Weapons Around the World
(Physics Web)
http://www.physicsweb.org/articles/world/18/8/3

August 2005
(This piece provides data from Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats by Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005)

Nuclear weapons remain the most powerful force ever invented by humankind. They can be constructed with either highly enriched uranium (over 20% U-235) or plutonium. Most modern nuclear weapons rely on a combination of fission and fusion, using the initial nuclear release from a core of uranium or plutonium to ignite a secondary fusion of lighter elements. The first nuclear weapons developed by the US had explosive yields equivalent to 10-20 kt of TNT, while most of today's deployed weapons range from 100-500 kt in yield. In all, there are approximately 27,600 nuclear weapons in existence.

A Pivotal Moment for 'Axis of Evil'
(Peter Grier, Axis of Evil)
http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0825/p01s02-usfp.html

Thursday, August 25
US relations with North Korea and Iran - the remaining members of President Bush's "axis of evil" - may be fast approaching crucial times. The two nations have long presented the West with seesawing expectations. Until recently, US officials were more optimistic about progress with Iran, and frustrated with the prickly North Koreans. But there are also signs the two cases are intertwined in complicated ways as the United States confronts what is left of the axis of evil.

For their part, Iran and North Korea are far from allies. The "axis" phrase (which, it should be said, the White House has long since abandoned) implies a relationship that does not really exist. Yet that doesn't mean they don't watch and learn from each other, or even talk about their respective positions. Experts note that in recent months the North Koreans have begun speaking more like the Iranians, insisting on a right to civilian nuclear power.

"I would be shocked if the Iranians hadn't gone to the North Koreans" and compared positions, says George Perkovich, a nuclear-proliferation expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Split Develops Over North Korea's Right to Civilian Nuclear Power
(Barbara Demick, Los Angeles Times)
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/wo...headlines-world

Wednesday, August 24
As another round of six-nation talks over North Korea's nuclear weapons program approaches, a rift has developed between the United States and the other parties over whether the North would retain the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Bush administration officials have stated repeatedly that North Korea cannot be trusted with any type of nuclear facility, even for power generation or scientific purposes, because it has cheated so many times on past promises not to build nuclear weapons. Among the six nations involved in the talks, only Japan stands solidly with the U.S. position.

South Korea, Russia and China all appear sympathetic to various degrees with the North Korean position that civilian nuclear power is its right as a sovereign nation.

Pakistan Now Says Scientist Did Send Koreans Nuclear Gear
(Salman Masood and David Rohde)
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/25/internat...5musharraf.html

Thursday, August 25
Pakistan's president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, confirmed Tuesday for the first time that a Pakistani nuclear scientist had provided North Korea with centrifuge machines that could be used to make fuel for an atomic bomb, a Japanese news agency reported.

In an interview here with the agency, Kyodo News, General Musharraf said the former head of his country's nuclear program, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, had sent "centrifuges - parts and complete" to North Korea. The Pakistani leader did not divulge the number of centrifuges that arrived in North Korea, saying, "I do not exactly remember the number."

General Musharraf also said Dr. Khan might have sent North Korea uranium hexafluoride, which can be enriched in centrifuges and then processed into fuel for civilian nuclear reactors or atomic warheads.

Iran Pledges to Offer New Proposals in Nuclear Talks With Europe
(Associated Press)
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/25/internat...ast/25iran.html

Thursday, August 25
Iran will soon offer new proposals for negotiations with Europe over its nuclear program, its president said Wednesday. The Bush administration responded that the European diplomatic process "still has legs."

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran said that he had instructed the Supreme National Security Council to write new proposals on Iran's uranium enrichment program. "Iran will soon offer proposals about the cycle of nuclear fuel for peaceful use of nuclear energy," he said on state-run television.

Iran Calls for Other Countries to Join Nuclear Talks
(Associated Press)
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/internatio...an-Nuclear.html

Thursday, August 25
Iran's top nuclear negotiator called for more countries to join the three European states engaged in talks about Tehran's contentious nuclear program, state-run television reported Thursday.

Ali Larijani, secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, said he welcomed negotiations with all members of the board of governors of the U.N.'s nuclear watchdog agency plus countries from the 116-member Non-Aligned Movement. ''There is a serious question in Iran that asks why nuclear negotiations should be limited to just three European countries,'' state TV quoted Larijani as saying.

All Weapons of Mass Destruction Are Not Equal
(Allison Macfarlane, MIT Center for International Security)
http://web.mit.edu/cis/pdf/Audit_6_05_Macfarlane.pdf

July 2005
In the United States, weapons of mass destruction have become the bête noir of the 21st century. They are now the justification for pre-emptive war, for an expansion of the cold war nuclear arsenal, and for the spending of billions of dollars on offensive and defensive measures. Since significant portions of U.S. foreign and domestic policy are based on this categorization, it is high time to reflect on whether these weapons pose such a lethal threat.

The United States has based recent nuclear weapons targeting policy on the concept of a broadly conceived WMD threat, equating nuclear weapons with biological and chemical ones. Moreover, the United States is still involved in a war in Iraq that it waged in large part because of the WMD threat. The United States spends $7 billion on biodefense but less than $2 billion preventing a nuclear attack. These developments beg the question: are biological and chemical weapons really as threatening to the United States as nuclear weapons?

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GH27Df01.html


Taking India's fight to the Hill
By Ramtanu Maitra

Recent reports indicate that the Indian Embassy in Washington, following consultations with New Delhi, has appointed Washington's lobbying heavyweight, Barbour Griffith & Rogers International (BG&R), which could get down to business as early as next month.

The news should not come as a complete surprise to Asia Times Online readers. This author, in an article The man who oils India's wheels, dated January 25, informed readers that soon after his resignation from the State Department, former US ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill, was hired as president by BG&R in November 2004.

According to BG&R's web site, its clients include the Republic of China (Taiwan).

His appointment was not only a "Good Samaritan" act by Blackwill's friends; it also enhanced BG&R's prestige and made it a potent competitor for a host of contracts in Iraq, India and



elsewhere, the author predicted. It is apparent that the auspicious moment has arrived and the appointment could not be delayed any further. The article indicated that BG&R was going to be hired by the Indian Embassy as lobbyists.

What triggered the appointment is the India-US nuclear deal, which is expected to be discussed in the US Congress next month. The July 18 agreement between US President George W Bush and the visiting Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh called for nuclear cooperation between the two nations. The Bush administration indicated readiness to embark on full civilian nuclear energy cooperation, amending its domestic laws and policies while adjusting international regimes to achieve this.

This will not only secure fuel for India's Tarapur atomic power plants 1 & 2 (TAPP 1 & 2) supplied by GE in the 1960s, but will also open up the possibility of fuel supply for other safeguarded reactors. Bush also got the US to refrain from vetoing fuel supplies by other countries (Russia, France) as it had in the past.

In return, India agreed to identify and separate civilian and military facilities in a phased manner, placing its civilian facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and signing an IAEA Additional Protocol. A number of existing policies were also reiterated by India, among them a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, working toward conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, non-transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies, securing nuclear materials and technology through export control and harmonization with the Missile Test Control Regime and the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines.

Bush-Manmohan agreement
The India-US nuclear agreement, often cited by New Delhi as "historic", is by no means a done deal. A very cursory look indicates that the accord on civilian nuclear energy cooperation will contravene the control guidelines laid down by the nuclear suppliers group, according to a study prepared for the US Congress.

Referring to the agreement of July 18, a Congressional Research Service (CRS) report said if implemented, the cooperation between the US and India for civilian nuclear energy "would dramatically shift US non-proliferation policy and practice towards India".

"Such cooperation would also contravene multilateral support control guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which was formed in response to India's proliferation," the report suggested.

Beside the report's apparent misgivings about the agreement, it is also evident from the rumblings heard on Capitol Hill that the agreement will face serious opposition from both sides of the aisle. It is almost a certainty that the minority Democrats will oppose the agreement more in unison than their opponents.

The first salvo was issued by none other than Strobe Talbott, a close associate of the pro-India former president, Bill Clinton, in his July 21 piece in the magazine, Yale Global. Calling it the "Good Day for India, Bad for Non-Proliferation", Talbott pointed out that the Bush administration gave up on all tradeoffs and granted India the privileges of a nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signatory member with very little in return. He said the US had, for much of the past seven years, tried to work out an agreement that would give India more access to technology necessary for its civilian nuclear energy program in exchange for meaningful constraints on its weapons program, consistent with its own declared policy of wanting to have only a "credible minimum deterrent".

Talbott argues against
Talbott says the Indians have received more leniency than the five established nuclear "haves" had asked for themselves: The US, Britain, France, Russia and China say they have halted the production of the fissile material that goes into nuclear bombs, while India has only promised to join a universal ban that would include Pakistan - if such a thing ever materializes. Yet that pledge, in the future conditional tense, was apparently enough for the Bush administration.

What seems to worry some Democrats is that both India, historically, and the US, under the Bush administration, have shown a penchant for going it alone - India in defying the international community (including the US) with its tests, the Bush administration in attacking Iraq over the objections of the United Nations and many of its own closest allies. If the Indian and American versions of unilateralism reinforce one another, it will work to the detriment of institutions such as the United Nations and risk turning treaties like the NPT from imperfect but useful mechanisms into increasingly ineffectual ones, Talbott argued.

In short, Talbott, who was engaged in long-winding negotiations with the then-Indian external affairs minister, Jaswant Singh, in the aftermath of the second round of Indian testing of nuclear explosives in 1998 to eventually ease the Clinton administration's relations with India, is making it plain that the Bush-Manmohan agreement is detrimental to the NPT and the UN as a whole. It is likely that Talbott is speaking on behalf of a large number of members of the US Congress, particularly those who belong to the Democratic Party.

The CRS report
The CRS report said: "Observers note that US-India cooperation could have wide-ranging implications for the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, and could prompt other suppliers, like China, to justify their supplying other non-nuclear-weapon states (as defined by NPT), like Pakistan ... There are no measures in this global partnership to restrain India's nuclear weapons program. India has a self-imposed nuclear test moratorium but continues to produce fissile material for its nuclear weapon program, despite support for the Fissile Material Cut off Treaty (FMCT)."

From a technical verification perspective, the report contends, "The existence of India's nuclear weapons program negates potential non-proliferation assurances that nuclear safeguards on civil facilities might provide. A significant question is how India, in the absence of full-scope safeguards (ie IAEA safeguards on every nuclear establishment, military and civil), can provide adequate confidence that US peaceful nuclear technology will not be diverted to nuclear weapons purposes."

The report, however, concedes that unlike Pakistan, there is little evidence to suggest that India has transferred sensitive nuclear technologies to other non-nuclear weapon states. There is no doubt that those in the US Congress who would support the agreement would consider this as an anchor.

Arms sales in progress
In addition to the nuclear agreement, the new India-US relationship also includes arms purchases by New Delhi. Reports indicate Indian and US officials are preparing to discuss the possible sale to New Delhi of US weaponry - including Aegis missile systems, an amphibious platform dock ship, anti-submarine patrol aircraft and Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 air defense systems. These could be concluded when Lieutenant-General Jeffrey Kohler, the Pentagon's Defense Cooperation Security Agency chief, visits New Delhi next month.

Asia Times Online has reported that the Indian Defense Ministry is negotiating the purchase of the USS Trenton, a decommissioned Austin-class amphibious transport dock, built in 1971 and used in transporting large numbers of troops over long distances.

The Indian navy also wants to buy US Aegis combat systems for its ships. One navy official said the system could monitor large areas of the Indian Ocean, keeping an eye on Chinese ships and submarines. The Aegis system can defend Indian sea-based assets from short- and long-range missiles, added the navy official, who strongly advocated the purchase of this system, news reports claim.

Nonetheless, since so much is at stake, New Delhi cannot afford to sit by quietly and leave the lobbying at the Hill entirely to the Bush administration. This is the reason the big guns were hired to punch some holes in the opposition battery.

By recruiting BG&R, India has hired a number of powerful people linked to the Bush administration. There is no question that Blackwill has a special service to offer BG&R with regard to India. Considered a highly successful ambassador, Blackwill mesmerized Indians with his pro-India and pro-Israel policies.

Serving in Delhi at a time when the anti-Muslim and pro-Israel Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was leading the National Democratic Alliance, Blackwill seized on the deep involvement of Islamic militants in the September 11 attacks to push Washington closer to New Delhi.

New Delhi, for its part, found this a great opportunity as well to move closer to Israel and the US. India hoped to influence Washington to accept India's nuclear weaponization and its unquestionable importance in the region. To that effect, Blackwill played a very important role for India during the period 2001-2003.

Power on the Hill
In addition to the presence of Blackwill as president, BG&R is partnered by Haley Barbour, now the Republican Governor of Mississippi. Beyond that, Barbour was chairman of the Republican National Committee (RNC) from 1993-1996. Barbour served as executive director of the Mississippi Republican Party from 1973 to 1976 and as a top political adviser in the Reagan White House in the mid-1980s before becoming RNC chairman.

Barbour is now chairman and CEO of BG&R, one of Washington's top-ranked lobbying firms, and is part-owner of the Caucus Room, a Washington restaurant that caters to the political set. His role as a prominent Washington lobbyist - representing corporate giants such as Lockheed Martin and Microsoft - helped make Barbour a millionaire.

In essence, Barbour is an extremely powerful backroom player in Washington DC. He put together something called the National Policy Forum (NPF) in 1993. Barbour called NPF a "think-tank" and compared it to the Heritage Foundation. But the NPF was anything but a think-tank - it got its money from big corporate contributors, including several foreign sources, by promising their executives a role in Republican Party policy development, critics say.

Washington's insiders point out that BG&R also has its eyes on the huge budgets allocated for the Iraq war. It is only natural that it would gear up to mobilize around the new business opportunities popping up in Baghdad. One of the most conspicuous newcomers is New Bridge Strategies, which was created for this purpose. Its vice chair is Ed Rogers, a founding partner in BG&R.

Another BG&R principal, Jennifer Larkin, ran the House Conservative Action Team, now called the Republican Study Committee, which their website calls "the largest, most influential Republican member organization in Congress". Yet another BG&R officer, Keith Schuette, helped start and run the International Republican Institute, which represents the party's interests overseas and was named in helping some of "color" revolutions that took place in Central Asia recently.

New Bridge's chairman is Joe Allbaugh, who was often referred to as the third point, with Karl Rove and Karen Hughes, in the president's "iron triangle". Allbaugh served as national campaign manager for Bush-Cheney 2000. Since then, he has trained for Iraq's reconstruction as head of FEMA, the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

All in all, New Delhi has decided to hire the heavy duty Republican guns to push the agreement through Congress, where Republicans enjoy a definite majority. It is a sound strategy, but it still may run into heavy weathers.

(Copyright 2005 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us for information on sales, syndication and republishing.)

http://www.antiwar.com/prather/?articleid=7110


August 27, 2005
A Six-Party Mess

by Gordon Prather
According to the New York Times;

"Pakistan's president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, confirmed Tuesday for the first time that a Pakistani nuclear scientist had provided North Korea with centrifuge machines that could be used to make fuel for an atomic bomb, a Japanese news agency reported."

State Department spokesman Sean McCormack promptly claimed Musharraf's confirmation "reinforces the idea that there is a highly enriched uranium program" in North Korea.

But what Musharraf did say in an interview published by Kyodo News isn't exactly what the Times said he said.

"President Gen. Pervez Musharraf has confirmed that Pakistan's disgraced nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan provided centrifuge machines and their designs to North Korea but played down the role these transfers have played in the North Korean bid to acquire a nuclear weapons capability.

"Dr. A. Q. Khan's part is only enriching the uranium to weapons grade," General Musharraf said. "He does not know about making the bomb. He does not know about the trigger mechanism."

General Musharraf also said Dr. Khan might have sent North Korea some depleted uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6).

Depleted UF6 is essentially a waste product of the uranium-enrichment process.

Interestingly enough, Glenn Kessler of the Washington Post reported in February that two senior officials on the National Security Council – Michael J. Green and William Tobey – had just made an urgent trip to brief Japanese, South Korean and Chinese officials. It seems technical experts in the Department of Energy had concluded that North Korea may have provided UF6 to Libya.

Libya had received several complete gas centrifuges, some drawings and two small cylinders of UF6 in September 2000 from "a foreign source" and one large cylinder of UF6 in February 2001.

The "special nuclear materials" in the cylinders – but not the centrifuges – should have declared by Libya to the IAEA at the time they were received, but weren't.

When they were eventually declared, the IAEA determined that the large cylinder and one of the small cylinders contained "natural" UF6. The other contained "depleted" UF6.

Early this year, DOE scientists apparently discovered some "North Korean plutonium" contamination on one of the cylinders.

Which one?

Well, back to Musharraf's revelations.

Under the US-DPRK Agreed Framework of 1994, all existing Korean plutonium-producing activities had been frozen – subject to a "frozen" IAEA Safeguards Agreement – in return for a promise of free nuclear power plants and an interim supply of free fuel oil.

Then, in September of 2002 – perhaps on the basis of an earlier "secret" revelation by Musharraf of what Khan had supplied – a State Department weenie accused a North Korean weenie of having a secret uranium-based nuclear weapons program. The Koreans promptly and vehemently denied – and continue to deny – having such a program. Furthermore, no evidence has surfaced that they do.

If Khan provided North Korea with several complete gas centrifuges, drawings, etc, acceptance would not have been – in and of itself – a violation of either their "frozen" Safeguards Agreement or of the Agreed Framework "freeze."

Here's what the Agreed Framework says:

"When a significant portion of the LWR project is completed, but before delivery of key nuclear components, the DPRK will come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA (INFCIRC/403), including taking all steps that may be deemed necessary by the IAEA, following consultations with the Agency with regard to verifying the accuracy and completeness of the DPRK's initial report on all nuclear material in the DPRK."

Nevertheless, Bush dismissed the North Korea denials, charged the Koreans with abrogating the Agreed Framework and unilaterally ceased making fuel oil shipments in October 2002.

In early December, Bush got the IAEA Board of Governors to send the Koreans a request for "clarification" about the "reported" enrichment program. But from the North Korean perspective, Bush's unilateral abrogation of the Agreed Framework nullified the requirement that they "come into full compliance" with their Safeguards Agreement.

On Dec. 31, 2002, IAEA inspectors left North Korea, thereby suspending IAEA verification activities for both the NPT and the Agreed Framework.

Weeks later, North Korea withdrew from the NPT, thereby making its Safeguards Agreement null and void.

The Bush Doctrine has been to induce – by force if necessary – Iraq, Iran and North Korea to give up, permanently, their rights to everything nuclear – peaceful or otherwise.

The Brits, French, and Germans were supposed to diplomatically "induce" Iran and the Chinese, Japanese, and Russians were supposed to "induce" North Korea.

But as Bush infamously said about Iraq, "diplomacy is not working."

So, we'll probably soon find out just how crazy the neo-crazies really are.

Arms Control Experts Urge UN Members to Resist U.S. Effort to Weaken Arms Control and Disarmament Commitments

8/26/2005 3:01:00 PM

To: National Desk

Contact: Daryl Kimball of the Arms Control Association, 202-463-8270 ext. 107

WASHINGTON, Aug. 26 /U.S. Newswire/ -- World leaders will meet Sept. 14 to Sept. 16 at the United Nations in New York to address critical challenges confronting international peace and security and development. But the Bush administration, led by Ambassador John Bolton, is jeopardizing the meeting's chances of success by seeking to dilute and eliminate a raft of commitments to reduce the dangers posed by biological, chemical, conventional, and nuclear arms from the UN meeting's draft final document. The nonpartisan Arms Control Association and other nongovernmental organizations are encouraging governments to preserve essential nonproliferation and disarmament commitments from the U.S. axe.

Reportedly, the administration's hit list includes declarations of support for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), negotiations on a fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT) to end the production of key materials for building nuclear arms, the Ottawa Convention banning anti-personnel landmines, small arms regulations, and nuclear-weapon-free zones, which are regions where countries forswear nuclear weapons. Most troubling is the administration's move to strip away all references to disarmament obligations, say the experts.

The 1968 nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) codified a deal in which countries without nuclear weapons would not seek them and nuclear-armed states would progress toward eventually giving them up. Although the administration supports retaining a call in the draft UN document for all countries to adhere to the NPT, it is seeking to cut more explicit language spelling out the actual disarmament obligations of the treaty.

"Ignoring one half of the NPT equation jeopardizes the other half," warns Daryl G. Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association (ACA). ACA joined with Greenpeace International, the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy, and New York-based Reaching Critical Will project in sending letters Aug. 17 to all UN member states recommending they conclude an outcome document that would "recommit the nuclear-weapon states, and all states, to the fulfillment of their nuclear disarmament obligations."

The organizations also urged states to maintain a nuclear testing moratorium pending the CTBT's entry into force. Referring to the administration's opposition to the accord, the organizations wrote, "If one or another state cannot at this time endorse this goal, that state should not be allowed to silence the vast majority that do."

"The upcoming UN meeting represents an excellent opportunity to bolster international efforts to counter the threat posed by dangerous weapons, but the Bush administration is on the verge of sabotaging it," stated Kimball. He added, "Other governments should avoid becoming accomplices and instead stand up for a meaningful nonproliferation and disarmament outcome."

The text of the draft outcome document is available at http://www.un.org/ga/59/hlpm_rev.2.pdf. The text of the Aug. 17 letter to UN missions is available at http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/politi.../1com05/NGOlett ertoGovernments.html.

For more information on the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, see http://www.npt2005.org.

------

The Arms Control Association is an independent, nonprofit membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of and support for effective arms control policies.

http://www.usnewswire.com/

-/© 2005 U.S. Newswire 202-347-2770/

Interesting discussion. As soon as I catch up I look foreward to participation. I am studying diplomacy right now and like "this sort of thing".

-Mordred

So, Snuffysmith, what do you think N. Korea is holding out for right now on the talks? Or, are they waiting to see what happens when China and the US have our upcoming talks... Or maybe potential UN changes?
-Mordred

http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/05/internat...ast/05iran.html


Iran Rejects an Ultimatum From Europe

By NAZILA FATHI
Published: September 5, 2005
TEHRAN, Sept. 4 - Iran on Sunday rejected a call by Europe to halt its nuclear program in two weeks or face possible Security Council penalties, and said it would not give in to what it called bullying.

The head of Iran's nuclear negotiating team, Ali Larijani, who is also the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, told state television that the increasing pressure on Tehran to freeze its program to make nuclear fuel amounted to "bullying" and warned that taking Tehran before the Security Council would be a mistake.

Britain, Germany and France, which represent Europe in negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program, urged Iran on Saturday to suspend its activities at a nuclear site near Isfahan before Sept. 19, when the United Nations nuclear agency's board of governors will meet.

Iran resumed conversion activities at the site on Aug. 8 to protest a proposal by the three European countries, which asked Iran to stop making nuclear fuel. The technology could provide Iran with the ability to make nuclear bombs.

Tehran has been under mounting pressure since Friday when Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of International Atomic Energy Agency, submitted a report in which he outlined several concerns, including Iran's failure to cooperate with the agency over its nuclear material after more than two years of work with the agency.

In separate comments, a Foreign Ministry spokesman, Hamidreza Assefi, said Sunday that Dr. ElBaradei's report lacked "coherence and integrity."

"The time when they could get us to hold back from our rights by threatening us is over," Mr. Assefi said at his weekly news conference.

Iran's new conservative president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who is expected to address a meeting of the United Nations General Assembly in New York this month, has said he will announce his proposal then to end the deadlock over Iran's nuclear program.

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/GI07Ak05.html


ElBaradei's report deconstructed
By Kaveh L Afrasiabi

Two years ago, Mohammad ElBaradei, the chief of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), repeatedly insisted that Iran should sign the intrusive, but voluntary, Additional Protocol to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)[1] .

Now he has gone on record as stating that Iran must comply with other measures "well beyond the Additional Protocol". Clearly, the sky is the limit and the IAEA has been pressured to make unreasonable demands on Iran well beyond the purview of its agreements with that country.

The European Union - three of whose countries, Britain, France and Germany (EU-3) are negotiating with Iran on its nuclear program - on Saturday pressed Iran to halt its resumed conversion activities before September 19, the date when the IAEA will hold its Board of Governors' meeting.

Europe's ultimatum came soon after ElBaradei submitted a comprehensive report on Tehran's nuclear program, which


criticized Iran for failing to keep its suspension on uranium-enrichment activities and defined Tehran's cooperation with the agency on its nuclear issue as "overdue".

In his report of September 3, ElBaradei, after a restatement of his previous reports on Iran listing the areas of cooperation and non-cooperation, demanded that Iran's "transparency measures should extend beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol and include access to individuals, documentation related to procurement, dual-use equipment, certain military-owned workshops and research and development locations".(Item 50).

This raises a curious question: can Iran, short of giving up all its military secrets and revealing sensitive military information to the West via the IAEA, ever appease the IAEA and its increasingly demanding chief? Probably not, at least not as long as Western pressure to dispatch Iran's nuclear dossier to the UN Security Council is on.

All eyes are now set on the September 19 meeting, and in light of ElBaradei's report that Iran had failed to heed the IAEA's request to suspend its resumption of uranium conversion activities in Isfahan, there is a great likelihood that the IAEA will follow the EU-US's guide to action by complaining against Iran to the Security Council with a view to having sanctions instituted against Tehran.

However, Russia said on Monday that it opposed sending Iran's case to the Security Council, potentially putting itself on a collision course with the US as Moscow holds a veto in the council.

While it remains to be seen if the express train to the Security Council can be somehow slowed by the combined pressure from countries of the Non-Aligned Movement that are members of the IAEA Governing Board and Washington's preoccupation with the natural disaster caused by hurricane Katrina, currently a critical evaluation of ElBaradei's report, to gauge the strength of case against Iran, is called for.

Titled "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran", the IAEA chief's report cites "good progress" in Iran's "corrective measures" since October 2003 (Item 43), resulting in the IAEA's verification of certain aspects of Iran's declarations, particularly on the "outstanding issue" of the sources of contamination of Iran's equipment with HEU (highly enriched uranium), which turns out be none other than Pakistan (Item 12).

The report reiterates the earlier finding, in November 2004, that "all the declared nuclear material in Iran has been accounted for, and therefore such material has not been diverted to prohibited activities". (Item 51).

Furthermore, the report cites several Iranian "transparency measures" even beyond the Additional Protocol, such as allowing inspection access to Iran's military bases (Item 37), and Iran's submission of comprehensive declarations with respect to its nuclear facilities, including design information (Item 5). It states that other than a tardiness in providing the latter, "No additional failures have been identified."(Item 8).

Interestingly, the report makes a passing reference to the Subsidiary Agreement between Iran and the IAEA, and yet somehow overlooks that in light of Iran's entry into this agreement in the 1990s, Iran was under no legal obligation to report some of its activities nowadays branded as "breaches of obligation".

The fact that the IAEA chief overlooks such a delicate and yet significant matter casts a long shadow on his credibility as fair and objective. It is important to see the nuance here, to distinguish between "clandestine" and "illegal" in light of the so-called "loopholes" in Iran's Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA whereby Iran was entitled to withhold information to the IAEA for a specified period prior to the introduction of nuclear material at its facilities. Western media are awash with oversight of this important distinction, and yet one naturally expects a little more nuanced understanding from the IAEA chief.

On the other hand, the report makes clear that Iran's uranium enrichment facilities at Natanz remained suspended, that the converted uranium had been relocated to safe storages, and that UF6, ie, uranium hexafluoride, the feed material that flows through the centrifuges in the enrichment process, "remained under agency seals".(Item 59) This, in turn, raises the question: what is the ground for the present Western panic about Iran as long as Iran has not abrogated its agreement with its European counterparts for maintaining a suspension of centrifuges?

After all, as long as Natanz remains shut down, there is actually little to worry about uranium conversion operations in Isfahan, which serve as the initial phases in the nuclear fuel cycle, and which have been under full IAEA monitoring since 2000. The bottom line, contrary to the hue and cry of the Europeans, is that the Paris Agreement is still alive and has not been breached by Iran, except incrementally and benignly, hardly warranting the panic reactions it has solicited in Europe and the US. Under the Paris Agreement of November 2004, Tehran agreed to voluntarily suspend nuclear work under a deal with the EU-3.

Again, Western media are partly to blame. A case in point: reports from both Reuters and the New York Times on ElBaradei's latest report make outlandish claims that the report says Iran's nuclear program is "shrouded in mystery", when, in fact, a glance at the report clearly shows not only the absence of such an adjective, but also plenty of ammunition to think otherwise, that is, a pattern of greater and greater transparency culminating in putting to rest key anxieties of the IAEA about the nature of Iran's nuclear program.

Of course, ElBaradei slams Iran for "lack of full transparency", but then again, Iran is not alone and per his own admission, dozens of IAEA member states are similarly guilty of lack of full cooperation, including Brazil and South Korea, a point aptly made to ElBaradei by a reformist Iranian parliamentarian two years ago in a letter to the IAEA.

The nub of the problem with the IAEA is, per ElBaradei's own admission, that "the agency's legal authority to pursue the verification of possible nuclear weapons-related activity is limited".(Item 49). This is a built-in, structural problem of the non-proliferation regime transcending Iran applied to Iran specifically, and unreasonably so, giving rise to the question: how in the world can the IAEA ever give Iran's nuclear program a clean bill of health. That is, confirming the absence of a nuclear-weapons program, short of inspecting every inch of the country, as was demanded of Iraq prior to the 2003 invasion?

By setting the bar so high, the IAEA opens a Pandora's Box of "Iran exceptionalism", following the logic of diminishing returns whereby the more Iran cooperates, the less satisfied the IAEA becomes due to its limitless demands not set by its own parameters (enshrined in the Additional Protocol).

On a related note, the IAEA's own findings about Iran's bargains with Pakistani nuclear blackmarketeers, such as turning down offers of nuclear-weapons drawings and parts in the 1980s, simply reinforce the Iranian position that it is not interested in acquiring nuclear weapons.

Similarly, with regard to Iran's experiment with plutonium separation there is a dispute as to when exactly these experiments occurred - early or mid-1990s, and a final answer is awaiting further lab analysis. Yet no one at the IAEA is even suggesting that Iran has continued this experiment into the 21st century, this while admitting that Iran's explanation of the time discrepancy, that the plutonium found in a bottle in 1995 had been "purified" as a result of experiments, is "plausible".

ElBaradei's report repeatedly states that in light of Iran's steady cooperation and increasing transparency, resolving the outstanding concerns cited above, Iran's nuclear issue "would be followed up as matters of routine safeguards"(Item 6), hardly the signpost to a nuclear crisis requiring an emergency gathering at the Security Council mandated to deal with clear and present dangers of war and potential conflict, let alone invoking Chapter VII and imposing sanctions on Iran - for what, failure to comply with a confidence-building and "legally-non-binding" request of the IAEA? Clearly, the legal ground for Security Council action is pretty thin, if not lacking.

The excesses and various flaws of ElBaradei's report and management of Iran's nuclear issue cited above may in the end come to haunt the IAEA in view of Iran's past threat to exit the NPT treaty if its case is referred to the Security Council.

That would spell doom for the troubled non-proliferation regime and, instead of full transparency, ElBaradei may find Iran back in the "black hole" of information it was prior to 2003, whereas a prudent approach would build on the present cooperation and avoid excess demands not justified by the IAEA's framework. For the moment, however, a necessary corrective to the IAEA's excesses may be none other than an Iranian declaration that from now on no more measures beyond the Additional Protocol will be even contemplated, let alone implemented.

Lest we forget, President George W Bush in his speech at the National Defense University on February 11, 2004 stated, "I propose that by next year, only states that have signed the Additional Protocol be allowed to import equipment for their civil nuclear programs." Given the fact that ElBaradei's report confirms that Iran has been implementing the Additional Protocol as if it had been ratified, and the Bush administration's stated support for the latest European initiative toward Iran, promising nuclear cooperation with Iran, one wonders why the White House is reluctant to take the next logical step and promise concrete steps with regards to existing Iran sanctions that prevent such cooperation with Iran by foreign companies (if and when the issue of objective guarantee is somehow settled)?

Concerning the latter, various experts, such as David Albright, a former IAEA nuclear inspector, have maintained that it is possible to verify Iran's enrichment process. In a recent article in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Albright writes: "As long as safeguards are in place, the IAEA would know if such an increase in enrichment level occurs."

Even French President Jacques Chirac in his June meeting with Iran's then top nuclear negotiator, Hassan Rowhani, consented to exploring an IAEA-led option of ascertaining the issue of objective guarantee, albeit fleetingly as Chirac and his foreign minister were subsequently forced to retract their statements because of external pressure, principally by London.

In conclusion, with reports of European disarray over Iran, and clear signs of growing division between Great Britain on the one hand and France and Germany on the other, the roadmap to the Security Council is paved with confused intentions and no amount of diplomatic facade at unity can hide the core problem of an illogical, paranoid resistance toward the option of a monitored, contained enrichment process in Iran. This resistance may be melting in some quarters in Europe, but it is simultaneously hardened by a determined US effort to stop Iran's nuclear program one way or another.

Note
[1] The Additional Protocol substantially expands the IAEA's ability to check for clandestine nuclear facilities by providing the agency with authority to visit any facility - declared or not - to investigate questions about or inconsistencies in a state's nuclear declarations.

Kaveh L Afrasiabi, PhD, is the author of After Khomeini: New Directions in Iran's Foreign Policy (Westview Press) and co-authored "Negotiating Iran's Nuclear Populism", The Brown Journal of World Affairs, Volume X11, issue 2, Summer 2005, with Mustafa Kibaroglu.

(Copyright 2005 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us for information on sales, syndication and republishing .)

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/GI07Ak06.html


THE ROVING EYE
Iran knocks Europe out
By Pepe Escobar

TEHRAN - In the high-stakes nuclear poker game between Iran and the EU-3 (Britain, France and Germany), Tehran has decided to call the EU's bluff and turn the game around.

On top of it Ali Larijani, the new head of the Supreme National Security Council - appointed by President Mahmud Ahmadinejad - and now Iran's top nuclear negotiator, stressed on Iranian TV that the criticism expressed in Saturday's report by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) head Mohammad ElBaradei was "neither legal nor technical" and distorted by political motives. ("The nuclear issue is a national issue. They [a reference to the EU-3, not the IAEA] should not talk to Iranian people with bullying language.")

Larijani once again stressed that as a signatory to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran had the right to develop the nuclear fuel cycle for civilian purposes. Right on cue, Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid-Reza Asefi added that "access to



peaceful nuclear technology is our inalienable right and we will not forsake such a right. The Isfahan issue is irrevocable." This a reference to uranium conversion being resumed at the Isfahan plant. According to Larijani, "If the IAEA was seeking to resolve Iran's nuclear issue, it could have already done so by now."

Putin to the rescue?
The European view appears to be that Iran now is trying to split the international community by talking to other players like Italy, as well as members of the Non-Aligned Movement , such as India, Malaysia and South Africa. The fact is the international community is already split on the issue between the US and the EU-3 on one side, and most of the developing world on the other. As much as the EU-3 is accusing Iran of playing the 35 member countries of the IAEA Board of Governors against each other, the US is exercising tremendous pressure over these same countries to refer Iran to the Security Council for possible sanctions.

Former Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, currently a key advisor on foreign affairs to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is quoted as saying that Iran now has the upper hand - and that's the consensus in Tehran. Velayati is a realist. If Iran is referred to the Security Council, "They will obviously set a deadline for Iran, and in the worst circumstances we would have to expect sanctions." Velayati thinks that both Russia and China may not veto the move for sanctions, "but they will try to moderate the Security Council's stances".

There are insistent rumors in diplomatic circles in Tehran that Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi has asked his close friend, Russian President Vladimir Putin, to intervene as the new broker of last resort - since the failure of the EU-3 strategy is now being widely acknowledged. Italy from the start wanted to be part of the negotiating team. Berlusconi believes that only Putin can bridge the gap between Western Europe and Iran as he is - relatively - trusted by both sides.

Russia said on Monday that it opposed sending Iran's case to the Security Council.

The showdown is when the 35-member IAEA board meets on September 19 in its headquarters in Vienna. The US and the EU-3 know that both Russia and China - with multiple billion-dollar deals with Iran - would be inclined to block any eventual Security Council sanctions. Diplomats in Brussels realistically realize that sanctions would not be considered at first: the council instead would try hard to come up with a long-term "constructive" solution.

Deal? What deal?
The story of the EU-3's mediation is a chronicle of a debacle foretold. In a nutshell, Iran voluntarily agreed under the Paris Agreement of November 2004 to suspend uranium enrichment at Isfahan as part of negotiations with the EU-3. The IAEA itself recognized the move as "a voluntary, non-legally binding, confidence-building measure".

Five months ago, Iran actually proposed to freeze uranium enrichment but to keep a few centrifuges (under severe IAEA inspections). The EU-3 rejected the offer. Why? Because of Washington. From the Bush administration's point of view, Iran has the right to nothing - much less to master parts of the fuel cycle.

Iranian negotiators saw through the EU-3 strategy from the start. They accused the EU-3 of trying to maintain the suspension of uranium enrichment "indefinitely" and at the same time obstructing any significant development in the negotiations. That was exactly the case, because Washington had blocked any possibility of a compromise. Iran has the right to work on a nuclear fuel cycle according to the NPT, and it has the right to keep at least a pilot enrichment program. In Tehran's view, the EU-3, pressured by Washington, was in fact trying to impose no uranium enrichment and no reprocessing.

The EU-3 had nothing to offer except a heavily spun "nuclear, commercial and political package", as it was advertised in Brussels. An iron rule in the package was for Tehran to definitively renounce uranium enrichment. For Tehran, conversion is not enrichment, thus the restart of Isfahan's plant.

The EU-3 package was in fact a very limited - and conditional - one. It offered a guaranteed supply of fuel for Iran's civilian reactors, as long as they were fully supervised by the IAEA; an agreement (but only in principle) for European companies to build a nuclear power station besides the Russian-made Bushehr reactor, but as long as Tehran allowed extremely intrusive IAEA inspections (and even this wouldn't fly if Washington actively blocked it); more trade (including conditional access to the World Trade Organization) and economic cooperation; sales of Airbus planes; and vague support in terms of "security cooperation" on energy matters, Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the fight against terrorism and drug trafficking.

Last month in Brussels, some European diplomats, off the record, admitted to Asia Times Online that the package was "an empty box of chocolates". But "there is nothing else we can offer", a diplomat said. "The Americans simply wouldn't let us." The diplomats also confirmed that both France and Germany were absolutely ready for a deal, considering they want to invest heavily in Iran, and want to close oil and gas agreements. The problem was Britain. "We know," said officials in Tehran, barely disguising their smiles.

Tehran was incensed not only by the terms of the package but by the way it was presented - a bureaucratic letter with no official signature by any of the EU-3 foreign ministers. The conditional offers were only on Europe's name, and did not implicate the US. That was the last straw. Iran called the EU-3's bluff and resumed uranium conversion at Isfahan. That led to last Saturday's IAEA report.

The report says many important things. Crucially, ElBaradei acknowledges that Iran is cooperating with the IAEA. And he admits that results of extensive analysis tend to support Iran's official statement about the foreign origin (from Pakistan) of uranium contamination.

ElBaradei also says that Iran has been asked to provide more information regarding its P-2 centrifuge program. He says a final assessment of Iran's plutonium research activities must await the results of more analysis. He says that Iran is building a heavy water research reactor at Arak (planned to start in 2014) and a heavy water production plant at Arak as well. He says Iran's heavy water reactor program will be monitored by the IAEA.

But ElBaradei also criticizes Iran for not reporting to the IAEA all its experiments in uranium enrichment, uranium conversion and plutonium research. He adds, however, that Iran has agreed to provide further supporting information and documentation. He says that after two-and-a-half years of intensive inspections and investigations the IAEA is not yet in a position to clarify some important outstanding issues; and he calls for Iran's "full transparency". In essence: the tone is "let's keep talking", not "let's shut the door".

Courting India
Larijani insists that "we did not stop the talks, they [the EU-3] did. We consider negotiations with every country as useful. We have not hidden anything. They must know that threats would not have any effect on our national will."

Tehran's new global diplomatic thrust is now evident. The strategy insists on Iran's inalienable nuclear rights according to the IAEA charter; stresses a close, respectful cooperation with IAEA inspectors; and actively courts support from non-aligned countries like India, Malaysia and South Africa (that's the spirit of Larijani's high profile visit to India last week). As far as Tehran is concerned, the EU-3 are now history. Unless they table a realistic proposal.

Tehran stresses that both Israel and Pakistan totally ignored the NPT and built their own nuclear weapons, without giving any explanation to the "international community". So why should Iran be punished when it is actually complying with the NPT?

The Isfahan plant will keep working on uranium conversion. And Tehran plans to resume uranium enrichment at Natanz as well. There's nothing the EU-3 can do about it. According to an Iranian diplomat, "The IAEA of course can talk about their 'serious concern' about nuclear activities in Isfahan and Natanz, but they cannot use this legally as a means to refer Iran to the UN Security Council." Or can they?

(Copyright 2005 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us for information on sales, syndication and republishing .)

A.Q. Khan Nuclear Chronology
Proliferation Brief, Volume 8, Number 8
September 7, 2005


The complete extent of Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan’s decades-long involvement in the illegal transfer of nuclear materials and technologies is not known. The details are submerged in Khan’s work over the past thirty years, which has included both the development of Pakistan’s uranium enrichment capabilities and a complex international network of experts, suppliers, and front companies that have aided Iran, Libya, North Korea, and potentially others. Since we do not know exactly what Khan did, we cannot know when he did it. As more information is released from those who have questioned Khan and his network partners, a more complete image of the nuclear black market will emerge. This chronology summarizes what we now know.

Download the complete A.Q. Khan Nuclear Chronology with citations at www.CarnegieEndowment.org/static/npp/Khan_Chronology.pdf.

Khan Builds His Base in Pakistan

Pre-1985: Khan’s early exposure to European technology and supply chains allow him to establish and develop uranium enrichment technologies in Pakistan. Knowledge of the technologies, and more importantly, the companies from which to obtain the necessary components set the foundation for how the future proliferation network would operate.

1936
• Khan is born in Bhopal, which is part of British India. Khan will immigrate with his family to Pakistan in 1952, several years after India and Pakistan are partitioned.

1961
• Khan moves to Europe to complete his studies, first in West Berlin and later at the Technical University in Delft, Holland, where he receives a degree in metallurgical engineering in 1967.

1972
• Khan receives Ph.D. in metallurgical engineering from the Catholic University of Leuven in Belgium.
• May – Khan begins work at Physical Dynamic Research Laboratory (FDO), a subcontractor of Ultra Centrifuge Nederland (UCN). UCN is the Dutch partner in the Urenco uranium enrichment consortium.
• 8 May - Within one week of starting work at FDO, Khan visits the advanced UCN enrichment facility in Almelo, Netherlands to become familiar with Urenco centrifuge operations and the aspects relevant to his own work to strengthen the metal centrifuge components. Khan is not officially cleared to visit the facility, but does so many times with the consent of his employers.

Early 1970s
• Dutch intelligence begins to monitor Khan soon after he begins work at FDO, concerned by a series of inquiries about technical information not related to Khan’s own projects.

1974
• 18 May – India conducts its first nuclear test, a “peaceful nuclear explosion.
• September – Khan writes to Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to offer his services and expertise to Pakistan.
• Late – Khan is tasked by UCN at Almelo with translations of the more advanced German-designed G-1 and G-2 centrifuges from German to Dutch, to which he has unsupervised access for 16 days.

Late 1970s and Early 1980s
• American intelligence officials convince Dutch authorities on two occasions not to arrest Khan for the purposes of monitoring his activities further.

1975
• August – Pakistan begins buying components for its domestic uranium enrichment program from European Urenco suppliers. S.A. Butt, a physicist in the Pakistani embassy in Belgium, contacts a Dutch company to obtain high frequency inverters, which are used to control centrifuge motors. Purchases accelerate in the following years and many components are secured from companies in the Netherlands that Khan is familiar with.
• October – Khan is transferred away from enrichment work with FDO as Dutch authorities become increasingly concerned over his activities. He is reportedly observed asking “suspicious questions” at a nuclear trade show in Switzerland.
• 15 December – Khan suddenly leaves FDO for Pakistan with copied blueprints for centrifuges and other components and contact information for nearly 100 companies that supply centrifuge components and materials.

1976
• Khan begins centrifuge work with the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), headed by Munir Ahmad Khan.
• July – After conflicts at the PAEC, Prime Minister Bhutto gives Khan autonomous control over Pakistani uranium enrichment programs. Khan founds Engineering Research Laboratory (ERL) on July 31, which focuses exclusively on developing an indigenous uranium enrichment capability.
• The PAEC continues nuclear research and experiments in both weapons and power programs in competition with A.Q. Khan and will later develop Pakistan’s first generation of nuclear weapons.

1978
• ERL develops working prototypes of P-1 centrifuges, adapted from the German G-1 design Khan worked with at Urenco. Pakistan enriches uranium for the first time on April 4 at Khan’s enrichment facility at Kahuta.

1979
• April - Pakistan is cut off from economic and military assistance by the United States after U.S. intelligence learns of the recently commissioned enrichment facility at Kahuta. However, the strategic importance of Pakistan after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan ensures that no meaningful sanctions will be imposed. This policy is consolidated following the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980.

Early 1980s
• Khan acquires blueprints for the Chinese bomb that was tested in China’s fourth nuclear explosion in 1966.
• Khan is, reportedly, approached by an unknown Arab country (possibly Saudi Arabia or Syria) requesting nuclear assistance.

1981
• 1 May – ERL is renamed A.Q. Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) by President Zia ul-Haq in recognition of Khan’s contributions to the operational enrichment facility at Kahuta.

1983
• Khan is convicted, in absentia, in Dutch court for conducting nuclear espionage and sentenced to four years in prison.

1985
• Khan’s conviction is overturned based on an appeal that he had not received a proper summons. The Dutch prosecution does not renew charges because of the impossibility of serving Khan a summons given Pakistan security and the inability to obtain any of the documents that Khan had taken to Pakistan.

The Network Flows Both Ways

Mid-1980s to mid-1990s: Khan’s early successes with the Pakistani uranium enrichment program are followed by the more advanced design and technologies of the P-2 centrifuge, an adapted version of the German G-2 that can spin twice as fast as the previous P-1 design. Khan is left with an excess inventory of P-1 components and begins to purchase additional P-2 components that he will export through many of the same channels he had used to import centrifuge components. Khan makes nuclear sales in this period to Iran and offers technologies to Iraq and possibly others.

Mid 1980s
• Pakistan produces enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for a nuclear weapon. KRL continues work on enrichment and is tasked with research and development of missile delivery systems.
• Khan, reportedly, begins to develop his export network and orders twice the number of components necessary for the indigenous Pakistani program. This transition from importer to exporter of centrifuge components is, apparently, completely missed by western intelligence services who believe Khan is only working on Pakistan’s domestic nuclear weapons program.

1986 to 1987
• Pakistan and Iran are suspected of signing a secret agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation. Allegedly, the deal includes a provision for at least six Iranians to be trained in Pakistan at the Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology in Islamabad and the Nuclear Studies Institute. Iranian scientists might also receive centrifuge training at KRL.
• Khan is suspected of visiting the Iranian reactor at Bushehr in February 1986 and again in January 1987. These early interactions may have led directly to Khan’s assistance to Iran, but the content of the visits is unknown.

Late 1980s
• Khan and his network of international suppliers are reported to begin nuclear transfers to Iran. The period of cooperation is thought to continue through 1995 when P-2 centrifuge components are transferred. The Pakistani government claims no transfers occurred after the shipments of P-1 components and sub-assemblies from 1989 to 1991.
• German intelligence investigates potential Pakistani assistance to Iraq, and possibly Iran and North Korea, with processes related to melting uranium.

1987
• Khan is suspected of having made an offer to Iran to provide a package of nuclear technologies, including assistance for the difficult process of casting uranium metal. The price for the package is reported to be from the tens of millions to the hundreds of millions.
• Khan is believed to make a centrifuge deal with Iran to help build a cascade of 50,000 P-1 centrifuges. In addition, Iran may have received centrifuge drawings through an unknown foreign intermediary around this time.
• KRL begins to publish publicly available technical papers that outline some of the more advanced design features Khan has developed. The papers include information that would normally be classified in the U.S. and Europe and show that KRL is competent in many aspects of centrifuge design and operation. The papers also include specifications for centrifuges with maraging steel that can spin faster than earlier aluminum designs. Later, in 1991, KRL publishes details on how to etch grooves around the bottom bearing to incorporate lubricants. These technical developments are important for Khan’s P-2 centrifuges.

1988
• Iranian scientists are suspected of having received nuclear training in Pakistan.

1989
• Iran is suspected of receiving its first centrifuge assemblies and components around this time. The shipped components are likely older P-1 centrifuge components that Khan no longer has use for in Pakistan. Through 1995, Khan is reported to have shipped over 2000 components and sub-assemblies for P-1, and later P-2, centrifuges to Iran.

1990
• An Iraqi memo, found during inspections in 1995, indicates that Khan may have offered significant nuclear assistance to Iraq in late 1990. He offered to sell Iraq a nuclear bomb design and guarantee material support from Western Europe for a uranium enrichment program. Khan stated that any materials needed from Europe could be routed through a company he owned in Dubai and that a meeting with a friendly intermediary could take place in Greece. However, Iraq is believed to have turned down the offer, suspecting it to be a sting and no known follow-ups were made after the 1991 Gulf War. The investigation in the 1990s was inconclusive in its efforts to determine the authenticity of the memo.

1992
• Pakistan begins missile cooperation with North Korea. Within Pakistan, KRL is one of the laboratories responsible for missile research and will develop the Ghauri missile with North Korean assistance. This cooperation probably establishes the connections that Khan could have used to transfer nuclear technologies. However, very little is known about when any nuclear transfers began, what nuclear components might have been obtained by North Korea, and whether or not the Pakistani government was privy to Khan’s activities.

1994 or 1995
• More advanced components for P-2 centrifuges are suspected to have arrived in Iran. B.S.A. Tahir, a Sri Lankan business man and Khan’s chief lieutenant, told Malaysian police that Iran paid approximately $3 million for these parts.

The Network Expands

Mid-1990s to the Present: After initial nuclear transfers to Iran, A.Q. Khan appears to have expanded his network of customers to include Libya and North Korea. Khan’s network was based on a complex structure of international suppliers that shipped components unimpeded by ineffective controls. Details of Libya’s acquisition trace the network to Malaysia, Singapore, Turkey, South Africa, Switzerland, South Korea, Dubai, and possibly others. Khan appears to have been financially motivated and, reportedly, received over $100 million from sales to Libya alone. Many details of the sales to Libya have been uncovered since late 2003, when it decided to come clean about its nuclear program. However many aspects of the network remain mysterious, including network sources for some necessary centrifuge components and details about suspected transfers to North Korea.

Mid 1990s
• Khan starts travel to North Korea where he receives technical assistance for the development of the Ghauri missile, an adaptation of the North Korean No Dong design. Khan makes at least 13 visits before his public confession in 2004 and is suspected of arranging a barter deal to exchange nuclear and missile technologies, though the details of any nuclear transfers remain unknown. Khan travels with military personnel from KRL. These officials could have helped with the transfer of nuclear technology because programs under the Ministry of Defense were exempt from normal export controls. The military presence at KRL, including personnel who traveled to North Korea, suggests that the Pakistani government might have been aware of Khan’s activities. President Musharraf denies this claim.
• Khan is suspected to have met with a top Syrian official in Beirut to offer assistance with a centrifuge enrichment facility.

1996
• The Pakistani currency reserve crunch may motivate Khan to expand his nuclear network with sales to North Korea. The crisis might have made a barter agreement attractive to Pakistan to avoid defaulting on external debt. Visits of North Korean and Pakistani officials accelerate following the crisis, but it is not known if these meetings include discussions of nuclear transfers or deal exclusively with missile technologies.

1997
• Khan begins to transfer centrifuges and centrifuge components to Libya. Libya receives 20 assembled P-1 centrifuges and components for 200 additional units for a pilot enrichment facility. Khan’s network will continue to supply with centrifuge components until late 2003.
• Khan is suspected of beginning nuclear transfers to North Korea around this time, though the dates of the first transfers are highly uncertain. Transfers to North Korea are believed to have continued through 2003, but the Pakistani government claims these transfers ceased in 2001. Over this period, Khan may have supplied North Korea with old and discarded centrifuge and enrichment machines together with sets of drawings, sketches, technical data, and depleted uranium hexafluoride.
• December – Secret visit by Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff General Jehangir Karamat to Pyongyang. Khan has claimed that Karamat was aware of the deal between Pakistan and North Korea to exchange enrichment assistance for missile technologies.

1998
• India detonates a total of five devices in nuclear tests on May 11 and 13.
• Pakistan responds with six nuclear tests on May 28 and 30.

1999
• Pakistani government releases an advertisement of procedures for the export of nuclear equipment and components. The ad lists equipment for sale, including gas centrifuges and magnet baffles for enriching uranium. Other advertisements from KRL are reported to include an “unsubtle drawing” of a mushroom cloud and vacuum devices that attach to centrifuge casings.

2000
• June – Peter Griffin sets up Gulf Technical Industries in Dubai, which serves as a front company for Khan’s network. B.S.A. Tahir will use Gulf Technical Industries as one of his front companies to order centrifuge components from Malaysia.
• September – Libya receives two P-2 centrifuges as demonstrator models and places an order for components for 10,000 more to build a cascade. Each centrifuge contains around 100 parts, implying approximately 1 million parts total for the entire P-2 centrifuge cascade.

2001
• Libya obtains 1.87 tons of uranium hexafluoride, the gas that is used to feed enrichment centrifuges. The amount is consistent with that required for a small pilot enrichment facility. The source of the uranium hexafluoride remains uncertain. In 2004, evidence emerges that North Korea might have supplied Libya with the material, which would be the first discovered transfer of nuclear material from North Korea to an A.Q. Khan network recipient. The evidence remains inconclusive, however, and authorities continue to suspect that the uranium hexafluoride came from Pakistan.
• March – Khan is forced into retirement. Khan refuses the compensatory position of “advisor to the chief executive” and is later given the ceremonial title of “Special Advisor to the Chief Executive on Strategic and KRL Affairs.” However, neither Khan nor the press use this title. President Musharraf has admitted that Khan’s suspected proliferation activity was a critical factor in his removal from KRL.
• Summer – American spy satellites detect missile components being loaded into a Pakistani cargo plane outside of Pyongyang. Intelligence services assume the cargo to be missile technology traded in direct exchange for nuclear technology, but no hard evidence exists.
• December – B.S.A. Tahir signs a $13 million contract with Scuomi Precision Engineering (SCOPE) in Malaysia for 25,000 aluminum centrifuge components. The components will be shipped to front companies in Dubai, including Gulf Technical Industries and SMB Computers. SCOPE representatives later acknowledge manufacturing parts for Tahir, but believed that they would be used in Dubai oil and gas industries.

Late 2001 or Early 2002
• Libya receives blueprints for nuclear weapons plans. The plans are reported to be of Chinese origin with Chinese notes in the margins. There is reported to be a note on the blueprints that “Munir’s bomb would be bigger,” possibly a reference to Munir Ahmad Khan of the PAEC, who was in competition with A.Q. Khan to develop a Pakistani bomb.

2002
• December – Shipments begin from SCOPE of aluminum centrifuge components. Four shipments are believed to have been sent from Malaysia to Dubai before August 2003, en route to Libya.

2003
• Asher Karni, a former Israeli military officer and military trader residing in South Africa, reportedly ships sophisticated oscilloscopes from the U.S. to South Africa, en route to Pakistan for nuclear weapons research. In August, Karni illegally transfers 66 triggered spark gaps to Pakistan through a front company in South Africa. Karni is later arrested in Denver in January 2004 and convicted in August 2005 of violating U.S. export control laws.
• Spring – The State Department announces some sanctions against KRL, citing illegal missile transactions. The State Department also states that it has insufficient evidence to issue sanctions for illegal nuclear transactions.
• April – German authorities intercept a ship in the Suez Canal with a large cargo of strong aluminum tubing en route to North Korea. The tube specifications suggest that they are intended for use as outer casings for P-2 centrifuges.
• October – The German cargo ship BBC China is intercepted en route to Libya with components for 1,000 centrifuges. The parts were manufactured in Malaysia by SCOPE and shipped through Dubai.
• December – Libya renounces its nuclear weapons program and begins the process of full disclosure to the IAEA, including the declaration of all foreign procurements.

2004
• 4 February – Khan makes a public confession on Pakistani television (in English) of his illegal nuclear dealings. Khan claims that he initiated the transfers and cites an “error of judgment.” He is pardoned soon after by President Musharraf and has been under house arrest since. The Pakistani government claims that Khan acted independently and without state knowledge.
• March – A container aboard the BBC China (the ship that was previously intercepted) arrives in Libya with one additional container of P-2 centrifuge components. Colonel Qaddafi reports the arrival to American intelligence and the IAEA. The Libyans warn American officials that not all of the components from Libya’s orders had arrived and some might still show up in the future.


Chronology by Michael Laufer at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Download the complete A.Q. Khan Nuclear Chronology with citations at www.CarnegieEndowment.org/static/npp/Khan_Chronology.pdf. For the latest proliferation news and resources, visit the Carnegie Proliferation News Website, www.ProliferationNews.org.

________________________________________
Click here [or visit http://www.carnegieendowment.org/resources...?fa=newsletters] to go to the Newsletter signup page to subscribe or unsubscribe. For questions and comments, please contact proliferationnews@carnegieendowment.org.

British study says Tehran is at least five - more likely 10-15 - years away from having nukes.

http://csmonitor.com/2005/0907/dailyUpdate.html

Ripple Effect
(Carnegie Analysis, Sarah Parkinson)
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/publi...a=view&id=17428

Thursday, September 8
The tragedy still unfolding in the southern United States has elicited an outpouring of support from Cuba to Kuwait. It has stirred fears of global oil shocks and of their economic consequences. Hurricane Katrina has also had an immediate, profound impact on the image of the United States in the world. It has prompted a debate on the seeming fragility of the world’s only superpower. Below we supply some representative comments from the global press.

Faulty Promises: The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal
(George Perkovich, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace - Policy Outlook)
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publicati...j=znpp,zsa,zusr

September 2005
At their July summit meeting in Washington, D.C., U.S. President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced potentially major departures in U.S. and Indian nuclear policies. President Bush promised to win congressional approval to change U.S. nonproliferation and export control laws and policies that heretofore have blocked full nuclear cooperation with India. In seeking to end restrictions on such cooperation, the United States wants India to be accepted globally as a responsible possessor of nuclear weapons even though India will not join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Q&A: Iran's Nuclear Program
(Interview with Ray Takeyh, New York Times)
http://www.nytimes.com/cfr/international/slot1_090705.html

Wednesday, September 7
Ray Takeyh, the Council's top expert on Iran, says the United States' conviction that Iran is secretly planning to develop nuclear weapons, and Iran's steadfast denial, have plunged relations between the two countries to its lowest state in about a decade.

He doubts the United States and the Europeans will be able to persuade the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] at its September 19 meeting to send Iran to the UN Security Council for its nuclear-related activities.

Takeyh was interviewed by Bernard Gwertzman, consulting editor for cfr.org, on September 6, 2005.

New Weapon Is Years Off for Iran, Research Panel Says
(Alan Cowell, New York Times)
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/07/internat...ast/07iran.html

Wednesday, September 7
A leading British research institute said Tuesday that Iran was at least five years away from producing sufficient material for "a single nuclear weapon," and that it could make one only if it chose to ignore international reaction and "throw caution to the wind."

The researchers, at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, said the conclusions were based on public sources of information, including visits to nuclear sites arranged by Iranian authorities. "Nevertheless," the institute's director, John Chipman, told reporters, "there remains a good deal that cannot be known for certain from the outside."

Reasons for Hope in Korea Nuke Talks
(Arnold Kanter and Daniel Poneman, Boston Globe - Opinion)
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial...rea_nuke_talks/

Thursday, September 8
It was no surprise that last month's six-party talks in Beijing failed to record tangible progress toward resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. The surprise was that after 13 days of intense negotiation failed to produce an agreed ''statement of principles," the parties decided to reconvene after a short recess. When talks resume next week, a half-forgotten agreement may help close the gap.

In January 1992, North Korea and South Korea signed the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. That agreement included an unqualified renunciation of nuclear weapons by Pyongyang and Seoul and an explicit prohibition on uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing while limiting the scope of ''denuclearization" to the Korean Peninsula. The declaration also provided for verification by means of on-site inspections.

N. Korea Clarifies Its Nuclear Position
(Choe Sang-Hun, International Herald Tribune)
http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/09/06/news/korea.php

Wednesday, September 7
North Korea offered a significant clarification on Tuesday of its position in the deadlocked nuclear disarmament talks, insisting that it would not dismantle its nuclear reactor - considered the country's main source of weapons-grade plutonium - unless the United States and its allies built a nuclear power plant to replace it.

The remarks Tuesday were the first time North Korea had publicly articulated its stance since six-party disarmament talks adjourned Aug. 7 without a breakthrough. The demand runs counter to the U.S. insistence that the country must first dismantle all of its nuclear facilities before even considering a civilian nuclear program.

Pakistan Wants Civilian Nuclear Deal
(Foster Klug, Associated Press)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...5090800133.html

Thursday, September 8
Pakistan should have the same access to U.S. civilian nuclear technology that President Bush has proposed for India, the Pakistani ambassador to the United States says.

Jehangir Karamat, Pakistan's former army chief, also warned that "the balance of power in South Asia should not become so tilted in India's favor, as a result of the U.S. relationship with India, that Pakistan has to start taking extraordinary measures to ensure a capability for deterrence and defense."

proliferationnews@carnegieendowment.org.

Pentagon Revises Nuclear Strike Plan

By Walter Pincus

The Pentagon has drafted a revised doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons that envisions commanders requesting presidential approval to use them to preempt an attack by a nation or a terrorist group using weapons of mass destruction. The draft also includes the option of using nuclear arms to destroy known enemy stockpiles of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons.

The document, written by the Pentagon's Joint Chiefs staff but not yet finally approved by Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, would update rules and procedures governing use of nuclear weapons to reflect a preemption strategy first announced by the Bush White House in December 2002. The strategy was outlined in more detail at the time in classified national security directives.

At a White House briefing that year, a spokesman said the United States would "respond with overwhelming force" to the use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States, its forces or allies, and said "all options" would be available to the president.

The draft, dated March 15, would provide authoritative guidance for commanders to request presidential approval for using nuclear weapons, and represents the Pentagon's first attempt to revise procedures to reflect the Bush preemption doctrine. A previous version, completed in 1995 during the Clinton administration, contains no mention of using nuclear weapons preemptively or specifically against threats from weapons of mass destruction.

Titled "Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations" and written under the direction of Air Force Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the draft document is unclassified and available on a Pentagon Web site. It is expected to be signed within a few weeks by Air Force Lt. Gen. Norton A. Schwartz, director of the Joint Staff, according to Navy Cmdr. Dawn Cutler, a public affairs officer in Myers's office. Meanwhile, the draft is going through final coordination with the military services, the combatant commanders, Pentagon legal authorities and Rumsfeld's office, Cutler said in a written statement.

A "summary of changes" included in the draft identifies differences from the 1995 doctrine, and says the new document "revises the discussion of nuclear weapons use across the range of military operations."

The first example for potential nuclear weapon use listed in the draft is against an enemy that is using "or intending to use WMD" against U.S. or allied, multinational military forces or civilian populations.

Another scenario for a possible nuclear preemptive strike is in case of an "imminent attack from adversary biological weapons that only effects from nuclear weapons can safely destroy."

That and other provisions in the document appear to refer to nuclear initiatives proposed by the administration that Congress has thus far declined to fully support.

Last year, for example, Congress refused to fund research toward development of nuclear weapons that could destroy biological or chemical weapons materials without dispersing them into the atmosphere.

The draft document also envisions the use of atomic weapons for "attacks on adversary installations including WMD, deep, hardened bunkers containing chemical or biological weapons."

But Congress last year halted funding of a study to determine the viability of the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator warhead (RNEP) -- commonly called the bunker buster -- that the Pentagon has said is needed to attack hardened, deeply buried weapons sites.

The Joint Staff draft doctrine explains that despite the end of the Cold War, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction "raises the danger of nuclear weapons use." It says that there are "about thirty nations with WMD programs" along with "nonstate actors [terrorists] either independently or as sponsored by an adversarial state."

To meet that situation, the document says that "responsible security planning requires preparation for threats that are possible, though perhaps unlikely today."

To deter the use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States, the Pentagon paper says preparations must be made to use nuclear weapons and show determination to use them "if necessary to prevent or retaliate against WMD use."

The draft says that to deter a potential adversary from using such weapons, that adversary's leadership must "believe the United States has both the ability and will to pre-empt or retaliate promptly with responses that are credible and effective." The draft also notes that U.S. policy in the past has "repeatedly rejected calls for adoption of 'no first use' policy of nuclear weapons since this policy could undermine deterrence."

Rep. Ellen Tauscher (D-Calif.), a member of the House Armed Services Committee who has been a leading opponent of the bunker-buster program, said yesterday the draft was "apparently a follow-through on their nuclear posture review and they seem to bypass the idea that Congress had doubts about the program." She added that members "certainly don't want the administration to move forward with a [nuclear] preemption policy" without hearings, closed door if necessary.

A spokesman for Sen. John W. Warner (R-Va.), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said yesterday the panel has not yet received a copy of the draft.

Hans M. Kristensen, a consultant to the Natural Resources Defense Council, who discovered the document on the Pentagon Web site, said yesterday that it "emphasizes the need for a robust nuclear arsenal ready to strike on short notice including new missions."

Kristensen, who has specialized for more than a decade in nuclear weapons research, said a final version of the doctrine was due in August but has not yet appeared.

"This doctrine does not deliver on the Bush administration pledge of a reduced role for nuclear weapons," Kristensen said. "It provides justification for contentious concepts not proven and implies the need for RNEP."

One reason for the delay may be concern about raising publicly the possibility of preemptive use of nuclear weapons, or concern that it might interfere with attempts to persuade Congress to finance the bunker buster and other specialized nuclear weapons.

In April, Rumsfeld appeared before the Senate Armed Services panel and asked for the bunker buster study to be funded. He said the money was for research and not to begin production on any particular warhead. "The only thing we have is very large, very dirty, big nuclear weapons," Rumsfeld said. "It seems to me studying it [the RNEP] makes all the sense in the world."

http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/e...er=emailarticle

http://www.antiwar.com/lobe/?articleid=7246

September 13, 2005
Pentagon Foresees Preemptive Nuclear Strikes

by Jim Lobe
Amid increasing tension between the United States and Iran over Tehran's nuclear program, and growing concern about overstretched U.S. ground forces, the George W. Bush administration is moving steadily toward adopting the preemptive use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states as an integral part of its global military strategy.

According to a March document by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that was recently posted to the Pentagon's Web site, Washington will not necessarily wait for potential adversaries to use what it calls "weapons of mass destruction" before resorting to a nuclear strike against them.

The document, entitled "Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations [.pdf]," has yet to be approved by Pentagon chief Donald Rumsfeld, according to an account published in Sunday's Washington Post. However, it is largely consistent with the administration's 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which was widely assailed by arms control advocates for lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons by the U.S.

"What we see as significant is that they are considering using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear powers in preemptive first strikes," said Ivan Oelrich of the Federation for American Scientists (FAS) about both the NPR and the new Doctrine.

The Doctrine would also appear to contradict the administration's oft-stated claim that it is significantly reducing the role of nuclear weapons in its global military strategy.

"[T]he new doctrine reaffirms an aggressive nuclear posture of modernized nuclear weapons maintained on high alert," according to Hans Kristensen of the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC).

"[T]he new doctrine's approach grants regional nuclear-strike planning an increasingly expeditionary aura that threatens to make nuclear weapons just another tool in the toolbox," he wrote last week in Arms Control Today.

"The result is nuclear preemption, which the new doctrine enshrines into official U.S. joint nuclear doctrine for the first time, where the objective no longer is deterrence through threatened retaliation but battlefield destruction of targets," according to Kristensen.

The Doctrine is the latest in a series of documents adopted by the administration that has moved the U.S. away from the traditional view that nuclear weapons should be used solely for the purposes of defense and deterrence.

Along with the NPR, which called for the development of new delivery systems for nuclear weapons and noted that China, North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya could all be targets, the new view was expounded by Bush himself in his September 2002 National Security Strategy document. "We cannot let our enemies strike first," he warned at the time.

In mid-2004, according to national security analyst William Arkin, Rumsfeld approved a top-secret "Interim Global Strike Alert Order" that directed the military to be prepared to attack potential adversaries, notably Iran and North Korea, that are developing WMD.

"Global strike," according to a classified January 2003 presidential directive obtained by Arkin, is defined as including nuclear, as well as conventional, strikes "in support of theater and national objectives."

The new document is the first to spell out various contingencies in which a preemptive nuclear strike might be used, including:

If an adversary intended to use WMD against the U.S. multinational or allied forces or a civilian population;
In cases of an imminent attack from an adversary's biological weapons that only effects from nuclear weapons can safely destroy;
Against adversary installations, including WMD; deep, hardened bunkers containing chemical or biological weapons; or the command-and-control infrastructure required for the adversary to execute a WMD attack against the U.S. or its friends and allies; and
In cases where a demonstration of U.S. intent and capability to use nuclear weapons would deter WMD use by an adversary.
The previous Doctrine, promulgated under the Clinton administration in 1995, made no mention of the preemptive use of nuclear weapons against any target, let alone describe scenarios in which such use would be considered.

Moreover, the new Doctrine blurs the distinction that existed during the Cold War between strategic and theater nuclear weapons by "assign[ing] all nuclear weapons, whether strategic or nonstrategic, support roles in theater nuclear operations," according to Kristensen.

Another particularly worrisome aspect of the latest Doctrine, according to Oelrich, is its conflation of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons as one "WMD" threat that could justify a U.S. nuclear strike, particularly given the huge disparity in destructive and lethal impact between chemical weapons, on the one hand, and nuclear arms on the other.

"What we are seeing now is an effort to lay the foundations for the legitimacy of using nuclear weapons if [the administration] suspects another country might use chemical weapons against us," he said. "Iraq is a perfect example of how this doctrine might actually work; it was a country where we were engaged militarily and thought it would deploy chemical weapons against us."

Critics also fear that resorting to nuclear weapons may have become increasingly attractive to the administration as the Army and Marines have become bogged down in Iraq and, to a lesser extent, Afghanistan.

"[U.S. Strategic Command] planners, recognizing that U.S. ground forces are already overcommitted, say that a global strike must be able to be implemented 'without resort to large numbers of general purpose forces,'" according to Arkin's account of recent directives received by commanders charged with contingency planning.

The new strategy may also be relevant to the situation in Iran, which is known to have chemical weapons but whose nuclear program Washington insists is being used to produce weapons as well.

Writing in The American Conservative last month, columnist Philip Giraldi, a former CIA officer who also worked at the Defense Intelligence Agency, reported that Vice President Dick Cheney's office had tasked the United States Strategic Command with drawing up a contingency plan for a "large-scale air assault on Iran employing both conventional and tactical nuclear weapons" in the event of another 9/11 terrorist attack.

"Many of the targets are hardened or are deep underground and could not be taken out by conventional weapons, hence the nuclear option," he wrote.

In fact, it is questionable whether even U.S. nuclear weapons could reach their hardened targets underground, which is why the Pentagon has been pressing Congress for several years to finance research into the development of the so-called Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator.

Democrats and a small minority of Republicans in the House of Representatives have so far blocked the administration's request, although it will be taken up later this fall by a joint House-Senate conference committee. The new Strategy may be aimed in part at exerting pressure on the lawmakers to approve the request.

Meanwhile, however, administration critics warn that instead of deterring potential adversaries from pursuing nuclear weapons, the new Doctrine is almost certain to have the opposite effect.

"We make it seem that nuclear weapons are essential to our security," noted Oelrich. "So it immensely enhances the cachet of nuclear weapons to others."

(Inter Press Service)

Tonnes of Fun
(Carnegie Analysis, Ben Bain)
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/publi...a=view&id=17443

Tuesday, September 13
There are over 3,700 metric tons of plutonium and highly-enriched uranium in global stockpiles, according to a recent report by the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS). Global Stocks of Nuclear Explosive Materials, authored by David Albright and Kimberly Kramer, says that these materials, together with the 140 tonnes of Neptunium 237 and Americium, are enough for over 300,000 nuclear weapons.

The report estimates that at the end of 2003, 50 countries held a total of 1,900 tonnes of HEU, with nine of those countries in possession of at least 1 tonne.

U.S. Rejects North Korea's Nuclear Stance as 6-Way Talks Resume
(Bloomberg)
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=100...=top_world_news

Tuesday, September 13
The U.S. chief negotiator rejected North Korea's plans to retain a civilian reactor program, as the two sides remained divided ahead of six-party talks about Pyongyang's nuclear weapons.

"We have a good idea of what their position is," U.S. chief negotiator Christopher Hill said after arriving at his hotel in Beijing today ahead of the scheduled resumption of talks. "Their position does seem to be wrong."

UN Inspectors 'Powerless to Stop Atom Bomb Plans in Iran'
(Con Coughlin, Telegraph)
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml...1/ixportal.html

Sunday, September 11
" It is reaching the point where it is beyond critical," Dr Goldschmidt told The Sunday Telegraph in his first interview since retiring from the IAEA in July. "The IAEA can only work on the basis of the facts that are presented to it, and there have been many serious omissions by the Iranians. The Iranians are exploiting all the loopholes in the international agreements. As to why they are doing this you can draw your own conclusions."

Dr Goldschmidt believes that to deal effectively with Iran, IAEA inspectors need to be given greater powers than they currently have.

"As it stands, the investigating authority of the agency is too limited with regard to Iran. To do its job properly it needs to have more authority than is currently available to it."

Iran Threatens Consequences If Its Case Goes to U.N. Council
(Nazila Fathi, The New York Times)
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/11/internat...artner=homepage

Sunday, September 11
Iran said today that it would not suspend its nuclear activities and contended that there would be serious consequences if its case were sent to the United Nations Security Council for possible sanctions. The comments came as Iran's new president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, prepared to travel to New York to address the United Nation General Assembly on Wednesday at its opening summit meeting.

"There is no legal basis to send the dossier to the Security Council," he said. "This would be a political move. We do not see a serious sign that this will happen."

He added, "It is natural that such an event will have consequences, but right now I do not want to go into what the repercussions would be."

US Rejects Pak's Demand for Parity With India on Nuclear Pact
(T. V. Parasuram, Press Trust of India)
http://www.outlookindia.com/pti_news.asp?id=321923

Friday, September 9
Rejecting Pakistan's demand for parity with India in accessing civilian nuclear technology, the US has said that the landmark accord with New Delhi was a "mechanism to deepen" further its commitment to international non-proliferation.

"We view India as an exceptional case, and see civil nuclear cooperation as a mechanism to deepen further India's commitment to international nonproliferation," Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Robert G Joseph said yesterday.

Pentagon Revises Nuclear Strike Plan
(Walter Pincus, Washington Post)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...5091001053.html

Sunday, September 11
The Pentagon has drafted a revised doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons that envisions commanders requesting presidential approval to use them to preempt an attack by a nation or a terrorist group using weapons of mass destruction. The draft also includes the option of using nuclear arms to destroy known enemy stockpiles of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons.

The document, written by the Pentagon's Joint Chiefs staff but not yet finally approved by Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, would update rules and procedures governing use of nuclear weapons to reflect a preemption strategy first announced by the Bush White House in December 2002. The strategy was outlined in more detail at the time in classified national security directives.

U.S. Shares Data With China, India To Build Iran Case
(Carla Anne Robbins, Wall Street Journal)
http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB1126660...N=wsjie/archive

Wednesday, September 14
As the U.S. and Europe prepare to face off with Iran at the United Nations, the Bush administration dispatched intelligence experts to China and India last week to brief them on Tehran's alleged efforts to develop a missile capable of delivering a nuclear warhead.

The decision to share the highly classified intelligence is a measure of the resistance the U.S. is meeting as it pushes, along with the Europeans, for Iran's nuclear activities to be referred to the U.N. Security Council.

European Leaders Hold Nuclear Talks With Iran
(Guardian - UK)
http://www.guardian.co.uk/iran/story/0,12858,1570849,00.html

Thursday, September 15
The leaders of Britain, France and Germany are meeting the new Iranian president today in an attempt to avoid referring Iran to the UN security council over its nuclear activities.

Iran's hardline president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, meets the leaders to discuss ways of avoiding possible sanctions after Iran resumed its uranium enrichment programme last month. The meeting is part of the three-day UN summit being held in New York.

Nonproliferation, Disarmament Matters Dropped From U.N. Summit Document
(Jim Wurst, Global Security Newswire)
http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2005_9_14.html#539B1CCD

Wednesday, September 14
U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan yesterday said it was “a real disgrace” that disarmament and nonproliferation are not addressed in the document produced by the General Assembly for the summit that began this morning.

Speaking minutes after the General Assembly adopted the 35-page “outcome document,” Annan yesterday told journalists, “The big item missing is nonproliferation and disarmament. This is a real disgrace. We have failed twice this year: we failed at the [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty] Conference, and we failed now."

Bush, Annan Disappointed U.N. Accord Lacks Key Reforms
(Warren Vieth and Maggie Farley, Los Angeles Times)
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/wo...&track=morenews

Wednesday, September 14
President Bush joined United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan today in chiding the global institution's member nations for rejecting key reforms advocated by the U.S. and U.N. leaders. Bush and Annan, in keynote addresses at a four-day summit in New York, praised world leaders for tackling some of the U.N.'s internal and external challenges, but expressed disappointment because they had avoided others.

Bush aimed his strongest criticism at the rejection of a proposal to create a new human rights council to replace the discredited U.N. Human Rights Commission, which has included among its members such alleged violators as Libya and Sudan.

Annan expressed greater concern about the failure to include in the final document any reference to nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, calling it "our biggest tragedy and our biggest failure."

North Korea Talks Stall Over Demand For Reactor
(Associated Press)
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2005-09...a-nuclear_x.htm

Thursday, September 15
North Korea said Thursday it won't give up its nuclear weapons without receiving a reactor for generating power, stalling six-nation talks on Pyongyang's atomic programs.

Hill said no progress was made during a 90-minute meeting Thursday because Pyongyang was demanding that it get a reactor before dismantling its nuclear program. Still, Hill and other delegates said the talks would continue, with no end date set.

The Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons: New Doctrine Falls Short of Bush Pledge
(Hans M. Kristensen, Arms Control Today)
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_09/Kristensen.asp

September 2005
A nuclear draft doctrine written by the Pentagon calls for maintaining an aggressive nuclear posture with weapons on high alert to strike adversaries armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), pre-emptively if necessary.

The doctrine, the first formal update since the Bush administration took office, is entitled “Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations” and has been strongly influenced by the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and other directives published by the Bush administration since 2001. A final version is expected later this fall.

Foremost among the doctrine’s new features are the incorporation of pre-emption into U.S. nuclear doctrine and the integration of conventional weapons and missile defenses into strategic planning. The Bush administration claims that it is significantly reducing the role of nuclear weapons.

Links of Interest:

"Global Cleanout of Civil Nuclear Material: Toward a Comprehensive, Threat-Driven Response,"
Strengthening the Global Partnership Project Issue Brief (No. 4) by Philipp C. Bleek, Georgetown University, September 2005

"Russia's Nuclear Policy in the 21st Century Environment"
Proliferation Paper (No. 12) by Dmitri Trenin, French Institute of International Relations, Autumn 2005

ArmsControlWonk.com, a nonproliferation and arms control blog, provides valuable information --with an edge--on security-related developments, including recent news and publications. The blog, written by Dr. Jeffrey Lewis, a Research Fellow at the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy (CISSM), has made the Pentagon draft document, "Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations (Joint Publication 3-12)" available for download on its site. The Pentagon has now removed the document, originally publicly available online at the Department of Defense Joint Electronic Library. For more information on this document, see Hans M. Kristensen, "The Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons: New Doctrine Falls Short of Bush Pledge," Arms Control Today, September 2005 and Walter Pincus, "Pentagon Revises Nuclear Strike Plan Strategy Includes Preemptive Use Against Banned Weapons," Washington Post, September 11, 2005

http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?.../i123211D46.DTL

Iran Ready to Share Nuclear 'Know-How'
By NASSER KARIMI, Associated Press Writer

Thursday, September 15, 2005
(09-15) 12:32 PDT TEHRAN, Iran (AP) --

Iran is willing to provide other Islamic nations with nuclear technology, Iran's hard-line president said Thursday.

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad made the comments after meeting Turkey's prime minister on the sidelines of a gathering of world leaders at the United Nations, according to the state-run Islamic Republic News Agency.

Ahmadinejad repeated promises that Iran will not pursue nuclear weapons, IRNA reported. Then he added: "Iran is ready to transfer nuclear know-how to the Islamic countries due to their need."

Iran has said it is determined to pursue its nuclear program to process uranium and produce energy, despite European attempts to limit it. The United States accuses Tehran of secretly seeking to develop nuclear weapons, a charge Tehran denies.

Meanwhile, diplomats and government officials in Europe said a U.S.-European drive to refer Iran to the U.N. Security Council is encountering fierce opposition and could be postponed despite deep international concerns about Tehran's nuclear agenda.

Just days before planned action on referral, the diplomats and officials told The Associated Press that the idea of giving Iran a deadline of several weeks to comply with international demands on its nuclear activities is gaining favor.

"It would not be a change in policy but a change in timing," said one European official about the possibility of delaying — but not withdrawing — the U.N. Security Council threat. There has been strong opposition from more than a dozen nations on the board of the International Atomic Energy Agency to a demand for referral at next week's board meeting.

The officials and diplomats — some in Vienna, others elsewhere in Europe — demanded spoke on condition of anonymity because of the delicacy of the negotiations on what tack to take on Iran.

Their comments seemed to mirror indications from Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice that Washington was prepared to delay again its drive for Security Council referral.

Rice last week appealed openly to China, Russia, India and other nations to support the United States in threatening Iran with sanctions for refusing to halt its nuclear program.

Russia quickly registered its opposition to trying to impose sanctions in the U.N. Security Council, and the White House acknowledged Wednesday that President Bush was unable to get a commitment from Chinese President Hu Jintao.

Ahmadinejad urged the U.N. not to bend to U.S. pressure.

"The raison d'etre of the United Nations is to promote global peace and tranquility," he told the General Assembly. "Therefore, any license for pre-emptive measures which are essentially based on gauging intentions rather than objective facts ... is a blatant contradiction to the very foundation of the United Nations and the letter and the spirit of its charter."

Washington had been a key force in trying to marshal enough support at Monday's board meeting of the Vienna-based IAEA for referral. But in comments Wednesday, Rice indirectly acknowledged that drive was faltering.

"I am not so concerned about exactly when it happens," Rice told the Fox News Editorial Board, "because I don't think this matter is so urgent that it has to come on Sept. 19."

The European Union has taken the lead in trying to persuade Iran to halt development of nuclear activities that could be used to make weapons in exchange for economic concessions.

The European official said that — as of Thursday — any resolution in Vienna demanding immediate referral to the Security Council would have "only a slim majority of two or three countries" on the 35-member IAEA board.

Rice on Wednesday suggested the EU remained fully committed to referral, saying: "The question is how much support can you bring that is non-European support."

But officials and diplomats said that was not so.

About a half-dozen EU member nations — among them Italy, Spain and Portugal — are openly questioning the authority of France, Britain and Germany to negotiate a resolution at the board meeting on behalf of the European Union, said the official.

Iran's lobby efforts against referral "have been rather successful," said the official. "Both African countries and nonaligned countries are very keen on it not going to the Security Council."

A senior nonaligned diplomat in Vienna said informal but high-level contacts were under way between Tehran and key EU countries on what concessions Iran was prepared to make in exchange for a delay of the push to have Iran hauled before the Security Council.

Ahmadinejad is expected to reveal new Iranian proposals by the weekend at the U.N. summit, which it hopes will defuse the nuclear crisis.

Among those leaning against the idea of immediate referral in favor of a several-weeks-long deadline is IAEA head Mohamed ElBaradei, said several officials and diplomats. One of them said ElBaradei "moved over to the camp" of countries opposed to referral in recent weeks as that group of countries has grown.

While an EU diplomat said ElBaradei had suggested a delay as one of several o