U.S. Misled Allies About Nuclear Export
(Dafna Linzer, Washington Post)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/artic...-2005Mar19.html

In an effort to increase pressure on North Korea, the Bush administration told its Asian allies in briefings earlier this year that Pyongyang had exported nuclear material to Libya. That was a significant new charge, the first allegation that North Korea was helping to create a new nuclear weapons state.

But that is not what U.S. intelligence reported, according to two officials with detailed knowledge of the transaction. North Korea, according to the intelligence, had supplied uranium hexafluoride -- which can be enriched to weapons-grade uranium -- to Pakistan. It was Pakistan, a key U.S. ally with its own nuclear arsenal, that sold the material to Libya. The U.S. government had no evidence, the officials said, that North Korea knew of the second transaction.

Pakistani's Black Market May Sell Nuclear Secrets
(William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, New York Times)
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/21/internat...ia/21nukes.html

Nuclear investigators from the United States and other nations now believe that the black market network run by the Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan was selling not only technology for enriching nuclear fuel and blueprints for nuclear weapons, but also some of the darkest of the bomb makers' arts: the hard-to-master engineering secrets needed to fabricate nuclear warheads.

Their suspicions were initially raised by the discovery of step-by-step instructions, some of which appear to have come from China and Pakistan, among the documents recovered last year from Libya. More recently, investigators have found that the Khan network had offered similar materials to Iran.

As Evidence Grows of Iran's Program, U.S. Hits Quandary
(Carla Anne Robbins, Wall Street Journal)
http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB1111110...page%5Fone%5Fus

For two years, U.S. experts and international inspectors have pored over satellite photos, radioactive samples and tips from sometimes-unreliable sources trying to solve the Iran nuclear puzzle.

Then, last year, U.S. officials received what they now consider the best evidence yet that Iran is pursuing an ambitious nuclear-weapons program. An intelligence source, solicited with German help, provided the U.S. tens of thousands of pages of Farsi-language computer files, diagrams and test data from Iran's missile program.

U.S. officials say the materials document Iran's efforts between 2001 and 2003 to adapt its Shahab-3 missile for delivering a "black box" that experts at the nation's nuclear-weapons laboratories believe is almost certainly a nuclear warhead. The specifications for size, shape, weight and height of detonation don't change during more than two years of work and don't make sense for conventional explosives, according to several officials who have been briefed on the intelligence.

Rice: U.S. and Allies Discussed 'Options' Against N. Korea
(Glenn Kessler, Washington Post)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/artic...-2005Mar21.html

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said Monday that she had raised the prospect with Asian allies over the weekend of imposing economic or political penalties against North Korea if its government persisted in refusing to return to six-nation talks aimed at ending its nuclear ambitions.

In remarks at the conclusion of her week-long tour of Asia, Rice said she had discussed using "other options in the international system" against North Korea, the first time a senior U.S. official has publicly acknowledged the possibility of shifting to an aggressive campaign to isolate North Korea if the talks remain dormant. U.S. officials said the options could include tighter strictures on North Korea's illicit trade in arms and drugs and referring the matter to the U.N. Security Council.

Brazil's Chance to Lead On Nuclear Containment
(Bernard Aronson, Wall Street Journal)
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/static/np...containment.htm

Brazil, like Iran, which has announced the same intention, is exploiting a flaw in the NPT, which permits signatories to produce the enriched uranium that fuels peaceful nuclear reactors, store the radioactive spent fuel from those reactors, and reprocess the fuel so long as the facilities that do so are subject to IAEA inspection. The danger is that the facilities which enrich uranium for nuclear power reactors can be used to enrich it further for nuclear weapons. And reprocessed spent fuel yields plutonium that can also be fashioned into nuclear bombs.

No one believes Brazil is seeking nuclear weapons capability. Brazil claims enrichment is for commercial purposes. But, rogue states like Iran, by exploiting the same provision in the treaty, can gather all the materials necessary to manufacture nuclear weapons, abrogate the NPT, and, in a short period of time, build a nuclear arsenal.

Brazil's decision to go forward with enrichment, thus, undermines the concerted international effort undertaken by the United Kingdom, France and Germany, in concert with the U.S., to convince Iran to suspend its enrichment program. It also opens up a nuclear Pandora's box in other nations.

Annan Seeks to Promote Nuclear Nonproliferation in Reform Proposal for United Nations
(Jim Wurst, Global Security Newswire)
http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2005_3_21.html#69E2B495

U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan in a new report called on nuclear weapons states to accept their “unique responsibility” in maintaining international security by making irreversible cuts in their arsenals and backed greater authority for the International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure nuclear technology is not diverted from civil to military uses (see GSN, March 10).

“Progress in both disarmament and nonproliferation is essential and neither should be held hostage to the other. Recent moves towards disarmament by the nuclear-weapon states should be recognized,” Annan wrote in a report on reforming the United Nations. “However, the unique status of nuclear weapon states also entails a unique responsibility, and they must do more, including but not limited to further reductions in their arsenals of nonstrategic nuclear weapons and pursuing arms control agreements that entail not just dismantlement but irreversibility.”

The report, released over the weekend and presented to the General Assembly this morning, said the nuclear powers should proceed quickly with negotiations on a fissile material cutoff treaty and should maintain the moratorium on nuclear testing. Annan added that the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty review conference in May should endorse these and other nonproliferation matters.

Pakistan Test-Fires Nuclear-Capable Missile
(Reuters)
http://www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml?t...storyID=7949761

Pakistan Saturday successfully test-fired a long-range, nuclear-capable ballistic missile, the latest in a series of tests in one of the world's flashpoints.

"Today, we carried out a successful test-firing of the indigenously developed Shaheen II missile," a military official told Reuters.

The missile could travel up to 2,000 km (1,200 miles) and carry all kinds of warheads, he said.

Carnegie News:
Washington Post - Book World Live:
Join George Perkovich, the vice president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the author of India's Nuclear Bomb, for a discussion of nuclear history and today's tensions with Iran and North Korea on Tuesday, March 22, at 3 p.m.
Log on to http://discuss.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/z...orld032205a.htm.

Upcoming Event:

The United Nations Association of the United States of America and the Business Council for the United Nations will be holding a discussion on "Iran’s Nuclear Program: The Challenge for Transparency." Participants include Danielle Pletka, vice president of foreign & defense policy studies at American Enterprise Institute, George Perkovich, vice-president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Shaul Bakhash, professor of Iran/Persian Gulf states at George Mason University. The discussion will be held on March 23, 2005 from 2:00-3:30pm at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (1779 Massachusetts Ave., NW). Listen to the Live @ Carnegie webcast beginning approximately at 2:30pm.

http://cbsnewyork.com/topstories/topstorie..._081091423.html

Iran Moving Ahead with Nuclear Program

--------------------
N. Korea Is Willing to Return to Nuclear Talks, China Says
--------------------

From Associated Press

March 23 2005

BEIJING; Chinese officials said Tuesday that North Korea's premier had told them the country might be willing to return to nuclear disarmament talks, despite its threat to indefinitely boycott the negotiations and its claim that it had expanded its atomic arsenal.

The complete article can be viewed at:
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/wo...headlines-world

--------------------
EU Wavers on Plan to Lift Arms Embargo on China
--------------------

Move to end the 15-year sales ban as a symbolic gesture has encountered U.S. resistance and new unease over Beijing's policy on Taiwan.

By John Daniszewski and Tyler Marshall
Times Staff Writers

March 23 2005

LONDON; Plans by Europe to lift an arms embargo against China this year are in doubt because of rising U.S. pressure and unease on the continent resulting from Beijing's recent warnings to Taiwan, diplomats said Tuesday.

The complete article can be viewed at:
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/wo...headlines-world

http://news.ft.com/cms/s/54ed4bb2-9a77-11d...000e2511c8.html

Level of US opposition surprises EU

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-1537265,00.html

How golden arms deals with China suddenly lost their shine

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea.html

N Korea's treasured sword and shield

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/GC22Ak03.html

An attack on nuclear control
Kaushik Kapisthalam

South Korea Should Have a Larger Role in Global Nonproliferation Efforts
(Carnegie Analysis, Jon Wolfsthal)
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/publi...a=view&id=16698

Wednesday, March 23
In just over one month, representative from over 180 countries will meet in New York to review the status and condition of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This meeting, which takes place every five years as required by the agreement, occurs in an environment more negative than at anytime in its history and the potential for the month-long meeting to produce a positive result is in serious doubt. Given its unique position, South Korea is in a unique position to improve the prospects for a successful meeting and Seoul should take active and even aggressive steps to play a large, constructive role at the meeting.

Annan Calls for Nuclear Security Reforms in New U.N. Report
(Carnegie Analysis, Caterina Dutto)
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/publi...a=view&id=16697

Thursday, March 24
U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan calls in a new report for states to renew efforts to improve verification and enforcement measures in the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The report, released March 21, urges nuclear-weapons states to reaffirm their commitment to disarmament by irreversibly reducing their nuclear arsenals and to uphold the moratorium on nuclear testing until the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty enters into force. Annan also encourages nuclear-weapons states to provide incentives to other states to voluntarily forego the development of domestic nuclear fuel programs by providing fuel guarantees for peaceful uses. He also calls on states to tighten export controls on missiles, rockets and shoulder-fired missiles. We have provided a full excerpt of the key sections from the report.

'Intelligence Fiasco' Stirs Up the Korean Peninsula
(Barbara Demick, Los Angeles Times)
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/wo...1,5992836.story

Thursday, March 24
At a sensitive time when the United States is trying to build a consensus on North Korea, South Koreans are in a furor over allegations that Washington hyped intelligence about the North's nuclear activities.

The flap, which roughly parallels some of the disputes over Iraq, concerns a trip by National Security Council officials through Asia this year to present evidence to Chinese, Japanese and South Korean officials about North Korea's alleged role in supplying Libya with uranium hexafluoride. The gas is used to make weapons-grade uranium.

China Says No Breakthrough on North Korea Nuclear Talks
(Reuters)
http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/news/news-korea-north.html

Thursday, March 24
China, keen to nudge North Korea back to six-party talks on its nuclear program, said on Thursday a visit by the reclusive country's premier, Pak Pong-ju, had yielded no date for a return to the negotiating table.

But Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao urged patience and flexibility, saying that North Korea was still committed to the process, but that ``deep distrust'' between Pyongyang and the United States remained the key stumbling block. ``From this visit no breakthrough has been made on when the six-party talks can be resumed,'' Liu told a news conference.

Nuclear Accord Eludes Iran and Europeans
(Elaine Sciolino, New York Times)
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/24/internat...ope/24iran.html

Thursday, March 24
Iran and its European negotiating partners struggled without success on Wednesday to break an impasse on reaching a long-term agreement on nuclear, economic and security cooperation.

But the Iranian side presented new proposals to provide further assurances to the Europeans that Iran's nuclear program is peaceful, and the two sides have agreed to meet again soon, participants said.

Among the ideas presented by the Iranians, participants said, was a phased approach including enhanced monitoring and technical guarantees devised to allow Iran to again enrich uranium, a process used in producing nuclear energy and nuclear bombs. But the Europeans reject that approach, arguing that Iran's nuclear activities are so suspicious that the country should never again be allowed to enrich uranium.

Nuclear Power Is Good: U.S. and Iran Have No Argument There
(Elaine Sciolino, New York Times)
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/23/internat...ast/23iran.html?

Wednesday, March 23
In an unadorned conference center at the French Ministry of Finance, the United States and Iran discovered this week that they had something in common. They are both passionate cheerleaders for nuclear power.

It's just that the United States wants to deny Iran the right to develop its own nuclear power capacity.

In a speech on Monday at a two-day conference on "nuclear energy for the 21st century," Constance Morella, the American ambassador to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, told an audience of government officials and nuclear experts from more than 70 countries that American support of nuclear energy "has never been stronger." Nuclear energy is clean, reliable, necessary for the world to have a secure energy supply and "a benefit to humankind," she said.

The Real Missile Gap
(David Ignatius, Washington Post - Opinion)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/artic...-2005Mar22.html

Wednesday, March 23
Here's a macabre defense quiz for the post-Sept. 11 world: Which kind of attack on the United States is more likely over the next 20 years -- a ballistic missile launched from another continent, or a low-flying cruise missile or rocket fired by terrorists from a ship off the U.S. coast? For me, the answer unfortunately is a no-brainer. The more plausible threat is the short-range cruise missile or rocket attack, not the distant ICBM. The ICBM is the old Cold War paradigm of what could get Americans killed; the short-range threat is an all-too-believable image of what terrorists could do today, using missiles bought on the black market and homemade chemical or biological warheads.

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/GC25Ag02.html

Ukraine's proliferation skeletons

Enforcing Compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty
Proliferation Brief, Volume 8, Number 1
March 25, 2005



As painful experience in Iraq, North Korea, Libya and Iran has shown, the rules that govern nuclear exports, safeguard nuclear materials, and control and eliminate nuclear weapons are not self-enforcing. States and international agencies must struggle to mobilize the power needed to enforce and adapt these rules as conditions change.

In 1995, one hundred and seventy-three states reaffirmed their renunciation of nuclear weapons in return for the explicitly reaffirmed commitment by the United States, China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom to eventually liminate their nuclear arsenals. All states did so with the understanding that while the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was clearly imperfect, it nonetheless made them all safer.

But the world has changed dramatically in the last ten years. We have seen terrorism, wars, nuclear black markets, and states cheating on, and even leaving, the NPT. Perhaps today’s greatest threat stems from the wide availability of highly enriched uranium and plutonium, the fissile materials that are the fuel of nuclear bombs. These materials have become more accessible to terrorists through the poor security at nuclear stockpiles in the former Soviet republics and in dozens of other countries.

There is also danger that new nations could acquire nuclear weapons by exploiting the NPT’s failure to define specifically what constitutes the "peaceful" application of nuclear capabilities. As the treaty has been interpreted, countries can acquire technologies that bring them to the very brink of nuclear weapon capability without explicitly violating the agreement, and can then leave the treaty without penalty.

There are also newer concerns. Fifteen years after the end of the Cold War, the majority of countries feel that the five original nuclear weapon states do not intend to fulfill their end of the NPT bargain—the pledge to eliminate nuclear weapons. That growing conviction erodes the willingness among members of this majority to live up to their side of the bargain—much less to agree to strengthen the regime.

For all these reasons and more, there are rising doubts about the sustainability of the nonproliferation regime. Nations with ample technological ability to develop nuclear weapons may be reconsidering their political decisions not to do so.

All of these developments show that in spite of major successes much more needs to be done to reduce the possibility of nuclear catastrophe. All nations—including the three unwilling to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty—need to be covered. Access to weapons material and the means of producing it needs to be far more tightly limited everywhere. Nonproliferation rules must be extended to individuals and corporations.

The Bush administration has correctly drawn international attention to the need for serious enforcement. For many years, too much attention had been paid to obtaining signatures on treaties, and not enough to achieving compliance with them. The absence of a collective political will to stop bad actors–by force if necessary–undermined deterrence. The United States itself had routinely made proliferation concerns secondary to other strategic and economic issues in relations with key states such as Pakistan, Israel, and Iraq.

However, the current Bush strategy–like the one it replaced–has proven insufficient. Stopping the spread of nuclear weapons requires more international resolve than previous administrations could muster, but it also demands more genuine international teamwork than the current administration recognizes. Nuclear weapons and fissile materials are problems wherever they are, not just in a handful of "evil" states. The threat cannot be eliminated by removing whichever foreign governments the United States finds most threatening at any given time. History has shown again and again that today’s ally can become tomorrow’s problem state. Moreover, terrorists will seek nuclear weapons and materials wherever they can be found, irrespective of a state’s geopolitical orientation.

The United States cannot defeat the nuclear threat alone, or even with small coalitions of the willing. It needs sustained cooperation from dozens of diverse nations—including the leading states that have forsworn nuclear weapons, such as Argentina, Brazil, Germany, Japan, South Africa, and Sweden—in order to broaden, toughen, and stringently enforce nonproliferation rules. To get that cooperation, the nuclear weapon states must show that tougher nonproliferation rules not only benefit the powerful but constrain them as well.

Success will depend on the United States’ ability to marshal legitimate authority that motivates others to follow. As Francis Fukuyama notes, "Other people will follow the American lead if they believe it is legitimate; if they do not, they will resist, complain, obstruct, or actively oppose what we do."

Recent events, most dramatically the war in Iraq, have undermined America’s legitimacy. With societies bristling at U.S. government rhetoric and action, elected leaders in key countries distance themselves from U.S. initiatives. Even when others share U.S. views of the nuclear threat, they may balk at following U.S. policies because they do not see Washington acting on their priorities, for example, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. In Robert Kagan’s words, "The United States can neither appear to be acting only in its self-interest, nor can it, in fact, act as if its own national interest were all that mattered."

Six Shared Obligations

Global nuclear security requires universal compliance with the norms and rules of a toughened nuclear nonproliferation regime. Compliance means more than signatures on treaties, or declarations of good intent – it means actual performance. Universal means that nonproliferation norms and rules must be extended not only to states that have joined the treaties, but to all states, and to non-state actors as well. Six obligations form the core of the universal compliance strategy.

Make Nonproliferation Irreversible

We must revise the rules managing the production of nuclear weapon-usable materials, and clarify and tighten the terms by which states can withdraw from the NPT.

Devalue the Political and Military Currency of Nuclear Weapons.

All states must diminish the role of nuclear weapons in security policies and international politics. The nuclear weapon states must do more to make their nonproliferation commitments irreversible, especially through the steady verified dismantlement of nuclear arsenals.

Secure All Nuclear Materials.

All states must maintain robust standards for securing, monitoring, and accounting for all fissile materials in any form.

Stop Illegal Transfers.

States must establish enforceable prohibitions against efforts by individuals, corporations, and states to assist others in secretly acquiring the technology, material, and know-how needed to develop nuclear weapons.

Commit to Conflict Resolution.

States that possess nuclear weapons must use their leadership to resolve regional conflicts that compel or excuse some states’ pursuit of security by means of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.

Solve the Three-State Problem.

India, Israel, and Pakistan should be persuaded to accept the same nonproliferation obligations accepted by the weapon state signatories to the NPT. The three states should not be rewarded with trade in nuclear power reactors, but should receive cooperation to strengthen nuclear material security and reactor safety.

The new proliferation challenges make it clear beyond denial that the present nonproliferation regime needs fixing. This is a time that demands systemic change: a new strategy to defeat old and new threats before they become catastrophes. Only by forging this balance of obligations involving all states and all actors can we erect a defense in depth to the dangers from the spread of nuclear weapons

Joseph Cirincione is the Director for Non-Proliferation at the Carnegie Endowment. This article is adapted from Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security, Chapters One and Two, by Jessica Mathews, George Perkovich, Rose Gottemoeller, Joseph Cirincione and Jon B. Wolfsthal. Download the full report at www.CarnegieEndowment.org/strategy. For the latest proliferation news and resources, visit the Carnegie Proliferation News website, www.ProliferationNews.org.

Illegal Nuclear Deals Alleged
--------------------

Investigators say Pakistan has secretly bought high-tech components for its weapons program from U.S. companies.

By Josh Meyer
Times Staff Writer

March 26 2005

WASHINGTON; A federal criminal investigation has uncovered evidence that the government of Pakistan made clandestine purchases of U.S. high-technology components for use in its nuclear weapons program in defiance of American law.

The complete article can be viewed at:
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/wo...0,7347311.story

http://www.antiwar.com/prather/?articleid=5346

Bye Bye NPT?

Proposed uranium deal to China raises weapons concerns
Australia is negotiating to supply fuel for 40 to 50 new nuclear power
plants in China. By Janaki Kremmer
http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0329/p04s01-woap.html?s=hns

Pakistan bought U.S. nuclear wares in secret, feds find:

A federal criminal investigation has uncovered evidence that Pakistan has made clandestine purchases of U.S. high-technology components for use in its nuclear-weapons program in defiance of U.S. law.
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nati...paknukes26.html

http://tinyurl.com/6roff

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A Con Job by Pakistan's Pal, George Bush
--------------------

Robert Scheer

March 29 2005

Trying to follow the U.S. policy on the proliferation of nuclear weapons is like watching a three-card monte game on a city street corner. Except the stakes are higher.

The complete article can be viewed at:
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-...0,656567.column

http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0329/p04s01-woap.html

Proposed uranium deal to China raises weapons concerns

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GC30Df04.html

US arms industry fishing in troubled waters
Ranjit Devraj

US Uses Arms Sales To Strengthen Ties with South Asian Regional Rivals

http://enews.voanews.com/t?ctl=C85225:2F72C9D

Analysts say US engaged in delicate balancing act in region

The Bush administration announced last week it would sell F-16
warplanes to Pakistan. But often overlooked was the simultaneous
announcement that the United States would also sell arms, including
F-16s, to India. The United States is engaged in a delicate balancing
act in South Asia.

The real surprise about the U.S. offer to sell some F-16 warplanes to
Pakistan, say analysts of South Asian affairs, was India's relatively
muted reaction to the move.

President Bush took the step of calling Indian Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh to alert him to the upcoming announcement. And India also got a
U.S. pledge that it, too, would be allowed to purchase arms, including
F-16s.

Sumit Ganguly, director of the Indian Studies program at Indiana
University at Bloomington, says that because of those actions, the
reaction from New Delhi was less vocal than might have been expected
in the past. "Consequently, while the Indians are somewhat piqued and
irritated by the renewal of an arms transfer relationship with
Pakistan, much of the sting of this message has actually been
removed," he said.

A South Asia analyst at the U.S. Institute of Peace, Christine Fair,
says India gains in the deal as well because Washington is trying to
bolster its renewed relationship with New Delhi. "India is in some
sense the long-term winner in all of this," she said. "Obviously,
India gets a lot of stuff as well. But over the long term India is
very much our partner. If you look at the kinds of stuff that the
Indian military is doing with the U.S. military, it is qualitatively
different than the stuff that the United States is doing with the
Pakistan military."

Ms. Fair says the United States is engaged in a broader range of
military training and exercises with India than it is with Pakistan.

The sale to Pakistan is seen in many quarters as gratitude to its
president, General Pervez Musharraf, for his help in fighting
terrorism, especially in flushing out Taleban and al-Qaida remnants
along the Pakistani-Afghan border.

But Terence Taylor, head of the U.S. office of the London-based
International Institute for Strategic Studies, says more is involved
than a mere thank you gesture. "I think there's more substance than a
thank-you. I think General Musharraf, although president of Pakistan,
needs to demonstrate to his military that their fight against
terrorism is recognized, that the military are getting the equipment
they need - they've had a longstanding need for this type of aircraft.
And so I think it helps stability in a sense in Pakistan, and in
particular President Musharraf's relations with his own military," he
said.

But Sumit Ganguly of Indiana University says there is concern in New
Delhi about how the arms sale might affect President Musharraf's
attitude toward India. "There is a worry in Indian circles that this
might send a wrong message to Musharraf, who might basically think he
has carte blanche from the United States to pretty much offer or not
offer the Indians what he wants," he said. "In my view, this would be
a serious mistake on the part of General Musharraf, but hardly unknown
on the part of military regimes."

Pakistan has long wanted F-16s to bolster its aging air fleet. But an
order of 28 of the jets was halted in 1990 under a bill sponsored by
then-Senator Larry Pressler, a Republican from South Dakota. The
Pressler Amendment barred U.S. military exports to Pakistan if it was
suspected of having a nuclear weapon. Since then both India and
Pakistan have conducted nuclear tests.

Pakistan greatly resented the law, feeling that it had been used by
the United States as a proxy in fighting the Soviet Union in
Afghanistan, then unceremoniously spurned. Jamsheed Marker, a former
Pakistani ambassador to the United States, says the current sale will
help to heal the wounds left by Washington's hot-and-cold policy
toward Islamabad.

"It's always been an up-and-down affair. There's always been -
certainly in Pakistan - an element of doubt about the long-term
sincerity of this relationship. And, as I said, I think this will go a
long, long way towards settling that in a satisfactory manner, in a
favorable fashion. In other words, I think it will help turn opinion
in Pakistan," he said.

Former Senator Larry Pressler remains adamantly opposed to any arms
transfers to Pakistan. In a VOA telephone interview, he says F-16
sales have nothing to do with fighting terrorism. "I am opposed to it
because I don't see any relationship between the F-16s and terrorism.
Now, we have repaid Pakistan many times over for the assistance that
Pakistan gave us," he said. "However, Pakistan has done some things
against us. They proliferated nuclear weapons to Libya, [North] Korea,
and lots of other places."

The sales must still have approval from the U.S. Congress. But as
Terence Taylor points out, the fact that Congress is controlled by
Republicans probably means there will no repeat of a Pressler-type bid
to halt arms sales to Pakistan.

With the addition of spinner Karen Hughes to the movie production team, the Bush Administration has been promoting its global democracy project -- or what David Rieff describes as "muscular utopianism" in yesterday's WSJ --- on a full time basis. Here I point to the inevitable tensions between the idealistic pretensions of the project and the realpolitik basis of U.S. policies. Case at point: The sale of F-16 to Pakistan.


Business Times - 30 Mar 2005


Now showing: The US global masquerade

Gap between its lofty ideals and the crude interests it advances will be exposed sooner or later

By LEON HADAR

DURING her meetings with foreign leaders in Washington and the many world capitals she has visited recently, US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice sounded like a kindergarten teacher warning rowdy kids that if they won't behave, they could end up standing in the 'Axis of Evil' corner. Meanwhile, those who had learnt by heart the entire State of Inauguration Address of President George W Bush earned her admiration.

Ms Rice disparaged the Europeans for considering the lifting of an arms embargo on China - a move which, she explained, could threaten the delicate military balance in East Asia, insisting that the US regards itself as the peacekeeper in the area and would look harshly on any European interference. 'It is the United States, not Europe, that has defended the Pacific,' she said. She then lectured the Chinese on the need to pressure the North Koreans, and told reporters that China could be 'a positive influence in the region', adding, however, that it could just as easily become the region's biggest problem.

America's diplomatic mission, and hers, she said, was 'to guide it to the positive side of the ledger'. At the same time as 'guiding' China, Ms Rice has been leading an effort aimed at helping India become a 'major world power in the 21st century'. And when it comes to the 'broader' Middle East, the US chief diplomat continued to lecture its people on the need to join the US-led March towards Freedom, which would now be marketed to the world by Karen Hughes, Mr Bush's former top media spinner.

In fact, Ms Rice and her aides are now grading the progress to democracy of the Middle East on an almost daily basis. Good grades are rewarded with US dollars and photo opportunities with Mr Bush, while an 'F' could bring, in some extreme cases, an American military occupation. Ms Rice even cancelled her stop in Cairo to punish the Egyptian government after it arrested a political activist.

What infuriates many non-Americans, including friends of the US, is not only the patronising America-knows-best tone of Ms Rice that echoes the attitude projected by past imperial powers towards their satellites. The most problematic aspect of the current American global approach is the continuing tension between the hegemonic US that reflects its own geo-strategic and geo-economic interests, and the idealistic and missionary pretensions that Washington exhibits.

Excusing America

Neoconservative ideologues resolve this tension by interjecting the idea of 'American exceptionalism'. Since America is the upholder of the ideals of freedom and democracy, then, by definition, whatever it does to spread liberty abroad, including the use of military force, should be blessed by all people of goodwill everywhere. The means to achieve those lofty goals can at times be harsh, but what counts are the intentions of the US, which, unlike those of other former global powers - Rome, the Ottomans, Britain, the Soviet Union, etc - are to 'do good' and are supposedly devoid of any element of self-interest.

Indeed, America is like the kindergarten teacher who sometimes inflicts harsh punishment on the naughty kid, but who is only motivated by a commitment to the broader public good - the teacher actually suffers when he or she is forced to discipline the bad boy by detaining him after class. But, hey, someone has to do the dirty job that would end up achieving a moral end.

In the real world, however, as opposed to the Democracy Movie produced by Ms Rice and Mr Hughes, the US is engaged in promoting real political, economic and military interests. It is trying to contain the threat from terrorist groups, maintain a hegemonic position in the Middle East to the exclusion of other regional players like Iran, and global powers like the EU, and protect its military supremacy in East Asia against the challenge from China. Therefore, the gap between the lofty ideals it is supposed to represent and the crude interests it advances will be exposed sooner or later.

Notable inconsistencies

After bashing the 'cynical' and 'greedy' Europeans for contemplating the removal of a 20-year-old arms embargo on China - none of the members of the EU had been actually planning to sell any arms to Chinese - Washington announces that it will sell F-16 jet fighters to Pakistan.

Isn't the deal going to keep American military manufacturers in Texas, the defence contractors and the guys at the Pentagon happy? You mean that you are really thinking that we are doing that to promote US global economic and military interests? Moi? How dare you? It's all done in order to 'improve regional security,' Washington explains. But isn't the move going to destabilise South Asia and force India to buy more planes? Perhaps, but then we would sell them F-16s and stability would be re-established in the Indian subcontinent.

And what about the promotion of democracy in the 'broader' Middle East? Isn't Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf a military dictator who ousted a democratically elected government? Isn't Pakistan an Islamic theocracy that is dominated by corrupt oligarchs and unlike, say, Iran, actually has a nuclear bomb? Wasn't Mr Musharraf's top scientist selling nuclear technology to all those 'Axis of Evil' types? Well - Okay. But then America is helping India, the world's largest democracy become a 'major world power in the 21st century' and that would help to contain the potential threat from Pakistan.

And that, my friends, should not be construed as 'cynicism'. Like your kindergarten teacher and other saintly figures, America works in mysterious ways. One day when you grow up, you'll understand.

Copyright © 2005 Singapore Press Holdings Ltd. All rights reserved.

Proliferation News: 30 March 2005
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
www.CarnegieEndowment.org/npp

Dissent on Intelligence Is Critical, Report Says
(Walter Pincus and Peter Baker, Washington Post)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/artic...-2005Mar29.html

A presidential commission assigned to look into the intelligence failures leading up to the Iraq war will recommend a series of changes intended to encourage more dissent within the nation's spy agencies and better organize the government's multi-tentacled fight against terrorism, officials said yesterday.

In a report to be made public tomorrow, the officials said, the panel will propose more competitive analysis and information-sharing by intelligence agencies, improved tradecraft training, more "devil's advocacy" in the formation of national intelligence estimates and the appointment of an intelligence ombudsman to hear from analysts who believe their work has been compromised.

The report will also suggest the creation of a new national nonproliferation center to coordinate the fight against weapons of mass destruction, according to officials who have read the 700-page classified version of the report and declined to be identified because it has not been released.



Past Arguments Don't Square With Current Iran Policy
(Dafna Linzer, Washington Post)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/artic...-2005Mar26.html

Lacking direct evidence, Bush administration officials argue that Iran's nuclear program must be a cover for bomb-making. Vice President Cheney recently said, "They're already sitting on an awful lot of oil and gas. Nobody can figure why they need nuclear as well to generate energy."

Yet Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and outgoing Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz held key national security posts when the Ford administration made the opposite argument 30 years ago.

Ford's team endorsed Iranian plans to build a massive nuclear energy industry, but also worked hard to complete a multibillion-dollar deal that would have given Tehran control of large quantities of plutonium and enriched uranium -- the two pathways to a nuclear bomb. Either can be shaped into the core of a nuclear warhead, and obtaining one or the other is generally considered the most significant obstacle to would-be weapons builders.



Iran Seeks "Latent" Nuclear Capability
(David Ruppe, Global Security Newswire)
http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2005_3_24.html#CF5B39DB

Iran appears to be developing a “latent” nuclear weapons capability that does not include assembling complete bombs or violating the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, a U.S. expert said yesterday (see GSN, March 23).

“They absolutely want to stay within the existing rules of the NPT and regime and … they will do everything they can to play by the rules,” said George Perkovich, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, speaking at an event here hosted by the U.S. United Nations Association and the Business Council for the United Nations. “The rules allow you — and in their argument give you the right — which I dispute … to acquire a capability to enrich uranium or to separate plutonium,” he said.

In addition to producing nuclear fuel for energy, Iran seeks to follow the model of Japan, which has maintained large stockpiles of plutonium without international recrimination, he said.



Illegal Nuclear Deals Alleged
(Josh Meyer, Los Angeles Times)
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/wo...headlines-world

A federal criminal investigation has uncovered evidence that the government of Pakistan made clandestine purchases of U.S. high-technology components for use in its nuclear weapons program in defiance of American law.

Federal authorities also say the highly specialized equipment at one point passed through the hands of Humayun Khan, an Islamabad businessman who they say has ties to Islamic militants.



Pakistan Mulls Nuclear Handover
(BBC)
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4381815.stm

Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf is considering sending nuclear parts to a UN watchdog to help it investigate if Iran is developing atomic weapons.

Pakistan admits its disgraced scientist AQ Khan gave Iran nuclear centrifuges.

The centrifuges help produce enriched uranium that can be used for nuclear weapons or in power plants.



Many Missiles Missing in Iraq, Review of Reports Shows
(Charles J. Hanley, Associated Press)
http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeas..._reports_shows/

Dozens of ballistic missiles are missing in Iraq. Vials of dangerous microbes are unaccounted for. Sensitive sites, once under UN seal, stand gutted today, their arms-making gear hauled off by looters, or by arms makers.

The world now knows that Iraq had no threatening WMD programs. But two years after US teams began their futile hunt for weapons of mass destruction, Iraq has something else: a landscape of ruined military plants and of unanswered questions and loose ends, some potentially lethal, a review of official reporting shows.



Saving Nonproliferation
(Jimmy Carter, Washington Post - Opinion)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/artic...-2005Mar27.html

Renewal talks for the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are scheduled for May, yet the United States and other nuclear powers seem indifferent to its fate. This is remarkable, considering the addition of Iran and North Korea as states that either possess or seek nuclear weapons programs. A recent United Nations report warned starkly: "We are approaching a point at which the erosion of the non-proliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation."

A group of "Middle States" has a simple goal: "To exert leverage on the nuclear powers to take some minimum steps to save the non-proliferation treaty in 2005." Last year this coalition of nuclear-capable states -- including Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, Sweden and eight NATO members -- voted for a new agenda resolution calling for implementing NPT commitments already made. Tragically, the United States, Britain and France voted against this resolution.

So far the preparatory committee for the forthcoming NPT talks has failed even to achieve an agenda because of the deep divisions between nuclear powers that refuse to meet their own disarmament commitments and the nonnuclear movement, whose demands include honoring these pledges and considering the Israeli arsenal.



Storage of Nuclear Spent Fuel Criticized
(Shankar Vedantam, Washington Post)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/artic...-2005Mar27.html

A classified report by nuclear experts assembled by the National Academy of Sciences has challenged the decision by federal regulators to allow commercial nuclear facilities to store large quantities of radioactive spent fuel in pools of water.

The report concluded that the government does not fully understand the risks that a terrorist attack could pose to the pools and ought to expedite the removal of the fuel to dry storage casks that are more resilient to attack. The Bush administration has long defended the safety of the pools, and the nuclear industry has warned that moving large amounts of fuel to dry storage would be unnecessary and very expensive.

Carnegie News:
On April 1, 2005, Director for Non-Proliferation Joseph Cirincione will speak to faculty and students at Princeton University in the afternoon on "What I Learned in Tehran" and that evening will deliver the keynote speech at the Coalition for Peace Action's 25th Anniversary Membership Dinner on "Preventing Nuclear Terrorism" in Princeton, New Jersey.

DA2: Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats, a substantially revised and expanded version of the award-winning first edition published in 2002, will be available for purchase in July, 2005. The second edition includes new chapters on Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya and other nations. All the charts and tables have been updated with the latest information on the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and missile systems. More information will be available soon on the Carnegie Endowment web site. Deadly Arsenals is distributed by the Brookings Institution.

Lock in Nuclear Successes
Proliferation Brief, Volume 8, Number 2
March 30, 2005

As any college basketball team can attest, particularly one that built a double-digit lead in a recent game only to lose in the final seconds, never take success for granted. What is true for basketball is true for nuclear strategy. Over 180 nations have decided that they are better off without nuclear weapons, including most recently, the former poster-child for outlaw states, Libya. Each of their decisions is important; some could be easily reversed. While we focus on the important problems of preventing new states or terrorist groups from getting nuclear weapons, we must also take decisive action to lock in these past successes.

Here's why. A large number of countries that have the technical and financial capabilities to produce nuclear weapons have rejected or abandoned nuclear weapons programs, including Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Egypt, Germany, Japan, Kazakhstan, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden, Taiwan, Turkey, and Ukraine. Preventing these states from undertaking nuclear programs is pivotal to the success of nonproliferation. If they choose not to comply with nonproliferation norms and rules, and not to cooperate in enforcement of these rules in tough cases, these states could create a global security crisis.

More pertinently, these states must advocate, or at least not resist, new rules to stop the spread of nuclear weapon production capabilities and strengthen the nuclear safeguards mandate of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Their support gives the UN Security Council greater resolve to prevent or reverse proliferation challenges. The states that could have been possessors of nuclear weapons bring special credibility to the political process of strengthening the global nonproliferation regime.

In sum, as former U.S. government officials Robert Einhorn and Kurt Campbell have observed, we want to reinforce the wisdom of states that have gone without nuclear weapons by shaping a world in which "existing nuclear arsenals are being reduced, parties are not pursuing clandestine nuclear programs, nuclear testing has been stopped, the taboo against the use of nuclear weapons is being strengthened, and in general, the salience of nuclear weapons in international affairs is diminishing."

Great. So, how do we do this? Washington’s first maxim should be Hippocratic: "Do no harm" to states that could readily produce nuclear weapons but have chosen not to. U.S. policy and rhetoric should never be dictatorial or arrogant in ways that would make officials in countries such as Japan, South Korea, or Turkey—to pick random examples—conclude that Washington would be more respectful of their interests if they had their own nuclear weapons.

On the contrary, the United States should reassure these countries and others, such as Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa, that do not have alliance security guarantees, that the United States recognizes a special duty to prevent threats that could make them reasonably feel the need for nuclear weapons. In Southwest and Northeast Asia, where Iranian and North Korean proliferation could tempt Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Japan, and South Korea to reconsider their nuclear status, the United States should engage in preventive high-level diplomacy and defense cooperation to reassure these states that their strategic interests can be met without nuclear weapons.

The United States (and other nuclear weapon states) should focus on rewarding states that actively strengthen the nonproliferation regime. Decisions on expanding the permanent membership of the UN Security Council should take into special consideration candidates’ contributions to nonproliferation. Decisions on where to conduct state visits and which countries should host major international conclaves should reward states that contribute heavily to stopping nuclear proliferation.

It is also important to deglamorize nuclear technology as a symbol of modernity. Even as we work on the design of new generations of safer, proliferation-resistant nuclear reactors, more work needs to be done to develop cutting-edge, environmentally friendly energy technologies such as hydrogen fuel cells and solar power.

Finally, the United States and other nuclear weapon states must devalue the security and political status associated with nuclear weapons so that political actors in other societies do not conclude that they will gain international leverage by seeking these weapons. A key step towards such devaluation is to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in national security doctrine. For example, our nation should reject, not embrace, the development of new nuclear weapons.

We cannot take the non-nuclear status of even our close allies for granted. The decisions we make over the next few years will determine whether they and other industrial and developing nations will stay the course. This is not a game we can afford to lose.

Joseph Cirincione is the Director for Non-Proliferation and Jane Vaynman is a Project Assistant at the Carnegie Endowment. This article is adapted from Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security, Chapter Five, by Jessica Mathews, George Perkovich, Rose Gottemoeller, Joseph Cirincione and Jon B. Wolfsthal.

Download the full report at www.CarnegieEndowment.org/strategy.

Iran opens secret nuclear plant :

Journalists have been allowed to accompany Iranian President Mohammad Khatami on his first official visit to the Natanz nuclear facility.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4394177.stm

How Bush Learned To Love the Bomb:

United States President George W. Bush is talking tough about nukes in Iran and North Korea. But critics say by illegally testing and building nuclear weapons, the U.S. is fueling a new arms race
http://service.spiegel.de/cache/internatio...,348779,00.html

http://snipurl.com/dqyy

Jimmy Carter: Non-Proliferation Treaty needs push for renewal :

Renewal talks for the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty are scheduled for May, yet the United States and other nuclear powers seem indifferent to its fate.
http://www.madison.com/tct/opinion//index....d=34173&ntpid=3

Pak refuses Rice's request for US access to AQ Khan:

Pakistan rejected US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's request to allow Americans to question disgraced scientist AQ Khan over his alleged role in Iran's nuclear programme, a report said in Washington on Tuesday.
http://www.hindustantimes.com/news/181_1299217,00050001.htm

Proliferation News: 31 March 2005
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
www.CarnegieEndowment.org/npp

Study Faults U.S. Response to Outlawed Arms
(David Johnston and Scott Shane, New York Times)
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/31/politics/31weapons.html

Thursday, March 31
A report on United States intelligence to be made public on Thursday concludes that the government has failed to respond to the dire threat posed by unconventional weapons with the urgency and national purpose displayed after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

The report includes a detailed analysis of the shortcomings of the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate that concluded that Iraq had biological and chemical weapons and an active nuclear program. It also contains before-and-after assessments of intelligence on Afghanistan and Libya, since American specialists now have access to those countries and can compare what weapons were expected and what were found.

The report, which focuses its main criticism on the Central Intelligence Agency, proposes the creation of an antiproliferation center to gauge the threat posed by chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. It calls for specific changes at agencies like the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which is urged to create a more independent intelligence unit inside its existing structure.



U.S. Was 'Dead Wrong' in Prewar Assessments, Commission Says
(David Johnston and Scott Shane, New York Times)
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/31/politics...artner=homepage

Thursday, March 31
A report made public this morning concludes that American intelligence agencies were "dead wrong" in almost all of their prewar assessments about the state of unconventional weapons in Iraq, and that on issues of this importance "we simply cannot afford failures of this magnitude."

It adds, "The harm done to American credibility by our all too public intelligence failures in Iraq will take years to undo."

The report concludes that while many other nations believed Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, "in the end, it was the United States that put its credibility on the line, making this one of the most public - and most damaging - intelligence failures in recent American history."



Intelligence Panel's Findings Criticized
(Walter Pincus, Washington Post)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/artic...-2005Mar30.html

Thursday, March 31
Some of the recommendations to be officially presented today by President Bush's commission on intelligence were already drawing criticism yesterday inside and outside the intelligence community.

One proposal being questioned calls for restructuring the FBI's counterterrorism and counterintelligence operations and analysis under one director, and having that individual report both to the new director of national intelligence as well as to the FBI director.

Kate Martin of the Center for National Security Studies, who had been briefed by FBI sources on the proposal, said that giving the DNI, whose prime concern is foreign intelligence, a role in domestic counterterrorism operations could create civil liberties issues.



Using Clues From Libya to Study a Nuclear Mystery
(David E. Sanger and William J. Broad)
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/31/politics/31nuke.html?

Thursday, March 31
In the 15 months since Libya turned over to the United States nearly two tons of illicit uranium it had planned to use in atomic weapons, the radioactive material has become a pivotal, if mysterious, piece of evidence for investigators unraveling the nuclear black market. The Bush administration, joined by United Nations inspectors, now say the uranium most likely came from North Korea and helps to build a case that the North has exported dangerous nuclear material to Libya, and perhaps beyond.

There are still many questions that allies and others have raised, and the administration has been unable or unwilling to fully answer. Jon B. Wolfsthal, a Korea expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, said the administration's public case was too weak for outsiders to react to with anything but doubt, given the intelligence failures over Iraq. "This is clearly within the realm of possibility," he said of the uranium sale to Libya. "But there's a big difference between that and saying it happened."

Joseph Cirincione, director of the nonproliferation project at the Carnegie Endowment, said the traces of plutonium might simply indicate that North Korea shipped an empty canister to Pakistan, and that it was filled there, or someplace else. "If you look hard at these pillars, there are alternative explanations," he said. "They don't disprove the government claims but they raise doubts about their certainty."



Behind Diplomacy, Iran Sees a Fight Coming
(Scott Peterson, Christian Science Monitor)
http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0331/p06s01-wome.html

Thursday, March 31
From Washington, the rhetoric calls for diplomatic solutions to the nuclear standoff with Iran. But Tehran also hears a growing drumbeat for war that echoes the build-up to US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.
In preparation for any strike on its budding nuclear facilities, Iran is making clear that the price will be high - burnishing its military forces, boosting its missile program, and warning of a painful response against US and Israeli targets in the region.

"They see a fight coming, regardless of what they do, so they are getting ready for it," says a European diplomat in Tehran, referring to ideologues who think a US invasion is a "very real prospect." Even moderate conservatives fear the "Iraqization of the Iran dossier," says the diplomat. The result is that Iran is "constantly trying to project strength" and is developing a new doctrine of asymmetric warfare.



Reporters Shown Underground Iran Nuclear Plant
(Reuters)
http://www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml?t...storyID=8033734

Wednesday, March 30
Iran's President Mohammad Khatami took a group of journalists deep underground on Wednesday into the heart of a key nuclear plant which Washington wants dismantled and whose existence was kept secret until 2002.

About 30 local and foreign journalists visited Natanz uranium enrichment facility, 250 km south of Tehran, the centrepiece of a disputed atomic fuel drive which Tehran suspended under international pressure in late 2003.

The unprecedented visit was an unusual gesture of openness by the Islamic state. Reporters, allowed to photograph and film the unimposing complex, were later shown parts of another atomic facility in the central city of Isfahan.



Old Woes Dog U.S. Intelligence Gathering
(Jonathan S. Landay and John Walcott, Philadelphia Inquirer)
http://www.philly.com/mld/inquirer/11262023.htm

Wednesday, March 30
A presidential commission investigating U.S. intelligence failures in Iraq has concluded that many of the same weaknesses that plagued American efforts to investigate Saddam Hussein's regime are preventing the United States from collecting accurate intelligence on Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs.

Lacking American spies in either country's top leadership or weapons programs, the commission concluded, the United States has relied heavily on satellite photos and communications intercepts, and on foreign intelligence services, exiles and defectors.

In North Korea and Iran, as they did in Iraq, officials also have extrapolated from older, confirmed information to make estimates about current nuclear and other weapons programs, said current and former officials who are familiar with drafts of the commission's top-secret report.



No Nations Should Have Nukes, Most in USA Say
(Associated Press)
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-0...ear-fears_x.htm

Thursday, March 31
Most Americans surveyed in a poll say they do not think any country, including the United States, should have nuclear weapons. That sentiment is at odds with current efforts by some nations that are trying to develop the weapons and by terrorists seeking to add them to their arsenal.

The only use of an atomic bomb — by the United States against Japan at the end of World War II — provokes sharply different reactions, depending on the age of those asked. Young adults tend to disapprove, while older Americans tend to approve, an AP-Ipsos poll found.

Washington security balance in South Asia takes a New Delhi twist.

http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0401/dailyUpdate.html

--------------------
Nuclear Terror Pact Advances
--------------------

U.N. General Assembly is expected to endorse the convention targeting rogue groups.

By Maggie Farley
Times Staff Writer

April 2 2005

UNITED NATIONS; After seven years of negotiations, the U.N. on Friday finalized a convention to prevent nuclear terrorism, paving the way for a broader international agreement to fight terrorist groups.

The complete article can be viewed at:
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/wo...headlines-world

Panel: U.S. Ignored Work of U.N. Arms Inspectors

By Dafna Linzer

By the time President Bush ordered U.S. troops to disarm Saddam Hussein of the deadly weapons he was allegedly trying to build, every piece of fresh evidence had been tested -- and disproved -- by U.N. inspectors, according to a report.

To view the entire article, go to http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/artic...er=emailarticle

http://www.mosnews.com/news/2005/04/01/usintellig.shtml

US Knows 'Disturbingly Little' of Modern Threats from States Like Russia

http://tcrnews2.com/disarmament.html

Message of John Paul II to the General Assembly of the UN
Disarmament Efforts Cannot Concern only some Countries or be Centered only on One type of weapon

Proliferation News: 5 April 2005
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
For past stories and further proliferation resources, visit:
www.ProliferationNews.org

A Profile in Timidity
(New York Times - Editorial)
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/01/opinion/...Ed%2fEditorials

Friday, April 1
The president's commission on intelligence gathering could have saved the country a lot of time, and considerable paper, by not publishing its report yesterday and just e-mailing everyone the Web addresses for the searching studies already done by the 9/11 commission and the Senate Intelligence Committee. After more than a year's dithering, the panel produced some 600 pages of conventional wisdom about the intelligence failures before the war with Iraq, along with a big dose of political spin that pleased the White House but provided little enlightenment for the public.

We were not optimistic when President Bush was pressured into creating this panel in February 2004. Though bipartisan, its membership lacked stature or independence, and Mr. Bush failed to give the commission a sweeping mandate that would go beyond rehashing the distressing but well-known shortcomings of the intelligence agencies. Still, it seemed worth waiting until after the election for the results because it was hard to imagine that the panel would not ask the vital questions.



Intelligence Gaps
(Washington Post - Editorial)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/artic...0-2005Apr2.html

Sunday, April 3
A presidential commission appointed last year to study the failings of U.S. intelligence on Iraq has returned with many of the same conclusions -- and similarly scathing rhetoric -- as previous official investigations. Intelligence agencies, it said, collected precious little hard data about Iraq and failed to critically examine what they had; in the absence of fresh evidence, analysts stuck to long-standing assumptions that Saddam Hussein must be hiding weapons of mass destruction. The commission also agreed with much of the critique of the Sept. 11 commission: that the 15 U.S. intelligence agencies fail to adequately share information or collaborate, operate poorly on the ground in collecting "human intelligence" and are too resistant to innovation. What's new, and alarming, is the commission's blunt conclusion that the same failings now plague intelligence collection on critical current threats, ranging from the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea to the proliferation of biological weapons. That finding ought to provide an urgent mandate for President Bush and his incoming director of national intelligence, John D. Negroponte.



Oh, That Politicization
(Los Angeles Times - Editorial)
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/editor...ment-editorials

Friday, April 1
The commission that investigated U.S. intelligence agencies and what they know — or mostly, do not know — about weapons of mass destruction produced a 600-page report Thursday that has something for everyone, and at least one dubious conclusion.

Led by Republican federal Judge Laurence H. Silberman and Democratic former U.S. Sen. Charles S. Robb, the review concluded that the intelligence community was "dead wrong" in nearly all its judgments on Iraq's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons leading up to the war that started two years ago last month. Yet the panel extended an olive branch of sorts by saying the collectors and analysts of information did a good job in learning about Libya's attempt to gain nuclear weapons.



Expert Warns of Risk from Leftover Soviet Arsenal
(Ross Liemer, Daily Princetonian)
http://www.dailyprincetonian.com/archives/...ews/12547.shtml

Monday, April 4
Prominent experts addressed international and local stability at the Coalition for Peace Action's 25th anniversary dinner on Friday.

"The most dangerous threat is terrorists plus nuclear weapons plus any state arsenal, including ours," nonproliferation scholar Joseph Cirincione said at the meeting.

Cirincione, a senior associate with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, recently returned from a five-day tour of nuclear facilities in Iran. He attacked the Bush administration's claim that "Axis of Evil" regimes could provide weapons of mass destruction to terrorists. "If you're Osama bin Laden and you want a nuclear weapon, where are you going?" Cirincione said. "You're not going to Iraq, they don't have nuclear weapons. You're not going to Iran, they don't have nuclear weapons. You're not even going to North Korea. Even if they had them, are they going to give them up?"



U.N. Committee Approves Nuclear Terrorism Treaty
(Jim Wurst, Global Security Newswire)
http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2005_4_4.html#9569044D

Monday, April 4
A treaty designed to improve international cooperation to prevent and punish nuclear terrorism was adopted by consensus Friday by the U.N. committee that had been negotiating the text since 1998 (see GSN, Dec. 1, 2004).

Completion of this treaty means that the ad-hoc panel of the General Assembly’s legal committee has only one unfinished antiterrorism text before it: a draft comprehensive treaty on terrorism that would include a consensus definition of terrorism.

The nuclear convention outlaws any use or threat of use of a nuclear weapon or other radiological device and would require all states to cooperate in prosecuting individuals accused of committing these crimes.



New Nuclear Warhead Proposed to Congress
(Walter Pincus, Washington Post)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/artic...6-2005Apr4.html

Tuesday, April 5
The head of the nation's nuclear weapons programs proposed yesterday that Congress approve funds to study the feasibility of building a new, more reliable nuclear warhead that could be deployed without nuclear testing in less than 10 years.

Saying that the current Cold War stockpile is inadequate technically and militarily, Linton F. Brooks, administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, told the Senate Armed Services subcommittee on strategic forces, "We want to explore whether there is a better way to sustain existing military capabilities in our stockpile absent nuclear testing."

[He] he insisted that the yields of most of the nuclear warheads in the current stockpiles, built to attack Soviet hard targets, "are probably too high." Because their casings were not designed to penetrate earth, "we have no capability against hardened, deeply buried targets." He also described the current stockpile as "unsuited for some specialized missions" caused by post-Cold War situations.



Congress Weighs Money for Missile Defense
(Associated Press)
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/national/A...le-Defense.html?

Monday, April 4
At a time of budget deficit pressures, Congress is weighing how much to invest in a fledgling but expensive ballistic missile defense system that has suffered setbacks and whose ultimate cost right now is a big question mark.

The system is the most costly defense research and development program under way. President Bush wants lawmakers to approve $9 billion for the system in the 2006 budget year -- $1 billion less than the administration previously planned.

Lawmakers of both parties are nervous about whether the nation is adequately protected against nuclear attack. But many also are concerned about the costs.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Carnegie News:

NPT Press Conference: On April 5 from 2-3:30 p.m., the Arms Control Association and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace will hold a joint press conference on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty with Rep. John Spratt (SC), Robert Grey, former ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, Joseph Cirincione, Director for Non-Proliferation at the Carnegie Endowment, and Daryl Kimball, Executive Director of the Arms Control Association. The press conference will be held at the National Press Club, Murrow Room, 529 14th St., N.W., Washington.

Rose Gottemoeller: On April 6 at 8 p.m., Carnegie Senior Associate Rose Gottemoeller will discuss "Loose Nukes and Brain Drain: Nuclear Proliferation Issues in the 21st Century" at Georgetown University, ICC Auditorium, Washington. She will be joined by Cathleen Campbell, U.S. Civilian Research and Defense Foundation.

Joseph Cirincione: On April 7 at 7pm, Carnegie Director for Non-Proliferation Joseph Cirincione will speak on "Iran's Nuclear Challenge: How Should the U..S. Respond?" at the Program for Peace and World Security Studies (PAWSS) in Amherst, Massachusetts. On Monday, April 11 from 12:30-1:30pm, Joseph Cirincione will speak at the Women In International Security (WIIS) Congressional Staff Briefing on, "Strengthening the Nonproliferation Regime: Challenges and Prospects for Global Security" at the Rayburn House Office Building, Room B369. He will speak with Linda Gallini, Deputy Director, Office of Multilateral Nuclear Affairs, Bureau of Nonproliferation at the Department of State.

Deadly Arsenals II: The second edition of Carnegie's proliferation atlas, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Threats, will be available for purchase this July. The second edition is substantially revised and updated with new chapters on Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya and others. The original 2002 book was selected as a CHOICE Outstanding Academic Title in 2003 as a "best of the best in published scholarship." The study is widely used in university graduate and undergraduate courses and is a staple on expert's bookshelves. Ordering information will be posted on the Carnegie web site shortly.

The 2005 NPT Review Conference and Beyond
Proliferation Brief, Volume 8, Number 3
April 6, 2005

Statement by the Campaign to Strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Thirty-five years ago, the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) set into place one of the most important international security bargains of all time: states without nuclear weapons pledged not to acquire them, while nuclear-armed states committed to eventually give them up. At the same time, the NPT allowed for the peaceful use of nuclear technology by non-nuclear-weapon states under strict and verifiable control.

Over the years, the NPT security framework has led several states to abandon their nuclear weapons ambitions and has made it far more difficult for other non-nuclear-weapon states to acquire the material and technology needed to build such weapons or to avoid detection of a covert nuclear weapons program. The NPT process also has encouraged action on several nuclear arms control initiatives and led the nuclear-weapon states to pledge not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon NPT members, thereby reducing incentives for others to seek nuclear arms for prestige or defense.

Today’s security environment requires an even more comprehensive and robust global nonproliferation strategy. The NPT’s future success depends on universal compliance with tighter rules to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, more effective regional security strategies, and renewed progress toward fulfillment of the nuclear-weapon states’ NPT disarmament obligations.

We call upon all states-parties to recommit themselves to the legal and political obligations established by the treaty and successive NPT Review Conferences, as well as agree on a specific and balanced program of action to strengthen treaty implementation and compliance.

Since the 2000 Review Conference, the nuclear threat has evolved in dangerous ways and the global nonproliferation system faces difficult challenges. We have seen new and more deadly forms of terrorism, wars, nuclear black markets, states cheating on the NPT, and even one, North Korea, announcing its withdrawal from the treaty. Perhaps today’s greatest threat stems from the existing global stockpiles of highly enriched uranium and plutonium, the fissile materials that are the fuel of nuclear bombs. These materials remain far too accessible to terrorists as a result of inadequate security and accounting at nuclear facilities throughout the former Soviet republics and in dozens of other countries.

Another significant concern is that additional countries could acquire the capacity to produce fissile materials and manufacture nuclear weapons under the guise of "peaceful" nuclear endeavors. North Korea may already have manufactured a small nuclear weapons arsenal. Iran may soon have the capacity to produce fissile material for weapons and may do so if current European diplomatic efforts falter. As the NPT has been interpreted, countries can acquire technologies that bring them to the very brink of a nuclear weapons capability without explicitly violating the agreement, and can then leave the treaty without penalty unless the United Nations Security Council takes action.

Fifteen years after the end of the Cold War, the majority of countries also feel that the five original nuclear-weapon states do not intend to pursue their NPT-related nuclear disarmament commitments. That growing conviction—reinforced by lackluster progress on disarmament—erodes the willingness among certain states in the non-nuclear-weapon majority to fulfill their own treaty obligations, much less to agree to strengthen the regime.

For all these reasons, there are rising doubts about the sustainability of the nonproliferation regime. Nations with ample technological ability to develop nuclear weapons may be reconsidering their political decisions not to do so. As the United Nation’s recent High-Level Panel Report A More Secure World concludes: "We are approaching a point at which the erosion of the nonproliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation."

The global nuclear threat cannot be reduced without stronger international leadership and cooperation.

Consequently, the United States and other countries should pursue a comprehensive and balanced approach beginning with the 2005 NPT Review Conference. They should:

Agree to establish more effective controls on technologies that can be used to produce materials for nuclear weapons.
Expand the ability of the International Atomic Energy Agency to inspect and monitor compliance with nonproliferation rules and standards through existing authority and the Additional Protocol, to which all states should adhere.

Conduct vigorous diplomacy to halt uranium-enrichment and other sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities in Iran and dismantle North Korea’s nuclear weapons capacity, as well as diplomacy designed to address the underlying regional security problems in Northeast Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East, which would facilitate nonproliferation and disarmament efforts in those regions.

Accelerate implementation of the nuclear-weapon states’ disarmament obligations and commitments, including further reducing the alert status and size of their nuclear stockpiles, permanently barring nuclear test explosions and the production of fissile materials for weapons, refraining from development of new nuclear weapons, and reaffirming existing assurances to NPT non-nuclear-weapon states that they will not be subjected to nuclear attack. These steps would reduce the risk of nuclear war and the allure of nuclear weapons.

Secure all nuclear-weapons-usable material to the highest standards to prevent access by terrorists or other states by expanding programs to secure and eliminate these materials, halting the use of highly enriched uranium in civilian reactors, and strengthening national and international export controls and material security measures as required by UN Resolution 1540.

Clarify that no state may withdraw from the treaty and escape responsibility for prior violations of the treaty or retain access to controlled materials and equipment acquired for "peaceful" purposes.

The May 2005 Review Conference is a crucial forum for parties to measure progress—or lack of progress—in implementing their mutual NPT obligations and commitments. It is also an essential opportunity for the parties to demonstrate their political will to make further tangible progress to meet all of the treaty’s objectives. The success of the conference should be judged by the ability of the parties to agree on specific, additional steps that will strengthen the treaty regime. The security of the international community demands no less.

Sec. Madeleine K. Albright
Alexei G. Arbatov (Russia)
Amb. George Bunn
Amb. Ralph Earle II
Robert J. Einhorn
Amb. Robert L. Gallucci
Amb. James E. Goodby
Rose Gottemoeller
Amb. Thomas Graham, Jr.
Amb. Robert Grey, Jr.
Hon. Lee H. Hamilton
Hon. John D. Holum
Hon. Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr.
Jessica Mathews
Sec. Robert S. McNamara
Sec. William J. Perry
Lt. Gen. Robert E. Pursley (USAF Ret.)
Sen. Douglas Roche (Canada)
Amb. Henrik Salander (Sweden)
Hon. Lawrence Scheinman
Amb. Wendy R. Sherman


Co-Chairs

Joseph Cirincione,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Daryl G. Kimball,
Arms Control Association

The Campaign to Strengthen the NPT is designed to provide the public, journalists, and policymakers with the latest and best information about the NPT, the challenges it faces, and leading proposals to make it stronger and more effective. For more information, please visit www.npt2005.org.

http://news.scotsman.com/international.cfm?id=360852005

US warns of backlash if EU lifts ban on arms to China

CALL TO ACTION: MAY 1, 2005
MASSIVE MARCH AND DEMONSTRATION IN CENTRAL PARK

Visit http://www.abolitionnow.org/may1.html for more information.
______________________________________

Iran: the coming war

Dan Plesch 21 - 3 - 2005
Published by openDemocracy

http://www.opendemocracy.net/debates/article-3-77-2383.jsp

Will the United States attack Iran? Eight major arguments say no. Each one
dissolves on inspection, says Dan Plesch.

Do not be in the least surprised if the United States attacks Iran. Timing
is an open question, but it is hard to find convincing arguments that war
will be avoided, or at least ones that are convincing in Washington.

There are eight arguments currently in circulation. How do they stand up?

First, is it likely that Iran will “do a Libya” – open all its facilities
to American and British intelligence officials and surrender any illicit
weapons along with its missile programmes? Such a policy would command
little support amongst the Iranian public, let alone within the
political-religious leadership.

Second, will the European Union succeed in brokering a compromise in which
Iran fully satisfies the International Atomic Energy Agency’s inspectors,
the United States and Israel? Privately and not so privately, senior US
officials – such as vice-president Dick Cheney, newly appointed
undersecretary of state Robert S Joseph, and nominee for United Nations
ambassador John Bolton – deride the EU’s efforts as futile.

Third, are the military obstacles too great to permit a successful US
attack on Iran? This may turn out to be the case. However for Washington –
and indeed for Israel – this conclusion is literally unthinkable.

The military strategy adopted under President Bush’s father, continued
under President Clinton and accelerated under the current administration is
based on the idea that the US should have “full spectrum dominance” of all
aspects of warfare and be so far ahead that, in the words of the current
national security strategy, any state will be “dissuaded” from even trying
to compete.

An attack on Iran would have to take into consideration a number of risks.
But from the perspective of those considering a military option, Iran’s
acquisition of nuclear weapons merely makes all of these problems harder –
and in that sense provides an additional argument for pre-emptive action.

Perhaps more importantly, none of the arguments made about the consequences
of an attack on Iraq – whether or not they proved true – influenced the
decision to go to war; some, such as the need to provide enough troops to
prevent the outbreak of disorder, were simply ignored.

Fourth, it is sometimes claimed that the US does not have enough troops to
attack Iran. But the US army is engaged in a reorganisation to provide more
frontline forces from headquarters and training units, and in any case the
US air force is wholly available for the task of blowing up Iran – and it
was barely used in Iraq beyond the first few weeks.

Fifth, it is argued that the Iranians may have hidden their activities in
inaccessible parts of their huge country. This is likely to be the case –
though whether these are banned WMD programmes or permitted activities is
an
open question. However, as Seymour Hersh writes in the New Yorker, special
forces are already in Iran preparing the target list. An aerial attack
would
not involve a ground invasion and would leave the Iranians to pick up the
pieces.

Sixth, could the Iranians cause immense trouble with Iraq’s Shi’a community
and through Hezbollah with Israel? Perhaps, but how much stronger would
Iran’s
hand be if it was believed to have nuclear weapons? Moreover, the Iraqi Shi’a
did not collectively defect to Tehran’s side during the Iran-Iraq war, and
may be more concerned to develop their own interests than to be drawn into
a
new war. The present US pressure on Syria in Lebanon is partly related to
Syria’s alleged involvement with the Iraq insurgency, but it can also be
seen as isolating Hezbollah and clearing the way for action against it,
prior to or in conjunction with an attack on Iran.

Iran’s military has considerable experience drawn from the long war with
Iraq in the 1980s. It has, no doubt, closely watched US military tactics
around its borders. It certainly retains some options to launch
counter-missile attacks on Israel, as well as at the US navy and US bases
along the Persian Gulf – from Kuwait to Bahrain and the straits of Hormuz.

At the same time, the US armed forces have been preparing for this
contingency for many years and it would be hard to be the military
commander
telling President Bush that Iran is just not “doable”. As the former
counter-terror official Richard Clarke has written, a
second-world-war-style
advance by US armies to Tehran from the Gulf coast is not possible, but
this
is not part of the planning anyway. As John Pike of the indispensable
globalsecurity.org puts it: “they think that they can just blow up what
they
want to blow up and let the ant-heap sort itself out afterwards.”

Seventh, wouldn’t a war with Iran cost too much and risk plunging the US
into recession? US conservatives are quick to point out that as a
percentage
of gross domestic product, US military spending is barely half the
Reagan-era peak of 6.5% of GDP; and of course, military spending is the one
Keynesian tool of economic policy that conservatives permit themselves.

Eighth, would US public opinion and US politicians prevent the war? There
are few who would come to the defence of what is widely seen as a fanatical
religious state that repeatedly calls for the end of the state of Israel.
As
one of John Kerry’s staff said to me: “why do you disarmament advocates
oppose our doing it militarily?”

So when might the attack on Iran occur? The Bush administration has, from
its perspective, allowed the Europeans and the non-proliferation diplomats
enough time to fail. They will certainly use the UN conference on nuclear
non-proliferation and disarmament from 2-27 May 2005 as an opportunity to
grandstand.

For US domestic political purposes a “crisis” in spring 2006 when the EU
and the UN can once more be confronted with their alleged failures, and
challenged to support US leadership, would be timely for mid-term elections
in which the ultra-conservative coalition will wish to consolidate its
gains
and eliminate any nascent moderate or realistic Republican candidate in
good
time for the 2008 presidential election. At present Senators Lugar, Hagel
and McCain all see themselves as being able to exploit the president over
his ideological policies.

But surely in the aftermath of Bush’s kiss-and-make-up tour of Europe, this
analysis is fanciful? Perhaps. One former British special forces officer
told me that the visit frightened him more than anything he had seen in the
last five years. Something like the Godfather’s last visit to an old family
retainer on whom he has just put out a contract.

For details of Dan Plesch’s work, and his book The Beauty Queen’s Guide to
World Peace see his website http://danplesch.net/

* See also: NucNews Links and Archives (by date) at http://nucnews.net *
(Posted for educational and research purposes only, in accordance with
Title
17 U.S.C. section 107) *

Former Officials Ask Administration to Strengthen Treaty to Stop Spread of Nuclear Weapons
(Barry Schweid, Associated Press)
http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/world/2...us-nuclear.html

Wednesday, April 6
Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and ex-Defense Secretaries Robert S. McNamara and William J. Perry are calling on the Bush administration and other governments to strengthen a pivotal treaty designed to stem the spread of nuclear weapons.

Stockpiles of highly enriched uranium and plutonium, the fuel of nuclear bombs, pose Wednesday's greatest threat and "remain far too accessible to terrorists as a result of inadequate security and accounting at nuclear facilities" in the former Soviet Union and in dozens of other countries, 23 former U.S. and European officials said.

The treaty, supported by 186 countries, will be reviewed at a nearly monthlong conference beginning May 2 in New York. Some 180 governments are expected to attend, with about 50 foreign ministers on hand.