Snuffysmith
May 20 2008, 11:09 AM
U.S. Military Reform Unlikely, Eland Argues U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates wants the armed services to devote more resources to training for counterinsurgency and guerilla warfare and fewer resources to preparing for conventional warfare against traditional nation-states. Will the military—and Congress, which controls the purse strings—take his heed? Probably not.
According to
Ivan Eland, director of the Independent Institute’s Center on Peace and Liberty, even if Gates were not a lame-duck secretary, his proposal would still face very powerful obstacles—namely, the Pentagon’s infamous inertia and Congress’s strong incentives to favor big-ticket arms and equipment manufactured in favored congressional districts, such as the F-22 fighter and expensive naval vessels.
“Thus, Gates and his successors as Secretary of Defense can chatter, cajole, exhort, prod, and even threaten the services, but they’ll probably have little luck in changing the incentive structure of the military-industrial-congressional complex,” Eland writes. “In short, when U.S. policy makers stumble into the next counterinsurgency quagmire, the U.S. military will probably have to reinvent the wheel yet again.”
“Bob Gates’s Hope to Reform the Pentagon Is Barking at the Moon,” by Ivan Eland (5/19/08)
Snuffysmith
May 30 2008, 07:07 AM
The Washington Times recently published two pieces that presented two very different pictures of how well the U.S. Army is dealing with the turmoil and stress of America's overcommitment of soldiers to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Brookings' Michael O'Hanlon asserts that things are going "reasonably well." CDI's Lawrence Korb strongly dissents. You decide.
These pieces, "Military Check-Up Time" by Michael O'Hanlon and "Reagan and the Draft" by Lawrence Korb, appeared in the May 4 and 16 issues of the Washington Times. Both pieces appear below; they can also be found at the Washington Times website.
The Korb piece can be accessed by clicking here, and here for the O'Hanlon piece.
Reagan and the Draft
May 16, 2008
By Lawrence Korb - As the person charged with saving the all-volunteer force (AVF) under President Reagan, I find Michael O'Hanlon's May 4 Commentary comparing the quality of today's ground forces with that of the quality of the force of the 1970s, the early Reagan years, or even 1985, to be misleading.
In 1981, Mr. Reagan inherited what the Army chief of staff called a "hollow Army" and a military force in disarray. With Mr. Reagan's rhetorical skills (he did a recruiting commercial) and the leadership efforts of Defense Secretaries Caspar Weinberger and Frank Carlucci, we began to turn things around. But it took a decade to do that and it was only by the end of the Reagan administration in fiscal 1989 that we had the Army back to where it should be. Even Mr. O'Hanlon admits that today's Army does not meet those standards.
Mr. O'Hanlon also distorts the picture by lumping the GED with a high school diploma. The military wants to recruit people who remain in high school until graduation because they are more likely to complete their enlistments and adapt to the military culture. Someone getting a general education diploma is a high school dropout.
Mr. O'Hanlon's data about West Point's graduates is also misleading. By January 2008, 54 percent of the class of 2000 had left the service and 46 percent of the class of 2001 had left. It is true that as of June 2007, only 32 percent of the class of 2002 had left.
But many could not leave because of the Army's stop-loss policy, which prevents soldiers from leaving until three months after their unit returns from Iraq or Afghanistan. And others re-enlisted because they knew if they got out after five years, they most probably would have been called back over the next three years from the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).
Maj. Gen. Robert Scales, the former commandant of the Army War College, has pointed out that for West Point graduates, eight has become the new five-year obligation. Let's see how many of the class of 2002 are in by 2010.
Mr. O'Hanlon's data on the quality of recruits is also misleading. He says that the aggregate total of 860 waivers for convicted felons is minor. Really. How many convicted felons were drafted by the NFL? Moreover, he ignores the fact that 13 percent of the Army's new recruits (or more than 10,000) received so-called "moral waivers" in 2008.
What is more troubling about the article is the way Mr. O'Hanlon glosses over the problems of those deploying to Iraq. He says that 15,000 have faced post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) after a third or fourth tour. But the total number of troops with PTSD, according to the RAND Corp., is about 230,000.
He says we must do everything to help those individuals. What, exactly? Do we keep sending them back to Iraq and Afghanistan without sufficient time at home?
Moreover, in looking at problems faced by soldiers, he compares suicides and divorces first to the general population and only then to levels in the ground forces before we invaded Iraq. But in saying our soldiers' serious problems are no more than the rest of the population, he ignores the fact that the military has higher standards. Moreover, even he admits that the number of suicides in the Army has doubled since 2001.
These problems would never have occurred in a Reagan administration. The 40th president accepted the social compact with the troops that said for every day in a combat zone, the military person would spend at least two days at home. Moreover, because he recognized that the all-volunteer force was not meant to fight a long war, he kept draft registration.
Those who support this mindless, needless and senseless war in Iraq should have the courage of their convictions and bring back the draft. Only then will we give real relief to the troops who have sacrificed so much for us. If we do not, the quality of the ground troops will continue to deteriorate and "soldiers' problems" will continue to mount.
By now, Mr. Reagan would most likely have redeployed our forces from Iraq as he did from Lebanon. But if he stayed, he would have implemented a draft.
Lawrence Korb, who served as assistant defense secretary during the Reagan administration, is senior fellow at the Center for American Progress and senior adviser at the Center for Defense Information.
Military check-up time
May 4, 2008
By Michael O'Hanlon - How well are our armed forces, and particularly our ground forces, holding up under the remarkable strain of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars?
As a nation, never have we asked so much of so few for so long. As such, the strain on soldiers and Marines must be constantly tracked as we reach decisions about how long to sustain 15 brigades in Iraq (once we draw down to that number this summer), how much to increase our forces in Afghanistan (now that Defense Secretary Robert Gates has promised U.S. allies that the next American administration will do so), and how much faster we should increase the size of our Army and Marine Corps (if that is even possible).
In fact, to date, our military is holding up reasonably well under the immense strain. By most measures of quality, it still looks roughly comparable to say the early years of the Reagan buildup — if not necessarily as strong as its typical state of the late Reagan years or the 1990s.
Of course, there have been huge individual sacrifices, and for many soldiers and Marines and their families, things are not good at all. We owe these people more than we can every say, more than we can ever repay. But at a strategic level, the state of the force is not so bad as to necessitate an immediate change in our approaches to fighting wars.
The most important area of strain on the military is on its personnel. While there are equipment shortages and maintenance depot queues of equipment due to the ongoing wars, Congress has been generous enough with supplemental appropriations that these situations are not dire. And while normal training patterns for soldiers and Marines have been badly disrupted by Iraq and Afghanistan, there can be little doubt that the overall battle toughness of these forces is robust.
But how well are people holding up? Key measures of personnel readiness include the experience and aptitude of typical troops, the availability of individuals with critical specialized skills, and the ability of the military to recruit new members and retain those already in.
One recent worry relates to a lowering of personnel standards. For example, the military has accepted more recruits with general equivalency degrees rather than high-school diplomas; it has enlisted a higher percentage of applicants scoring very low on its aptitude tests; and it has also taken on more individuals over 40 years old as first-time military personnel.
For the most part, however, these are not huge problems at present. The G.E.D. is considered academically equivalent to a high-school diploma, and certainly the military can ensure that anyone with such qualifications is up to par by testing them in other ways too. As of 2005, moreover, 90 percent of recruits continued to have high-school diplomas, comparable to the 1985 figure at the height of the Reagan buildup. And the typical recruit scored better on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) in 2005 than in 1985.
That said, while figures for the other services have remained good, the Army has had some worsening problems of late, with the high-school graduation figure for 2007 declining to just over 70 percent of new recruits — comparable to the norm of the 1970s. That suggests a trendline that needs to be arrested and reversed, even if overall statistics on the quality of new recruits are reasonably solid.
Moral waivers for new recruits for their criminal histories have increased substantially in recent years. A total of 860 soldiers and Marines required waivers from convictions for felony crimes in 2007, up by 400 from 2006.
While most of the convictions were for juvenile theft, and the aggregate total is modest compared with the size of the force, only by arresting such trends will the quality of the force be ensured. Again, the current situation is not that dire, but the trendlines are worrisome and must be watched.
So much for finding new soldiers and Marines; what about holding on to those we already have? There has been a recent rumor that West Point graduates have been leaving the service at drastically increased rates as soon as their minimal obligations are satisfied.
In fact, this appears not to be true. The last year for which data are available as of this writing (the class of 2002, which was eligible to leave the service as of 2007), showed a 68 percent re-enlistment rate, only 4 percentage points below the 1990s average.
More generally, company grade officers (first and second lieutenants as well as captains, and West Point grads and others all combined) have not been leaving the force at a greater than normal rate.
The average attrition rate during the Iraq war has been less than the average rate of the late 1990s, for example. A similar conclusion is true of majors.
Nonetheless, there is a problem: The Army is now short several thousand officers in aggregate. The reason is not what one might think. As noted, officers are not quitting in droves. Rather, the Army is trying to increase the number of its officers as it enlarges the number of brigades in its active-duty force by at least 25 percent.
In addition, the Army did not enlist enough young officers in the early 1990s, meaning the current pool of officers from which to recruit for mid-level positions is too small.
How about the general morale of the force? One way to assess this is to look at those having serious problems in their lives. Soldiers and Marines' divorce rates have leveled off somewhat at about 3.5 percent, after reaching 3.9 percent in 2004, and are not worse than in the general population — but still above the 2.9 percent of 2003.
Suicide rates reached 17.3 per 100,000 soldiers in the U.S. Army in 2006, not far off from the age-adjusted and gender-adjusted average for the U.S. population on the whole (for males, for example, the rate is 17.6 per 100,000), but still much higher than the rate of 9.1 per 100,000 soldiers in 2001.
Most of all, many soldiers and Marines face huge personal challenges and often tragedy, in part due to the strain of the wars. These trends area serious reason for worry. But as noted, they are not totally out of the norm of historical experience either.
For one group of soldiers surveyed in 2008, among those who had been to Iraq on three or four separate tours, the fraction displaying signs of post-traumatic stress disorders was 27 percent (in contrast to 12 percent after one tour and 18.5 percent after two).
As of early 2008, among the 513,000 active-duty soldiers who have served in Iraq, more than 197,000 had served more than once, and more than 53,000 had deployed three or more times. That means almost 15,000 people have faced PTSD after a third or fourth tour. We must of course do everything possible to help these individuals.
As we near Memorial Day, the above statistics should not only cause us considerable concern at a policy level, they should of course further reinforce our desire and commitment to honor those who serve our nation in uniform, now and in the past.
Thankfully, however, they do not add up to a broken force or a military on the verge of collapse. We should not continue to deploy them lightly at the pace of the recent past.
But the picture that emerges from the above information is that our soldiers and Marines are continuing to find it within themselves to do the near-impossible to protect the country.
Michael O'Hanlon is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.
Snuffysmith
Jun 15 2008, 05:22 AM
What Rumsfeld Got Right - Robert Kaplan,
The Atlantic Rumsfeld, one former Pentagon official told me, saw Iraq’s degraded military as an easy target for our own; its destruction would provide a quick demonstration of American power, as well as get rid of the regional threat that the Iraqi regime constituted. No firm believer in democratic transformation, he probably assumed, as did many other people at the time, that any new regime in Baghdad, even a military one, would be a dramatic improvement, in strategic terms for the US and in human-rights terms for the Iraqis. Rather than a fear of chaos, what is more apparent at this stage is a certain complacency on Rumsfeld’s part. For example, he evidently did not challenge the personnel system’s choice of ground commander in post-invasion Iraq. The Army’s 5th Corps was slated to rotate out of Germany and into Iraq. Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, the 5th Corps commander, and his staff, despite their service in Bosnia, had done little thinking about counterinsurgency. From that set of circumstances, a long trail of well-documented mistakes followed. In this and other cases, Rumsfeld, who is often accused of micromanaging, did not micromanage enough.
Air Force Firings Followed Budget Battle - Rowan Scarborough,
Washington Times Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates' decapitation of the Air Force leadership came months after a heated debate pitting Mr. Gates and his staff against Air Force generals over spending priorities, knowledgeable sources have revealed. Gen. T. Michael Moseley, whom Mr. Gates fired June 5 over lax nuclear weapons controls, vehemently argued in private for producing more F-22 Raptors, an advanced stealth fighter that represents air power's future. Gen. Moseley, a fighter pilot with extensive combat experience, argued that Mr. Gates and his budget shop were so focused on providing money for the current wars of counterinsurgency, it shortchanged the Air Force's future, according to a source close to the Air Force leadership.
Firing Up the Air Force - Austin Bay,
Washington Times opinion
The classic World War II-era poster reminded talkative dock workers that "loose lips sink ships." Well, loose nukes present an even more imposing problem, one with continent-cracking possibilities. Last week, when Defense Secretary Robert Gates requested and received the resignations of Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne and US Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Michael Moseley, Mr. Gates' office cited as a reason a Pentagon investigation of lax standards in Air Force oversight of nuclear weapons. One incident involved a USAF bomber with cruise missiles overflying a wide swath of the United States - and the crew didn't know the weapons had real nuclear warheads. That sounds bad, and bad it is. Resignation at Mr. Wynne's and Gen. Moseley's level of national service, especially under these conditions, is a euphemism for "fired."
Tom Ricks's Inbox - Thomas Ricks,
Washington Post Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates recently fired the two top officials in the Air Force over the service's sloppy handling of nuclear weapons. Last week, he visited the Air Force Combat Command to explain his actions. His remarks struck me as a model of the way a civilian chief should speak to service members: respectfully and precisely, but leaving no doubt about who is in charge.
Kaplan on Rumsfeld - Max Boot,
Contentions Robert D. Kaplan, one of our most thoughtful and enterprising foreign correspondents, has an intriguing article in the Atlantic headlined, “What Rumsfeld Got Right.” He admits that the Rumsfeld legacy is not a good one, as seen in the worsening situation in Iraq and Afghanistan on his watch. But he tries to argue that Rumsfeld wasn’t wrong about everything. “Even before 9/11,” he writes, “Rumsfeld saw a new strategic landscape of manifest uncertainty, of fundamental and catastrophic surprise.” In responding to that changed environment, Rumsfeld moved tens of thousands of troops out of established bases in Europe and Asia
Reforming Strategic Defense Planning - Robert Jordan Prescott,
House of Marathon With a pivotal presidential election on the horizon, contesting visions for the future will proliferate. Presidential contenders will outline their agenda for America over the next four years and esteemed observers will elaborate on global trends. Perusing the bookshelves, one can find new titles declaring the “return of history”, a “post-American world,” or journal articles describing an “age of non-polarity,” globalization, violent insurgencies, and the challenges posed by China, Russia, Iran, India, Brazil, and Japan. Similarly, the departing administration will undertake a last round of assessments and identify key trends and challenges in its compendium of strategic plans. Previously, American strategic planning was facilitated by the singularity of the enemy and the indisputable likelihood of its endurance. One would reasonably conclude the successful peaceful end of the Cold War of 1991 would have validated the inherent value of strategic planning and identification of national interests and objectives. However, the near universal conclusion of former policymakers and observers alike has been the paucity of strategic planning capability within the government and insufficiency of existing strategic plans. Rectifying this deficiency will entail substantial presidential leadership as well as a departure from existing approaches.