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Snuffysmith
China's Hu Recommits to Efforts on N.Korea
(Associated Press)

Thursday, November 17
President Hu Jintao on Thursday reaffirmed China's commitment to denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula, and later warned that security issues such as terrorism have become a threat ''to the very existence and development of mankind.''

Hu made the comments in two separate speeches during an official visit to South Korea, the first by a Chinese president to the country in a decade.
Snuffysmith
Defense Bill Blocks Energy RNEP Funding
(David Ruppe, Global Security Newswire)

Wednesday, November 16
The U.S. Senate yesterday unanimously passed legislation barring allocation of $4 million requested by the Energy Department to continue study of an earth-penetrating nuclear weapon.

The language sponsored by Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) was approved as an amendment to the Senate’s $492 billion fiscal 2006 defense authorization bill.“None of the funds authorized to be appropriated to the Department of Energy under this act may be made available for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator,” it says.
Snuffysmith
UN: Iran Got Nuclear Info on Black Market ABC News
U.N. Nuclear Agency Says Iran Obtained Instructions on Enriching Uranium From Black Market Network. Iran obtained detailed instructions on how to set up the complicated process of enriching uranium, which can used to make nuclear arms, from the black market network run by a Pakistani scientist, the U.N. atomic monitoring agency said Friday. In a confidential report, the International Atomic Energy Agency also said Iran was not giving inspectors access to a sensitive site that could be used to store equipment indicating whether the military is running a secret nuclear program.
IAEA says Iran still blocking access to crucial military sites Forbes
France criticises Iran for uranium moves Independent Online
Reuters - Guardian Unlimited - Reuters.uk - AKI - all 411 related »
Snuffysmith
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/GK18Ak02.html

Friendly fire and the US in Iran
By Neda Bolourchi

In recent months, the Mujahideen-e Khalq (MEK) and its attempts to prove that the Islamic Republic of Iran intends to develop nuclear weapons garnered widespread media coverage and speculation. While bringing forth a modicum of new information, the attention fails to illuminate just how dangerous the MEK could be to the United States.

Grappling in Iraq, the Bush administration now faces an analogous yet graver situation in the Islamic Republic. In the years leading up to the Iraq war, Ahmad Chalabi led the exiled Iraqi National Congress. In courting Bush officials like Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz to stoke the war flames in Iraq, Chalabi materialized defectors who affirmed suspicions about Saddam



Hussein's ethereal weapons of mass destruction. Chalabi then secured administration support by seducing it with visions of Iraqis showering American liberators with flowers and a quick handover of a well-ordered Iraq from US troops to his Free Iraqi Fighters.

Today, Maryam Rajavi, the so-called president-elect of the MEK's National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), conjures up the same desert visions for Iran.

Like the case of Chalabi, who offered information on the seemingly impenetrable Iraq, reliance on Rajavi and her supporters superficially makes sense. Given the US's lack of human intelligence inside the Islamic Republic's government, supporting the MEK would naturally appeal to the US administration as a means to quickly develop and install agents who can provide reliable information regarding the Islamic Republic's nuclear advancements.

The MEK even appears to fit the bill better than Chalabi in many respects. As an Iranian opposition group with members inside and outside the country, the MEK can utilize its nativist connection to seamlessly merge with countrymen without fear of being detected by foreign accents, mannerisms or characteristics.

Moreover, the MEK is the largest and the best-organized Iranian opposition group, with realistic estimates between 6,000 to 10,000 fighters, members and supporters combined. More importantly, the MEK demonstrated its ability to deliver reliable information when it revealed, on August 14, 2002, that the Islamic Republic possessed an advanced nuclear program that included facilities at Natanz and Arak.

The MEK now finds support within parts of the American government as a "third option". Such support is built on the fallacy that the MEK can not only provide information, but also enjoys enough popular support so that diplomacy and direct military action can be skirted. By lobbying to remove the MEK from the US's list of foreign terrorist organizations and considering the group as leverage to destabilize, overthrow, and/or replace Tehran's clerical government, supporters ignore the unsavory history of the MEK.

And that puts the United States, its citizens and its interests in grave danger.

Under the Bill Clinton administration, the State Department placed the MEK on its terrorist organization list in 1997 as a conciliatory gesture to the then newly elected Mohammed Khatami moderates. In justifying its decision, the State Department used several acts of violence committed against Americans to justify its actions.

These acts included the November 1971 attempt to kidnap the American ambassador, as well as the 1972 bombings of the offices belonging to Pepsi-Cola, General Motors, the Hotel International, the Marin Oil Company, the Iranian-American Society and the US Information Office. Over the next three years, the MEK robbed six banks, assassinated the deputy chief of the US Military Mission (Colonel Lewis Hawkins), killed the chief of the Tehran police, killed five American civilians and/or military advisers, attempted to assassinate the chief of the US Military Mission in Iran (General Harold Price), and bombed the offices of Pan-American Airlines, Shell Oil Company, British Petroleum, El Al and British Airways. [1]

In a military tribunal in 1972, MEK leader Massoud Rajavi explained such acts of violence by premising that the future of Iran depended on armed resistance.

Blaming most of the world's problems on imperialism, Rajavi insisted that "American imperialism" was the main enemy of Iran because the United States conducted the 1953 coup d'etat that overthrew the then prime minister, Mohammad Mossadeq. [2] In retaliation, the Shah attempted to discredit the group by labeling the mujahideen as "Islamic Marxists" and by claiming that Islam merely served as a cover to hide the group's Marxist ideology.

In response, the MEK declared its respect for Marxism "as a progressive social philosophy" but stated that "their true culture, inspiration, attachment and ideology was Islam". [3] Attempting to clarify its position, the MEK later published an article declaring that
[T]he regime is trying to place a wedge between Muslims and Marxists ... Of course, Marxism and Islam are not identical. Nevertheless, Islam is definitely closer to Marxism than to Pahlavism. Islam and Marxism contain the same message for they inspire martyrdom, struggle, and self-sacrifice. Who is closer to Islam: the Vietnamese who fight against American imperialism or the Shah who helps Zionism? Since Islam fights oppression it will work together with Marxism which also fights oppression. They have the same enemy: reactionary imperialism. [4]
With this history, news that the MEK engaged coalition forces during Operation Enduring Freedom should not be surprising. [5] With their obvious ideological differences, the US and MEK have been separately battling the Islamic Republic of Iran for about the past 25 years. Now, however, the MEK and its supporters within the American government want to temporarily put aside such differences to bring about regime change.

Intelligence sources, though, are quick to note that the information the MEK/NCRI provides is only sometimes correct.

For example, on September 16, the group's "spokesman", Alireza Jafarzadeh of Strategic Policy Consulting, a corporation viewed as established to circumvent US laws prohibiting the MEK/NCRI's existence on American soil, proffered that the Islamic Republic had secretly built an underground tunnel-like facility deep in the mountains of the Parchin military complex, in order to transfer secret nuclear components and conduct other activities related to a supposedly vibrant nuclear weapons program.

The tunnels allegedly house secret "military-nuclear factories" and serve as storage space. Diagrams that were produced appear to show that the tunnels are supplied with water, electricity and ventilation, providing a suitable and seemingly extensive working space deep underground. Jafarzadeh claims that Iranian officials decided to construct the tunnels in response to continuing leaks regarding the country's nuclear activities, and that they serve to prevent the easy destruction of essential facilities by US "bunker-busting" munitions.

Yet neither a direct inquiry into the credibility of the statement nor confirmation from reliable sources seems to exist. Given that American satellites would be able to detect the mass movement and transit required to perform the alleged tunneling activities, and with access given again to international nuclear inspectors, additional skepticism is in order.

In much the same manner that the American intelligence community questioned the credibility of Chalabi over his allegations regarding Iraq, it is rightfully wary of the MEK.

Unlike Chalabi, though, the MEK's disdain for democracy is clear. In the years following the Islamic Revolution of 1979, when the MEK arguably reached its height both in popular domestic support and sheer strength, the mujahideen avoided legitimate elections for its top leadership positions and any democratic formulation for an official strategy.

Instead, Massoud Rajavi assumed the chairmanship of the NCRI, with the result that as other Iranian dissident groups joined the MEK in the 1980s, most quickly left the national council because the MEK insisted on full control over all important decisions, including who could join the NCRI, who would receive full voting rights within the NCRI and who could represent the NCRI at international meetings.

Although in recent years the MEK has recast itself as a pro-democratic, pro-capitalist organization that provides equal opportunities to minorities and women, the group continues to exert authoritarian control over its members.

Having essentially declared himself the leader for life of the Iranian people, Massoud Rajavi appointed his wife, Maryam, as so-called president-elect. Saddled with one appointed leader for life in Ayatollah Ali Khameini, the Iranian people are unlikely to want another. Like Tehran's regime, the MEK has its own interpretation of Islam that includes mandatory Islamic dress for women. On the verge of potentially re-embracing secularism, Iranians do not want another government-mandated and imposed interpretation of Islam.

Moreover, supporting the MEK will irrevocably alienate all classes because Iranians do not consider the group a legitimate source of resistance. Now alienated from the Islamic government, Iranians remember that the MEK significantly aided Khomeini in bringing about the revolution and the current government. Multiplying their grievances against the group, Iranians say that when Khomeini pushed out the former icons of the Islamist movement, the MEK used assassinations and terrorism in an attempt to destabilize the regime.

Once beloved by the masses, "the hypocrites" turned and fought for Saddam Hussein during the grizzly Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s - an act that continues to outrage Iranians. At the war's end, Saddam attempted to use the MEK as a fifth column, but the Islamic Republic set a trap and massacred thousands of MEK paramilitary fighters and prisoners. No Iranian publicly objected at the time. Thus, despite arguments that empowering the MEK would "support President [George W] Bush's assertion that America stands with the people of Iran in their struggle to liberate themselves", Iranians with their long and collective history will neither forgive nor forget the "traitors" who attacked their own country and people.

As such, the MEK cannot be an asset to the US because the group carries a deadly legacy from the Iran-Iraq War that only stokes the embers of Iranian nationalism. Such nationalism brought about much in the last century: from the 1905 constitutional revolution to the nationalization of oil and the Mossadeq movement; from a vital role in the 1979 revolution to surviving a deadly war with Iraq. Any foreign military action can expect a similar reaction.

The MEK and its supporters, however, will encounter a rare ferociousness because the group presents the kind of common enemy against whom the reformists, the conservatives, the students and common people will all rally against - something that has not happened since the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq War.

But now the Islamic Republic is dangerously better armed, holds a network of relations throughout the Middle East, and is bolstered by proxies operating widely and freely from Russia to Bosnia and from Lebanon to Iraq and Afghanistan.

Although the Iranian people are clearly the most pro-American populace in the Middle East, does the United States really want to turn that advantage on its head and be on the receiving end of such an Iranian nationalist movement?

While the Persian puzzle continues to perplex, Chalabi-style fantasies are not an answer. The lessons from Iraq have been too many, at too high a price, for that mistake to be made again.

Notes
[1] In defending the current Rajavi leadership, supporters cite that Massoud Rajavi was in jail at the time of the American murders. However, in the critical early months preceding the Revolution, the MEK (under the leadership of the freed Rajavi) not only moved towards clerical power bases but cooperated with radical clerics to weaken and eliminate the moderate leadership of prime minister Bazargan, whom they viewed as bourgeois and pro-American. See Ervand Abrahamian, Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin 184-85 (1989).

[2] Viewing the Pahlavi regime as having little social support outside the middle class, the MEK asserted that the monarchy had to rule through terror, intimidation, and propaganda. In aiming to shatter the "atmosphere of terror" through heroic acts of violence that would bring the collapse of the regime, the Mujahideen ultimately intended to could out carry out "radical reforms" that included ending Iranian dependence on the West, building an independent society, and redistributing wealth while giving a free voice to the masses. See Ervand Abrahamian, The Guerrilla Movement in Iran, 1963-77, 86 Merip Reports 9 (1980)

[3] See The Mujahideen Organization, Dafa'at-i Naser Sadeq (The Defense Speech of Naser Sadeq) 24 (1972).

[4] See The Mujahideen Organization, Pasokh Beh Etemat-i Akher-I Rezhin (An Answer to the Regime's Latest Slanders) 10-13 (1973).

According to Abrahamian, note 1, 92-93, original members of the MEK's "Ideological Team", Hosayn Ruhani and Torab Haqshenas, explained that their "original aim was to synthesize the religious values of Islam with the scientific thought of Marxism ... for [the two] were convinced that true Islam was compatible with the theories of social evolution, historical determinism, and the class struggle." The fusion of Islam and Marxism made sense because the Mujahideen believed that the Prophet Mohammed sought to establish not just a new religion but a new ummat(progressive society) that sought social justice by delivering the message of nezam-e tawhidi (a classless society free of poverty, corruption, war, inequality, and oppression).

In contrast, at least one author asserts that the MEK, as a group of Marxists, realized they lacked grass roots support and tried to legitimize their movement by utilizing Islam and following Ali Shariati's interpretation. In opposing the view of Frantz Fanon, who believed that people from non-Western countries must give up their religion to bring about revolutions in their countries, Shariati argued that without rooting identity within religion and culture, non-Western peoples could not fight Western imperialism See Asaf Hussain, Islamic Iran: Revolution and counter-revolution 85 (1985).

[5] See Sam Dealey, Iran "Terrorist" Group Find Support on the Hill, The Hill, April 2, 2003.

(Copyright 2005 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us for information on sales, syndication and republishing .)
Snuffysmith
http://www.antiwar.com/orig/hirsch.php?articleid=8089

November 21, 2005
Can a Nuclear Strike on Iran Be Prevented?
Or will the world allow it to happen?
by Jorge Hirsch
The Bush administration has put together all the elements it needs to justify the impending military action against Iran. Unlike in the case of Iraq, it will happen without warning, and most of the justifications will be issued after the fact. We will wake up one day to learn that facilities in Iran have been bombed in a joint U.S.-Israeli attack. It may even take another couple of days for the revelation that some of the U.S. bombs were nuclear.

Both Americans and the rest of the world have left the door wide open for this to happen. The international community has failed to declare the Iraq war illegal (e.g., Resolution 1483) under international law, implicitly condoning the next similar U.S. adventure. Furthermore, since the IAEA resolution of Sept. 24, 2005, it is "legal" for the U.S. to use nuclear weapons in a military conflict with Iran.

And the discussion now riveting the country's attention, about whether the administration misused faulty intelligence to justify attacking Iraq, plays right into the plan to attack Iran. Many critics of the war are implicitly conceding that if the intelligence had been right, the attack on Iraq would have been justified. However, the charges that were false for Iraq are true for Iran, or are at least widely accepted to be true.

Since after the fact there isn't much one can do about it, except, in Cheney's words "clean up the diplomatic mess," it is important to bring up the topic for discussion now, even if the administration would prefer that you focus instead on the Iraq mess, incredible as that may seem.

How the Iraq Deception Aids an Attack on Iran

The country is up in arms over the "16 words" in the 2003 State of the Union address about Iraq "attempting" to buy yellowcake uranium from Niger. Some criticisms imply that if indeed there had been such an attempt, the attack against Iraq would have been justified. Iran makes its own yellowcake and is processing it into uranium hexafluoride at this very moment. According to the latest reports, the material being processed is enough for 10 nuclear bombs.

The other reasons given to attack Iraq apply at least as much or even more so to Iran and will be brought up by the U.S. government after the attack, so we may as well consider them now:


Iraq was falsely accused of possessing WMD; it turned out it didn't have a single ounce. Iran almost certainly still has remnants of chemical weapons (as do many other countries, including the United States). The U.S. accuses Iran of having both chemical and biological weapons.
Iraq was accused of having used chemical weapons in war in the past. Iran has been also.
Iraq was accused of having ties to al-Qaeda and 9/11. The bipartisan 9/11 commission determined that Iraq had no significant ties to al-Qaeda, and no connection to 9/11. Instead, it determined that "senior al-Qaeda operatives and trainers traveled to Iran to receive training in explosives" in 1993, alleged the "persistence of contacts between Iranian security officials and senior al-Qaeda figures" after 1996, and claimed that "there is strong evidence that Iran facilitated the transit of al-Qaeda members into and out of Afghanistan before 9/11, and that some of these were future 9/11 hijackers."
Iraq was accused of supporting terrorists intent on harming America. No proof of such allegations has emerged. Iran is accused of sponsoring Hezbollah, labeled a terrorist organization. Iran was indicted by the U.S. attorney general for the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing that killed 19 Americans, which according to the 9/11 commission, may have involved al-Qaeda. Furthermore, an American court ruled that Iran was directly involved in the 1982 Beirut bombing that killed 241 U.S. marines.
Both Iraq and Iran have long been declared enemies of Israel. The U.S. and Israel have been warning against the Iranian danger to Israel for many years, claiming it is trying to develop nuclear weapons since at least as far back as 1995. Iran has missiles that can reach Israel; Iraq did not after the Gulf War. Iraq was only accused of giving money to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers; Iran is accused of supplying arms and rockets to Palestinian and Lebanese terrorists.
The U.S. and Britain are accusing Iran of supplying arms and bombs to insurgents in Iraq.
Iraq under Saddam Hussein was a secular regime, more to the liking of America than the Iranian Muslim fundamentalist regime.
Iran has denied most of the allegations listed above. However, the accusations are widely reported in the Western press as facts, and most Americans have accepted them as such.

Consider the following: if the Bush administration knew that it was misusing and manipulating faulty intelligence to justify the Iraq invasion, as most Americans now believe, it also knew that the truth about nonexistent Iraqi WMD would come out after the fact. Whether the American people interpreted it as incompetence or deliberate deception, the administration's decision to go to war would eventually be subject to widespread criticism on either ground. Why did the administration choose to build up a case for invading Iraq out of thin air, knowing full well it was destined to fall apart in the aftermath?

I believe there are two complementary reasons. (1) The faulty arguments to attack Iraq provide an even stronger justification to attack Iran, as explained above. Since the country has already accepted that line of argument, the administration can argue after the attack on Iran that it did not need to go to Congress or the American people to ask for their support again. (2) The real, ultimate goal was always to attack Iran, but the Iraq invasion was a necessary intermediate step.

What the Rest of the World Is Doing

The United States used diplomacy, in particular UN resolution 1441 of November 2002, which was supported unanimously by the Security Council, as a cover to justify its military action against Iraq, and it is using the same strategy again. Europe is enabling the U.S. strategy by pushing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to refer Iran to the Security Council. When the process reaches a dead end at the Security Council, or even if it never gets there, the U.S. will argue that the international community, especially Europe, "share[s] our assessment of the danger, but not our resolve to meet it." Depending on whether diplomatic action stalls at the Security Council or before that at the IAEA, the U.S. will argue that each entity "has not lived up to its responsibilities, so we will rise to ours." Russia and China oppose placing sanctions on Iran, but they are not taking a strong stand against U.S. aggression.

Why a Nuclear Attack Against Iran Is Imminent

The U.S. and Israel have made it clear that they will not allow Iran to implement a civilian nuclear program that includes the fuel cycle, because it will bring Iran closer to a point where it could develop nuclear weapons if it so decided. Iran claims the right to develop civilian nuclear technology, including the fuel cycle, which is explicitly allowed under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). These are completely irreconcilable positions, and in the absence of compromise they can only be resolved by military action in which the stronger side prevails. The U.S. is not negotiating with Iran either directly or indirectly and is in essence demanding that Iran prove today beyond any doubt that it will not have nuclear weapons in the indefinite future, which is as impossible as it was for Saddam Hussein to prove that he did not have weapons he didn't have.

Iran is much stronger militarily than Iraq was, and is potentially a much larger threat to Israel. Iran will continue to grow stronger in the future, and following the Bush logic, it is preferable to preempt than to wait. The Bush statement in the 2002 State of the Union address,

"States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic."

was directed to Iran as much as to Iraq. So was the following:

"I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons."

Furthermore, the balance of power in the region has been upset by the U.S. invasion of Iraq in an irreversible way. The containment that Saddam Hussein provided to Iran's power in the region no longer exists, and if the U.S. reduces its presence in Iraq without attacking Iran, Iran is likely to establish itself further as a strong regional superpower, expanding its influence over Iraq as well as the broader Middle East.

So why hasn't Iran been attacked yet?

Only because several elements had to first fall into place, as they now have. The attack on Iran will occur at any time in the coming days or weeks and will include the use of nuclear weapons by the U.S. Let us summarize the pieces of the puzzle assembled by this and previous administrations that lead to the upcoming nuking of Iran:


The lumping of nuclear weapons together with other unconventional weapons under the general concept of WMD, starting in earnest in the early '90s;
The "negative security assurance" [.pdf] declaration of the United States, which promises not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states, but explicitly excludes from this assurance states that are in noncompliance with the NPT;
The United States' gradual modification of its approach to the use of nuclear weapons, to the point where now they are part of the conventional arsenal. In 2002, when the "Nuclear Posture Review" policy document was leaked and criticized, the Defense Department argued that it was just a "wide-ranging analysis of the requirements of deterrence" and that it "does not provide operational guidance on nuclear targeting or planning." Such "operational guidance" was recently provided and leaked to the press (possibly to gauge public reaction, which unfortunately has been almost nonexistent) in the "Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations" [.pdf] document, which describes many specific scenarios in which the U.S. will use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries, scenarios that apply specifically to the Iran situation.
The scuttling of the NPT Review Conference of 2005, caused mainly by the refusal of the U.S. to include on the agenda issues related to nuclear disarmament and negative security assurances, which are of primary interest to non-nuclear states;
The declaration by the IAEA on Sept. 24, 2005 [.pdf], that Iran is in noncompliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and thus subject to nuclear attack by the U.S.;
The placement of 150,000 U.S. troops within the range of Iranian missiles and conventional forces.
Why are nuclear weapons an indispensable part of the enterprise? Because conventional military action against Iran would be very costly and would likely lead to disaster. Iran has dozens of Shahab 3 missiles that can reach Israel and many more short-range missiles that can target U.S. forces in Iraq, potentially with chemical warheads. It also has a 7 million-strong Basiji volunteer militia and local support from the Shi'ite population in southern Iraq, all of which would easily overwhelm the 150,000 U.S. troops and the weak Iraqi army.

Before the U.S. invaded Iraq, a conventional aerial attack against Iranian installations (like Israel did to Osirak's reactor in 1981) would also have been futile. Iran's facilities are numerous, many are underground, and partial destruction would only have led to a radicalization of Iran's regime and a full-scale drive toward nuclear weapons.

However, to justify the breaking of the 60-year-old taboo against the use of nuclear weapons, it is necessary for the lives of many Americans to be at stake. Otherwise, the American public would not condone the use of nuclear weapons against Iran. By placing U.S. forces within range of Iranian missiles and conventional forces, a situation has been created in which the American public will support the use of nuclear weapons to save thousands of American lives. This is why the invasion of Iraq was a necessary prelude to the nuclear attack on Iran.

Most importantly, the value of nuclear weapons as a deterrent is emphasized in Defense Department policy, and it will undeniably enhance their deterrent effect to demonstrate that the U.S. is ready to use nuclear weapons, lest the world forget after 60 long years of dormancy that nuclear weapons are for real.

Why a Nuclear Attack on Iran Is a Bad Idea

Now that we have outlined what is very close to happening, let us discuss briefly why everything possible should be done to prevent it.

In a worst-case scenario, the attack will cause a violent reaction from Iran. Millions of "human wave" Iranian militias will storm into Iraq, and just as Saddam stopped them with chemical weapons, the U.S. will stop them with nuclear weapons, resulting potentially in hundreds of thousands of casualties. The Middle East will explode, and popular uprisings in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and other countries with pro-Western governments could be overtaken by radical regimes. Pakistan already has nuclear weapons, and a nuclear conflict could even lead to Russia's and Israel's involvement using nuclear weapons.

In a best-case scenario, the U.S. will destroy all nuclear, chemical, and missile facilities in Iran with conventional and low-yield nuclear weapons in a lightning surprise attack, and Iran will be paralyzed and decide not to retaliate for fear of a vastly more devastating nuclear attack. In the short term, the U.S. will succeed, leaving no Iranian nuclear program, civilian or otherwise. Iran will no longer threaten Israel, a regime change will ensue, and a pro-Western government will emerge.

However, even in the best-case scenario, the long-term consequences are dire. The nuclear threshold will have been crossed by a nuclear superpower against a non-nuclear country. Many more countries will rush to get their own nuclear weapons as a deterrent. With no taboo against the use of nuclear weapons, they will certainly be used again. Nuclear conflicts will occur within the next 10 to 20 years, and will escalate until much of the world is destroyed. Let us remember that the destructive power of existing nuclear arsenals is approximately one million times that of the Hiroshima bomb, enough to erase Earth's population many times over.

Furthermore, despite all the U.S. and Israeli allegations, there is not a shred of real evidence that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons. The fact that it hid its nuclear program for many years is understandable, given that the U.S. imposed sanctions on Iran and first accused it of pursuing nuclear weapons many years ago. Since 2003, all Iranian nuclear activities have been open and accessible to the IAEA, and Iran has signed an additional protocol that allows unannounced inspections of all its facilities. Iran would not be able to develop nuclear weapons under these conditions even if it wanted to. Finally, Iran has offered to enter into partnerships with foreign companies to provide additional assurances that its uranium enrichment is devoted solely to civilian purposes. Recall that uranium enrichment for reactors is at 3-5 percent levels, while weapons require 90 percent levels, which demands a qualitatively different effort.

Can a Nuclear Attack Be Averted?

The reader will notice that this section is very short. Creative ideas are needed!

Because the United States is counting on the "nuclear option" to ensure the success of military action against Iran, it is not seriously pursuing diplomatic alternatives, such as negotiating directly with Iran to reach an agreement on a civilian nuclear program under strict international supervision.

It is essential to debate whether the U.S. should use nuclear weapons against Iran before it happens rather than after. In the case of Hiroshima, because the existence of nuclear bombs was classified information, a public discussion on whether nuclear bombs should have been used against Japan to end World War II could not occur. Many physicists who were part of the Manhattan Project in 1945 urged the government not to use the newly developed weapons, but their calls went unheeded.

Today, a public debate can occur. The scenarios described in the Pentagon document [.pdf] in which the U.S. would use nuclear weapons include "for rapid and favorable war termination on U.S. terms," against "an adversary intending to use WMD against U.S., multinational, or alliance forces," and "to demonstrate U.S. intent and capability to use nuclear weapons." These are not acceptable scenarios. It is not in the best interests of the United States nor the rest of the world for the U.S. to base its military planning on such policies, because if it does so a situation will inevitably arise in which no alternative will be left, as in the case considered here. There has to be a public discussion in the media, online, and in Congress. Unless there is an extraordinary outcry of opposition against such policies, they are bound to be implemented in the very near future.
Snuffysmith
http://fairuse.1accesshost.com/news2/nyt097.html

November 20, 2005
Iran Approves Bill to Bar U.N. From Nuclear Sites

By NAZILA FATHI
TEHRAN, Nov. 20 - Iran's conservative Parliament approved the outline of a bill today that would bar United Nations inspectors from visiting its nuclear sites if the agency referred Iran's case to the Security Council for possible punitive measures.

The vote came before the International Atomic Energy Agency's board of governors was expected to review Iran's case on Thursday. The agency passed a resolution in September and called on Iran to suspend all its uranium enrichment-related activities before the meeting this month.

The Iranian measure needs to be approved by the Guardian Council before it becomes law. But the vote today, which was approved by 183 of the 197 lawmakers present at the session, suggests that Parliament backs the government's tougher stance over its nuclear program.

"By approving this bill, we are sending a message to the atomic agency," said Alaedin Boroujerdi, the head of Parliament's Commission for Foreign Policy and National Security, urging the agency not to act against Iran.

"Otherwise, we require the government to suspend all its voluntary measures," he said, according to the ISNA student news agency. Mr. Boroujerdi was referring to Iran's allowing inspection of its nuclear sites.

Iran defied an agreement with the three European countries, Britain, France and Germany in August and resumed activities at one of its nuclear sites near the city of Isfahan.

It further complicated diplomacy last week after it fed a new batch of uranium into the facility. The work includes converting mined uranium, known as yellowcake, into a gas, uranium tetra-fluoride, or UF4, a step before enrichment.

In a report on Friday, the head of the international nuclear agency, Mohamed ElBaradei, praised Iran's "transparency and indispensable" cooperation but also urged it to suspend its enrichment-related activities and to allow inspectors to visit a military site, Lavizan Shian, near Tehran.

Last year, the United States accused Iran of dismantling buildings at the Lavizan Shian site and removing topsoil from the area in an effort to hide nuclear-weapons related experiments. Iran contended that the razed construction was not related to military or nuclear work.

A Foreign Ministry spokesman, Hamid Reza Assefi, said today that Iran would only allow the inspectors to visit that site if they could provide "concrete proof" of weapons-related activity. "They cannot just say we want to talk to this or that person and keep dragging out the case," he said. "They should tell us their aims, and these aims should be towards closing the case."

He also brushed off references in the report to blueprints of detailed nuclear designs, saying they were "baseless," and "media speculation."

The report said Iran had turned over a document - which it never used - that said in 1987 it obtained blueprints of nuclear information from a network run by Abdul Qader Khan, the father of Pakistan's atomic program. Diplomats said the information could be used for making a nuclear bomb.

Copyright 2005 The New York Times Company
Snuffysmith
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20051120/wl_mi...ea_051120201310

Iran may have handed over nuclear core plan by accident Sun Nov 20, 3:13 PM ET



Iran may have handed over a document which describes how to make what could be the explosive core of an atom bomb by accident to UN inspectors, diplomats said, giving more details about its contents.

One diplomat told AFP: "It's a bit puzzling they came and gave" the document to inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Other diplomats said the IAEA inspectors found it in a stack of other unrelated papers that the Vienna-based UN nuclear watchdog had asked for.

But IAEA vice chairman Mohammad Saidi said Saturday in Tehran that by handing over the document Iran was showing its good faith, reporting with "complete transparence" on its controversial nuclear program.

Iran said the document was part of a 1987 offer from a black market network that it never acted upon.

The text spells out "procedural requirements for ... the casting and machining of enriched, natural and depleted uranium metal into hemispherical forms," the IAEA said in a confidential report released Friday to its 35-nation board of governors and obtained by AFP.

Gary Samore, a non-proliferation expert who was an official in former president Bill Clinton's White House, told AFP: "There is no other purpose for manufacturing highly enriched uranium in hemispheres except for nuclear weapons."

The disclosure of the document raised concerns about Iran's nuclear program, which Tehran says is a peaceful drive to produce electricity but the United States and Europe fear could conceal a secret program to develop atomic weapons.

A diplomat close to the IAEA said the document was found in "two or three cardboard boxes" full of papers which Iran handed over and was in a binder and consisted of some 10 pages.

The diplomat said the document was a "step-by-step" guide for turning uranium gas into enriched uranium metal and casting it into a hemispherical shape.

Samore, speaking from Chicago where he works for the MacArthur Foundation, said: "The first step is you have to convert the gas to metal, then melt and cast the metal, not too much at a time because you don't want a criticality accident (an explosion).

"Then you make it into a rough cast hemisphere, put it on a lathe and cut it to exact specifications," he said.

The diplomat close to the IAEA said the Iranian document had "a couple of drawings" but was by no means a blueprint and that there were "no drawings for the core" of a bomb where the hemispheres would lie.

Also, the document "doesn't give anything like dimensions," the diplomat said.

But the 1987 offer from the smuggling network run by disgraced Pakistani atomic scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan did provide blueprints for centrifuges, the IAEA has said.

The diplomat said the Iranian document was the same sort of texts and drawings the Khan network handed to Libya and South Africa but that no one has seen a "whole set" of the Khan documents detailing nuclear technology and materials.

"Khan and company were hawking the whole works" of bomb technology, a second diplomat said, while the first diplomat said the IAEA was "still working to find out what else Iran may have received."

Gregory Schulte, the US ambassador to the IAEA, told reporters Friday: "Iran owes the (IAEA) board an explanation why it had these documents, what it has done with them, and why it didn't disclose them in the past."

He said the "documents open new concern about weaponization that Iran has failed to address."



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Prewar Nuclear Myths and Realities from the Arms Control Association : Chronology of Bush Administration Claims that Iraq Attempted to Obtain Uranium from Niger (2001-2003)

11/21/2005 4:28:00 PM
To: National Desk

Contact: Paul Kerr, 202-463-8270 ext. 102, Daryl G. Kimball, 202-463-8270 ext. 107, both of the Arms Control Association

WASHINGTON, Nov. 21 /U.S. Newswire/ -- One of the chief arguments used by the Bush administration to justify the U.S.-led March 2003 invasion of Iraq was that Saddam Hussein's Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. For instance, only three days before U.S.-led coalition forces invaded Iraq Vice President Dick Cheney claimed that Iraq had "reconstituted nuclear weapons." Central to the administration's argument were erroneous claims that Iraq had recently attempted to obtain lightly-processed uranium, or "yellowcake," from Africa and that it had attempted to acquire specialized aluminum tubes as part of a uranium enrichment program to produce fissile material, which is necessary for making nuclear weapons.

The claim regarding the uranium deal remains contentious to this day because President George W. Bush cited it in his January 28, 2003 State of the Union Address and because officials in the White House and the Office of Vice President Cheney waged a public campaign to discredit former Ambassador Joseph Wilson, who publicly challenged the uranium claim in the summer of 2003.

Contrary to White House assertions that the "intelligence was all wrong," as early as a year before the invasion U.S. intelligence assessments and senior U.S. officials disagreed about the reliability of the information supporting the main nuclear weapons-related claims.

Furthermore, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors working on the ground in Iraq from November 2002 until March of 2003 found no evidence that Baghdad had reconstituted its nuclear weapons program. The evidence from the field should have made it clear that UN inspections and sanctions had constrained Saddam's unconventional arsenal and led the administration to reevaluate its own intelligence assessment. But it did not.

The chronology of events involving the internal intelligence assessments and international inspections (see http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/IraqUraniumClaim.asp) clearly demonstrates that senior Bush administration officials disregarded intelligence assessments that did not support the claim that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program and that the administration did not provide an accurate picture of the military threat posed by Saddam Hussein's Iraq to Congress or to the American people.

As Greg Thielmann, a former senior official in the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, described the situation at a July 2003 ACA press briefing, "Some of the fault lies with the performance of the intelligence community, but most of it lies with the way senior officials misused the information they were provided."

Now, the administration's handling of the uranium and other pre-war intelligence regarding Iraq is the subject of the delayed, "second phase" investigation by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI).

"Among other issues, the SSCI investigation should examine who in the White House and other agencies chose to put forward dubious claims about Iraqi attempts to secure uranium from Africa despite clear warnings from the CIA Director and other members of the intelligence community that such claims were not reliable," said Daryl G. Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association.

"It is also essential that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence investigate why Bush administration officials also failed to take into consideration the weapons intelligence findings and assessments of the IAEA and UN inspectors working in Iraq, which strongly repudiated the nuclear program reconstitution claim, as well as the Bush administration's faulty claim that Iraq had mobile biological weapons labs," Kimball urged.

Prior to the March 2003 invasion, ACA publicly argued that "continued, tough inspections can provide the necessary confidence that Iraq cannot reconstitute militarily significant chemical, biological, or nuclear capabilities and help produce more definitive findings to help Security Council members bridge their differences" about military action.

"Intelligence is meant to inform government decision-making, not to be invoked or discarded selectively to justify predetermined political decisions," Kimball concluded.

------

The Arms Control Association is an independent, nonprofit membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of and support for effective arms control policies.

http://www.usnewswire.com/
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Europe Moves Toward Delay of Iran Referral
(Steven R. Weisman, New York Times)

Tuesday, November 22
The leading countries of Europe conferred about Iran on Monday, with growing indications that they would not move later this week to refer Iran's recent actions in its nuclear program to the United Nations Security Council for possible sanctions.

Western diplomats said it remained important to keep a consensus on Iran, not only between Europe and the United States but also with China, Russia and India, all of which have said they oppose a referral to the Security Council at this time.
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Coming Up Short
(Carnegie Analysis, Joshua Williams)

Friday, November 18
Earlier this week the 9/11 Public Discourse Project, an extension of the bipartisan 9/11 Commission, reported on efforts to protect America from terrorists that seek nuclear weapons and materials. Their verdict was not a happy one. Chairman Thomas H. Kean and Vice Chairman Lee H. Hamilton cited “insufficient progress” in the race against time to prevent the world’s most dangerous people from getting the world’s most dangerous weapons. In short, they wrote, “the size of the problem still dwarfs the policy response.”
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Iran Gives UN Bomb Part Instructions
(Mark Heinrich and Francois Murphy, Reuters)

Friday, November 18
The U.N. nuclear watchdog said in a confidential report on Friday that Iran had given it a document which diplomats said included partial instructions for making the core of a nuclear bomb.

The U.S. ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said the disclosure heightened concerns about weaponisation, but other diplomats and a U.S. nuclear expert said more inquiry was needed.

"Iran's full transparency is indispensable and overdue," IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei said in his report to the agency's board of governors, due to meet on November 24 to consider again whether to send Iran's case to the U.N. Security Council, which has the power to impose sanctions.
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Iran Parliament Approves Bill To Block Nuclear Inspections
(Wall Street Journal)

Sunday, November 20
Iran Parliament approved a bill Sunday requiring the government to block international inspections of its atomic facilities if the United Nations nuclear monitoring agency refers Iran to the Security Council for possible sanctions. The bill was approved by 183 of the 197 lawmakers present at the session, which was broadcast live on state-run radio. The vote came four days before the International Atomic Energy Agency board meets to consider referring Tehran for violating a nuclear arms control treaty.

When the bill becomes law, as is expected, it will strengthen the government's hand in resisting international pressure to abandon uranium enrichment, a process that can be used to produce fuel for nuclear reactors or an atomic bomb. The bill will go to the Guardian Council, a hard-line constitutional watchdog, for expected ratification.
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Bush Backs Plan to Move Iran's Uranium Enrichment to Russia
(David E. Sanger, New York Times)

Friday, November 18
President Bush told President Vladimir V. Putin today that the United States was willing to accept a nuclear compromise - rejected by Tehran in recent days - that would move all of Iran's enrichment of uranium to Russia.

"We hope that over time Iran will see the virtue of this approach, and it may provide a way out," Mr. Bush's national security adviser, Stephen Hadley, told reporters here today, after the two leaders met.
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US Wants China to Clean Up N.Korea Nuclear "Mess"
(Elaine Lies, Reuters)

Saturday, November 19
The top U.S. negotiator to six-country talks on North Korea's nuclear programs urged China on Saturday to "take a little more responsibility for cleaning up that mess."

A fifth round of talks broke off last week in Beijing with the United States and North Korea far apart after Pyongyang offered to freeze but not dismantle its nuclear programs in return for compensation. Washington said that was unacceptable.
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N.Korea Nuclear Deal Could Lead to Regional Body-Roh
(Reuters)

Saturday, November 19
If the crisis over North Korea's nuclear programmes can be resolved it could boost the region's economy as well as enhancing security, South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun said on Saturday.

Roh told reporters security was vital to the economy of the Northeast Asia region, and the six-party talks on North Korea's nuclear ambitions were a crucial factor. He said it was a common theme when foreign investors spoke with him.

"I think it's safe to say that once the six-party talks succeed that this will give greater momentum to expanding the horizons of our dialogue into including a peace regime on the Korean peninsula as well as a multilateral security regime in the Northeast Asia region as a whole," he said.
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Carnegie Conference Featured Resources:

The Taboos, Secrets, and Hidden History of Nuclear Weapons
The panel was chaired by William Burr, National Security Archive.

Download a transcript of this panel by the Federal News Service
Download a rapporteur summary of the panel
Download Lynn Eden's presentation
Download Robert Norris' presentation
Download Nina Tannenwald's presentation

Download audio:

Part I: William Burr, National Security Archive
Part II : Robert Norris, Natural Resources Defense Council
Part III : Lynn Eden, Stanford University
Part IV: Nina Tannenwald, Brown University
Part V: Question and Answer Session
Click here for more resources from the 2005 Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference.
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Russian plan for Iran unites IAEA By Mark Heinrich and Louis Charbonneau
Thu Nov 24, 3:22 PM ET



Governors of the U.N. nuclear watchdog broadly agreed on Thursday it was better to explore a Russian compromise over Iran's nuclear activities than to report Tehran to the Security Council, Western board members said.

A text reflecting this was submitted by the European Union's three biggest powers, France, Britain and Germany, and was adopted as part of a statement approved at a meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency's board (IAEA).

The statement noted the view of developing country members that Iran was showing more cooperation with IAEA inspectors, but Western powers said it also said Tehran had a long way to go to refute suspicions it had a covert atomic bomb project.

"Calls were made for Iran to resume the negotiating process with the (EU's big three or EU3)," said the statement, prepared by current IAEA chairman Japan and seen by Reuters.

"Support was expressed for the EU3 effort to broaden the basis for international consensus through additional elements ... such as the Russian proposal," it said.

The statement omitted mention of previous threats to refer Iran to the U.N. Security Council for possible sanctions over suspicions over its nuclear ambitions, a move the United States and EU had been seeking for months.

Tehran denies wanting anything more than civilian nuclear energy. But it acknowledges hiding potentially weapons-related technology from U.N. inspectors for 18 years until 2003.

Diplomats said a decision by the EU and the United States not to press for referral at the meeting had averted a potential clash with Russia and China, which oppose such a move.

Both powers have major energy stakes in Iran but have urged it to be provide more IAEA access to its nuclear sites.

Rarely united previously, they and the Western powers, along with developing countries such as India and South Africa, now seem to agree Russia's proposal offers the best route forward.

RUSSIAN PROPOSAL

Moscow has suggested letting Tehran perform less sensitive uranium processing in Iran and send the converted material to Russia, where a Russian-Iranian joint venture would handle the critical enrichment process. Enrichment can yield fuel for nuclear power stations or bomb-grade uranium fuel.

The EU text said the IAEA's 35-nation board had "unanimous hope ... that the negotiation process could resume, taking into account, among different ideas, the Russian proposals."

Javad Vaeedi, deputy head of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, said Tehran had seen no proposal yet.

"Iran welcomes any proposal that acknowledges its right to have access to peaceful nuclear technology," he told the official news agency IRNA in Vienna.

Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani, said enrichment would be the main topic of any future discussions with the Europeans and Russia.

But the EU text cited "broad consensus not to allow Iran in the present circumstances to conduct enrichment-related activities on its soil ... None of the members of the board wishes Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon."

Germany's ambassador to the IAEA, Herbert Honsowitz, told the board session that if Iran began enriching uranium, "it must be absolutely clear that this would immediately put an end to our (diplomatic) efforts."

U.S. Ambassador Gregory Schulte said only "a short period" should be given for Iran to earn international confidence.

"Just as we join with all in this room in seeking a diplomatic solution ..., (if there is no) verified change in course in Iran, very little more time can pass before the board must make its report to the Security Council," he said.

Western concerns were heightened last month when the Islamic republic's president said Israel should be "wiped off the map."

Diplomats said envoys from Russia, Britain, France, Germany and Iran tentatively planned to meet in December, four months after the EU3 cut off contact with Iran in protest over it ending a suspension in converting uranium for nuclear fuel.

The statement said some IAEA members were disturbed by Iran's disclosure that it got documents from black marketeers describing in part how to build the core of a nuclear bomb.

Peter Jenkins, British envoy to the IAEA, said this clearly reflected a quest for nuclear arms. He warned that while the EU had opted to give Iran more time to weigh Moscow's proposal, the West's forbearance was not unlimited.

"Iran should not conclude that this window of opportunity will remain open in all circumstances," he told reporters.

Mohammad Mehdi Akhunzadeh, Iran's envoy to the IAEA, said the black-market document contained "simple, non-sophisticated information that could be found on the Internet."

A European diplomat said: "The Internet did not exist at the time when they got these (bomb core) papers."

(Additional reporting by Parinoosh Arami and Paul Hughes in Tehran and Paul Taylor in Brussels)



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China Opposes Bringing Iran Before U.N. By ALEXA OLESEN, Associated Press Writer
Thu Nov 24, 5:51 AM ET

China stuck to its long-held position Thursday that the dispute over Iran's nuclear program should be resolved through negotiations and not be brought before the U.N. Security Council.

The statement comes as diplomats gathered in Vienna for a 35-nation meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency, with the European Union expected to warn Iran to change its ways or face the threat of referral to the U.N. Security Council.

"We have a consistent position on the Iranian nuclear issue," said Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao at a briefing.

"For the current stage, we should seek a proper solution within the framework of the IAEA," Liu said. "We don't think it is appropriate now to refer this question to the U.N. Security Council."

At issue is Iran's refusal to give up uranium enrichment, which can be used to generate power but also to make weapons-grade material for nuclear warheads. Iran says it wants only to make fuel, but international concern is growing that the program could be misused.

For months, Iran has relied on Beijing and Moscow, two of the five permanent members of the Security Council, to fend off a U.S.-backed push to have it hauled before the Council.

Currently, Iran's enrichment program is frozen. But negotiations between Iran and France, Britain and Germany — the so-called EU-3 — broke off in August after Iran restarted the conversion of raw uranium into the gas that is used as the feed stock in enrichment.

Liu said China hoped to see "the early restoration of negotiations between Iran and the EU-3 so as to seek a long-term solution acceptable to all parties."




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EU Alleges Iran Possesses Nuclear Designs By GEORGE JAHN, Associated Press Writer
Thu Nov 24, 4:15 PM ET



The European Union accused Iran on Thursday of having documents that show how to make nuclear warheads and joined the United States in warning Tehran it could be referred to the U.N. Security Council for possible sanctions.

Iran, meanwhile, suggested it was considering a compromise to reduce tensions.

Britain, in a statement on behalf of the 25-nation bloc, offered new negotiations meant to lessen concerns over Iran's insistence it be in full control of uranium enrichment — a possible pathway to nuclear arms.

"But Iran should not conclude that this window of opportunity will remain open in all circumstances," said a statement read by Peter Jenkins, the chief British delegate to the International Atomic Energy Agency, outside a closed meeting of the 35-nation board.

Diplomats described the statement as a veiled threat of Security Council referral.

"It won't be open for a great deal longer," Jenkins said later when asked how much time Iran had to influence the language of a report to the Security Council.

The final statement was toned down before being delivered to the media.

An earlier version made available to The Associated Press said: "Failure to make progress" on easing international concerns about Iran's nuclear program "will hasten the day when the board decides that a report to the Security Council must be made."

The United States said separately that Iran cannot avoid referral to the Security Council for violating the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty but added that Washington and its European allies were delaying such a move to give Tehran a chance to defuse fears it wants to make nuclear arms.

"Iran must understand that the report to the council is required and will be made at a time of this board's choosing," said Gregory L. Shulte, the chief U.S. representative to the Vienna-based IAEA.

But, he said, Washington is ready to wait in hopes that "Iran will reverse course and demonstrate" cooperation both with an IAEA probe of its nuclear activities and an international attempt to re-engage it in talks meant to reduce fears about its intentions.

"One thing is clear, no one wants this dangerous regime to acquire the most deadly of weapons," he later told reporters.

With even traditional allies Russia and China increasing pressure on Tehran, the Iranians are "digging themselves deeper into a hole that threatens to collapse around them," he said.

For months, Iran has relied on Beijing and Moscow to fend off a U.S.-backed push to have it hauled before the Security Council. But the Russians are now working with the Americans and Europeans to push a compromise enrichment plan, and officials recently told AP that China also is moving closer to the Western position.

The main issue is Iran's refusal to give up its right to enrichment, which can be used to generate power but also to make weapons-grade material for nuclear warheads. Iran says it wants only to make fuel, but international concern is growing that the program could be misused.

A plan floated in recent weeks foresees moving any Iranian enrichment plan to Russia. There, in theory, Moscow would supervise the process to make sure enrichment is only to fuel levels.

But Iran insists it wants to master the complete fuel cycle domestically. Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki told reporters in Tehran on Wednesday that, while his country was willing to resume formal talks with key European powers on its nuclear program, "naturally we aim to have enrichment on Iran's territory."

On Thursday, however, a senior Iranian diplomat appeared to soften his country's stance.

"We are considering it," Mohammed Mehdi Akhounzadeh Basti, the chief Iranian delegate to the IAEA, told the AP when asked about the plan to move Iran's enrichment program to Russia.

Fellow delegate Javad Vaidi said, "We are prepared to follow the path of dialogue with other countries, including the EU-3," referring to France, Germany and Britain, the key EU negotiators.

Jenkins focused on new revelations contained in a report drawn up for the board meeting by IAEA head Mohamed ElBaradei, including a finding showing the Iranians in possession of what appeared to be drawings of the core of an atomic warhead. The agency said last week that Iran obtained detailed designs from the black market run by Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan's nuclear program.

In his statement to the board, also made available to AP, Jenkins said the documents have "no other application than the production of nuclear warheads."

"This reinforces earlier concerns aroused by possible indications of Iranian weaponization activity," he told the board, alluding to a series of findings over the past three years by IAEA experts suggesting that Iran may have experimented with procedures meant to make nuclear weapons.

A separate Iranian statement prepared for the board meeting accused the "U.S. and terrorist groups" of fabricating "false allegations against Iran" in suggesting it was interested in nuclear arms.

It described the find of the warhead documents as a "minor issue" that should not detract from the "tremendous progress achieved by (the) joint cooperation of (the) IAEA and Iran" in clearing up questions about Tehran's nuclear program.



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Iran: A-bomb data available on Net By Louis Charbonneau and Francois Murphy
Thu Nov 24, 3:23 PM ET



Iran attempted to play down the importance of information it received from the black market on making the core of a nuclear weapon and said on Thursday the material was freely available on the Internet.

Last week the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said in a report that Iran had handed over several pages related to the production of key components of a nuclear weapon.

The United States and European Union said the pages showed Iran's atomic ambitions may include a nuclear arsenal but Iran's ambassador to the IAEA, Mohammad Mehdi Akhunzadeh, denied this.

"The information contained in one-and-a-half pages is simple and non-sophisticated information which could be found in (public) literature and on the Internet," Akhunzadeh told a meeting of the IAEA's 35-nation board of governors.

He said the documents were "incomplete" and argued that handing the documents to the IAEA was in itself "a clear indication of Iran's full transparency with the IAEA."

But Western diplomats and analysts disagreed.

"The Iranian explanation is laughable and not credible. It's classified information. It's about metallurgy and how to machine uranium successfully into spheres for a nuclear weapon," William Peden, a Greenpeace nuclear analyst, told Reuters.

A European diplomat pointed out that the Internet did not even exist at the time Iran got the documents.

Gregory Schulte, U.S. ambassador to the IAEA, told reporters: "This is not information Iran downloaded from the Internet. This is information that they obtained, according to the IAEA, from a nuclear trafficking network that has provided a nuclear weapons design to at least one other country (Libya)."

Iran says it received the documents from an illicit procurement network linked to disgraced Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, whose agents met with Iranian officials in 1987 while the Iran-Iraq war was raging.

Tehran says it wants only civilian energy from its nuclear development program.

It acknowledges hiding potentially weapons-related technology from U.N. inspectors for 18 years until 2003 but says it was given these particular documents without having requested them and did nothing with them.

A European diplomat questioned Iran's claim to transparency and said Iran had claimed for months it had received only a one-page offer after the 1987 meeting with agents of Khan before it suddenly said it had found a large box of documents.




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Wisdom prevailed at UN atomic meeting: Iran cleric
Fri Nov 25, 2005 6:17 AM ET

TEHRAN (Reuters) - Influential Iranian cleric Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani said on Friday the U.N. nuclear watchdog's latest statement on Iran's disputed atomic program was a step in the right direction but still had elements of "harassment".

The International Atomic Energy Agency decided on Thursday not to refer Iran to the U.N. Security Council for possible sanctions in order to give Russia time to broker a compromise deal under which Moscow would enrich Iran's processed uranium.

"This time a kind of wisdom, precaution, and an avoidance of adventurism prevailed over the IAEA meeting," Rafsanjani told worshippers at Friday prayers in Tehran.

The mid-ranking cleric heads the powerful Expediency Council which arbitrates in constitutional disputes.

Iran has been risking referral to the Council after failing to convince the world that its nuclear scientists are working on fuel for power stations rather than bombs.

Western diplomats say Tehran could guarantee that the uranium would only be enriched to the low level needed for power stations, and not to the higher weapons-grade, by allowing Russia to act a middle man and conduct the nuclear fuel work.

Rafsanjani, president from 1989 to 1997, made no specific reference to this proposal.

"There are some points in the communiqué that betray a vestige of harassment," he said.

The IAEA statement noted that Western powers reckoned Tehran had a long way to go to refute suspicions it had a covert atomic bomb project.

It also said some IAEA members were disturbed by Iran's disclosure that it got documents from black marketeers describing in part how to build the core of a nuclear bomb.

"We will never accept being bullied and it is not worth you bullying us," Rafsanjani added.



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EU agrees to renewed dialogue with Iran on nuclear programme
By Gareth Smyth in Tehran
Published: November 28 2005 02:00 | Last updated: November 28 2005 02:00

European Union foreign ministers delivered a letter in Tehran yesterday agreeing to renewed talks over Iran's nuclear programme.


The move, in response to a request sent earlier this month by Ali Larijani, Iran's top security official, came after the EU and US stepped back from pressing last week's meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency to refer Tehran to the UN Security Council. The semi-official Mehr news agency reported that talks could begin around December 10.

In Barcelona Javier Solana, the EU foreign policy representative, said: "A letter has been conveyed to Iran this afternoon [by] the three countries (UK, France and Germany) plus myself. In that letter we offered the Iranians to have conversation, dialogue, to see if we have enough common basis to start negotiations."

European diplomats acknowledge that last week's meeting did not produce a united front to censure Iran but maintain that the pressure remains on Tehran to comply and that it is important to continue to seek a dialogue. Iranian officials and politicians have publicly hardened opposition to a Russian proposal that EU diplomats believe could offer a compromise guaranteeing Iran would not divert enriched uranium into nuclear weapons. Hamid-Reza Asefi, the foreign ministry spokesman, said yesterday any talks would centre on the "materialisation of nuclear fuel production in Iran", apparently ruling out Moscow's suggestion that Iran enrich uranium in Russia. His remarks came after leading parliamentary deputies attacked the proposal. Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh, a member of parliament's security and foreign policy commission, said Iran could not rely on another country "to supply its nuclear energy needs".

The conservative Kayhan newspaper, a long-term critic of talks with the EU, hailed the IAEA meeting as a victory resulting from Iran's "position of honour and dignity".

"Much to the joy of the United States and its allies, Iran has on several occasions retreated from its inalienable right to peaceful nuclear technology," Kayhan said. "All these setbacks [for Iran] never gained the expected results [but] instead made the opponents even more voracious and aggressive. . . "

In a similar tone, President Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad told western nations on Saturday that they had "no right to tell Iran to cease its peaceful nuclear activities" and called for war crime charges against President George W. Bush.

Mr Ahmadi-Nejad was addressing a rally of the Basij, an official militia, which claimed that 9m members had formed human chains across Iran to show willingness to defend the country from foreign attack. State television aired footage of the Basij rally shot by Fox News, the US station recently allowed access to Iran.

A European diplomat admitted that the EU faced a challenge in convincing Iran that time for a compromise was limited.
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This is not information Iran downloaded from the Internet. This is information they obtained … from a nuclear-trafficking network that has provided a nuclear-weapon design to at least one other country.
—U.S. Ambassador to the IAEA Gregory Schulte, responding to Tehran’s defense that nuclear-weapon design information it purchased from the Khan network was “nonsophisticated information” that could easily be obtained online.







U.S. Ambassador to the IAEA Gregory Schulte last week dismissed Tehran’s claim that documents obtained from former Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan were readily available through open sources (Joe Klamar/Getty Images).

Iran Wins Reprieve, West Concedes Uranium Conversion

By Greg Webb
Global Security Newswire

VIENNA — Iran received a diplomatic reprieve late last week as the European Union and the United States agreed to defer their push to report the Iranian nuclear issue to the U.N. Security Council (see GSN, Nov. 23).

Officials gathering here at a meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s governing board elected to allow more time for reinvigorated negotiations between Iran and France, Germany and the United Kingdom, the three largest EU nations, which have been spearheading an effort to resolve the nuclear crisis...Full Story



North Korea Seeks U.S. Compensation for Scrapped Light-Water Reactor Project

Pyongyang today asked for “political and economic” compensation after last week’s decision by an international consortium to scrap a light-water nuclear reactor project in North Korea, Reuters reported (see GSN, Nov. 23)...Full Story



German Proliferator Receives Prison Sentence

A German court on Thursday sentenced a man to seven years and three months in prison for smuggling dual-use equipment to Pakistan, Agence France-Presse reported (see GSN, Oct. 28)...Full Story

Monday, November 28, 2005




Iran Wins Reprieve, West Concedes Uranium Conversion


By Greg Webb
Global Security Newswire



VIENNA — Iran received a diplomatic reprieve late last week as the European Union and the United States agreed to defer their push to report the Iranian nuclear issue to the U.N. Security Council (see GSN, Nov. 23).

Officials gathering here at a meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s governing board elected to allow more time for reinvigorated negotiations between Iran and France, Germany and the United Kingdom, the three largest EU nations, which have been spearheading an effort to resolve the nuclear crisis.

Still, while leaving open a “window of opportunity” for continued talks, British Ambassador Peter Jenkins cautioned that the opening would not “stay open forever or under all circumstances.”

Next Round of Talks

While the agency board meetings have often served as the main forum for the international community to discuss Iran’s nuclear ambitions, last week’s meeting was overshadowed by an agreement for renewed EU-Iran talks, which are scheduled for early next week.

Diplomats here told Global Security Newswire that the precise schedule remains to be set but that the meetings would take place Dec. 6 or Dec. 7, most likely in Vienna or possibly Moscow.

The Moscow option has indicated the growing involvement of Russia in a possible resolution to the crisis, which began two years ago, when Iran acknowledged concealing an extensive nuclear program for nearly 20 years. Tehran has steadfastly declared its programs to be peaceful, but the long-time clandestine nature of the program, combined with a still-unsatisfied nuclear agency, has fueled continued Western suspicion of Iran’s nuclear aims.

Moscow has proposed a compromise solution in which it would host a Russian-Iranian facility to enrich uranium to low levels for use in Iranian nuclear power plants.

The success of this proposal remains uncertain. While Iranian diplomats here said they were considering the Russian offer, other officials in Tehran said Iran would insist on having the uranium-enrichment facility on its territory.

“Any proposal that contains producing nuclear fuel inside Iran will be supported by Iran,” said Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi yesterday, the Associated Press reported.

While the Russian proposal focuses on the location of enrichment sites, it tacitly accepts Iran’s intention to convert mined uranium into a gaseous form to make it ready for enrichment.

In a significant concession, the EU nations and the United States have retreated from opposing Iran’s uranium conversion program. Earlier this year, the EU halted talks with Iran after Tehran restarted its conversion facility, but that opposition has faded with the prospect of enrichment taking place outside Iran.

For its part, the United States has made an evolutionary leap in policy. During the Clinton administration and the beginning of the Bush administration, the United States leaned heavily on Russia to end Moscow’s nuclear cooperation with Iran. Russia has nearly completed building a nuclear power plant in Iran at Bushehr and has agreed to supply the fuel for that reactor. Today, Washington appears to have no problem with that relationship and sees such an arrangement as an acceptable path to preventing Iran from acquiring the means to make nuclear weapons, according to officials here.

U.S. Ambassador Gregory Schulte sidestepped the policy change Thursday.

“I’m a very bad historian on that,” he told reporters.

Hemispheres

Although the forum for Iran has switched to the next week’s talks, Western nations still seized the opportunity here to continue accusing Iran of having nuclear-weapon ambitions.

In particular, many nations drew attention to a single sentence in a recent report by agency Director General Mohamed ElBaradei that said Iran had admitted receiving documents “on the casting and machining of enriched, natural and depleted uranium metal into hemispherical forms.” The documents came from the international nuclear-smuggling network led by former Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, who provided Iran with much of its uranium enrichment technology.

While ElBaradei is politically prevented from drawing conclusions from the data the agency gathers, agency member states are not.

As for uranium shaping, “such a process has no application other than the production of nuclear warheads,” said British Ambassador Jenkins on behalf on the European Union.

He criticized Iran for revealing the documents only this year, long after Tehran pledged full cooperation with the agency.

“It is disturbing that a state which practiced a policy of concealment for 18 years should be so reluctant to demonstrate that it no longer has anything to hide. This reluctance makes Iran’s claim that its nuclear program is exclusively peaceful in nature ring hollow,” Jenkins said.

Iran sought to soften the disclosure’s blow by arguing that it had never requested the documents and that Khan had simply included them in a package of other material.

Furthermore, “the information contained in one-and-a-half pages is simple and nonsophisticated information which could be found in open literature and [the] Internet,” said Iranian Ambassador Mohammad Akhondzadeh in his statement to the board Thursday.

He complained also that “it has become the usual practice by the U.S. and terrorist groups supported by this state to fabricate false allegations against Iran.”

U.S. Ambassador Schulte disagreed with Akhondzadeh’s assessment of the documents.

“This is not information that Iran downloaded from the Internet. This is information that they obtained, according to the IAEA, from a nuclear-trafficking network that has provided a nuclear-weapon design to at least one other country,” he told reporters, referring to Khan’s supply of design information to Libya.

Agency officials also privately expressed concern about the documents to GSN, saying they had no purpose but to manufacture nuclear weapons.

British Ambassador Jenkins initiated a minor disturbance on the board when he asked ElBaradei to deliver copies of the documents to the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council for examination.

“It would be helpful if the director general could arrange for the document to be seen by experts from the five nuclear-weapon states,” he said in the British statement to the board on Thursday.

A number of non-nuclear nations quickly objected, however, complaining that providing access to only a portion of the board would be discriminatory. Led by South Africa, the non-nuclear states also argued that such a move “would undermine the director general’s independence and authority,” said one diplomat in the boardroom.

Eventually, Jenkins stepped back and said the United Kingdom was simply offering its services to the agency.

Security Council Report

At its meeting in September, the board found Iran to be in noncompliance with its nuclear safeguards obligations, a finding that U.S. officials have argued must lead eventually to the board reporting Iran to the U.N. Security Council. By giving the EU-Iran talks more time, Washington and the EU agreed not to push for such a report at last week’s meeting.

The report was still inevitable, said Schulte.

“The report to the Security Council will come, and it will come at a time of our choosing,” he said. “And that time will be soon if Iran continues to defy the board’s calls to cooperate fully with the IAEA.”

Nobel Prize

In other business, the board agreed to spend the agency’s share of this year’s Nobel Peace Prize on a fund to train cancer treatment professionals in developing nations. ElBaradei and the agency were awarded 5 million Swedish kronor each last month in recognition of their work toward world peace.

ElBaradei’s portion would go toward funding orphanages in Egypt, according to an agency spokeswoman.
Snuffysmith
U.S. alters nuclear weapons policy
Congress rejects 'bunker busters' for more reliable arms
- James Sterngold, Chronicle Staff Writer
Monday, November 28, 2005


After struggling in recent years to redefine U.S. nuclear policy, Congress turned the country in a new direction this month by giving millions of dollars for a program aimed at producing a smaller arsenal of more reliable warheads.

Lawmakers killed the widely criticized nuclear "bunker buster" concept, which critics regarded as too aggressive, and instead appropriated $25 million for research on what is called the reliable replacement warhead, or RRW. Though that initial sum is relatively modest, it signifies an important policy shift that could end up costing many billions of dollars.

Even some arms control advocates have applauded the decision, because many see the new program as a sharp scaling back of the Bush administration's once soaring nuclear ambitions.

Democrats as well as Republicans were so enthusiastic that they voted for almost three times the amount of money requested by the White House, in large part because the program is viewed as an exercise in restraint.

"This is about tinkering at the margins of the existing weapons systems, nothing more," said Rep. Ellen Tauscher, D-Walnut Creek, a member of the House Appropriations Committee's energy and water subcommittee, which controls the nuclear weapons budget "They (the White House) aren't getting what they wanted."

But while the vote was decisive, just what the nuclear future will look like is not. Some experts caution that more than tinkering may be involved.

"The answer to every question at this point is, 'It depends,' " said Philip Coyle, a senior Pentagon official in the Clinton administration and a nuclear scientist at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory for 33 years. "A new warhead can be new in a wide variety of different ways, and nobody knows what that will mean yet."

Indeed, the reliable replacement warhead is a strikingly elastic concept that, at this stage, each side can define as it likes. One of the few clear guidelines is that Congress has ordered that, whatever it is, it must be deployed without new underground testing, which President George H.W. Bush banned in 1992. But few agree on whether that is even feasible.

Beyond that, experts generally agree, the new program will mean spending billions of dollars to ensure that nuclear weapons remain a fundamental element of military planning, at a time when many other countries -- some friendly, some not -- are making similar calculations. The commitment is, in short, part of a global trend.

"It's not just that the Cold War is over, the post-Cold War period is over, too," said Nikolai Sokov, a senior research associate at the Monterey Institute for International Studies and a former Russian arms control negotiator. "What you're seeing now is a whole wave of policies of this kind being discussed in Russia and the United States and other places. There is an active process in a wide variety of countries. They are all exploring the option of nuclear weapons."

He added, "We're not talking about disarmament, we're talking about optimization. What you're doing is reducing the warheads to a more appropriate size." To those who believe in nuclear restraint, the program is a modest upgrading of existing weapons. For instance, optical fiber detonator cables would replace electrical wires and safer high explosives would be used to initiate the implosion of the radioactive core, which starts the nuclear chain reaction.

"This is not a sneaky way to get a whole new powerful warhead type of thing in the future," insisted Rep. David Hobson, R-Ohio, chairman of the House Appropriations Committee's energy and water subcommittee, and the most influential voice for restraint. "We're not trying to do separate missions than those the warheads were designed for today."

Nuclear weapons proponents, however, see it in more expansive terms. Although the initial funding is just for research, and Congress will have to approve any further steps, nuclear proponents regard the program as an efficient new production platform for rapidly developing new warheads for specialized missions.

For some government officials, the code word is capability. When the talk turns to warheads with new capabilities, or of dealing with new threats, the implication is that whole new weapons designs will be required.

"Part of the transformation will be to retain the ability to provide new or different military capabilities in response to (the Department of Defense's) emerging needs," Linton Brooks, administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, which builds and maintains the stockpile, said at a Senate hearing earlier this year.

That increases the possibility, many experts say, that the warheads may need not only testing, but also the development of heavily modified missiles or new missiles to deliver them, adding billions of dollars more to the ultimate cost.

William Schneider Jr., chairman of the Defense Science Board, an influential advisory body to the Pentagon, said in a report last year that "the nature of the potential threat demands that we consider solutions that go beyond improvement on the margin," and that the country should build "weapons more relevant to the future threat environment," including nuclear warheads.

Cutting through the distrust and disagreements, there are critical areas of bipartisan agreement. First, the method of maintaining the Cold War-era stockpile -- the so-called life extension program -- cannot last indefinitely because the warheads are aging. Some experts dispute this, but Congress seems to have accepted the view that a new approach is required.

Second, the U.S. nuclear weapons manufacturing capability, all but halted after the Cold War, needs to be resuscitated. It could cost tens of billions of dollars over the coming decades and, as some envision it, could give the United States the capacity to produce more than a hundred warheads a year.

How the new warheads would be delivered to their targets has been little discussed, but expensive missile improvements are a prospect, even though Hobson and others insist this will not be called for. But making the new warheads more reliable and safer, weapons experts say, could make them heavier and bulkier. At the least, that would require extensive retesting of missiles.

The first warhead to be upgraded will be the W76, which is deployed on the submarine-based Trident missiles. But whether that missile will still work as designed with a new warhead, without substantial modifications, is yet to be proven.

"You can't just have a conversation about the warheads -- it has to be about the delivery systems and even the military's command and control," said John Browne, a weapons designer and former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. "These things are part of an interrelated system. That's what people forget."

The rethinking of the U.S. nuclear posture began after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Underground nuclear testing was banned, warhead production was stopped, and thousands of weapons were decommissioned.

Some demanded that the nuclear stockpile, with more than 10,000 warheads, be scrapped. Instead, the Clinton administration started increasing the budgets for the nuclear design labs, at Livermore, Los Alamos and Sandia National Laboratory, for what was called "science-based stockpile stewardship," a program of maintaining and refurbishing aging warheads.

While the nuclear weapons budget has more than doubled since the mid-1990s to about $6.5 billion, some now argue that the old warheads are growing less reliable with age and are not suited for deterring new types of enemies, such as North Korea or Iran, in part because they are too powerful.

In 2001, a conservative Washington think tank, the National Institute for Public Policy, called for the development of new types of specialized warheads, such as "bunker busters" -- warheads in super hard casings that would allow them to burrow deep into the earth before exploding -- to destroy deeply buried targets or caches of chemical and biological weapons.

That report became the backbone of the Bush administration's new nuclear strategy, the Nuclear Posture Review, issued in 2002. Half a dozen members of the group that drew up the 2001 study assumed senior positions in the Bush administration, including Brooks at the National Nuclear Security administration, Schneider at the Defense Science Board and Stephen Hadley, now the president's national security adviser.

In 2003, the White House won funding in Congress for the bunker buster study and research into other new types of warheads.

But that is when Hobson, concerned that the weapons could spur a new arms race, surprised fellow Republicans by pushing back. He later slashed some of the funding and strongly criticized some of the White House plans. He wanted, he said, a more restrained policy, one that would survive pressure from nuclear hawks.

"My problem is I can only be chairman for six years," Hobson said. "That's why I'm trying to lock in place a footprint for the future. I'm trying to kill things so they don't come back."

But California Sen. Dianne Feinstein, a member of the Senate's energy and water appropriations subcommittee, said she did not trust the administration and expected to fight the same battle again.

"This administration continues to try to reopen the nuclear door," she said. "So we must remain vigilant in ensuring that the reliable replacement warhead program does not lead to the development of new nuclear weapons and the resumption of nuclear testing."

Hobson and others say they fully expect the government to try at some point to expand the program, and they insist they are prepared to fight back. But some nuclear proponents are angry at what they see as a weakened Bush administration backing off at all.

"This 'modernization' is not a modernization of the weapons' capabilities," said Kathleen Bailey, a senior associate of the National Institute for Public Policy and a co-author of the 2001 nuclear study. "That's what is needed. But the administration has already shown it doesn't have the willingness to stand up and go to bat on this. So I can't imagine the Republicans or the Democrats in the future doing so."

Surprisingly, one of the few groups that seems not to have engaged directly in the debate is the military.

William Odom, a retired lieutenant general trained in nuclear warfare and former director of the National Security Agency, said one reason was that professional military leaders regarded the weapons as too dangerous and too difficult to protect and maintain, given the modest probability that they would ever be used, particularly as conventional bombs become more powerful and more accurate.

"Once you get through all the imponderables of using these things, you increasingly lose your enthusiasm for the desirable effects of the weapons," said Odom, who also helped put together the 2001 study but has a limited belief in the usefulness of nuclear weapons. "From a professional's perspective, it's damn hard to work up any excitement about them. Eventually, they'll go the way of chemical weapons."

E-mail James Sterngold at jsterngold@sfchroicle.com.

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Snuffysmith
Time Running Out on Iran's Nuclear Compliance, U.S. Envoy Says
State's Schulte cites "crisis in confidence over" Iran's nuclear intentions



Iran’s continuing failure to comply with international nuclear nonproliferation obligations has created a “crisis in confidence” over its nuclear program intentions, U.S. Ambassador Gregory Schulte told the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) November 24.

Schulte is the U.S. permanent representative to the IAEA. The IAEA Board of Governors is meeting November 24-25 in Vienna, Austria.

In September, the IAEA board found Iran not in compliance with its international nuclear safeguards obligations but deferred submitting a required report to the United Nations to give Iran time “to take positive steps” that could be reflected in that report, Schulte told the board. (See related article.)

Since then, Schulte said, Iran “has failed on each and every count” to meet requests in a September IAEA resolution calling for more cooperation.

Schulte said a November 18 report from the IAEA director general “underscores that the IAEA’s concerns about Iran’s past nuclear activities are growing instead of diminishing,” citing seven specific examples of noncooperation.

Schulte said the United States was willing to support a request from the so-called EU-3, the United Kingdom, France and Germany, “to defer for a short period” the required report to the U.N. Security Council on Iran’s cooperation and compliance efforts. The EU-3 has been the lead negotiator with Iran over its nuclear program.

Schulte also said the United States, which is not negotiating directly with Iran, welcomed Russia’s efforts to encourage Iran to return to meaningful negotiations.

“But the [IAEA] Board cannot and should not have unlimited patience if we seek to re-establish confidence about Iran’s program, as well as demonstrate that states cannot simply ignore their IAEA and other nuclear nonproliferation obligations, Schulte said. “Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability is a danger to all of us.”

For more information about U.S. policy see Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.

Following is the text of Schulte’s remarks:





U.S. Statement
IAEA Board of Governors Meeting November 24-25, 2005
Agenda Item 3 ©
Other Safeguards Implementation Issues
Iran

Mr. Chairman,

On behalf of the United States, I would like to express my government’s appreciation for the hard work of the Director General and the IAEA Safeguards Department to monitor and report to the Board the status of Iran’s implementation of its safeguards obligations. In particular, my delegation appreciates the Agency’s efforts to investigate all unresolved issues with Iran, including concerns about possible undeclared nuclear activities. Similarly, we appreciate the Agency’s efforts to verify Iran’s suspension commitments, which, as the Director General has informed us, Iran continues to violate.

September 24 Resolution

Mr. Chairman,

Two months ago, the Board of Governors adopted a resolution that made two important findings. First, we found that Iran’s many breaches and failures of its obligations to comply with its safeguards agreement constituted noncompliance as described in Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute. Second, we found that the long history of deception and concealment of Iran’s nuclear activities, the nature of those activities, and the absence of confidence in Iran’s peaceful nuclear intentions, have given rise to questions that are within the competence of the UN Security Council. Both of these findings are cause to report Iran to the UN Security Council. However, we chose instead to give Iran time to take positive steps that could then be reflected in the content of the requisite report. With that goal in mind, the September resolution urged Iran to take a number of steps, including:

· to provide the Agency with the extended transparency requested by Dr. ElBaradei in his September report, including access to individuals, documents relating to procurement, dual use equipment, certain military owned workshops, and research and development locations;

· to re-establish full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related activity, including uranium conversion;

· to reconsider the construction of the heavy water reactor at Arak;

· to promptly ratify and implement an Additional Protocol;

· to continue acting as if the Protocol is in force pending its ratification;

· and finally, to observe fully its commitments and return to the negotiating process.

The Director General’s November 18 Report

Mr. Chairman,

On the basis of Dr. ElBaradei’s November 18 report, one cannot avoid the conclusion that Iran has failed on each and every count to meet this Board’s requests. Even on the fundamental issue of Iran’s transparency and cooperation with inspections, Iran is continuing its long-held practice of choosing one or two areas for limited, selective, and incomplete cooperation, and then claiming the Agency’s needs have been fully met. Moreover, the Director General’s report underscores that the IAEA’s concerns about Iran’s past nuclear activities are growing instead of diminishing, and emphasizes that “Iran’s full transparency is indispensable and overdue.” For example:

· The IAEA still seeks information, documentation, and access related to military workshops, the Physics Research Centre, the Lavisan-Shian site, and specific individuals associated with those efforts.

· Documents described in the IAEA report – documents that Iran previously said did not exist regarding the 1987 offer of centrifuge technology by a proliferation network – raise new issues, including information Iran received on casting and machining hemispheres of enriched uranium, characteristic of weapons components and opening up a new field of safeguards enquiry.

· The IAEA is still seeking information on the scope of Iran’s P-1 and P-2 centrifuge programs, and continues to find implausible Iran’s claims that it undertook no work on P-2 designs between 1995 and 2002.

· Operation of the Esfahan uranium conversion facility is picking up, with the latest batch of yellowcake introduced into the facility on November 16, despite calls for re-suspension by the Board. The new batch of conversion is reportedly 50 percent larger than the previous batch.

· Construction of the heavy water reactor at Arak continues, despite calls for reconsideration by the Board.

· There has been no resolution of questions concerning uranium mining, Iran’s past activities with polonium and beryllium, or the scope and history of Iran’s plutonium separation experiments.

· Rather than ratifying the Additional Protocol, Tehran has orchestrated through the Iranian Parliament a threat that appropriate and responsible Board action to address Iranian noncompliance, which is fully in accord with the IAEA Statute, will lead to even less Iranian cooperation with the IAEA.

Mr. Chairman and fellow delegates, we can draw only one conclusion: Iran is not taking seriously the legitimate international concerns that have arisen over its covert nuclear programs and continued stonewalling.

The Way Forward

Mr. Chairman,

Given Iran’s record of willfully disregarding the Board’s requests, it would have been appropriate for this Board to adopt this week a resolution reporting Iran to the UN Security Council required under Articles XII.C and III.B.4. We believe a majority of Board members would support taking that step, even right now. But, just as we join with all in this room in seeking a diplomatic resolution, we likewise are willing to support the request of our EU-3 colleagues again to defer for a short period the required report to the Council. We do so in the sincere hope that Iran will reverse course and demonstrate it will meet its obligations and commitments before the report to the Security Council must be made.

Iran must understand that the report to the Council is required and will be made a time of this Board’s choosing. We again urge Iran to re-engage in good faith with the Eu-3 on the basis of the Paris Agreement. For their part, it is clear the EU-3 are working hard to broaden the international consensus about how to address the crisis in confidence Iran has created. In that context, we welcome Russia’s efforts to encourage Iran to return to negotiations, and the ideas that Russia has put on the table.

But the Board cannot and should not have unlimited patience if we seek to re-establish confidence about Iran’s program, as well as demonstrate that states cannot simply ignore their IAEA and other nuclear nonproliferation obligations. Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability is a danger to all of us. The September resolution addressed the requirement for a report to the Security Council, while still providing Iran some time to change course. Two months have passed since that resolution was adopted. The question for all of us is: How long can we give Iran to meet its obligations before we report to the Security Council? This question is before us at a time when the Director General continues to be unable to assure us that there are no more hidden elements to Iran’s program, especially its centrifuge efforts. If so, how can we know that such covert efforts are not proceeding even now? The Director General has also now reported, despite previous Iranian denials, that Iran did indeed receive at least one document indicative of a weapons end-use.

The United States, and, we believe, a majority of Board members, are prepared to conclude that, absent a verified change of course in Iran, very little more time can pass before the Board must make its report to the UN Security Council. The Board will need to see Iran return to negotiations with the EU-3 on the basis of the Paris Agreement, and the Board will need to see that Iran is providing the full transparency that the IAEA has requested. We hope Iran will finally realize that the burden is squarely on it to do exactly what the Board has asked in hopes of rebuilding confidence. If Iran does not do so, this Board will have to choice but to make a report to the Security Council that reflects the need for further action. Failure to do so would undermine the authority and credibility of the Agency and hinder its efforts to investigate Iran’s nuclear program.

Mr. Chairman,

I close by requesting that Iran’s noncompliance be formally included on the agenda of our next meeting, that the Director General provide a follow-up written report to the Board in advance of that meeting, and that the Agency make available to the public the Director General’s November 18 report.

Thank you.






Created: 24 Nov 2005 Updated: 24 Nov 2005
Snuffysmith
- Iranian FM Denounces Nuclear Apartheid
http://www.spacewar.com/news/iran-05zzzzzzu.html

Paris (AFP) Nov 30, 2005 - Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki accused Western powers of imposing a form of "nuclear apartheid" by denying Tehran the right to nuclear technology, in a French newspaper column published Wednesday.

- Iran EU Nuclear Talks To Start In Two Weeks
http://www.spacewar.com/news/iran-05zzzzzzv.html

- Revolutionary Guardsman Wins Top Iran Security Post
http://www.spacewar.com/news/iran-05zzzzzzw.html

- N Korean Military Seeks Tougher Stance
http://www.spacewar.com/news/korea-05zzzzzx.html
Snuffysmith
haron: Iran nukes may require military response
By Joshua Brilliant
UPI Israel Correspondent
Published December 1, 2005

TEL AVIV, Israel -- Prime Minister Ariel Sharon said Thursday Israel and other countries couldn't accept an Iran with a nuclear bomb, adding Tehran's program could be stopped by military means.

Iran has been Israel's main foe since 1979, when Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini deposed the Shah. Iran has vowed to eradicate the Jewish state.

The nuclear issue came up Thursday at an annual meeting with the Israel Editors' Committee in Tel Aviv.

Sharon stressed Israel and other countries "cannot accept a situation in which Iran will have a nuclear weapon. That is clear to us, known to us and we are also making all the preparations necessary in order to be ready for such situations."

The meeting with the editors is an annual event held around the anniversary of the Nov. 29, 1947, United Nations decision to partition Palestine into Jewish and Arab states. Shortly before the meeting, the Maariv newspaper ran a red banner headline quoting a "senior security source" as saying Israel by itself couldn't cope with Teheran.

"We shall have to put up with a nuclear Iran," the unnamed source said.

"I do not see any force in the world, today, that could reverse the situation -- namely Iran becoming nuclear ... and there will be no alternative but to put up with the emerging situation," he added.

Sharon suggested the editors be skeptical over reports by anonymous sources, though the context indicated the source was, indeed, high.

"Israel is not helpless and it is taking all the necessary steps," the prime minister asserted.

He did not go into detail, but in recent years Israel has acquired long-range F-15I aircraft, developed its Arrow anti ballistic missile system mainly to intercept missiles with nuclear warheads and has recently ordered two more Dolphin Class submarines from Germany. Foreign reports suggest the three German made submarines Israel already has give it a second-strike capability. That is, the ability to destroy the enemy even after absorbing his first strike. It launched spy satellites into space, indicating it has powerful missiles.

However, Sharon reiterated Israel's long-standing policy that stresses Israel is not at the forefront of the struggle with Iran.

"The danger is not only to Israel but to the Middle East and many other countries in the world," he said.

Israeli security sources have often noted that Iran is developing missiles that can reach Europe.

"That is why the effort underway today, with the U.S. leadership, is an effort that all the free states who understand the terrible danger (of a nuclear Iran) must share," Sharon said.

Israel is "in very close contact with other countries leading this struggle," he added.

Asked whether the international community has a military option, should all the diplomatic efforts fail to stop Iran, Sharon said: "Yes, definitely."

He said he was "sure that before anyone goes for such (military) steps, every effort would be made to pressure Iran to stop this activity."

In 1981 Israel destroyed Iraq's Osiraq reactor and thereby prevented Saddam Hussein from developing an Iraqi nuclear bomb, but Iran has learnt the lesson and reportedly dispersed and fortified its facilities.

Israel is particularly vulnerable to a nuclear attack because it is a small country (it is slightly smaller than New Jersey) and its population is concentrated in the center.

In a paper the Institute for Contemporary Affairs published in Jerusalem Thursday, professor Gerald Steinberg wrote, "There is no basis for accepting the Iranian claim that it is not seeking nuclear weapons or the assertion that a nuclear Iran is not dangerous."

Iran's leaders have repeatedly declared they aim to destroy Israel, he noted.

Iran's new president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, publicly repeated that threat in October 2005. "A few weeks earlier, the streets of Teheran were filled by missiles on parade, decorated with posters declaring the intention to "wipe Israel off the map," Steinberg wrote.

The diplomatic option is still a serious one largely because Iran "seeks to be part of the international community and not (be) a rogue state or a member of the 'axis of evil,'" he wrote.

International pressure has increased as India, whom Teheran considered a supporter, backed the International Atomic Energy Agency's decision in September, which said Iran has not complied with its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Russia and China, who had traditionally been Iran's allies, suddenly ceased to support it, Steinberg noted.

"The Iranian leadership has taken some measures and engaged in negotiations that only make sense when seen as efforts to avoid sanctions. It is also dependent to a degree on foreign technology for its nuclear weapons and missile development programs," Steinberg wrote.

Technically Iran's nuclear program includes developing a nuclear fuel cycle, and it seeks an ability to produce highly enriched uranium that is primarily useful for producing bombs, Steinberg wrote.

"In the Iranian case we have clear and detailed evidence of nuclear weapons efforts, not speculation or extrapolation. IAEA inspectors have samples of enriched uranium and other materials," Steinberg stressed.

"It could take two years, five years, or even 10," until Iran is seen as a de facto nuclear weapons state. It has reportedly been facing technical difficulties.

Nevertheless, Chief of Military Intelligence, Maj. Gen. Aharon Zeevi-Farkash, Wednesday reportedly told the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that Iran has already produced 45 tons of gas needed to make enriched uranium. The time for diplomatic efforts to bloc Iran's nuclear program is running out. In his address to the Cabinet Sunday, he reportedly spoke of few months before Iran makes a critical decision on how to move on with its research and development program.
Snuffysmith
Iran buys Russian surface to air missiles: paper
Fri Dec 2, 2005 2:55 AM ET



MOSCOW (Reuters) - Iran has signed a deal to buy Russian tactical surface-to-air missile systems, a Russian newspaper reported on Friday.

Iran is to buy 29 TOR-M1 systems, designed to bring down aircraft and guided missiles at low altitudes, said the Vedomosti daily, citing Russian defense sources close the deal.

The deal is the biggest sale of Russian defense hardware to Iran for about 5 years, the newspaper said. It did not say how much the order was worth.

Defense industry officials could not immediately be reached for comment.

Tehran is under intense international pressure after failing to convince the United States and others its nuclear scientists are working on fuel for power stations rather than bombs.

Russia is helping Iran build a nuclear power station at Bushehr.



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