During WWII, as most people know, Germany invaded and occupied France.

Many citizens formed militias or worked alone in fighting this occupation.

They were all considered heroes by the world including the USA.

Question: What is the difference between Iraqi terrorists and French Freedom Fighters?

Anyone have an opinion?

A.B.

Partisan resistance is the term used to describe quasi-military individual and small-group covert activities. The practice is common in countries occupied by a victorious military force. Unable to retaliate with equal force, patriotic citizens often band together secretly to fight their oppressor. On the other hand, collaborators (quislings¹), were citizens of an occupied country who, out of fear or resentment of their own government, cooperate with the enemy. Partisan resistance movements have existed long before recorded history. In the Western tradition, Greek historian Herodotus referred to partisans in his histories.


Partisan resistance arose in all theaters of World War II. The German Blitzkrieg, (Lightning war), overran much of Europe from 1939 through 1942. As a result, small pockets of resistance fighters formed in towns and cities across the continent. Other notable partisan groups arose in Italy, Greece, the Balkans, China, and the Philippines. Numerous freedom fighters died in obscurity, but some became famous and influential. Some even rose to lofty governmental positions in postwar years.

One of the more famous groups in World War II was the French Resistance. The Free French Forces (Forces Françaises Libres) were fighters who decided to go on fighting against Germany after the Fall of France and German occupation, and to fight against Vichy France². The French resistance fighters ambushed German units, abducted and killed German army officers, obliterated bridges, wrecked trains and gave British bombers directions to such German targets as troop trains.

The difference is George W. Bush, Mr. A.B. ...

And racial discrimination ....

There's where I'll start ....

And well done in starting this thread, Mr. A.B. ....

It's past time for it, in my opinion as a Viet Nam combat veteran from out near the Cambodian border in Hau Nghia province in Viet Nam in 1969 ...

Hau Nghia province was in the top ten for Americans killed in the Viet Nam war, according to statistics that I have seen, and it was a hotbed of insurgent activity, as was Long An, out of which Hau Nghia was formed ......

The only other thing that I will say right now, because I am short on time, is that the original "INSURGENTS" in modern western history are the Americans ....

And it is interesting to read what was said about the American insurgents in the British press both during and after the American war to kick out another TYRANT named George ...

And the BRITISH INVADERS, as monuments at Saratoga battlefield near me proudly proclaim ...

The derogatory language about the American insurgents in both the English press and British Parliament at that time is essentially the same language as is used by the BUSHITES and their toadies and PROPAGANDISTS today to describe the insurgents in IRAQINAM ...

Go figure, eh ...

And so ...

We can only judge people as individuals, Mr. A.B. ...

"Sadr changes his tune, calls Iraqi forces 'brothers'"

By Raviya H. Ismail, McClatchy Newspapers

Fri Apr 25, 4:36 PM ET

BAGHDAD — Shiite Muslim leader Muqtada al Sadr , who a week ago threatened "open-ended war" against Iraq's U.S.-backed government, on Friday called on his followers to halt their attacks on Iraqi security forces and to concentrate instead on ending the U.S. occupation of Iraq.

An imam read the militant cleric's announcement during Friday prayers at a mosque in Baghdad's Sadr City, a Sadr stronghold where his Mahdi Army militia has been battling U.S. and Iraqi government forces for several weeks.

"So brothers in the (Iraqi) army, the police and brothers from the Mahdi Army, stop the bloodshed and let's be one hand to achieve justice, security and prosperity," the statement read.

Sadr issued a "final warning" to the Iraqi government on April 19 and called for an "open-ended war until liberation" if U.S. and Iraqi forces didn't stop attacking his followers.

His latest announcement repositions him in support of Iraq's mostly Shiite security forces, which his followers have battled since late last month, when U.S.-backed Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki launched a nearly weeklong assault on Sadr's forces in the southern port city of Basra.

The commander of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' elite Quds Force helped broker a cease-fire in Basra at the end of March, but the fighting has continued.

Sheik Salah al Obaidi, Sadr's top spokesman in the Shiite holy city of Najaf, said that Sadr's April 19 statement was being manipulated to turn Iraqis against one another.

Sadr especially doesn't want his forces to fight in residential areas such as Sadr City, Obaidi said.

"You are putting the lives of normal Iraqis, of civilians, under the occupation forces' hands," Obaidi said.

Although Sadr wishes to fight the U.S. and foreign occupation, "he does not have the desire to use civilian places to start raids."

In Sadr's latest message, he emphasized that there was to be "no war among Iraqi brothers in one homeland, whatever sect or race they belong to."

He called the killing of an Iraqi by his forces "haram," or forbidden.

He asked his followers to calm down and to solve critical problems peacefully.

He emphasized a goal of a sovereign Iraq free of occupiers and foreign involvement.

Sadr's opposition to the U.S., however, remains evident in continued mortar and rocket attacks on the Green Zone, the fortified compound in Baghdad that houses U.S. and Iraq government and military offices, from his Sadr City stronghold.

This week, mortars were fired into that area, and insurgents have clashed with Iraqi forces all over Baghdad , targeting U.S. patrols and Iraqi police using roadside bombs and other weapons.

A bomb killed at least 11 people and injured about 30 others in Sadr City on Thursday evening.

Sadrists blamed the Americans for that attack, while the U.S. military said it was Iraqi forces.

Mahdi Hakim of Sadr City said residents have no faith in the Iraqi government.

Iraqi political officials "have no real power while they support the Americans," he said.

"They have to do the opposite; support the resistance against the Americans."

Hakim said he'll follow whatever Sadr says.

"We know that there were some mistakes here and there," Hakim said.

"But Muqtada knows who is good and who is bad."

(Ismail reports for the Lexington (Ky.) Herald-Leader . Shashank Bengali and McClatchy special correspondent Hussein Kadhim contributed to this report.)

I think there's a difference between "freedom fighters" of WW II and "terrorists" we see today. Terrorists target civilians to instill fear to advance a political agenda...freedom fighters used violent acts to disrupt enemy military operations. I think that's an essential and important difference.

amy, I saw your post in here yesterday afternoon, and as that combat veteran mentioned above, I certainly appreciate the fact that you came in here and expressed your opinion in the manner that you did ...

And as that combat veteran from Hau Nghia Province in Viet Nam, I did not answer your post yesterday when I saw it ....

Rather, as is my habit, I have been cogitating on what you have said, and several thoughts immediately came to mind, all of which I have been trying to sort out and categorize before I said another word in here, lest I in some way offend you ....

And the first thought that comes to mind is WHO IN AMERICA TODAY CAN SAY THAT THEY HAVE EVEN SEEN A "TERRORIST" IN IRAQINAM?

And more important, WHO IN AMERICA TODAY CAN SAY THAT THEY KNOW WHAT IS IN THE MIND OF A PERSON LABELED AS A "TERRORIST" IN IRAQINAM, since that is the theater of operations that Mr. A.B. is addressing ....

Here in America, which likes to prattle on to the world about being a place where RULE OF LAW is supreme, it is axiomatic in a court of law that NO ONE CAN TESTIFY AS TO WHAT IS IN THE MIND OF ANOTHER ...

WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE ....

Those are things we can testify to in a court of law over here ....

And in the course of doing so, we can testify as to things that we have seen and heard, to establish an "INTENT" on the part of someone to commit a crime, or to take part in a crime ...

BUT WE CANNOT TESTIFY AS TO WHAT A PERSON'S THOUGHTS WERE ...

And so ...

That has me curious about your statement about "THE TERRORISTS THAT WE SEE TODAY" ...

For I have never seen one, myself ....

Which probably makes me the odd man out here ....

But it wouldn't be the first time for that ....

Being a combat veteran from the SURREAL Viet Nam COCK-UP or BOONDOGGLE, I am possessed of a rogue consciousness ...

And I accept that ....

And so ...

A question for you, amy, and it is in the nature of a SURVEY, it is not meant to confront you personally in any way:

WHEN GEORGE W. BUSH ORDERED THE BLITZKRIEG INVASION OF IRAQINAM TO COMMENCE, DID HE ORDER AMERICAN TROOPS TO INVADE IRAQINAM WITH AMERICAN FLAGS FLYING?

OR DID HE ORDER THE INVASION TO COMMENCE WITH NO AMERICAN FLAGS SHOWING?

Or don't you honestly know?

Which is certainly an acceptable answer ...

Since it is a survey being conducted in here out of curiosity ...

And so ...

Well, I certainly don't know what's in the minds of people who target innocent civilians, whether those civilians be in Iraq or in NYC or DC or PA or Oklahoma City. Have I ever seen a person who has committed a terrorist act? Yes, McVeigh who blew up a federal building. But I suppose that's not really important. I would imagine that people who commit acts of terrorism think they are on the side of "right", "righteous" acts committed to advance a "righteous cause". The U.S. invaded Iraq to supposedly advance the "righteous cause" of "freeing" the Iraqis from a dictatorship so they could pursue democratic ideals. The deaths of innocent civilians resulting from our efforts to "liberate" the Iraqis are labeled "collateral damage" because innocents were not the intended "targets". The various groups in Iraq who target innocent civilians in the name of their various "causes" apparently feel they have no other means for fighting for whatever it is they're fighting for.

It's all "bad"...none of it is "good". Innocent people are dead or maimed and those responsible for those atrocities continue to justify their actions through the carefully crafted use of labels and slogans ("fighting against occupiers, infidels"....."we will never surrender to the terrorists") ad nauseum.

All bad, IMO.

How right this difference is!! Using this description, Israel is a terrorist organization and should be sanctioned in total by the whole world. I won't say the same about the US because I'd likely be accused of treason by the definition in the Patriot Act.

Pinochet and his cohorts were terrorists, the Indonesian govt that tried to wipe out East Timorese were terrorists. Anyone who fought against them should be called heroes.

Hi Amy -----

Like Livyjr, I saw your post on the subject of " terrorists " vs. " freedom fighters " yesterday and appreciate your input, which I value very much. I, too, as Livyjr did, decided to put the matter into my subconcious overnight because I truly believe this is an extremely important subject and one in which propaganda is being fed to the American public constantly. It is always being painted as , on one side, ' US,- the loving caring United States Government ' which only wants to liberate the heathen, the downtrodden, the victims of vicious leaders. We want to bring them democracy in all its glory and THEM, -meaning those who do not understand us or our motives. They think we want their oil.* How ridiculous is that?*

What is not apparent to many, many people is that there are two powerful dynamics in play simultaneously, unlike the case of the " freedom fighters ' in France who had one common enemy, the German army, on which to concentrate.

In Iraq, there are two main enemies. One, of course is the occupying country. ( Let me say at this point, this has NOTHING to do with our troops, As a former WWII veteran who spent almost three years in the South Pacific, most of it in a combat zone, I am always on the side of the troops. Military people go where they are sent. ) The other enemy is those on the other side of the religious divide. To Shiites, the enemy is Sunnis. To Sunnis, it is the Shiites. Not all of either but there enough fanatics on both sides who fail to see what they are doing to their country.

When I posted the original premise, comparing the terrorists to those civilians who fought the occupiers, I thought it would be obvious who I was referring to. Those who sacrifice innocent people in the name of " My Allah " vs. " Your Allah " have nothing to do with those who are fighting to liberate their country from the occupier.

Actually, although our imbecilic president refuses to see the struggle between Shiites and Sunnis as a civil war, that's exactly what it is, Just like the American Civil War which took place between 1861-1865, although for a different reason.

Incidentally, Wikipedia states there were over 800,000 killed in the U.S. Civil war, of which about 213,000 were killed in combat and the balance were to quote our leader's phrase, " peripheral damage ".

My personal opinion is that we ( America ) is not at war with Iraq even though our C.I.C. loves to see himself as as the Chief Soldier. Why does not the media call it as it is .

We are an occupying country.

And as you have noted, Amy, when a country is occupying another country --- bad things happen.

A.B.

* Just to be sure there is no misunderstanding by anyone. this is said tongue in cheek. Of course that is the reason we are there.

Hi AB,
You've more than adequately laid out what's going on in Iraq! Of course there are Iraqis who are targeting the U.S. military and any Iraqi forces who align themselves with the U.S.military (the occupiers as they see the U.S). And then, as you have stated, the religious fanatics who kill civilians in the name of their cause.

So, yes, some Iraqis could be considered "freedom fighters" as they view the U.S. as the occupying force.

Wasn't this to be expected when Bush invaded Iraq? The rivalries between the religious factions would be unleashed and of course some Iraqis would resent our presence there and respond accordingly. No surprises here, for me at least.

Sad state of affairs.

There is a saying, I can't quote it exactly word for word, but basically it says " if you don't learn from history, you are doomed to repeat your mistakes. "

And as you have pointed out many times, Livyjr, the mistakes in Vietnam from beginning to end are being made over and over again. It's as though robots were programmed to handle the Viet Nam ghastly experience, then these robots were put away for a few years, finally they were found and with no adjustments were recharged and sent to run the Iraq tragedy. I do not use the word " tragedy lightly ".

Actually, what has happened and continues to occur day after day is more than tragic.

IMO, it is criminal on the part of the puppeteers.

A.B.

amy, if you were president, probably none of us would be in here BLOGGING, because there would be no need to ...

But alas, you are simply you ...

And as mind-boggling as it might seem, this stupid witless Texas peckerwood that we are stuck with in the White House as Commander-In-Chief of our military was totally CLUELESS as to all of this ...

AS WAS HILLARY

AS TO McCAIN, I DON'T THINK HE REALLY GAVE A DAMN ...

KILL THEM ALL, LET GOD SORT THEM OUT IS McCAIN'S MANTRA IN THIS FIASCO ....

IF SMALL BOMBS WON'T WORK TO ERADICATE AND EXTERMINATE THEM, THEN, BY GOD, USE BIGGER BOMBS ...

I have been actively following this "war" now since its inception, and before that, I was actively following its "run-up", and while I cannot claim to have a complete collection of every word that has ever been said on the subject, in my Livyjr files and in my veteran's thread, I have quite a comprehensive collection of MSM news articles on the subject of IRAQINAM, and who has said what, and when ...

Plus I quote from such works as FIASCO by Thomas Ricks and COBRA II by Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor and IN THE COMPANY OF SOLDIERS by Rick Atkinson, which I think is especially relevant to today, because Atkinson was embedded with the headquarters of General David Petraeus, who is now in command in IRAQINAM, when the BLITZKRIEG INVASION began ...

And when I read your well-considered and thoughtful post above about what George W. Bush did or did not foreseee with respect to the religious factions over there fighting with each other, I simply went to my files and pulled up this news article from AFP dated Mon., March 27, 2006 2:13 AM ET, and entitled "Bush told Blair determined to invade Iraq without UN resolution or WMD", wherein was stated:

NEW YORK (AFP) - US President George W. Bush made clear to British Prime Minister Tony Blair in January 2003 that he was determined to invade Iraq without a UN resolution and even if UN arms inspectors failed to find weapons of mass destruction in the country, The New York Times reported.

Bush predicted that it was "unlikely there would be internecine warfare between the different religious and ethnic groups."

Blair agreed with that assessment.

end quotes

Sooooo .....

There's an answer to that question, alright ....

A total idiot and a complete fool in charge of the military forces of two nations got together and the sum of idiocy became much more than either of the parts ...

And here we are today ...

Which takes me back to my unanswered question above about flying American flags or not when the invasion began ...

And to what had preceded that invasion in the prior 48 hours ...

And so ...

Talk about SURREAL, alright, Mr. A.B., your robot analogy is dead on the money ....

To me, it is as if the MAW of HELL has opened up and is taking in the whole of IRAQINAM in one gulp ....

It is beyond comprehension to me how such STUPID people as George W. Bush and "CON-JOB CONNIE" Rice can get so much power to do nothing but destroy and pervert everything that they touch in what is supposed to be an educated, civilized, modern world ....

There is nothing that I can at all call "civilized" about what we are doing in IRAQINAM ...

To the contrary, it is totally barbaric, as I measure such things ...

BUT ..

It is also not without precedent ....

Julius Caesar did much the same thing when he went over the mountains from Rome into Gaul, where part of my family has its roots ...

And such conduct was already old when Caesar was doing all of his killing over there ...

Like you, Mr. A.B., I am a reader of the Bible, although I might look upon it more as a history than you ....

And the Bible is full of this same conduct, page after page after page, plus there are a lot of stupid rulers in there as well who end up destroying their own people and nations in return for having tried to destroy the lives of others ....

And so ...

As I said over in Mr. A.B.'s Place a bit ago - what a long strange trip this has been ...

And so ...

Funny!

That's the page I was turning, as well ...

Although I was also thinking of us in Viet Nam to add to that list ....

And so ...

Israel purposely targets innocent civilians? They use suicide bombers or plant bombs in marketplaces, schools, neighborhoods? I don't approve of all that Israel does, but I don't believe their military or non military Israelis target innocents.

And talking about repeating history ...

And being real stupid at the same time ....

We have ...

"Torture Didn't Work for the French in Algeria Either"

By Shawn McHale

Shawn McHale is an associate professor of history and international affairs at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, and a writer for the History News Service.

"We all had the same reaction."

"We tried not to see it."

"We were shocked, but powerless."

"At first, revolted; by the end, indifferent."

"It has to be said, it's shameful."

These are the words of a French soldier, Raymond Dumas, who witnessed torture during France's war in Algeria in the 1950s.

They could, however, be the words of torturers everywhere and in every era.

The French case provides eerie parallels to today, when we are faced every day with new allegations about the use of torture in Iraq, Afghanistan and Guantanamo.

A democracy like the United States, France has long affirmed support for human rights.

Like the United States, it resorted to extreme forms of coercion as part of a war against what it called "terrorists."

France won key battles by torturing suspects for intelligence.

But the bigger lesson is that it lost the war.

The fact that French military leaders resorted to the extensive use of torture shows that they had lost the support of the populace at large.

It is a lesson that seems to have been ignored by American leaders as they prosecute a war in Iraq.

The French use of torture in Algeria didn't happen overnight.

It was a reaction to a deepening crisis in which the French military, originally looking for suspect Algerians, came to see all Algerians as suspects.

A signatory to the Geneva Conventions on war, the French government nonetheless insisted that these conventions weren't applicable to the Algerian situation.

Its rejection of Geneva protections, and the consequent acceptance of harsher methods of interrogation of prisoners, proved to be fertile breeding ground for torturers.

Since late 2001, because the attacks against al-Qaida and the Taliban in Afghanistan, the U.S. government has, like the French in Algeria, displayed a clear ambivalence toward the Geneva Conventions.

At times it has professed adherence; at others, it has scoffed.

Even the reasoning for rejecting these conventions is identical to earlier French arguments: like the United States today, the French military argued that countering terror required harsh methods.

In Algeria, concerned about countering a "revolutionary war," French generals increasingly seized authority from civilian leaders.

They ran roughshod over legal protections for the population.

The main opposition to French rule, the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN), seized the initiative.

But the FLN was not simply the virtuous revolutionary force beloved of the left; like many weak revolutionary forces (for example, the Vietnamese Viet Minh at the beginning of its war against the French), it too resorted to terror to achieve its aims.

In Iraq, frustrated with the rising use of terror attacks, the U.S. military has, understandably, pushed aggressively for more and better intelligence.

In the process, it has ignored its own regulations against extreme forms of coercion.

The French experience in Algeria should have driven home, however, the danger in linking intelligence and torture.

In Algeria, faced with the threat of the FLN, French officers pushed for better intelligence.

At the end of 1956, they set up the Detachments Operationnels de Protection, autonomous military intelligence units whose primary function was to dismantle the FLN networks.

These French units exploited the unclear lines of their own command authority to act somewhat independently of the rest of the military.

This ambiguous command authority also allowed them to set up a vast network of detention camps in which torture was widely practiced.

When we look at Iraq today, many parallels to Algeria jump out at us: the ambivalence toward the Geneva conventions on war, the diminished civilian judicial authority over the conduct of war, the problem of ambiguously defined command authority and the creation of "extra legal" spaces in which clandestine use of coercion can thrive.

The French failure in Algeria also suggests some questions that must be asked about Iraq.

The vast majority of American attention has been focused on one place: Abu Ghraib prison.

But other detention centers exist.

In Algeria, much of the torture took place in "temporary" or transitional detention camps, some of them clandestine.

For suspects, the time between being rounded up as a suspect and officially documented as a prisoner was particularly dangerous.

Suspects were often tortured; if they tried to escape, French soldiers were allowed to shoot to kill.

It is imperative that U.S. military clarify whether or not it engages in similar practices toward "suspects."

In the short term, intelligence operatives can use torture to extract information that will save lives.

But in the long term, the widespread use of torture destroys a population's acceptance of occupation.

As Gen. Jacques Massu, commander of the army corps in Algiers, who played a leading role in the Algerian war, admitted in 2001, "Torture is not indispensable in time of war, we could have gotten along without it very well."

Torture helped the French army win the Battle of Algiers; it also helped the country lose the Algerian War.

That defeat, and the role that torture played in it, is one that the United States should heed today as it confronts the crisis in Iraq.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

This piece was distributed for non-exclusive use by the History News Service, an informal syndicate of professional historians who seek to improve the public's understanding of current events by setting these events in their historical contexts. The article may be republished as long as both the author and the History News Service are clearly credited.

http://hnn.us/articles/5458.html

Of course not, amy ...

There aren't any non-Isrealis who are innocent of anything!

All non-Isrealis are guilty ....

Like the Algerians were ...

Like the Vietnamese were ....

Like the people of IRAQINAM now are ....

They are all criminals ....

Especially the women and children ...

And hey, everybody knows that criminals deserve to be killed on sight ...

Saves the "STATE" the cost of a trial ...

Especially since they are already guilty because they were born there ....

And so ...

That was simple ....

And so ...

Liv,
I never said that non Israelis are guilty and Israelis are guilt free. I said they don't intentionally target innocents although of course innocents are killed when there is military action, intentional killing or not.

Anyway, that's just my opinion and at this point in time my attention is firmly placed on the election and the news on that front.

THIS IS WHEN I FIRST STARTED HEARING ABOUT "TAY-RIZM", WHEN I WAS ABOUT 10 YEARS OLD, IN 1956 ...

I'VE BEEN LIVING WITH THIS SAME **** ALL MY LIFE ...

AND IT SEEMS TO ME THAT IRAQINAM IS A CARBON-COPY, WITH US NOW STARRING AS THE FRENCH, OF COURSE ...

AND THE DUMB PECKERWOOD BUSH AND HIS TOADY, "CON-JOB CONNIE" RICE SHOULD KNOW ALL OF THIS HISTORY COLD ...

AND THEY OR ANY AMERICAN LEADER SHOULD BE ABLE TO EXPLAIN TO US IN PLAIN LANGUAGE HOW IT IS THAT THEY ARE NOT REPEATING THIS SAME HISTORY ALL OVER AGAIN ...

BUT, OF COURSE, THEY CAN'T ....

BECAUSE THE BUSHITES ARE THE ONES WHO WRITE THE HISTORY THAT EVERYBODY ELSE WILL GET TO READ ABOUT ...

THE SUPPOSED "BUSH LEGACY" ...

WHICH IS NOTHING MORE THAN A TALE ABOUT A TOTAL FOOL ...

And so ...

http://www.atimes.com

Middle East

"Occupation case studies: Algeria and Turkey"

By K Gajendra Singh

Jan 7, 2004

"We studied history at school that taught us to say freedom or death."

"I think you know well that we as a people have our experience with the colonialists."

- US ambassador April Glaspie to Saddam Hussein in Baghdad on July 25, 1990.

While formulating foreign policy options, political leaders also look to history for guidance.

Unfortunately, the United State's history is only two centuries old, and to meet the challenge of terrorism, Frankenstein monsters partly of its own creation, the mujahideen, jihadis, the Taliban and al-Qaeda , the US can only recall a long genocidal war against its native Americans.

Those who resisted were called "terrorists" for defending their native land and way of life against foreign invaders.

There are Hollywood films galore that depict the "American Indians" as savages to be hunted down by the US cavalry.

The same cavalry units now force Iraqis daily to lie face down in the land of their ancestors and describe those fighting to free their country from the occupying forces as "terrorists".

The Iraqis, other Arabs and Iranians are the new "American Indians", and those who collaborate with the Bush administration are like the good Indians who helped the Americans fight and defeat bad Indians.

So the display of a seemingly drugged and unwashed Saddam Hussein was to assert white Christian supremacy over the natives.

US policy in Iraq and the region is pure and simple, blatant neo-colonization.

After Vietnam and Afghanistan, the Middle East is the new American West.

The US administration, scared of Islamic fundamentalism and religious fanatics, has yet to evolve a coherent policy to counter it.

But it is turning occupied Iraq into an oligarchy of crony capitalism, after an ill-advised and illegal war on Iraq, set off and egged on by Christian fundamentalists at the core of the administration.

The idea of nationalism - developed by the West - socialism, rule of law, fraternity and equality, have been abolished in the discourse since September 11.

But the sturdy plant of nationalism in Iraq cannot be eliminated by going into denial mode.

According to Iraqi opposition and other sources, there are perhaps more than 50 different resistance organizations, including Ba'athists, communists, nationalists, cashiered soldiers discarded by the occupation, and Sunni and Shi'ite religious groups, as well as foreign elements.

In reality, almost everyone is opposed to foreign occupation.

In an era of nation states based on patriotism and shared history, people just hate occupying powers.

While Vietnam's example and its people's fight for freedom and making it a quagmire for US forces has been talked about, Iraq's comparison with post World War 2 Germany and Japan shows little historic understanding.

The ground situation and the evolution of the war for independence in Muslim, Arab, and till now secular Iraq, is closer to the wars of independence in Algeria and Turkey.

In a November 2003 report by MEDACT, the London-based affiliate of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and Physicians for Social Responsibility, it was estimated that the number of Iraqis killed since the invasion in March was between 20,000 and 55,000, including at least 8,000 civilians, with upwards of 20,000 civilian casualties.

The Algerian war of independence lasted from 1954 to 1962, in which almost every family lost a member, a son, a cousin, a nephew, willingly or unwillingly sacrificed at the alter of freedom, self respect and dignity.

After its defeat in World War 1, when the Ottoman empire lay supine under the heels of Allied power in its capital Istanbul with the Sultan Caliph a captive, the national leadership, led by Mustapha Kemal and his comrades, mostly former Ottoman soldiers, aroused the masses of Anatolia to make yet another supreme effort to expel the Greeks and other occupying powers.

Algerian case study

When I arrived in Algeria in 1964 from Egypt as a young diplomat, one saw very few young men between the ages of 14 and 40 years in the streets of Algiers, its capital.

One million Algerians out of a population of 11 million had been killed in the war for independence against France.

When president Ahmed Ben Bella was ousted by his defense minister Colonel Houari Boumedienne in June 1965, there was almost no violence.

Algerians had had enough bloodletting.

Ben Bella was quietly taken away from the president's palace, just across from my 4th floor apartment.

The Battle of Algiers, now being screened for the benefit of US decision makers, was filmed in 1965.

Like Operation Iraqi Freedom and other US claims to usher democracy into Iraq and the Middle East now, during World War 2, Allied and Axis powers in their Arabic radio broadcasts promised freedom and a new world for the natives.

Ferhat Abbas drafted an Algerian manifesto in December 1942 for presentation to Allied and French authorities for political autonomy for Algeria.

Following General Charles de Gaulle's promise in 1943 for their loyalty, some categories of Muslims in North Africa were granted French citizenship, but this did not go far enough to satisfy Algerian aspirations.

When Algerian nationalist flags were displayed at Sitif in May 1945, French authorities fired on demonstrators.

In a spontaneous uprising, 84 European settlers were massacred.

The violence and suppression that followed resulted in the death of about 8,000 Muslims (according to French sources) or as many as 45,000 (according to Algerian sources).

That laid the foundations for the Algerian War of Independence, which began in earnest 10 years later.

A number of nationalist groups and parties were organized in Algeria even before World War 2, which became increasingly radicalized when peaceful means failed to obtain freedom.

A radical paramilitary group, the Special Organization (Organization Spiciale; OS) formed in the mid 1940s was discovered in 1950 and many of its leaders imprisoned.

In 1954, a group of former OS members formed the Revolutionary Committee of Unity and Action (Comiti Rivolutionaire d'Uniti et d'Action; CRUA).

This organization, later to become the FLN, made preparations for military action.

The leading members of the CRUA became the so-called chefs historiques (historical leaders) of the Algerian War of Independence: Hocine Aot-Ahmed, Larbi Ben M'Hidi, Moustapha Ben Boulaid, Mohamed Boudiaf, Mourad Didouche, Belkacem Krim, Mohamed Khider, Rabah Bitat, and Ahmed Ben Bella.

They organized and led several hundred men in the first armed confrontations.

The Algerian war of Independence was ignited in 1954 in the Aures mountains.

It was at first dismissed as just colonial trouble.

The armed uprising soon intensified and spread, gradually affecting larger parts of the country, and some regions - notably the northeastern parts of Little Kabylia and parts of the Aurhs Mountains - became guerrilla strongholds that were beyond French control.

France became more involved in the conflict, drafting some 2 million conscripts over the course of the war.

To counter the spread of the uprising, the French National Assembly declared a state of emergency.

Jacques Soustelle arrived in Algiers as the new governor-general in February 1955, but his new plan was ineffective.

Soon the situation developed into a full-scale war with French military rule, censorship and terrorism and torture.

White French and European settlers known as pied noires (black feet) thrice challenged the central government in Paris.

The white European settler population was part of Algeria for generations, perhaps much longer than any other settler community in Africa, with the mother country just across the Mediterranean.

The French were almost as numerous as the Muslim Algerians in the main cities and had rendered conspicuous services to Algeria.

A decisive turn in the war for independence took place in August 1955, when a widespread armed outbreak in Skikda, north of the Constantine region, led to the killings of nearly 100 Europeans and Muslim officials.

Countermeasures by both the French army and settlers claimed the lives of somewhere between 1,200 (according to French sources) and 12,000 (according to Algerian sources) Algerians.

A French army of 500,000 troops was sent to Algeria to counter the rebel strongholds in the more distant portions of the country, while the rebels collected money for their cause and took reprisals against fellow Muslims who would not cooperate with them.

By the spring of 1956 a majority of previously non-committed political leaders, such as Ferhat Abbas and Tawfiq al-Madani, joined FLN leaders in Cairo, where the group established its headquarters.

The first FLN congress took place in August-September 1956 in the Soummam Valley between Great and Little Kabylia and brought together the FLN leadership in an appraisal of the war and its objectives.

Algeria was divided into six autonomous zones (wilayat ), each led by guerrilla commanders who later played key political roles in the country.

The congress also produced a written program on the aims and objectives of the war and set up the National Council for the Algerian Revolution (Conseil National de la Rivolution Algirienne) and the Committee of Coordination and Enforcement (Comiti de Coordination et d'Exicution), the latter acting as the executive branch of the FLN.

Externally, the major event of 1956 was the French decision to grant full independence to Morocco and Tunisia and to concentrate on retaining "French Algeria".

The Moroccan sultan and premier Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, hoping to find an acceptable solution to the Algerian problem, called for a meeting in Tunis with important Algerian leaders (including Ben Bella, Boudiaf, Khider and Aot-Ahmed) who were the guests of the sultan in Rabat.

French intelligence officers, however, hijacked the plane chartered by the Moroccan government to Oran instead of Tunis.

The Algerian leaders were arrested and imprisoned in France for the rest of the war.

This act hardened the resolve of the Algerian leadership and provoked an attack on Meknhs, Morocco, that cost the lives of 40 French settlers before the Moroccan government could restore order.

After the meeting with the Moroccan sultan at Rabat at the end of 1957, Bourguiba again offered to mediate, but the French, deceived into optimism by some recent successes in the field, declined.

Bourguiba wanted a peaceful solution, because of growing links between the FLN and Egypt.

A Maghrib federation to include an independent Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia was also discussed.

From the beginning of 1956 and lasting until the summer of the following year, the FLN tried to paralyze the administration of Algiers through what has come to be known as the Battle of Algiers.

Attacks by the FLN against both military and civilian European targets were countered by paratroopers led by General Jacques Massu.

To stem the tide of FLN attacks, the French military resorted to the torture and summary execution of hundreds of suspects.

The entire leadership of the FLN was eventually eliminated or forced to flee.

The French also cut Algeria off from independent Tunisia and Morocco by erecting barbed wire fences that were illuminated at night by searchlights.

This separated the Algerian resistance bands within the country from some 30,000 armed Algerians on the frontiers of Tunisia and Morocco.

Constitutionally declared a part of metropolitan France, the Frenchmen maintained a stubborn belief that Algeria was French, while others wondered why the French were unable to see that their days as rulers in Algeria were numbered.

Like other colonists, the sudden descent from the first rank world colonial power was too much.

The British in the Middle East after the retreat from India also made the mistake by hanging on to Egypt and even invaded it along with France and Israel in 1956.

It ended in disaster.

After their retreat from Indo-China, senior French officers in Algeria took their role with a sense of mission which distorted their sense of proportion and led them in the end to jettison their oaths of allegiance and violation of human rights.

The settler French community arrogated to itself an authority which belonged rightly to Paris.

The weaknesses and divisions of the governments of the Fourth Republic in Paris allowed this authority to be enhanced and exercised in Algiers recklessly until the return of General de Gaulle in 1958.

Some French governor-generals in Algeria did try to alleviate their repression of nationalism with some economic developments and reforms, but the nationalists' aim was full independence.

In the first phase of the revolt after the defeat of the Faure government in November 1955, a fresh general election installed a minority government led by Guy Mollet.

Mollet went to Algiers where he was pelted with garbage by pied noirs, while talks with the FLN leaders remained totally unproductive.

A widely respected and liberal General Catroux appointed governor general by Mollet resigned his office without even leaving France.

By May 1956, Mollet felt that he had taken enough risks and in a trial of strength between Paris and the Europeans in Algeria, and Paris might not win.

During the next 18 months political attitudes remained rigid, the French army and the FLN established positions in which neither could defeat the other.

Terrorism mounted on both sides and even spread to Paris and other cities in France.

Torture became a regular instrument of government, with retaliation by the FLN.

The impasse seemed to be complete, politically and militarily.

The European community's preoccupation with repression left little room for anything else.

On May 28, 1958, Pierre Pflimlin, the last prime minister of the Fourth French Republic, resigned, becoming the sixth victim of the Algerian war.

On May 13, Algiers had rebelled against Paris planning to seize power in Paris by a coup on May 30.

Most of Corsica had accepted the rebel regime and half the commanders of the military regions in France were believed to be disloyal.

Then on June 1 emerged General de Gaulle, World War 2 hero of the French resistance who was invested with full powers.

He flew to Algiers on June 4, but kept his cards close to his chest, but he probably saw the inevitable.

By a mixture of authority and ambiguity, he imposed his will and gradually acquired the power to impose a solution.

It was a masterly performance, but it took him nearly four years.

He did enough to retain the initiative, but would not reveal his plans, thus preventing potentially hostile groups from acting against him until it was too late.

He normalized relations with Tunisia and Morocco, agreeing to withdraw French forces from both countries (except from the Tunisian naval base at Bizerta).

He transferred from Algeria many senior officers who could not disobey the general.

General Salan, a prime rallying point for rebels and leader of the May putsch, temporarily retained his command, but was relieved of his civilian duties.

After preliminary moves and with cautious deliberation, de Gaulle delivered his first major statement on the future status of Algeria in September 1959.

He offered a choice (similar to France's colonies in western and central Africa in 1958) between independence, integration with France and association with France.

The choice was to be made within four years from the end of hostilities, defined as any year in which fewer than 200 people were killed in fighting or by terrorism.

It was followed by another pied noires revolt on January 24, 1960 when the European community opposed even de Gaulle.

The revolt was a failure because the French government acted quickly in Algeria and at home.

But to Algerians, de Gaulle's offer was no more than a half-way house.

The FLN wanted full independence.

Support for de Gaulle in France was more widespread in 1960 than in 1958.

People felt that the war had gone on for too long and they were opposed to the violent means used.

Henri Alleg's book La Question focused on the use of torture by units of the French army.

The trial of Alleg in 1960, followed by the disappearance and murder of the French communist and university lecturer Maurice Audin, the trial in 1961 of the Algerian girl Djamila Boupacha, protests by Roman Catholic cardinals occupying French sees and a manifesto signed by 121 leading intellectuals all contributed to turn French opinion against the settler French community and the French army in Algeria.

Toward the end of 1960 the leaders of the January revolt were themselves put on trial.

But still one more settler rebellion occurred, in April 1961, led by four generals, which lasted for four days.

Two of the four generals, Salan and Jouhaud, were subsequently sentenced to death in absentia and the other two, Challe and Zeller, who surrendered, were given 15 years imprisonment - all sentences were eventually reduced.

Out of the failed rebellion rose the Organization de l'Armee Secrete (OAS) which resorted to terrorism and by creating among the European population fears of reprisals by an independent Algerian government, provoked (as independence became inevitable ) an exodus which deprived the country of much-needed skills in administration, education and other public services.

The lesson was well learnt by leaders in South Africa when it became independent at the end of an apartheid regime.

De Gaulle's efforts in Algeria did not improve relations with the nationalist forces.

In September 1959, the FLN proclaimed a provisional Algerian government with Ferhat Abbas as prime minister and the imprisoned Ben Bella as his deputy.

It then turned for help to Moscow and Beijing.

During 1960 it became apparent that the non-combatant Algerians favored the FLN and its unequivocal demand for independence, which made de Gaulle turn to negotiations with the FLN.

In July de Gaulle, in a televised speech, unequivocally accepted Algerian independence, but the FLN adopted a more assertive line when Yusuf Ben Khedda succeeded a moderate Ferhat Abbas as the head of the provisional Algerian government.

In the same month the OAS made an unsuccessful attempt on de Gaulle's life as its activities increased throughout France and Algeria, with rumors of the proclamation of a dissident French republic under General Salan in northern Algeria.

The first secret negotiations held at Melun in June were a failure, but after discussions between de Gaulle and Bourguiba, between FLN leaders and Georges Pompidou (then a private banker) and between the FLN and Moroccans, Tunisians and Egyptians, a conference was called at Evian in Switzerland.

The problems were the FLN's claim to be recognized as a government, the right of the imprisoned Ben Bella to attend the conference, guarantees for the French who might wish to remain in Algeria, continuing French rights in the naval base at Mers-el-Kebir, Saharan oil, and the conditions under which the proposed referendum on the status of Algeria would be held.

Negotiations were opened in France with representatives of the Algerian provisional government ( GPRA) in May 1961.

GPRA had long been recognized by the Arab and communist states, from which it received aid, though it (communism) was never been able to establish itself on Algerian soil.

Negotiations were broken off in July, after which Abbas was replaced as premier by the much younger Ben Youssef Ben Khedda.

Settler opposition around the OAS began to employ random acts of terror to disrupt peace negotiations.

The second Evian conference took place in March 1962.

On March 18, a ceasefire agreement was signed.

The conference also agreed on the terms for the referendum and presuming that the result would favor independence, further agreed (among other things), that French troops would be withdrawn progressively over three years, except from Mers-el-Kebir.

France might continue its nuclear tests in the Sahara and retain its airfields there for five years and would continue its economic activities in the Saharan oilfields.

France also agreed to continue technical and financial aid to Algeria for at least three years.

This announcement produced a violent outburst of OAS terrorism, but in May it subsided as it became obvious that such actions were futile.

A referendum held in Algeria in July 1962 recorded some 6 million votes in favor of independence and only 16,000 against it.

After three days of continuous Algerian rejoicing, the GPRA entered Algiers in triumph, as settler Europeans began to depart.

Algeria becomes Independent

On July 3, 1962 Algeria became an independent sovereign state.

But its leaders could not remain together.

Ben Bella returned to Algiers after six years' absence in prison and joined hands with army chief Colonel Houari Boumedienne to become the first president.

But perhaps he alienated colleagues and followers by trying to reorganize the FLN on communist lines and playing a leading role in African and Afro-Asian affairs to the neglect of urgent domestic problems.

In June 1965 Ben Bella tried to sideline conservative Boumedienne, now defense minister, but was himself overthrown, with the latter becoming the president.

Ben Bella was imprisoned until 1978 and remained under house arrest until 1990.

But Algeria remains a violent place and in the bloody confrontation between FLN/army and radical Islamic groups 100,000 Algerians were killed during the 1990s.

Civil wars and Turkey's war of Independence

After the Allied powers' victory in World War 1, the Ottoman government in Istanbul under the 36th and last Ottoman Sultan Caliph Mehmed VI Vahideddin (1918-22) decided that resistance to Allied demands was futile, but there remained many pockets of resistance in Anatolia.

These consisted of bands of irregulars and deserters, a number of intact Ottoman units and various societies for the "defense of rights".

At this time, Mustafa Kemal (he became Ataturk "Father of Turks" later ), a hero of the Gallipoli front in the war was sent as Inspector of the army to eastern Turkey.

Landing at Samsun on May 19, 1919, he immediately began to organize resistance and was soon joined by other military leaders like Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Kasim Karabekir, Ruaf Orbay, Refet Bele and others with their troops.

The Association for the Defense of the Rights of Eastern Anatolia was founded and a congress at Erzurum (July-August) summoned.

It was followed by a second congress at Sivas with delegates representing the whole country.

A new Association for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia elected Mustafa Kemal as the chairman of its executive committee to organize national resistance.

But the fire of resistance really flared up when the hated Greeks, with British encouragement, occupied Izmir (May 15, 1919).

The Allied plans imposed in the Treaty of Sevres, which the Ottoman representative signed, would have created an independent Armenia, an autonomous Kurdish region, demilitarization and international control over the Straits and Istanbul, with the rest of the country parceled to the Greeks, the French and the Italians.

Only a barren northeast rump of Anatolia would have remained with the Turks.

Negotiations were arranged between the Istanbul government and the Kemalists.

A new parliament was elected, which met in Istanbul in January 1920.

Kemal was against the meeting in Istanbul and stayed back in Ankara.

The new parliament passed the National Pact, formulated at Erzurum and Sivas, which called for independence roughly within the October 1918 armistice lines.

In response the Allies enlarged the area of occupation in Istanbul (March 16, 1920), arrested and deported many deputies and set out to crush the Kemalists.

Most deputies escaped to Ankara and the die was cast.

To establish a legitimate basis of action the Grand National Assembly (parliament) met at Ankara on April 23 and asserted that the Sultan's government was under infidel control.

It was the duty of Muslims to resist foreign encroachment.

In the Fundamental Law of January 20, 1921, the assembly declared that sovereignty belonged to the nation and that the assembly was the "true and only representative of the nation".

The name of the state was declared to be Turkey, and executive power was entrusted to an executive council, headed by Mustafa Kemal, who could now concentrate on the war of independence.

Soon the Kemalists were faced with local uprisings, official Ottoman forces and Greek hostility supported by the Allies.

In response to the declarations of the Grand National Assembly in Ankara, the Istanbul government appointed its own extraordinary Anatolian general inspector and a new Security Army, later called the Caliphal Army, in 1920 to enforce its rule and fight the nationalists with British support.

The Istanbul and Ankara governments issued fatwas against each other, specially against Kemal.

Thus the stage was set for a full civil war.

The situation was similar to the chaos in Anatolia in the early 15th century after Bayezit's defeat by Tamerlane, when rival Ottoman governments in Europe and Ankara contested control over Anatolia.

The empire was threatened by foreign invasion and the land was infested by local rebellions and roaming bands.

And in both cases it was the heartland of Turkish life and tradition, Anatolia, that produced the victor.

In this chaotic and lawless situation, many bands rose to seek wealth and power for themselves, in alliance with one or the other of the governments, sometimes at the instigation of the Greeks, the British, or even the communists.

Sometimes the bands represented large landowners who were seeking to regain their power.

Most degenerated into little more than bandit forces, manned by a motley assortment of dispossessed peasants, Tatars from the Crimea and Central Asia and Turkish and Kurdish nomads, always ready for a good fight against whoever was in power.

These armies became so powerful that on April 29, 1920, the Grand National Assembly passed a law that prohibited "crimes against the nation" and set up independence courts (Istiklal Mahkemeleri) to try and execute on the spot.

These courts became a major instrument of the Ankara government to suppress opposition long after independence was achieved.

Most famous of the private armies operating in Anatolia during the civil war was the Green Army (Yesil Ordu), which posed a major threat to all sides.

It was organized during the winter of 1920 "to evict from Asia the penetration and occupation of European imperialism".

Its members were former unionists, known to and respected by Mustafa Kemal, including its secretary general, Hakki Behic, Bey and Yunus Nadi, an influential Istanbul journalist, whose journal Yeni Gun (New Day) had just been closed by the British.

Nadi in 1924 founded the leading newspaper of republican Turkey, Cumhuriyet (The Republic).

Its objective was to counter the reactionary propaganda spread in Anatolia by agents of the Istanbul government and the Allies and to popularize the national movement and mobilize the Turkish peasants' support.

So the Green Army was supported and encouraged by Kemal.

But many of its members wished to combine unionism, Pan-Islam and socialism and "establish a socialist union in the world of Islam by modifying the Russian Revolution".

Soon it attracted a number of groups opposed to the Ankara government, including not only supporters of the Istanbul government but also anti-Kemalist unionists and communists connected with the Third International.

This led Kemal to get Hakki Behic to disband the organization late in 1920, though its various anti-Kemalist elements continued to act on their own during the next two years.

There were two other independent armies, both led by Circassians, which were very active.

They were mostly formed of Tatar and Circassian refugees driven into Anatolia by the Russians.

A left-leaning guerrilla movement led by Cerkes Ethem was at first quite successful against the Greeks near Izmir in 1919.

It supported the national movement for some time against the reactionary Caliphal army and the anti-Ankara movements that were active in the eastern Marmara region in 1920.

The other Circassian, Ahmet Anzavur, led a more conservative movement and force with money and arms provided by the Istanbul government and the British.

He led two major revolts against the nationalists in the areas of Baliksir and Gonen in October-December 1919 and again from February to June 1920.

For a time he even led the Caliphal army and his bands began to ravage the countryside.

Kemal chose Cerkes Ethem, who was still with him to defeat and send Anzavur on the run in April 1920.

Anzavur soon raised a new army, but was defeated and killed and his army dispersed by the nationalists in May, 1920.

Ultimately, Cerkes Ethem became too big for his boots and increasingly rapacious towards the civilian population, Muslim and non-Muslim alike.

He had allied with the Green Army, sometimes he supported various communist manifestos being circulated.

And he was not inclined to follow Ankara's plans so essential for the success of the new nationalist army being raised.

Finally, Kemal sent a major force to destroy Cerkes Ethem's army in January 1921, forcing him to flee to the Greeks and eventually to Italy into exile.

There were also strong local rebellions around Bolu, Yozgat, and Duzce, (halfway between Ankara and Istanbul).

The last was led by the Capanoglu Derebey family, which tried to restore its old power.

He and his followers were hunted down and dispersed by the nationalists.

Its leading members were hanged in Amasya in August 1920.

Such movements and revolts did not subside, even after the establishment of the republic.

It took time to reduce the old family and tribal forces that were revived by the civil wars.

And finally there were the communists, with Russia sending propaganda literature into Anatolia.

Kemal was opposed in principle but took little action initially as he needed the Bolsheviks' help.

He even tolerated a number of communist activities during 1920, including a new joint communist-unionist organization in Ankara called the People's Communist Party (Tiirkiye Halk Istirakiyun Firkasi), which enabled the communists to come out publicly in Turkey for the first time.

It had some connection with the Green Army.

On October 18, 1920, to please the Russians, Ataturk even allowed the formation of a separate Turkish Communist Party (Tiirkiye Komiinist Firkasi).

But it was manned mainly by some of his close associates from the assembly.

It was less radical than the first group and was used by the government as a tool to divide and confuse the communist movement and its supporters.

But when the former became too active it was suppressed.

It had issued a joint declaration with the Green Army and Cerkes Ethem that they had "approved the Bolshevik party program passed by the Third International ... and joined to unite all the social revolutionary movements in the country", and adopted the name Turkish People's Collectivist Bolshevik Party.

Communist agents became active around Ankara and Eskisehir and cooperated with unionist groups in Erzurum and Trabzon, which were centers of Enver Pasha's supporters throughout the war for independence.

This forced Ataturk to criticize the communists for working outside the organ of the people, the Grand National Assembly.

After crushing the Green Army and chasing out Cerkes Ethem, he now turned on the communists.

Their leaders were tried, but the final sentences were suspended until after a treaty was signed with Moscow in March 1921.

As Russian support was important, the sentences were relatively light.

The only violent action against the Turkish communists came when communist Mustafa Suphi and others entered Anatolia via Kars in December 1920.

Though they met with top nationalist leaders like Ali Fuat and Kazim Karabekir at Kars in January 1921, they were arrested soon and sent by boat to Erzurum for trial.

On the way they were assassinated by a group of pro-Enver supporters from Trabzon, apparently because of the fear that Suphi might expose Enver's plans.

As for the dashing Enver Pasha and his colleagues Cemal and Talat, who had led the Ottoman empire into World War 1, they fled from Istanbul on November 2, 1918, on a German freighter going to Odessa.

Then they went over to Berlin, but lived under assumed names, since the victors had demanded their extradition for the "crimes" of their regime.

Soon they were invited by Karl Radek to continue their work in Moscow, with full Bolshevik support for the "Turkish national struggle".

Talat, who remained in Germany, was killed by an Armenian assassin on March 15, 1921.

Cemal and Enver went to Moscow and later to Central Asia, where they undertook a series of political activities with the ultimate intention of using the Bolsheviks to regain power in Turkey once the nationalists were defeated.

With Bolshevik encouragement, Enver proclaimed the organization of the Union of Islamic Revolutionary Societies (Islam Ihtilal Cemiyetleri Ittihadi) and an affiliated Party of People's Councils (Halk 'uralar Firkasi), the former as the international Muslim revolutionary organization, the latter as its Turkish branch.

In early September 1920, he attended the Congress of the Peoples of the East at Baku.

But while Ataturk generally encouraged Enver, hoping to use him to get Bolshevik aid, he never trusted him.

Enver had some groups of supporters in Anatolia, including about 40 secret unionists in the assembly, working to install Enver in Ataturk's place at an opportune moment.

Enver moved from Moscow to Batum in the summer of 1921 when the Greek offensive began, hoping to enter Anatolia if Ataturk nationalist forces were defeated.

But following Kemal's victory over the Greeks at Sakarya (September 1921), Enver abandoned Turkey and went into Central Asia to lead its Muslims against both the British and the Russians.

He was killed in a battle with Russian forces near Ceken while pursuing his pan-Turanian mission.

What was the role of the Sultan in the conflict?

According to Sir Horace Rumbold, British ambassador in Istanbul, the Sultan did not understand the nationalists or their movement.

He thought a handful of brigands had established complete ascendancy and stranglehold on the people as a whole.

The Ankara leaders were men without any real stake in the country, with which they had no connection of blood or anything else.

Kemal was a Macedonian revolutionary of unknown origins.

Bekir Sami was a Circassian.

They were all the same, Albanians, Circassians, anything but Turks.

There was not a real Turk among them.

The real Turks were loyal to the Sultan, who had been hoodwinked by fantastic misrepresentations, like his own captivity.

They looked for external support and found it in the Bolsheviks.

The Angora leaders might discover and regret too late that they would bring on Turkey the fate of Azerbaijan.(which was taken over by the Bolsheviks).

In the meantime, Kemal organized his national army to fight for Anatolia's independence, trained, disciplined and armed at a new officers' school established in Ankara.

Russian arms and ammunition began to flow across the Black Sea in increasing amounts.

In Istanbul after the Allied occupation a new and well-spread group was organized among the remaining civil servants and officers and called the National Defense Organization (Mudafaa-i Milliye Tefkildtt) to send information, arms and equipment to the nationalists.

During 1920-1921, the Greeks had made major advances, almost to Ankara, but were defeated at the Battle of the Sakarya River (August 24, 1921) and began a long and hasty retreat that ended in the Turks regaining Izmir (September 9, 1922) and the expulsion of Greek forces from Anatolia.

The total dead in the war was; for Turks, 10,000 dead in fighting and 22,000 from disease.

Greek dead and wounded were estimated at 100,000.

During World War 1, with the front with Russian forces shifting in northeast Anatolia where Armenians were encouraged and hopeful of an independent state, terrible killings took place involving all sides.

It continued even after wars.

In the World War 580,000 Ottoman soldiers died, half from disease.

Turkish official history calculates that 300,000 Armenians were killed.

An Ottoman war crimes tribunal set up by the victors gives a figure of 800,000.

But Armenian historians allege that 1.5 million died, practically the entire Arme