase, it will be because of the combined total emissions of a far larger national population--not because Indians have intrinsically energy-intensive lifestyles. As of 2005, India's annual emissions work out PDF to less than 1.1 tons of carbon dioxide per capita; in the United States, it's more than 20 tons per capita. That's a big gap that won't be closing any time soon.

While these arguments may make it sound as though India is ethically justified in refusing to curtail emissions for the sake of its development, the problem is that the energy policies that the government is defending are not justifiable--neither on the basis of efficiency, equity, nor environmental sustainability. The hope amongst those desiring a more sound energy policy, especially independent analysts, is that the pressure on India to devise a climate plan of action will bring the government's historically poor energy and development policies into sharper focus.

Energy planning PDF in India has resulted in an electricity sector that doesn't provide access for millions of rural inhabitants, proves unreliable even for those who have access, and negatively impacts local environments, disrupting the lives and livelihoods of untold millions. For evidence of the latter, see this photo essay on coal and uranium mining in India, this World Bank report PDF on a power plant run by India's National Thermal Power Corporation, and Indian novelist Arundhati Roy's writing on the impact of dams on villages and indigenous populations. Unfortunately, the future policies the government is considering are no better.

Equity has been a prime casualty. Even though energy projects are often constructed in the name of poverty alleviation and rural development, they're largely focused on meeting the demands of the urban rich. (Note "demands" should be differentiated from the normative term "needs.") Therefore, it shouldn't be surprising that even official estimates show that around 56 percent of rural households PDF in the country didn't have electricity in 2000. These residents live without adequate lighting, and many spend hours each week collecting firewood because they don't have access to modern cooking fuels. An October 2007 Greenpeace report PDF shows how the rich in India have much higher carbon emissions compared to the poor.

Not only do the poor and marginalized in India not have access to electricity, they also often face the brunt of the negative consequences of generating electricity for the rich. In a densely populated country such as India, a significant fraction of the population is directly dependent on land, water, and forests. Practically all large-scale electricity generation projects in the country--whether coal plants, nuclear plants, or large dams--impact these resources, and most recent large-scale electricity generation projects have met with stiff resistance from local inhabitants. (See "Haripur: Land for Nuclear Plant" PDF and "Campaign Against Coal-Based Thermal Power Plant Project," an online petition signed by hundreds of people who oppose a proposed coal-based thermal power plant in India's Chamalapura Valley.) This alone makes it unlikely that massive expansion of large and centralized energy projects will materialize anytime soon.

Independent energy analysts have shown that it's possible to plan for energy and electricity in a way that caters to India's marginalized poor and that this makes financial sense. Studies PDF using the development-focused end-use-oriented service-directed (DEFENDUS PDF) paradigm for energy pioneered by the late Amulya Reddy and his collaborators have shown that in contrast to conventional energy planning, DEFENDUS could result in greater achievement of development objectives at far lower cost in a shorter time. And because of the emphasis on improved efficiency--as well as the use of decentralized and renewable sources of electricity generation wherever it made economic sense--it also resulted in enormous environmental gains.

The necessity of such methods of energy planning that pay attention not just to overall electricity generation targets but also equity and environmental sustainability is implicitly highlighted by the National Action Plan on Climate Change. While it includes no commitments to reduce emissions, the plan reiterates a non-numerical promise by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, first made at a June 2007 meeting PDFof the G-8 in Germany that India's per-capita emissions wouldn't exceed the global average emissions of the developed countries.

An important international implication of this statement, which India's special envoy on climate change recently highlighted DOC, is that according to Singh's promise, India will limit its carbon emissions according to the scale of effort that the developed countries are themselves prepared to put in. "The more ambitious they are, the lower the limit that India would be prepared to accept. Thus, there is an inbuilt mutuality of incentive," the envoy stated. If Washington takes Singh's commitment seriously, it could be a small but significant step in breaking the impasse of mutual inaction.

Though mentioned again in the national action plan, the document fails to explore the implications of the prime minister's promise. If the promise is taken together with what scientists posit are the requirements for avoiding catastrophic climate change, then it would imply tight constraints on emissions for India. If the world were to agree on reducing its emissions to 80 percent below 1990 levels by 2050, then in one plausible scenario PDF, global emissions would have to peak by 2015 before declining to less than 20 billion tons of carbon dioxide by 2030 (and less than 6 tons by 2050). The United Nations projects PDF that the world's population in 2030 will be about eight billion or more. If the allowed emissions were to be shared equally, the per-capita threshold will be 2.5 tons of carbon dioxide.

Compare this with what is projected by India's planners for its emissions. In its "Integrated Energy Policy" report, the Indian Planning Commission projects PDF that electricity generation in India during the next 25 years will increase seven- to eightfold, involving a four- to fivefold increase in coal use and a nine- to tenfold increase in the use of natural gas. This would increase India's per-capita emissions to 3.6-5.5 tons of carbon dioxide by 2030.

Reducing per-capita emissions by 1 ton of carbon dioxide is hard enough, but it's much harder for a nation whose population is expected to be 1.5 billion people. This is the challenge that the national action plan should have identified and based its targets on. Turning around emission trends will not be easy, but the task will become harder the longer planning for it is delayed.

http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/feature...d-energy-policy
Snuffysmith
bitterlemons-international.org
Middle East Roundtable


Edition 37 Volume 8 - October 15, 2009

Trouble in Yemen

• Yemeni troubles: broad implications - Theodore Karasik
Hopefully, a show of confidence by Arabian Peninsula states and Egypt will help to arrest one or more of the current Yemeni crises.

• Isolated no more - Brian O'Neill
Yemen is unwillingly imposing its problems on the rest of the world.

• Yemen: snapshot of a potential future - Waleed Sadi
The full significance of the unfolding Yemeni conflict is that it is a template for potential conflicts in other parts of the Arab world.

Yemeni troubles: broad implications
Theodore Karasik

Yemen's crisis may be reaching new heights. The multiple factors affecting the country are a concern that should be noted not only on a regional level but also globally. Yemen, to some, may already be a failed state that harbors terrorist and criminal elements that promote a serious danger to regional governments, economies-- including energy supply chains--and populations.

President Ali Abdullah Saleh's government is under siege. It is battling a Huthi Shi'ite insurgency and attacks by Sunni extremists acting as the franchise "al-Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula" and fending off a growing secessionist struggle led by the "Southern Movement". Absent urgent regional or international intervention, Yemen is on a course leading to the potential collapse of Saleh's government or the country's partitioning into autonomous zones run by non-state actors.

Concerns in Saudi Arabia and other countries are mounting as Iran, apparently, has entered the fray backing the Huthi insurgency (the Zeidi Shi'ite sect make up one-third of the population). Like Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq, Yemen may be emerging as a battlefield in a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Tehran is threatening to secure a beachhead in the strategic southwest Arabian Peninsula, where Yemen offers oil, proximity to Saudi oilfields and control over critical Red Sea shipping lanes.

Of most importance, the Sanaa government launched Operation Scorched Earth on August 11, 2009 with the aim of finally crushing the five-year uprising--the sixth time the two sides have clashed. Fighting between the army and the Zeidi rebels, who complain of political and economic marginalization by the government, has killed hundreds and displaced tens of thousands of people in this poor country.

The Zeidis accuse the government of not fulfilling its obligations under previous agreements, including freeing rebel detainees, paying compensation to victims and rebuilding Saada region villages ravaged by fighting that has displaced about 150,000 people since 2004. The current escalation has killed unknown numbers on both sides and crammed tens of thousands of the newly displaced into camps, schools and barns turned into shelters, while aid groups struggle to bring in supplies.

In addition to the conflict with the Zeidi rebels in the north, the Sanaa government has been facing mounting demands in the south for the restoration of southern independence. After two years of peaceful protests led by civil service workers and soldiers whose pensions were never paid, the secessionist Southern Movement is escalating to violence. In the last few months, three opposition leaders have been murdered by northern security forces and seven newspapers have been shut down.

The movement has been joined by socialist forces and sympathizers of the former South Yemen government who are frustrated with the Saleh government's widespread fraud and negligence of the economy. Ali Salem al-Bidh, the former Marxist leader who negotiated the first reunification agreement between North and South Yemen in 1990, has been named the new leader of the Southern Movement. Because it has no faith in negotiating with Saleh, it has called for the United Nations to lead reconciliation talks or allow the Gulf Cooperation Council to form a new caretaker government in lieu of new negotiations.

Yemen is also the regional nerve center for arms trafficking, narcotics trade, transiting jihadists and sponsorship of Somali pirating operations. Drugs, notably Khat, are popular too: the populace and troops battling the Zeidi rebels haggle daily for the leaves with local Khat vendors, whose business is the only one still thriving in the devastated northern area. Khat is so popular in Yemen that cultivating the plant uses up nearly half of the country's water supply and farmers prefer to grow it for the high profits involved in the trade.

Finally, and just as important, is the fact that al-Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula is planning operations from Yemen. Hundreds of hardcore Arab fighters loyal to al-Qaeda have fled the Afghanistan-Pakistan region this year, heading mainly to Yemen to bolster an Islamist insurgency targeting Saudi Arabia and the ruling al-Saud family. The past year in Yemen witnessed numerous attacks against US interests and threats against British and UAE interests. In Saudi Arabia, the attempted assassination of Prince Muhammad bin Nayif is a case in point. His would-be assassin entered Saudi Arabia from Yemen using an unusual deception, gained access to the prince's Majlis during Ramadan and exploded a bomb hidden within his body.

Overall, Arabian Peninsula states and Egypt are concerned and are assisting the Yemeni central government to rid the country of its ills. For example, the Dana Gas and Crescent Petroleum (Naft al-Hilal) Companies in the UAE recently announced the signing of a memorandum of understanding with Yemen to set up GasCities Ltd to attract investment and create thousands of jobs. Hopefully, this show of confidence will help to arrest one or more of the current Yemeni crises.- Published 15/10/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org

Dr. Theodore Karasik is Director, Research and Development, at INEGMA, Dubai, UAE.

Isolated no more
Brian O'Neill

Yemen, an ancient and remote place, has long been ignored by the media. Its oceans, deserts and mountains have greeted potential conquerors with hostility, and its confused and confusing politics have kept journalists at bay. Even to dedicated scholars of and in the Arab world, Yemen has been an exotic place. But recently, the convulsions driven by an inexorable pull of history have captured the attention of journalists, politicians and scholars. Frequently immune to history, Yemen is isolated no more.

The reasons why are known to anyone with a browsing familiarity with the daily papers. Yemen is currently being wrenched by three revolutions, independent of each other but with a common theme: the central government is more than illegitimate--it is antithetical to the nature and history of Yemen.

The rebellions are the Huthi revolt in the north, the southern secessionist movement and the pervasive threat of a reconstituted al-Qaeda. Without delving too deeply into history, each one is based on a series of decisions and indecisions flowing from Yemen's separate revolts against imamate and colonialism, its unification and its civil war. The north, roughly, feels that President Ali Abdullah Saleh's approximation of republicanism is an affront to Yemen's monarchial, decentralized rule, and southerners broadly feel colonized in their own country. Al-Qaeda, of course, feels that any ruler not following its strict laws is an apostate and a traitor. These are the themes being played out in Yemen, set tragically against the jagged backdrop of economic collapse and ecological ruin.

The Huthi rebellion has been the one grabbing the most attention since violence flared for the sixth time earlier this year. The government showed a disdain for subtlety, nicknaming its campaign "Operation Scorched Earth". Though a ceasefire is in effect, the underlying grievances still remain. And while the war is rooted deeply in Yemeni history, many commentators have tried to paint it as proxy fight between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the regional powers.

The main thrust of the argument is that the rebels are Shi'ite Muslims and therefore supposedly kindred with the "ancien" revolutionaries running Iran, hence getting aid and comfort. And, of course, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia opposes any attempt by Iran to impose its will in the region and certainly on the Peninsula. This ignores the fact that the Shi'ism practiced by the Huthis is far removed from Iran's Twelver theology (and is often referred to as the sixth school of Sunnism); it also ignores the long-standing enmity between Sanaa and Riyadh. And despite the picture Saleh attempts to present to the world, there is no evidence of Iranian interference. But his portrayal has been effective, and supposed Iranian mischief has been a reason why the world has largely turned a blind eye to the government's scorched earth policy. In international relations, there is little shadow between perception and reality.

The southern secessionist movement is a different animal. The world is concerned about Yemen fragmenting, and distaste for Marxist remnants is subsumed under the auspices of national unity. Were Yemen to split apart, aside from the historical failure of what was a rare political triumph in the Arab world, the Saleh government would lose major sources of revenue both in oil and from the large port of Aden. This would hasten its slide into failed state. And it would also be a perception loss for the West: an ostensible ally in the war against radical fundamentalism can't be allowed to split apart.

Al-Qaeda's revolt is more immediately prominent in the international context. Though there is no evidence that displaced jihadis from the Afghanistan/Pakistan region are regrouping in Yemen, it is indisputable that a powerful new franchise has broken ground in the Peninsula. The marriage between the Saudi and Yemeni branches of al-Qaeda was essentially consummated in the failed attempt on the life of Saudi Interior Minister Muhammad bin Nayif. Though the attack was unsuccessful, it showed the patience, the cunning and the reach of the organization--a group with the intelligence and the manpower to carry out attacks in Saudi Arabia as well as on key shipping lanes around the Horn of Africa. The world is tied down in the AfPak conflict; al- Qaeda has almost free reign in the wilds of Yemen.

And that is the main importance, on a global political scale, of these rebellions. Yemen is poised on the brink of collapse, and the enemies of the western world stand ready to take advantage. A strong and well-funded government would have enormous difficulties dealing with these problems; Yemen is neither, and is therefore incapable. A failed state would be even more of a breeding ground and safe-haven for al-Qaeda--even more than a dangerously distracted or over-stretched state currently is. Were there no al-Qaeda, the world might be able to treat Yemen's internal convulsions as an unfortunate sideshow, like fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan. That might not be moral, but it would be possible.

That luxury, though, is impossible. Yemen has been an important stop on trade routes and has given the world spices and stories and legends. But it has rarely played a decisive role in history. That is no longer the case. Were the global community to take the cheap and easy route of ignoring Yemen's crumbling edifices, it would have to pay for it ten times over in the near future. Yemen's history may be exotic, its politics may be confusing and its present may be idiosyncratic, but it is unwillingly imposing its problems on the rest of the world. The world, in turn, has to be willing to adopt these problems. - Published 15/10/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org

Brian O'Neill is a freelance writer based in Chicago. A former reporter and editor for the Yemen Observer, he currently co-runs the Yemen blog Waq al-Waq (islamandinsurgencyinyemen.blogspot.com).

Yemen: snapshot of a potential future
Waleed Sadi

The conflict, or should one say, the conflicts in Yemen arise from a mosaic of reasons.

On the surface, the ongoing armed conflict in the country was sparked by a clash in 2004 between government security forces and a group of students protesting the war in Iraq and the deployment of US forces there. The protesters were led by a Zeidi cleric by the name of Hussain al-Huthi, who was also a member of Parliament at the time. Huthi was later killed in an ambush by government forces. The issue of Iraq and the ongoing war there is therefore one factor in the conflict in Yemen.

The bigger picture of a conflict that has grown relentlessly since then, however, needs to incorporate the fact that Yemen lacks fully fledged democratic institutions and is structured to be effectively governed by one man, namely President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who happens also to be the leader of the Hashid tribe. The Zeidi people, who sparked the conflict with their protest against the war in Iraq, are a Shi'ite minority who harbor their own grievances against the central government. They were obviously ready to explode at the first spark and the war in Iraq provided that spark.

Yet the extent of the crisis in Yemen does not end there. Recent heavy-handed bombings of Huthi strongholds in Dhahian, al-Mahader and al-Ghabeir have caused anger to spread across the country, especially after about 85,000 Saada residents fled the fighting and the government bombardments, in the process triggering a massive humanitarian crisis and wider dissatisfaction. The 750,000 residents of Saada itself began to suffer from malnutrition when government forces besieged and isolated the rebellious city. The tribal feature of the conflict was further reinforced when a so-called citizens' army was proclaimed by the government, composed mostly of Hashid tribesmen.

Accusations leveled by the central government in Sanaa that Libya and Iran were supporting the rebellion gave the conflict a regional dimension as well. Certainly, Saudi Arabia is viewed as siding with President Saleh. Mediation efforts were not in short supply but all of them foundered almost as soon as they were launched. Qatar tried first and longest, in June of last year, but that effort unraveled in January this year, allegedly because the government reneged on its pledges to vacate certain areas belonging to the rebels. Meanwhile, on the battlefield about 400 rebels have taken refuge in Bani Hushaish, a city of 75,000 people. Government forces are determined to drive them out and recently began a series of bombardments and military strikes to dislodge them. This military effort is still going on.

The full significance of the unfolding Yemeni conflict is that it is a template for potential conflicts in other parts of the Arab world. Yemen shares many features common to other Arab countries, with its tribal nature, sectarian divisions and the lack of democracy. The interplay of regional politics in the conflict is also not unique to Yemen. The central government's determination to maintain its territorial unity is clearly a legitimate goal. Nevertheless, the means undertaken to protect and consolidate that unity have entailed violations of the civil and political rights of certain ethnic, religious and tribal groups.

The broader issue raised by the Yemeni conflict is how to construct an Arab nation-state where the political and sociological terrain is a peaceful hybrid of religious, tribal and ethnic differences. What is happening in Yemen is essentially a scenario of what can happen elsewhere in the Arab world. The right to self-determination is one of the most vexing and troublesome issues confronting states across the globe. How to reconcile states' rights with the right of peoples of different religions and backgrounds to determine their own future is an issue that dominates human rights conferences until this day, and, as Yemen shows, there is no clear answer yet.-Published 15/10/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org

Waleed Sadi is a former Jordanian ambassador to Turkey and the UN and other international organizations in Geneva. He is currently a columnist for the Jordan Times and Al Rai newspapers.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------

Bitterlemons-international.org is an internet forum for an array of world perspectives on the Middle East and its specific concerns. It aspires to engender greater understanding about the Middle East region and open a new common space for world thinkers and political leaders to present their viewpoints and initiatives on the region. Editors Ghassan Khatib and Yossi Alpher can be reached at ghassan@bitterlemons-international.org and yossi@bitterlemons- international.org, respectively.
Snuffysmith
Guest Note by Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett: Obama's Iran Sanctions Delusion
from The Washington Note by Ben Katcher

jibao2.jpg

This is a guest note by Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett. Flynt directs the New America Foundation/Iran Project and is a former Senior Director of Middle East Affairs at the National Security Council. Hillary is chairman of Stratega, a political risk consultancy. They are co-publishers of the forthcoming blog, The Race for Iran.

As anticipated in our post on this blog on October 13 (and a monograph published by Johns Hopkins' Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies earlier this week), China authoritatively signaled today that it will not support the imposition of anything approaching "crippling" international sanctions against Iran over its nuclear activities.

Nor will Chinese leaders support measures that would negatively impact what Beijing sees as its most important economic and strategic interests at stake in China's developing relationship with the Islamic Republic.

Indeed, after meeting with Iran's Vice President, Mohammad Reza Rahimi, in Beijing, China's Premier Wen Jiabao noted that Sino-Iranian "cooperation in trade and energy has widened and deepened", and stated that the Chinese government "will maintain high-level exchanges with Iran, enhance mutual understanding and trust, promote bilateral pragmatic cooperation and coordinate closely in international affairs".

Wen's statement comes a day after Secretary of State Hillary Clinton - who has done more than anyone else in the Obama Administration to promulgate the threat of "crippling" sanctions if Tehran does not surrender on the nuclear issue - was disabused of whatever illusions she was clinging to about Moscow's willingness to support a strategically meaningful intensification of international pressure on the Islamic Republic.

Furthermore, it comes a day after Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs Kurt Campell, also in Beijing, offered more hot air about "the need to see more cooperation and coordination between the United States and China" regarding Iran.

We supported Barack Obama in his campaign for the White House in 2008 - but we have to say that, at this point, it is hard to identify any significant improvement in America's Iran policy under President Obama compared to the strategically dysfunctional approach pursued by the George W. Bush Administration.

The Obama Administration's continuing advocacy of a "dual track" approach to Iran is particularly misleading. There is not a serious sanctions "option" for resolving the nuclear issue or other strategic differences with Iran. The Administration's constant cheer leading for sanctions does nothing for U.S. interests - but will undercut the credibility of whatever diplomatic overtures Secretary Clinton and her colleagues make toward Tehran.

The "dual track" approach only makes sense as a lowest-common-denominator consensus position among different camps of Obama's foreign policy and political advisers. Looking for that kind of consensus may have been an effective way to run the Harvard Law Review. It is not a way to define coherent and effective foreign policy.

Significantly, the meeting between Wen and Rahimi took place on the margins of a summit meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization - a regional security forum comprised of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, in which Iran, India, and Pakistan have observer status.

Among other things, summit participants will be launching discussions about expanding use of member states' currencies for intra-SCO trade (including oil and gas), thereby reducing the dollar's use as a transactional currency.

It is popular in U.S. foreign policy circles to dismiss the SCO as a "talk shop". But we think the SCO is interesting as a harbinger of future strategic trends - trends that, left unchecked, could profoundly accelerate the decline of America's strategic position. Checking those trends requires that the United States pursue a fundamentally different sort of relationship with Iran.

But that won't happen until the Obama Administration faces reality about what its options really are.

Hillary and I will be launching our own blog, The Race for Iran, next week. We hope you will take a look.

-- Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett

http://www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/...hina_iran_post/
Snuffysmith
Pakistan's Jihadi Stew
By Aaron Mannes

The aftermath of the attack on the Pakistani military’s GHQ earlier this week has brought attention to the complex stew of jihadi groups running around the Punjab. Imtiaz Gul provides an overview at Foreign Policy while the venerable B. Raman provides another at Outlook India. The story starts with the Saudis supporting anti-Shia groups in Pakistan to counter Iranian-backed Shia militancy. This was exacerbated by local animosities in regions were Pakistan’s Shia minority were wealthy landowners. The main anti-Shia group was Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). Reportedly it received substantial state support under General Zia who wanted to counter his political rivals. SSP became involved in politics and spun-off violent groups, most notably Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) in 1996. Supposedly there is no connection between the political SSP and the terrorist LeJ. This is an organizational maneuver that has been repeated endlessly in the Pakistani jihadi milieu. Supposedly, both of these groups have been banned – but banned groups in Pakistan never seem to disappear, they just change their names.

Read the full post here.
http://terrorwonk.blogspot.com/2009/10/pak...ihadi-stew.html
Snuffysmith
How to get out of Afghanistan
By Hugh Gusterson
http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/columni...-of-afghanistan
Snuffysmith

GORDON ADAMS
Afghanistan and Pakistan: The graveyard for U.S. foreign policy planning?
The challenges and potential failures in Afghanistan and Pakistan could very well torpedo the comprehensive, cross-agency review of U.S. foreign assistance and development aid that's happening in Washington right now.

http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/columni...-policy-plannin
Snuffysmith
India's quest for dual-use technology Premium
BY MATTHEW HOEY
Over the last 10 years, India has taken on a significant challenge: become a great power in space-, missile-, and nanotechnology, and do it with the help of a new friend--the United States. But is U.S.-Indian technology-sharing still seen as harmless international engagement?

http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/f...d51e5c&pi=4
Snuffysmith
Stratfor
---------------------------



THE KREMLIN WARS (SPECIAL SERIES), PART 2: THE COMBATANTS

Summary
Former Russian president and current Prime Minister Vladimir Putin is the
indisputable executive power in Russia. His strength comes largely from his
ability to control Russia's opposing political clans. Those two clans, which
have been fighting for influence for most of the past eight years, are about to
see fresh conflict as a new force, the civiliki, attempt to use Russia's
economic crisis as an opportunity to reshape the country.

Editor's Note: This is part two in a five-part series examining the Russian
political clans and the coming conflict between them.

Analysis


Executive power in Russia indisputably rests with former president and current
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Putin emerged as the supreme political force in
Russia following the chaos that defined the 1990s precisely because he stepped
outside of the fray and acted effectively as an arbiter for the disparate power
structures. Although Putin's background is in the KGB (now called the Federal
Security Service, or FSB) and he used these links in intelligence and security
services to initially consolidate his reign, his power does not rest on those
foundations alone. Putin's power comes from his ability to control Russia's
opposing clans through favors and fear that he will give one clan the tools and
authority to destroy the other.

The two main clans within the Kremlin are the Sechin clan led by Deputy Prime
Minister Igor Sechin and the Surkov clan led by Russian President Dmitri
Medvedev's First Deputy Chief of Staff Vladislav Surkov. These clans have been
involved in almost continual competition for power for the past eight years. The
group that may tip the balance in the coming clan wars is a newly defined class
that is part of the Surkov clan: the civiliki. Putin's balance of power is
intertwined with economic reform, and the civiliki -- a group of lawyers and
economic technocrats -- want to use the economic crisis to reform Russia.


Sechin and the FSB and Siloviki

Sechin has deep roots within the FSB and the siloviki (a term which translates
as "the strongmen") who are either directly linked to the FSB or are former
security officers who have tried their hand at business or politics or both
during their "retirement." Sechin and his group generally have a comparatively
Soviet frame of mind, but without any ideological nostalgia for communism. They
do, however, long for the powerful Soviet Union, which acted forcefully on the
world stage, was respected by its foes and allies, was suspicious of the West
and was led by a firm (bordering on brutal) hand at home. The economic system
Sechin favors is one that harnesses Russia's plentiful natural resources to fund
champions of industry and military technology, and essentially depends on high
commodity prices to sustain itself.

Sechin's main source of power is undoubtedly the FSB. Although the FSB is fully
loyal to Putin, this does not mean that it would not side with Sechin in a
showdown against its opponents. Sechin uses the FSB as a talent pool from which
to fill various positions under his command, including the chairmanships of
various state-owned companies. This naturally irks the civiliki, who abhor the
thought of intelligence operatives running Russian companies.

Aside from the FSB, Sechin's other pillars of power are the state-owned oil
giant Rosneft and the interior, energy and defense ministries. The distribution
of assets between the Sechin and Surkov clans is not random; Putin coordinated
it precisely so that neither clan becomes too powerful. Sechin's control of
Rosneft is therefore balanced by Surkov's control of Gazprom, the state-owned
natural gas company. While Sechin gets control of the energy ministry, Surkov is
in charge of the natural resources ministry and so on.

Surkov and the GRU

Surkov rose through the ranks by proving himself invaluable in two key episodes
of Russian state consolidation: the Chechen insurgency and the collapse of the
largest Russian private energy firm, Yukos. Originally from Chechnya, Surkov
played a role in eliminating a major thorn in the Kremlin's side: Chechen
President Dzhokhar Dudayev. He also helped mastermind Moscow's win in the Second
Chechen War by creating a strategy that divided the insurgency between the
nationalist Chechens and the Islamists. His role in bringing down Yukos oligarch
Mikhail Khodorkovsky began the all-important consolidation of those economic
resources pillaged during the 1990s by disparate business interests.

Surkov's power base is the Russian Foreign Military Intelligence Directorate
(GRU). The GRU represents both military intelligence and the military.
Throughout Soviet and post-Soviet history, it has been the counterbalance to the
KGB/FSB. The GRU is larger than the FSB and has a longer reach abroad, although
it its accomplishments are not as well known as those of the FSB.

Also under Surkov's control are Gazprom; the ministries of finance, economics
and natural resources; and the Russian prosecutor general. However, Surkov's
rival Sechin controls the interior and defense ministries -- which have most of
Russia's armed forces under their command. This limits the GRU's ability to
control the military.

Surkov has sought to weaken Sechin and the FSB's position by constantly looking
for potential allies to add to his group. In 2003, he formed an alliance with
the heads of the reformist camp -- previously known as the St. Petersburgers --
that has proven to be invaluable in the context of the financial crisis. It is
this group, the civiliki, that will help Surkov in his attempt to defeat Sechin,
possibly for the last time.

The Civiliki

The civiliki are rooted in two camps. The first is the St. Petersburgers group
of legal experts and economists that coalesced around Anatoly Sobchak, mayor of
St. Petersburg from 1991-1996. Many of Russia's power players -- from Putin to
Medvedev to key civiliki figures like Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin and German
Gref, the former trade and economics minister and current head of Sberbank --
either worked directly under Sobchak or were somehow related to his
administration. The second is the somewhat younger group of Western-leaning
businessmen and economists that eventually joined the reformists from St.
Petersburg.

The civiliki primarily want economic stability and believe Russia has to reform
its economic system and move past state intervention in the economy that depends
largely on natural resources for output. They try to be non-ideological and are
for the most part uninterested in political intrigue. In their mind, economic
stability is to be founded on a strong business relationship with the West that
would provide Russia with access to capital with which to fund economic reforms.
From their perspective, funding from the West has to go to rational and
efficient companies that seek to maximize profit, not political power.

The first grouping of economic experts and Western leaning businessmen was led
by Anatoly Chubais, who led the St. Petersburg group and was essentially in
charge of various privatization efforts in the 1990s under former Russian
President Boris Yeltsin. However, most of the St. Petersburg group was sidelined
by the general failure of economic reforms enacted during this period. They were
then almost snuffed out by the siloviki during the commodities boom from 2005
onward, leaving only Kudrin in a position of some power.

However, Surkov rescued the civiliki and incorporated them, giving them the
powerful protector they lacked. Part of Surkov's plan was to turn one of the
more prominent civiliki -- Medvedev -- into a superstar at the Kremlin. In
Surkov's mind Medvedev was the correct choice since he was neither FSB nor GRU,
though Surkov still felt he could influence him. This move helped Medvedev
become president. Since Medvedev's ascendance to the presidency, and with
Surkov's support, the other civiliki leaders -- Kudrin and Gref -- have been
given even greater liberty to run the economy without fear of being replaced.
Kudrin is handling the economy while Gref essentially is masterminding the
banking system reform. The two of them work very well together, and with their
allies Economic Minister Elvira Nabiullina and Natural Resources Minister Yuri
Trutnev.

There is a rapidly brewing Surkov-backed conflict between the civiliki and
Sechin. The strife is rooted in the simple issue of efficiency: The civiliki
argument is that the Sechin clan wasted the good years of high commodity prices,
crashed the Russian economy and weakened the state. This forces Putin to look at
the conflict differently from previous clan battles. The Surkov-Sechin arguments
typically are "just" about power, and thus about maintaining a balance. But the
civiliki see Sechin's group not so much as a threat to them but as a threat to
Russia. This is an argument that Putin has been able to ignore, but the latest
economic crisis could have changed this.

The civiliki have a ready-made solution for the inherent problems in the Russian
economy. Surkov's support for the civiliki, along with the financial crisis, has
given Putin pause and he is giving their proposals consideration. However, the
implementation of such reforms could reignite the feud between the clans and
thus completely destabilize the delicate balance Putin has attempted to keep in
the Kremlin.

Copyright 2009 Stratfor.
Snuffysmith




http://www.counterpunch.org/gore10232009.html



An Interview with Bill and Kathleen Christison

Palestine in Pieces

By JEFF GORE

In 1979, Kathleen and Bill Christison retired from the CIA, where they worked as analysts. Ever since then, they've had an unorthodox retirement, to say the least. With only a couple relatively brief interludes, they've dedicated what could have been years of relaxation to fighting perhaps the most uphill battle imaginable: trying to bring the plight of the Palestinians to the public eye. The newest addition to the Christison canon is Palestine in Pieces: Graphic Perspectives on the Israeli Occupation, published in August by Pluto Press. During this decade the Christisons have made a habit of visiting Palestine at least once per year; they returned from their most recent trip earlier this month. Since the couple warned against the potentially endless nature of a conversation over the phone, I elected to send them a few questions via email, which they were gracious enough to answer.

Jeff Gore: Kathleen: In a recent interview with Laura Flanders on GRITtv, you said that based on your travels to Palestine over the past half-decade or so, you believe the situation of the Palestinians “has gotten worse, every year.” Given that the interview was conducted before your latest trip, would you still say this today, considering the downgrade or closure of several checkpoints this year, and, according to the New York Times, “a sense of personal security and economic potential...spreading across the West Bank?”

Kathleen Christison: This is an extremely important question. The supposed closure of checkpoints throughout the West Bank and what is being widely touted as an opening of economic potential are a fiction—a huge scam perpetrated by Israel and the U.S., intended to make it look to the world as though Palestinians are now prospering, that the Palestinian economy is thriving and Palestinian society is now content, all thanks to the beneficence and good will of the Israelis. The media—not just the New York Times, but other print and electronic media and various opinion-molders like Thomas Friedman—have fallen for this scam and indeed have been knowingly participating in it.

The objective is to delude us all, including the Palestinians, into thinking that a new era of peace and prosperity is dawning in the West Bank because Palestinians have stopped terrorism and Israel has responded in good faith by easing restrictions, all in contrast to the situation in Gaza, where all the misery is supposedly the fault of Hamas because it refuses to recognize Israel and refuses to end violence. We are meant to forget that the occupation in the West Bank and East Jerusalem continues and is continually being reinforced, that Israel launched an unprovoked murderous assault on Gaza early this year, that Israel continues to dominate every aspect of Palestinian daily lives.

In actual fact, things are no better for Palestinians in the West Bank, and in many cases they are worse. We’ve made two trips to Jerusalem and the West Bank this year, in April-May and October, and we’ve seen no substantial improvement in the situation Palestinians face on a daily basis. Despite the supposed removal of many checkpoints, most remain, and all can be reimposed at a moment’s notice. OCHA, the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, which has kept careful track for the last several years of Israeli movement obstacles, just issued a report indicating that the numbers of obstacles, which include checkpoints, roadblocks, earth mounds across roads, and gates blocking roads, had been reduced in recent months hardly at all—from 618 earlier in the year to 592 now. OCHA also suggests that there’s a good deal of subterfuge in Israeli reporting: although the Israelis promised the removal of 100 roadblocks by the end of Ramadan and issued GPS coordinates for these supposedly vanishing obstacles, OCHA did an on-the-ground survey and could confirm the removal of only 35. In numerous instances, the Israeli GPS locations weren’t even in the West Bank.

It’s true that there has been some improvement in a few showcase locations. The cities of Jenin and Nablus are rebuilding after the terrible destruction there during the Israeli siege of 2002 and 2003, and there’s a bit more economic prosperity. Even in Hebron, which lives under siege from the most vicious of Israeli settlers, some market areas are reopening. The most notorious checkpoint, Huwara just south of Nablus, has been opened up somewhat so that Palestinian cars may now drive through and people no longer have to walk through. But this is classic colonialism, designed to make things just enough better to take the edge off the anger of the colonized: you fill the natives’ stomachs and hope they become tame, that they won’t want to resist your oppression, that they’ll forget that they have no freedom, that they still live under oppression, always at the mercy of a colonialist oppressor who has no intention of relinquishing his domination or ending his exploitation of the oppressed and their resources.

The “model cities” in Jenin and Nablus and the “model checkpoints” such as Huwara are the exceptions in the Palestinians’ grinding life under occupation. Movement from one area to another is still severely restricted. Most West Bank Palestinians still cannot visit Jerusalem. Those who have work permits to enter Jerusalem must still wait for hours in endless lines to enter the city and pass through multiple security checks, including biometric checks that leave a record of when they entered the city and whether they have exited by the end of the day. Israeli settlements continue to be built and expanded on confiscated Palestinian land. The road network connecting the settlements to each other and to Israel, on which Palestinians may not drive, continues to be expanded, cutting off increasing numbers of Palestinians from each other. Palestinians are still harassed and physically attacked by aggressive Israeli settlers. Olive groves and other agricultural land continue to be confiscated, destroyed, burned, either by settlers or by bulldozers clearing land for more settlements or for the Separation Wall. Construction of the Wall is proceeding, cutting off more Palestinian land from its owners.

Non-violent protesters who demonstrate regularly against the Wall continue to be shot and killed or imprisoned. While newly trained, spiffily uniformed Palestinian security forces patrol city streets during the day, Israeli forces control the night and therefore control the entire territory. They conduct middle-of-the-night raids in villages throughout the West Bank, arresting young Palestinian men on suspicion merely of being Palestinian, beating or even shooting anyone who resists. In Jerusalem, where the Netanyahu government is currently concentrating its harshest oppression, the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians continues quite openly. Palestinian homes continue to be demolished for no other reason than that they are in Israel’s way—in the way of the Wall’s advance, or of the next new or expanding Israeli settlement, or of Israel’s efforts to depopulate the land of Palestinians and create a Jewish majority. Palestinian families continue to be evicted from their homes so that Israeli settlers can live in them.

The catalog of horrors is long, and it is not ending, despite the hypocritical claims by the New York Times and others of an increased “sense of personal security,” despite all efforts by Netanyahu and the Obama administration to make us think peace has come. The occupation continues, and more harshly than ever. As Israeli journalist Amira Hass recently put it, the occupation “completely shrinks people’s lives,” and this has not changed.

JG: What are the advantages and disadvantages of being a white Westerner traveling in the Occupied Territories?

Kathleen & Bill Christison: Although we feel very comfortable among Palestinians, and have always felt very welcome, at the same time we always feel some embarrassment because we’re there basically as voyeurs watching other people’s misery. In fact, we feel we’re helping by bringing the Palestinians’ story, the facts of the occupation and what it means for Palestinian daily lives, to public attention in the West, but it’s still hard to get away from the feeling that we’re invading other people’s privacy by watching them line up at checkpoints and taking pictures of them, or watching them sob as their homes are demolished. Or, as happened to us once, talking to a man scheduled for surgery in Jerusalem who had been waiting for days for an Israeli permit to get into the city and who cried as he told us his story and asked us to take a picture of the medical certificate that attested to his need for surgery and should have provided his entrée to the city. We’ve told his story, but we knew, and he knew, that we couldn’t do anything to help him and that we would ultimately be able to go home to our comfortable lives in the U.S. while he waits—waits for his permit, waits for his freedom, waits for a decent life.

This is the principal reason, incidentally, that we’ve decided we won’t take any royalties or other profits from our new book, but will donate them to organizations that we feel most benefit the Palestinians. No book on the Palestinians will ever make much money in the first place, sad to say, but the idea that we personally should make any money because we’ve been witness to other people’s misery is unacceptable to us.

JG: I've always thought that the strongest argument for the two-state solution -- and against the one-state solution -- was Michael Neumann's assessment of Israel as unwilling to “abolish itself.” On the other hand, Kathleen, you've written critically about Neumann's remarks and advocated a single democratic state in Palestine. Ruling out any precipitous fall in American power, any miraculous surge in power of the Palestinian governing body, or God forbid, any catastrophic regional war, in what scenario can you envision Israeli Jews consenting to a binational secular state; to changing their flag, national anthem, even the name of their country?

KC: I have to say I object to the premise of Michael Neumann’s argument—that we should or should not pursue one or another solution simply on the basis of whether it meets Israel’s desires. I think, on the contrary, that we should pursue a solution for no other reason than that it is just, for both Palestinians and Israeli Jews. A two-state solution—which at its very best would give Palestinians a state in less than one-quarter of their original homeland and at its most likely would give them a non-viable, non-contiguous state in little pieces constituting quite a bit less than one-quarter—is simply not just. I recognize that realists like Michael disdain “dreamers,” as he’s called one-state advocates, as naïve and maybe other-worldly to be talking about unrealistic, impractical concepts like justice. But I don’t think, first of all, that it’s really so naïve or even futile to advocate and work for justice—justice does prevail on occasion. And, secondly, I think perpetrating gross injustice is ultimately totally impractical and cannot endure: a two-state solution, to my mind, is so grossly unjust—not to say also unlikely because Israel doesn’t want that either—that it is also impractical.

So my preference, if we’re faced with a situation in which Israel is not willing at the moment to “abolish itself” but is also not willing to give the Palestinians anything, not even a non-viable, cantonized state, is to work for the most just solution, which is a single democratic state in which Palestinians and Jews would live as equal citizens with equal access to the instruments of government and a constitution that would guarantee the equality of everyone. (I would not, by the way, call this a “binational” state, which I see as a state that maintains some de jure separation between the two peoples. This is something I fear would perpetuate the power imbalance and perpetuate Jewish domination of Palestinians. Although nothing would be easy for the Palestinians no matter what solution is pursued, a single integrated state with constitutional guarantees of equality would more readily assure them of some kind of political and economic parity.)

Those like Michael who argue on the basis of what Israel would not want to do are arguing from the premise that might makes right, that might makes a reality that we cannot counter, and that simply because the powerful party in this conflict doesn’t want something, it won’t come to be and none of us should even speak about it. This is absurd. Who would have expected in the mid-1980s when liberals throughout the world were fighting a seemingly futile battle of sanctions against apartheid South Africa, that the very powerful white leadership of that country would decide in the next few years to “abolish itself”? Who would have expected at that same time that the very powerful Soviet Union would “abolish itself”?

My crystal ball isn’t clear enough to be able to lay out a precise scenario, but I believe that Zionism and the racism and injustice inherent in it simply cannot endure and that Israel will collapse of its own weight at some time in the future, hopefully in our lifetime. No empire has lasted in history, and gross, systematic injustice does not last either. I also give Jews greater credit for having a conscience, for caring about justice and caring about the injustices perpetrated against the Palestinians in the name of world Jewry, than Michael or others like Uri Avnery do, who criticize us one-staters because we don’t seem to realize, as they say, that Israeli Jews will always want to screw the Palestinians if they all live in the same state. I just don’t buy that. If white South Africans and Soviet appartchiks could relinquish power voluntarily and non-violently, then I believe Jews will ultimately be led by their consciences to do the same.

My bottom line is, I don’t think we can or should shut our mouths about a just peace settlement—or, even more importantly, deliberately limit Palestinian options by refusing to speak about the possibilities—simply because Israel might not happen to like it, which is what I see as the principal argument of the anti-one-staters.

JG: Similarly, in your travels, what impression have you gotten from Palestinians as to which solution they advocate?

KBC: It’s hard to make a definitive judgment on this, but it is fair to say that support for a one-state solution is growing among Palestinians. Polls of Palestinian opinion still show this support in the minority, but growing. Many Palestinians whom we’ve talked to still favor two states and specifically reject one state, either because they fear Jewish political and economic domination in a single state or because they are closely enough connected to the Palestinian Authority that they are unwilling even to think of any alternative to the PA’s official support for two states, which is the position that gives them entrée into negotiations and whatever favors are bestowed by the U.S. But an increasing number of our acquaintances now more explicitly favor one state. They are increasingly dissatisfied with the PA’s position and its acceptance of the two-state solution, all of which they see as collaboration with the Israeli oppressor and a betrayal of fundamental rights in return for no benefit whatsoever for the Palestinians.

Much of Palestinian thinking is formed more around the possibilities than strictly on the basis of preferences, which is to say that as long as the two-state solution was the only alternative held out to the Palestinians, support for this option was quite high, but the more the possibility of a one-state solution is talked about—and, of course, the more the likelihood of a real, independent Palestinian state ever being formed in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem has receded—the more Palestinians are willing to think about and advocate a single state. As it has become clearer and clearer to the Palestinians that Israel under its current leadership has no intention of ever withdrawing from the occupied territories and no intention of allowing Palestinians any sovereignty in Jerusalem, support for a single state in all of Palestine has grown. More importantly, Palestinians increasingly recognize that their demand for the right of return is ultimately incompatible with a two-state solution, in which only limited numbers of refugees, if any, would be allowed to return to their homes and land inside Israel and the vast majority would have to be accommodated inside the tiny Palestinian state. It’s unlikely that an enduring peace settlement will ever be forged that does not address and provide a fair solution of the refugee issue and the right of return.

JG: In my recent interview with Jonathan Cook, he spoke highly of the Boycott Divestment Sanctions (BDS) movement, saying that in his view, “there is no way to end the occupation unless Israelis are made to see that they will pay a heavy price for its continuance.” Would you agree with this? If so, how would you respond to criticism about harming “innocent” Israelis with a blanket boycott or sanctions? Or is there even such a thing as an “innocent” Israeli when it comes to the issue of Palestinian suffering?

KBC: We do indeed agree with Jonathan on the wisdom of BDS and the notion that Israelis must be made to pay a heavy price for continuing the occupation if there’s to be any hope of ever ending it. As to whether “innocent” Israelis might be harmed by a blanket application of BDS, we would ask where one should draw the line on what harms Israelis. Does it harm innocent Israelis to cut off or cut back U.S. aid to Israel—which would be the ultimate sanction? Under a long-term ten-year agreement, the U.S. gives, not lends, Israel $3 billion of military aid every year—in cash, at the beginning of each fiscal year—plus additional increments of economic aid and loan guarantees on a year-by-year basis. Aid of this magnitude and given under these terms obviously greatly helps the Israeli economy. It also gives Israel virtually total impunity to commit whatever atrocities it wants against the Palestinians without fear that the U.S. will cut it off. So if we’re worried about harming individual Israelis, we have to worry about the guy in an electronics shop who is harmed economically because he no longer gets the subcontract for some airplane or tank part, but we also have to worry about the innocent Palestinians—the literally millions of innocent Palestinians—in Gaza particularly, but elsewhere as well, who are being killed by those airplanes and tanks and other military equipment that Israel uses with the impunity granted it by the U.S. If blind justice weighs these two groups of innocents and the harm done to them on her scales, we believe she would conclude that the “innocent” Israeli is after all not so innocent.

Although it may be clearer how the scales should balance when we’re talking about military aid, the same factors must be weighed when we deal with boycotts of non-military products and academic and cultural boycotts, and we think the same conclusions must be reached: ending Palestinian suffering at Israel’s hands is a more worthy, more just objective than saving the economic hide or the jobs of any Israelis. Maybe you’re right that there is no such thing as an “innocent” Israeli when it comes to Palestinian suffering. In a democratic state—democratic at least for Israeli Jews—all Jewish Israelis are responsible for the injustices and the killing and the atrocities visited upon the Palestinians. They elected the governments that have carried out these policies and actions; they have failed to put an end to them; they live in a state established on the suffering and the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians over 60 years ago. We Americans are just as responsible for the killing and atrocities visited by U.S. forces on Iraqi and Afghan civilians and in past eras on civilians in places like Vietnam, and we would not claim that sanctions against the U.S. were unfair, even if these caused us to suffer personally. Perhaps this should be the criterion: that innocence lies in greater measure with the people being oppressed and bombed and occupied, and we must be more concerned with ending harm to them than with causing incidental harm to individuals in the oppressor-occupier nation.

JG: In your new book you briefly compare Israel's treatment of the Palestinians to the U.S's treatment of Native Americans. That said, I was wondering if you had an opinion on how to respond to one of the peskier questions addressed specifically to Americans that nobody seems to be able to answer. The question is: what right do I have to criticize Israel as a “colonial” or “settler” state when I am a descendant of colonists and settlers myself, enjoying the spoils of theft from an indigenous people?

KBC: This is indeed a difficult question to answer, and there is for sure a measure of hypocrisy in criticizing Israel without also rectifying our own nation’s sins. But we don’t believe that one injustice, even when perpetrated by our own country, imposes an obligation to remain silent about another injustice or requires that we stop working on Israel’s injustice until we’ve resolved the United States’ unjust policies. In fact, having acquired a conscience about what our country did, and continues to do, to our own native population has given us, we feel, a bit more moral authority from which to demand that the United States stop giving Israel the means—the political, military, and economic support—with which to commit a similar atrocity against the Palestinians.

We all pick our battles in this life, and we happen to have picked support for Palestinian rights as our battle. We did this initially from a position of considerable—and, we would acknowledge, shameful—ignorance about the history of U.S. treatment of Native Americans, but our focus on the Palestinians has helped open our eyes to the Native Americans’ situation, and we’re now more conscious of the need to work for justice for both peoples. If we personally continue to devote more of our attention to the Palestinians, this is because it’s a more easily resolvable situation and because we’ve already invested 30-plus years of our education and work in it. But to repeat, whatever inequity exists in our own allocation of attention, whatever hypocrisy exists in demanding of Israel what the U.S. has not done for its own native population, does not put any obligation on us to give Israel carte blanche to continue its oppression unopposed.

JG: Kathleen, in the GRITtv interview you described losing interest in the conflict for a few years before returning to it due to its "haunting" nature. Could you describe that in more detail, or in other words, what has compelled you to keep writing on behalf of the Palestinians for three decades, despite their situation growing increasingly worse over that time period?

KC: Maybe it’s precisely because the Palestinians’ situation has grown worse that I’ve been so “haunted” and so compelled to continue working on this issue. Although I had worked on the Palestinian question for several years before Bill and I left the CIA in 1979, I never actually met a Palestinian until the late 1980s, when I began interviewing Palestinian Americans about their attitudes toward Israel—which ultimately led to my book The Wound of Dispossession. It was only by doing these interviews, and doing a lot of reading on the history of Palestine-Israel, that I really learned the Palestinian story. And I was and continue to be shocked at how horribly that story has been distorted in the United States and the rest of the West. For me—and for Bill too—it’s been a kind of crusade to bring this story to greater public attention. The Palestinians are such a graceful people and the injustices perpetrated against them for six decades and more have been so horrific—and so deliberate—that we both feel we can’t give up.

JG: For those who don't have time or means to visit Palestine, but want to help the Palestinians, what would you suggest is the best thing that they can do?

KBC: This may be the most difficult of your questions to answer. The usual route, talking to one’s congressmen, is an almost totally futile pursuit on this issue. The Israel lobby, in all its aspects, has Congress so sewed up that it’s almost impossible to get any attention if one is talking about Palestinian rights or demanding concessions from Israel or advocating anything other than the current so-called international consensus on two states. We both think that at the popular level in the U.S. there’s been an upsurge in support for the Palestinians and a greater willingness to criticize Israel. This has been particularly true since Israel’s assault on Gaza early this year. But so far this change in viewpoint hasn’t reached up to the political level, meaning in the administration and Congress, because there simply aren’t enough people willing to mobilize, visit congressmen, write letters to the editor, etc. But this is what’s needed. We need to educate ourselves on the issue so that we can educate others, join whatever solidarity organizations exist in our areas, gain some political muscle by increasing our numbers, work together, lobby congressmen in numbers, write letters to the editor, force the media to pay attention to what’s happening on the ground, call out Israel’s supporters everywhere for their moral blindness, sign on to the many petitions and letters to politicians that circulate on the internet. In general, make ourselves known, make our position known, and make noise!

Jeff Gore is a freelance journalist based in Athens, GA. He is a frequent contributor to the Athens weekly Flagpole Magazine and has also written articles for Dissident Voice and The Comment Factory. His journal of his summer spent in Palestine can be read at holylanddispatches.blogspot.com. He can be reached at jgore00@gmail.com.

Snuffysmith

Stratfor
---------------------------



THE KREMLIN WARS (SPECIAL SERIES), PART 3: RISE OF THE CIVILIKI

Summary
The global economic crisis has led the Kremlin to examine its decisions about
running Russia's economy, financial sectors and businesses. A group of
intellectuals including Russian President Dmitri Medvedev, called the civiliki,
want to use the crisis as an opportunity to reform the Russian economy. The
civiliki's plan will lead to increased investment and greater efficiency in the
economy, but it will also trigger a fresh round of conflict between the
Kremlin's two powerful political clans.

Editor's Note: This is part three in a five-part series examining the Russian
political clans and the coming conflict between them.


Analysis


In the aftermath of the global economic crisis, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir
Putin has had to step back and examine the Kremlin's decisions on running the
country's economy, financial sectors and businesses and the effects of a
state-controlled system on investment, growth and the freedom of capital. In
response, a group of Russian intellectuals called the civiliki, who are trained
in economics, law and finance, have presented proposals on "fixing" the economy.
The civiliki (a play on words, since the Federal Security Service and other
members of the security class in Russia are called the siloviki) is a new group
of economically liberal-minded (by Russian standards) politicians and
businessmen. This group includes Russian President Dmitri Medvedev, Finance
Minister Alexei Kudrin (who is also a deputy prime minister), Sberbank chief
German Gref and many more.

The civiliki are not ideologues like the liberal Russian reformers of the 1990s
and understand that the Russian economy and institutions must maintain some
sense of balance with national security and national interests. But the civiliki
also see how much damage the siloviki's control of key power structures and
businesses has done to the Russian economy.

The civiliki's plan has one main goal in mind: to implement real structural
reform in Russia's major economic sectors. This will improve competition,
attract investment and purge waste and mismanagement. The plan has three parts
-- purge the non-business-minded siloviki from positions of economic
responsibility, introduce new pro-investment laws and partially liberalize the
economy. It is an incredibly ambitious plan that would reverse laws designed by
the FSB and Putin over the past six years. But the reforms are being spearheaded
by the one man Putin trusts on all finance and economic issues: the civiliki's
Kudrin.


Kudrin is an experienced official, being one of the very few to make the
transition from the Yeltsin era to Putin's Russia and having held a prominent
position in every one of Putin's governments. The reason for his longevity at
the Kremlin is simple: Rather than playing politics (to the extent usually seen
in Russia) he is a technocrat who makes decisions based largely on the economic
facts. His numbers-oriented mind, apolitical nature and competency as a manager
are at least as important to Russia's relative financial stability as the strong
energy prices of the past decade. Because of this, Putin values Kudrin's counsel
greatly. Kudrin has also been an important buffer between Deputy Chief of Staff
and First Aide to Vladimir Putin Vladislav Surkov and Deputy Prime Minister Igor
Sechin, the heads of the Kremlin's opposing clans -- until now.


Kudrin's Plan

Part 1: Purging the Siloviki

The most controversial part of Kudrin's plan is to purge the siloviki from
positions of control over businesses and economic institutions. The siloviki
clan, run by Sechin, took command of most of the Russian state firms over the
past six years, and has -- by Kudrin's technocratic reckoning -- run them
poorly. The siloviki run firms including oil giant Rosneft, rail monopoly
Russian Railways, Russian airline Aeroflot, nuclear energy company Rosatom and
arms exporter Rosoboronexport. The issue is that the siloviki have placed former
KGB agents as heads of industry and businesses though many have no expertise as
businessmen. According to Kudrin, it was largely Sechin's clan that sought
access to international credit before the global economic crisis hit. Some $500
billion flowed into Russia via such connections, flooding the Russian financial
sector with foreign capital. Sechin's clan spent the money as if it were free,
often on irrational mergers and acquisitions that increased the clan's political
power but had little economic purpose.

When the global recession occurred, all those funding sources dried up in a
matter of weeks. And as the ruble declined, all of those loans still required
repayment -- in the then-appreciated U.S. dollars, euros and Swiss francs.
Consequently, the Russian economy suffered a contraction worse than any other
major state in the world. The Kremlin was forced to bail out many firms,
particularly those linked to Sechin's clan, to prevent a broader collapse. As
part of the efforts to contain the crisis, the Kremlin also spent more than $200
billion on slowing the depreciation of the ruble so that the loans taken out by
corporations and banks did not appreciate so much that they would not be
repayable. From Kudrin's perspective, this was a huge cost to save companies
whose managers had no business being in business.

Kudrin's plan is to weed out the security-minded officials now occupying
leadership positions in industry and business, leaving only those who can
actually run their institutions properly. But in doing this, Kudrin would strip
Sechin's clan of massive economic and financial clout --something the siloviki
would not stand for.

Part 2: Making Russia Investor-Friendly

Next, Kudrin's plan calls for legal changes that would make Russia more
attractive to investors. One of the issues investors have with Russia is that
there is very little legal protection, which leaves them highly vulnerable to
hostile takeovers and becoming a target for the Kremlin or its power players.
Moreover, the few legal authorities that do exist -- like the Federal Tax
Service or the Audit Chamber -- often are tools for the Kremlin to help it
pressure Russian and foreign firms that the government wants to either destroy
or devour. The best-known case of this is the story of Yukos, whose owner
Mikhail Khodorkovsky had evolved from businessman to ruler of Russia's vast oil
sector and aspiring politician -- much to the Kremlin's ire. In 2004, the
government brought the full power of a reinvigorated state to bear against
Khodorkovsky and sent him to a Siberian prison. Other examples are of the
Kremlin targeting energy assets belonging to foreign firms like BP and Royal
Dutch/Shell to give those assets and/or control over projects to
state-controlled energy firms.

In theory, the new investors' rights laws would protect businessmen and
investors in Russia. The country has never had sound laws protecting investors'
rights. However, it is most likely that any new laws will leave the state plenty
of wiggle room to ensure that the Kremlin has significant control over
investors' actions.

The next step to creating an investor-friendly Russia, according to Kudrin's
plan, is to repeal the strict energy cap laws Putin put in place in 2007. These
laws affect strategic industries and clarify which assets would be off-limits to
foreigners. The sector affected most by these laws was energy. The laws limit
foreign firms' ability to own more than 40 percent of a project in the country
and forbid foreign firms from owning any projects involving the subsoil. These
laws have made Russia an unattractive environment for foreign businesses to
maintain or expand investments in energy projects, even though Russia is one of
the world's most energy-rich countries.

But Kudrin's plan involves more than repealing the energy laws and allowing
foreign firms to rush back in. There is a political side to the plan,
masterminded by Surkov. The changes in Russian energy laws will allow foreign
companies to own up to a 50 percent stake in projects, but if a foreign firm
wants majority control then it must "trade" assets outside of Russia with one of
the Russian energy behemoths. In essence, Russia will allow foreign companies to
own majority stakes in large projects like the new fields on the Yamal peninsula
in exchange for downstream projects in those companies' own countries. The goal
is for Russian energy companies to not only move more into the downstream
sector, but also have greater access to international markets -- something the
Kremlin can use later for political purposes. STRATFOR sources say deals like
this are already being negotiated with firms like BP, France's Total and EDF
Trading, and U.S.-based ExxonMobil.

Part 3: Reprivatization

The last part of Kudrin's plan is to reprivatize the vast number of companies
the Kremlin has taken over in the last few years. Under Putin, the Russian state
once again became the main driver of economic activity. Upon becoming leader of
Russia in 1999, Putin set a goal to reverse the massive privatization that
occurred during the 1990s -- like the housing and voucher privatizations and
loans-for-shares schemes -- that, in most Russians' eyes, wrecked the country.
Putin wanted to put the Kremlin back in control by consolidating its power over
a slew of economic sectors, including energy, banking and defense. As of this
year, the Russian state and regional authorities own approximately 50 percent of
Russian businesses, according to Kudrin.

In the short term, Russian state control over strategic sectors made sense. It
pushed out forces that were not too friendly with the Kremlin, like the
oligarchs and foreign groups. But it also allowed the state to marshal its
financial resources toward certain key domestic and foreign policy goals.
Russian economic consolidation under the state brought about a stability that
most Russians had longed for after the 1990s.

However, in the long term, the lack of non-state funding and private capital has
become a problem, creating inefficiencies across the board -- particularly in
areas where the state does not focus a great deal of its resources. Russia is
traditionally capital-poor; therefore, any major economic overhaul needs to
include the creation of an investment-friendly climate. The financial crisis
made this clear; when the state took on the burdens of the failing private
sector, it swallowed more businesses and industries but also took on their debt
and need for cash.

Kudrin's plan is for the state to step back and start reprivatizing some 5,500
firms over the next three years -- which would drop state ownership in Russian
firms by approximately 20 percent. The goal is to abandon some of the companies
currently draining the government's coffers, but this step will also generate
cash through the sales needed for the government to plug 2010's estimated budget
deficit. Kudrin also believes that once the government starts to reduce its
stake in companies, a more competitive environment will form in the Russian
economy, allowing it to become more diversified.

Kudrin wants to ensure that the next reprivatization looks nothing like the
feeding frenzy of the 1990s. In the minds of the civiliki, the failures of the
1990s were caused not only by investor greed but also by the state's failure to
create a rational environment for privatization. The Russian state in 2009 is
much stronger than it was in the 1990s, so Kudrin believes that the new round of
privatization would be controllable, and the fact that the Kremlin would know
who would gain control of each company would keep anyone hostile to Russian
(read: Kremlin) interests out. The last thing Kudrin wants is a new generation
of oligarchs.

Kudrin's plan would start with selling the state's stakes in companies purchased
during the financial crisis, such as telecommunications giant Rostelecom and a
series of banks, including Globex, Svyaz and Sobinbank. After that, the civiliki
would like to consider companies such as oil giant Rosneft, banking giant
Sberbank and railway monopoly Russian Railways for privatization -- a rather
bold move since many of these companies are run by the siloviki.

In Putin's mind, the state consolidated the economy during Russia's identity
crisis in the 1990s. Certain people, groups, influences and companies needed to
be purged, in his opinion. Now that this has been completed, the government can
step back and, in a highly controlled manner, start to reprivatize businesses.
Putin is starting to believe that this is all just a cycle.

Easier Said Than Done

Kudrin and the other civiliki's plans are a technocratic approach to a crisis
that has been long in the making in Russia but was exacerbated by the global
financial crisis. The civiliki's plans have very specific economic goals in
mind, leaving out power politics. The plan is actually not a new one, but it is
one that the siloviki have continually sidelined over the years as they placed
national interests above economic reform. The civiliki have also never been
powerful enough by themselves (even with one of their own as president of the
country) to push through any of their reforms.

What the civiliki needed was for one of the truly powerful clan leaders in
Russia to stand behind their reforms. Fortunately for Kudrin and the civiliki,
one such leader -- Surkov, who serves as Medvedev's deputy chief of staff and
first aide to Putin -- has done just that. However, Surkov is not interested in
Kudrin's plan in order to reform the Russian economy. He sees the plan as
something that will help him eliminate his rivals and consolidate his power.

Copyright 2009 Stratfor.


Snuffysmith
Palestinian Feuds and International Stalemate by Patrick Seale
The quarrel between Fatah and Hamas spreads poison across the Middle East and beyond. The Arab states are unable to pull their weight; Israel is relentless; the EU is preoccupied with its own problems, and Obama’s aroused expectations are evaporating.
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=2174


How To Get Out by Robert Dreyfuss (The Nation)
The elements of a responsible withdrawal from Afghanistan
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=2175


After Nine Months by Rami G. Khouri
It has been exactly nine months since Obama took office with a pledge to personally work for a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace, and the scorecard of results on that pledge looks rather thin.
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=2173


In Afghanistan, the ‘Trivial Fate of Women’ by Ann Jones (The Nation)
Once, half the country's doctors, more than half the civil servants and three-quarters of the teachers were women, and a peaceful Afghanistan advanced slowly into the modern world. But the Obama administration has deserted Afghan women to a harsh inhumane fate.
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=2172


Paranoia over Pakistan by Manan Ahmed (The Nation)
Is Pakistan really in danger of falling into the hands of the Taliban?
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=2171

Devil in the Old Dominion by Bob Moser (The Nation)
Everyone is looking to Virginia's off-year gubernatorial contest as a Middle American barometer for 2010.
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=2169


Finding an Exit from the Afghan Trap by Patrick Seale
The approaching winter is the ideal time to attempt to reach an Afghan political settlement. By putting a curb on war fighting, the bad weather will give all sides time to reflect on how to climb out of the Afghan trap with honour intact.
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=2168
Snuffysmith
NATO plays a waiting game
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization faces a crucial decision on Afghanistan, with the top United States commander in the country, General Stanley McChrystal, asking the body for 40,000 more troops. Until next month's re-run of Afghanistan's presidential election comes to a close, NATO's defense ministers aren't committing to anything. (Oct 26, '09)

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KJ27Df01.html
Snuffysmith
America's new crusader castles

Across the Middle East, the US is building heavily fortified embassies which cut off diplomats and create hostilities

Simon Tisdall
guardian.co.uk,

Thursday 29 October 2009 16.09 GMT

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/ci...rusader-castles

After the US Congress agreed a $7.5bn aid package for Pakistan this autumn, the Obama administration was taken aback by the seemingly ungrateful reaction of its intended recipients. Pakistani opposition politicians fumed about "colonialism" and "imperialism". Military men spoke angrily of insults to national sovereignty implied in conditions attached to the aid.

But particular hostility was directed at US plans to spend over $800m on building a new, heavily fortified embassy in Islamabad, to be protected by the private security contractor, DynCorp. The activities of contractors in Iraq, notably Blackwater, have become notorious in the Muslim world. In addition, expanded US "bunker consulates" were announced for Lahore and Peshawar.

"Just the other day we had a television debate on America wanting to colonize us," one Pakistani said. "How easy it was for us to believe this when we hear of Blackwater setting up camp in our cities, buying hundreds of homes, not being accountable to the laws of our country, of hundreds of US marines on our soil, being allowed to enter without visas, of the enormous new US embassy being built which is like a mini-Pentagon."

Despite such complaints, US plans are going ahead. They include a $405m replacement embassy building in Islamabad, the construction of a $111m office annex to accommodate 330 workers, and new housing units costing $197m. In Peshawar, scene of a devastating Taliban car bomb attack on Wednesday, the US plans to buy the city's only five-star hotel and turn it into a sort of diplomatic Martello tower.

The US says the new facilities are needed because old premises are insecure and it must accommodate the "civilian surge" of diplomats and officials into Pakistan and Afghanistan ordered by Barack Obama. But the American expansion in Islamabad mirrors similar developments in other Muslim and foreign capitals that are focal points for the Pentagon's "long war" against Islamist extremism.

Shocked by the 1998 al-Qaida attacks on its Nairobi and Dar es Salaam embassies, the US has opened 68 new embassies and overseas facilities since 2001 and has 29 under design and construction, the state department's bureau of overseas buildings operations says. Total worldwide spending on embassy replacement has been put at $17.5bn.

In Kabul, Baghdad, Jakarta, Cairo and beyond, in "allied" cities such as London and Berlin, Washington is building, reinforcing or expanding slab-walled, fortress-like embassies that act as regional overseas HQs, centres of influence and intelligence-gathering, and problematic symbols of superpower.

Historically speaking, these formidable outposts are the 21st century equivalent of crusader castles, rising out of the plain, projecting superior force, and grimly dominating all they behold.

As in Pakistan, the new strongholds attract plenty of criticism, acting almost as magnets for trouble. The massively fortified $700m Baghdad embassy, the biggest US mission in the world with 1,200 employees, was dogged by construction delays and militant attacks before it finally opened in January this year. Now even the state department's own inspector-general has ruled that the 21-building, 104-acre encampment is too big. "The time has come for a significant right-sizing," a July report said.

The Kabul embassy, which is negotiating an $87m purchase of 30 to 40 additional acres, encountered a different kind of trouble last month after photographs emerged of embassy guards engaging in sex acts, pouring vodka on each other, and dancing naked round a fire. The guards were employed by another private security firm, ArmorGroup North America. The revelations underscored existing concerns about security contractors. Investigators concluded the embassy's safety had been seriously compromised.

Away from the frontline of America's wars, the unveiling last year of the new US embassy in Berlin, close by the Brandenburg Gate, brought strong objections of an aesthetic nature. Architectural experts queued up to lambast the squat, custard-coloured but bomber-proof building, deriding it as a "klotz" (lump) built by barbarians.

One newspaper compared the offending edifice to a maximum security prison, another to a council house, while Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung fumed: "There is hardly a modern building in existence, with the exception of nuclear bunkers and pesticide-testing centres, that is so hysterically closed off from public spaces as this embassy."

On present trends, Londoners face being similarly shut-out as the US embassy currently centrally located in Grosvenor Square, Mayfair, prepares to move to a brand new concrete citadel in wild, far-off but hopefully al-Qaida-free Wandsworth.

The way the new embassies tend to physically cut off America's diplomats from the countries they are supposed to connect with is one good reason, among many, why Washington might want to rethink its laager policy. While effective security is obviously important, the worldwide rise of America's diplomatic fortresses undermines the kind of "soft power" outreach and public diplomacy that the Obama administration earnestly espouses.

In a policy-setting speech in July, secretary of state Hillary Clinton stressed the US need to communicate directly with other countries from the bottom up. "Reaching out directly to people will encourage them to embrace cooperation with us, making our partnerships with their governments and with them stronger and more durable," she said.

That makes sense. But it's not the message citizens of Islamabad are hearing. When America speaks to Pakistanis and other Muslim countries, it too often sounds like it's shouting down from the battlements.



Snuffysmith



EU Finally Puts On A Show That Is Worth Watching
Stephen Glain
The National 11/01/09

In case you missed it, the EU has done something completely out of character. It has become interesting. Consider the countervailing developments that shook the EU last month. In a referendum, Ireland conclusively endorsed the Lisbon Treaty, an administrative reform plan that supporters say will make the common market more efficient. The Irish "aye" pressured David Cameron, the British parliamentarian who is due to become the prime minister next year once he undergoes the formality of an election, to declare whether he sides with extremists in his Conservative Party who oppose British membership of the EU.

Mr Cameron, who has implied he would dismantle at least some of Britain's EU commitments, has led the offensive against the former prime minister Tony Blair's bid to become the union's first president, an office provided for under the Lisbon Treaty. (The presidential seal, a yellow swoosh on a blue field, looks like something a superhero would wear on his cape. This begs the question: could "Euroman" be far behind?)

Economically, EU states are splitting ranks as countries such as Germany and France display signs of recovery while others, such as Spain and Ireland, are still sucking wind. At the same time, several of the EU's powerhouse members continue to pile on debt to stimulate growth. France, for example, has just announced a budget deficit for next year worth 8.5 per cent of GDP, while Germany has indicated it will begin to dismantle the €50 billion (Dh270.56bn) stimulus package it launched in January. The European Central Bank (ECB) has suggested that unless Europe's debt-engorged economies agree to shed their large public shortfalls, it will be obliged to raise interest rates to keep inflation within the 2 per cent limit ordained by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty that established the euro.

Norway, rich in oil and a non-EU member, last week became the first European country to raise credit rates, a reminder that inflation may be less remote than many economists once averred and a warning that the 16 EU states that share the euro, a currency bloc that does not include the UK, may pay a price for failing to co-ordinate their fiscal policies in the global downturn.

That appeared to be the subtext of remarks made this month by Jean-Claude Trichet, the president of the ECB, about the consequences of an "uneven" recovery in euroland.While assuring investors that the bank's base interest rate would remain at its record low level of 1 per cent for the time being, Mr Trichet also said eurozone inflation was likely to turn positive "in the coming months". Lest reporters doubt the resilience of his delightfully dry sense of humour, the ECB chief also restated his faith in Washington's official "strong dollar" policy - reaffirmed to general hilarity by the US Treasury last week - despite the dollar's 17 per cent decline against the euro this year.

Suddenly, the dull business of European integration has become a rollicking feast of tension, intrigue, and self-parody. Anyone concerned that the departure of Mr Blair, with his Bill Clinton-like craving for love and attention, would starve official Europe of the odd prurient thrill can breathe easy. (Raise your hand if you think Silvio Berlusconi, the Italian prime minister, had lost his subtle, ironic touch.)

Now we have forceful Europeanists such as David Miliband, the British foreign secretary, who warned in the Financial Times this week that splitters such as Mr Cameron were "dangerous to Britain, dangerous for our influence, dangerous for our interests". And in case anyone is wondering, Mr Miliband, 44, "is not a candidate" and is "not available" for that EU president's seat.

Who would have thought that on the 10th anniversary of the birth of the euro that the EU in general and monetary union in particular would incite such passion? Did not the euro protect Europe from an Icelandic-style currency collapse? Has it not served as a popular safe haven for investors in these uncertain times? The terms of Maastricht may seem draconian to Eurosceptics as member countries are forced to relinquish control over monetary policy. But what is the alternative? A withering cycle of competitive devaluations of the kind that prevailed in the 1930s?

What, after all, was so special about those drachmas, pesetas, and liras? If the Germans can give up their precious deutsche mark, that potent symbol of Teutonic redemption, why can't the British dispense with their pound? If anything, the world should welcome the expansion and internationalisation of the euro, which despite its success remains very much a regional unit of exchange. At a time when the dollar's long-term prognosis is for continued weakness - official US sentiments aside - the need for a viable alternative to the world's fiat currency is not only preferable but necessary for global monetary stability.

Will Mr Cameron indulge the reactionary wing of his party and wrench Britain from the continent? Will the ECB pre-emptively lower the boom on the EU's Keynesian revival? Will Mr Miliband be voted off the island? Stay tuned for the next new episode of "Lost in Euroland".



This is a "lo-fi" version of our main content. To view the full version with more information, formatting and images, please click here.
Invision Power Board © 2001-2010 Invision Power Services, Inc.