Link TrackBack (0) Print Hezbollah Wins in Lebanon - Is This the "Grand Bargain" in Action? By Andrew Cochran Today is a day which we should mark on the calendar and remember for a long time. For on this day, it became abundantly clear that
the Iranian-Syrian axis now controls Lebanon through Hezbollah, and Al Qaeda and the Taliban now control the Northwest provinces in Pakistan (see
ABC News and
the AP story). Both groups of terrorists won through sustained asymmetric (and, in Lebanon, conventional) warfare which eventually collapsed the will of the opposition, which was not supported in any material way by the United States and other nations. I want to concentrate on the events in Lebanon in this post.
Just eight days ago, in an emergency briefing that I helped to arrange on Capitol Hill for Congressional staff,
Walid Phares accurately diagnosed the long-term Iranian-Syrian-Hezbollah strategy and forecast the outcome unless forces supporting the Cedars Revolution, specifically the U.S. and the U.N., would quickly mobilize. That didn't happen; I suspect, based on past experience, that the Administration couldn't come to a quick determination on the course of action, with the State Department probably at odds with other elements and the White House unable to build a coherent and forceful counterstrategy in time. As
Walid posted below, Hezbollah not only built and runs a private strategic telecom network inside Lebanon, but now, thanks to the "victory treaty," it is capable of moving large numbers of men and material right into southern Lebanon.
Hezbollah's sizable conventional and asymmetric forces are a giant dagger aimed straight at Israel. What's the response? For some time, powerful officials in Washington and elsewhere have whispered about a "Grand Bargain" with Syria, to be concluded with the assistance of other Arab states. Rep. Gary Ackerman, chairman of the U.S. House Middle East subcommittee, concisely described the outlines of that proposal
at a Congressional hearing on April 24:
"Many analysts believe that the relationship between Iran and Syria is a purely tactical and transactional one. Implicit in this belief is the idea that if only the United States would make Syria an offer of sufficient size and sweetness, the axis from Tehran to Damascus could be shattered and the Middle East transformed. Syria, in this view, might even join our team. In exchange for the return of the Golan Heights, and the restoration of its overlordship of Lebanon, Syria would renege on its relationship with Hezbollah, give Hamas the boot, and slam the door shut on Iran. The mullahs would be cut-off from their Lebanese and Palestinian terrorist proxies and isolated completely in the region. The flow of jihadis from Syria would dry up-perhaps in return for a restoration of Saddam’s old largess with Iraq’s oil-and the situation in Iraq would settle down, further isolating Iran from the Arab hinterland. Faced with a united Middle East, the ayatollahs would set their dreams of hegemony and Islamic revolution aside, and give up their nuclear program in exchange for international security guarantees."
Notice the catch: "The restoration of its (Syria's) overlordship of Lebanon." That has now occurred through its proxies in Lebanon. But be careful what you wish for - note Rep. Ackerman's assessment of the "Grand Bargain" that day in his statement:
"I’m not convinced. It sounds lovely, and it has a sort of logic to it. But it’s a fantasy. The relationship between Iran and Syria is longstanding, durable, and is based on a bedrock of shared interests. This relationship is meant to fulfill each party’s deepest strategic aspirations and regional ambitions. Neither state wishes to live as a second class citizen in a Middle East ordered, organized and run by Washington, Cairo, and Riyadh. They have bigger dreams."
So is
today's news of talks between Israel and Syria, brokered by the U.S. and Turkey, the result of Israel's realization that it cannot count on the U.S. and U.N. to defend its northern border from a Hezbollah-led invasion or sustained guerilla warfare? Will it offer to return the Golan Heights in the hopes that it can forestall the inevitable Hezbollah invasion with guarantees for defensive measures by the U.S. and U.N.? (
EDIT: Here is
a McClatchy analysis supportive of the Grand Bargain. Note that it holds no hope for a Lebanon free of Hezbollah domination.) I agree with Rep. Ackerman, and I hope we don't see some American official waving a piece of paper and declaring "We have peace in our time" over this. Because right now, the good Lebanese have lost their freedom, and the new peace in Beirut is just an illusion. There's nothing grand and no bargain in that.
(
EDIT: Contributing Expert
David Schenker takes
a different view: "But given the potential outcome of the 2009 parliamentary elections, the Shiite group's victory may be short lived.")
May 21, 2008 01:58 PM
Link TrackBack (0) Print Hezbollah's Communication Network Confirms Its Terror Goals By Walid Phares An intelligence map released by a French web site, referencing Lebanese sources, shows the extensive communications network established by Hezbollah throughout Lebanon. These closed telephone circuits are operationally independent of government networks. The Lebanese Ministry of Telecommunications has no link to these closed cable-based networks. These systems were at the heart of the latest confrontation between the Seniora cabinet and Hezbollah commander Hassan Nasrallah. The latter accused the government of attempting to seize these networks or supervising them, and the Lebanese government naturally stating that all telephonic networks in Lebanon, as in any country, must be under the auspices of the legal government. Hezbollah rejected this "normal" status and responded that since it perceives itself as a "resistance" therefore it can and should have its own "closed communications system." In other words, a state within the state.
The Lebanese government, operating under Lebanon's constitution, and under the auspices of UNSCR 1701 and 1559 declared - but didn't even act upon its declaration - that these telecommunication systems were not under government authority and thus must be integrated. This was a basic state of fact. But as soon as these ministerial decisions were publicized Hezbollah waged a blitz campaign on the Lebanese government. Even though the latter wasn't even ready to dismantle these networks nor did it have the necessary means to confront Hezbollah militarily, Secretary General of Hezbollah Hassan Nasrallah held a press conference, declared war against the government, and gave the signal to the coup.
Why would Hezbollah wage such a risky war for a telecommunication system? Is it because of the income generated by these networks, used also to sell international phone calls? Less likely. The Iranian foreign aid to the terror group was upgraded from 300 million dollars to less than a billion dollars few months ago. Obviously more revenue isn't bad for the leaders of the so-called "resistance" but more important is the big picture revealed by the Hezbollah-phone map. Look at the web of cable (in red) on the map in
this World Defense Review article and let's analyze this.
Read More »
Map A: Hezbollah Telecommunications System
The "Red Lines" stretch from southern Beirut along the coast to the Hezbollah exclusive zones in the south. They cover a complex network of bases in the area, cut through the Jezzine district and connect with the Bekaa valley all the way up to northern Lebanon. The most important features and dimensions of the Hezb-net are the following:
1. The net covers large parts of Greater Beirut: This can provide Hezbollah with the ability of organizing its forces in Dahiye (southern suburb of Beirut) for assaults against West Beirut, East Beirut and the Druze Mountain in Aley and the Shuf. The closed circuit can mobilize thousands of fighters without interception from Lebanese or international monitoring. It explains how Hezbollah launched its blitzkrieg offensive on Sunni Beirut, the Druze Mountain and was testing Christian Beirut, without real warning to the areas under attack.
2. The coastal cable-line links the Dahiye to the inner land of the Hezb. It serves to move troops and material from the south to the north without major detection. It explains how thousands of Hezbollah forces were moved from as far as Nabatieh and Tyre to Beirut. But it also tells about the capacity of Hezbollah to use it against UNIFIL forces in the future, if needed.
3. The network between the south and the Bekaa indicates the strategy of Hezbollah to close the gap to the East. As I have indicated in many articles and interviews previously, the Lebanese-Syrian borders are what counts to Hezbollah's Terror network. As long as these frontiers are open for Iran to supply weapons and logistics via Syria, the state within the state can thrive and grow. The Lebanese government and the UN, with European and US backing should have closed that gap three years ago, but they didn't. Let's leave the blame game to another discussion. Hezbollah was faster than any one else. According to this map the Iranian backed militia built an impressive network throughout East Lebanon from the southern fortresses to the closest position to the northern borders with Syria. This means that Hezbollah, by now, has covered the entire Bekaa valley, and thus has beaten the international community to the borders with Syria. Military and intelligence analysts can understand this development very clearly. Strategically, Hezbollah is in control of these areas as shown by Map B which I established two years ago.
Map B: Hezbollah Strategic Control Areas
4. In the mid Bekaa, the cable-route connects the center of the valley to one of the highest peaks in Mount Lebanon and - as Map A shows - thrusts into the mostly Christian districts of Byblos and Kesruan. This shows that Hezbollah has already established an axis of penetration inside the Mount Lebanon area, at few kilometers only from the sea shore.
5. Map A also shows that Hezbollah positions are connected to the Anti-Lebanon range and thus to the Syrian hinterland. Militarily there are no Lebanese-Syrian borders to stop the flow of weapons and forces coming from Iran through Syria into Lebanon.
6. The northern tips of the Hezbollah "cable road" shows clearly that its forces are deployed as far north as the Eastern slopes of the Cedars Mounts. From these positions, the Iranian-backed forces can seize the highest peak south of Turkey, leap to the Akkar district, and reach the northern borders with Syria.
7. More importantly, and because of the strategic bridge between Hezbollah and Iran, this communications network is a battlefield system which can be used by the Iranian Pasdaran and eventually by Syrian special forces in a potential mass return to Lebanon. During the summer of 2007, I presented the following projection-map in a briefing to the Caucus on Counter Terrorism at the US House of Representatives, as well as to a number of high-ranking US military officers. It shows the potential paths of a Hezbollah offensive in Lebanon.
Indeed, strategic projections show that Hezbollah can move its forces from the south towards Beirut (which was executed in May). But it also shows that combined forces of Hezbollah and Pasdaran can move on the Damascus road to Beirut and Mount Lebanon and to the center of the mountain as well. Hezbollah-Pasdaran forces would move in the north on an East-West axis and Jihadist elements and pro-Syrian forces can move from the borders to Tripoli. The Hezbollah communication systems shows that when time will come, massive reinforcement from Syria and Iran can move swiftly along axis already secured by Hezbollah across Lebanon. The invasion of West Beirut and the attacks against the Shuf and Aley districts are only the early signs of what is to come.
8. Last, but not least, the Hezbollah communications network can also allow an activation of their massive Rockets and Missiles system across Lebanon without significant interference from Western assets. The aim of this powerful missile force seems to be against a potential "international" force tasked with the mission of bringing peace to the country. Here again Hezbollah - and Iran - has already beaten the West in the race towards dominating the Eastern Mediterranean.
— Dr. Walid Phares is Director of the Future Terrorism Project at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies (FDD) in Washington, D.C., and a visiting scholar at the European Foundation for Democracy in Brussels. He is the author of the recently released book, The Confrontation: Winning the War against Future Jihad
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May 21, 2008 09:50 AM
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