QUOTE(Snuffysmith @ Apr 14 2005, 05:08 AM)
Old Guard: Think deterrence is useless against terrorism? Think again.
http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=w050411&s=levi041305Old Guard
by Michael Levi
Only at TNR Online
Post date: 04.13.05
Fifty years ago, most Americans believed deterrence was simple: The United States had nuclear weapons, and the Soviet Union would not dare attack us for fear of a devastating response. So Albert Wohlstetter's now-famous 1958 article in Foreign Affairs, "The Delicate Balance of Nuclear Terror," was something of a bombshell. Wohlstetter argued that deterrence was in fact far more subtle, requiring careful technological and policy choices to succeed.
Rather than fearing nuclear war, today we fear nuclear terrorism. And against this threat, most have again come to the conclusion that deterrence is simple. This time, though, the typical judgment is that no matter what the United States does, deterrence will fail. Too many terrorists seek martyrdom; what use is the threat of retaliation against people like that? But just like 50 years ago, our view of deterrence lacks sophistication, and the result is again a far-from-optimal approach. Tomorrow, the House International Relations Committee will take up the question of how to avoid nuclear terrorism. At the hearings, I will testify that while deterrence is a less powerful tool than it once was, it is far from hopeless. With a carefully designed approach, it can be effective again.
A new approach would start by rethinking the terrorist calculus. Observers are right to assume that groups like Al Qaeda would be willing to endure severe retribution following a successful nuclear attack, undermining a basic tenet of deterrence. But such groups may not be willing to endure severe retribution following a failed nuclear plot--for them, that would be the worst of all worlds. As a result, promising retribution for even failed nuclear plots may deter terrorists from taking risks in the first place, and hence from initiating attacks. A strategy like this would work best if combined with homeland security measures designed to make terrorist failure more likely.
Proponents of missile defense often advance a similar framework: They argue that by raising the chances an enemy missile attack will fail, while promising an overwhelming response even to an unsuccessful attack, missile defense will deter attacks in the first place. There is sense to that argument, though it is often undermined by the basic technical limitations of missile defense, and by the fact that nuclear deterrence already works quite well against missile attack. But leaving missile defense aside, the idea that preventive measures improve the logic of deterrence rather than replace the logic of deterrence is in general a sound concept.
The promise of deterrence does not end there. One of the dangers the United States worries about is that a state will transfer nuclear arms to terrorists. Many have argued that a state could do this without fear of detection, and could thus escape retaliation, gutting the core of deterrence. But anonymity is far from guaranteed, and the right investment in technology can make detection more likely. In fact, the United States already has significant capabilities in this area as a legacy of its Cold War intelligence activities--for instance, American intelligence analysts inferred details of Soviet nuclear weapons by analyzing debris produced by Soviet nuclear tests. Similar techniques could be adapted to determine the origin of a nuclear weapon following a nuclear terrorist attack; and those details could in turn be used to target a retaliatory response. The purpose of having such capabilities would, of course, be to deter such attacks in the first place.
For this work, we would need to make several advances. The human capital involved in analyzing weapon debris atrophied after the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty sent Soviet testing underground; we need to bolster those capabilities while improving our forensic technology. Our biggest challenge will be to build a set of "fingerprints" for nuclear weapons and materials in foreign stockpiles so that we can match them to terrorist weapons. This will demand a mix of hard intelligence and international cooperation. The former may be hard to come by; the latter is likely to be obtained through nuclear inspections and from states that want to rule themselves out as sources of terrorist bombs.
Strategy, as always, is as important as technology. The United States needs to decide what consequences would follow terrorist attacks, and to communicate these to would-be state sponsors. In some cases, the response would be clear: North Korea, for example, would meet massive retaliation were it to provide a nuclear weapon to a terrorist group. But other cases would be harder. Were a Russian nuclear weapon acquired by terrorists, the United States would be unlikely to strike back. But no one knows what steps the United States would take were terrorists to acquire a Pakistani bomb. Would the United States attack its ally? Would it matter whether the bomb was stolen, or provided deliberately? For deterrence to work, these questions need clear answers now. Such clarity would go a long way towards deterring transfers of nuclear weapons, making it more likely that actual retaliation would never be necessary.
None of these elements of a new deterrence strategy is as rock-solid as cold war deterrence once was, and nothing will change that. But like the marginal innovations Wohlstetter counseled 50 years ago, these steps would cut the risk of nuclear devastation significantly. That alone should make them steps worth taking.
Michael Levi is coauthor of The Future of Arms Control.
>... A new approach would start by rethinking the terrorist calculus. Observers
are right to assume that groups like Al Qaeda would be willing to endure severe
retribution following a successful nuclear attack, undermining a basic tenet of
deterrence. But such groups may not be willing to endure severe retribution
following a failed nuclear plot--for them, that would be the worst of all
worlds. As a result, promising retribution for even failed nuclear plots may
deter terrorists from taking risks in the first place, and hence from initiating
attacks. A strategy like this would work best if combined with homeland security
measures designed to make terrorist failure more likely.
At least he caveats this statement with "...may...". How do you take retribution
against a terrorist group that has no HQ, no territory, no defined bases? While
the Western world will be in shock and will be supportive
of the victimized country (presumably, us, and presumably until national
interest kicks in again and it's politics as usual), much of the Third World may
shrug or even cheer.
Promising retribution without being able to deliver would highlight our
vulnerability and perhaps even further encourage such an attack.
> The promise of deterrence does not end there. One of the dangers the United States worries about is that a state will transfer nuclear arms to terrorists.
> Many have argued that a state could do this without fear of detection, and could thus escape retaliation, gutting the core of deterrence. But anonymity is far
> from guaranteed, and the right investment in technology can make detection more likely. In fact, the United States already has significant capabilities in
> this area as a legacy of its Cold War intelligence activities--for instance, American intelligence analysts inferred details of Soviet nuclear weapons by
> analyzing debris produced by Soviet nuclear tests. Similar techniques could be adapted to determine the origin of a nuclear weapon following a nuclear
> terrorist attack; and those details could in turn be used to target a retaliatory response. The purpose of having such capabilities would, of course, be to
> deter such attacks in the first place.
> For this work, we would need to make several advances. The human capital involved in analyzing weapon debris atrophied after the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty sent Soviet testing underground; we need to bolster those capabilities while improving our forensic technology.
We need to find out about nuclear weapons BEFORE they're exploded, even in the
testing process. Underground tests would virtually eliminate debris. This is why
the "atrophy" occurred - Soviet atmospheric nuclear testing ceased.
> Our biggest challenge will be to build a set of "fingerprints" for nuclear weapons and materials in foreign stockpiles so that we can match them to terrorist weapons. This will demand a mix of hard intelligence and international cooperation. The former may be hard to come by; the latter is likely to be obtained through nuclear inspections and from states that want to rule themselves out as sources of terrorist bombs.
Countries that have refused to abide by CTBT and other treaties will likely find
excuses not to do so...until a terrorist group is confirmed to be in possession
of a nuclear device. Just like pre- and post-9/11 air passengers, some restrictions
will only be accepted after something awful has happened.