Concerns Regarding Defense Trade Cooperation Treaties
May 21, 2008
Matt Schroeder, Federation of American Scientists

Arthur Shulman and Matthew Godsey, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control

Jeff Abramson, Arms Control Association

The U.S. arms export control system is widely and rightfully regarded as one of the best in the world.

This regime of pre-license checks, retransfer and end-use restrictions and notification requirements, and

post-shipment end-use monitoring is effective at preventing the unauthorized acquisition and use of U.S.

weapons and military technology. By keeping these items out of the hands of terrorists, criminals, and

rogue regimes such as Iran; preserving our military technological edge; and serving as a model for other

governments, arms export controls contribute directly and profoundly to U.S. national security and the

advancement of key U.S. foreign policy objectives. For this reason, it is vitally important that the rigor

and integrity of this system be preserved, and that Congress systematically and thoroughly scrutinize

any significant changes before they are implemented. Of the recent proposals to change the arms export

control system, none are potentially more significant than the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaties with

the UK and Australia, which have been described by State Department officials as a “paradigm shift in

how the U.S. government does export controls.”

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It is important to note that many (but not all) of the concerns identified below stem in part from a lack of

detailed information about the administration’s plans for implementing the treaties. Without this

information, it is impossible to assess the adequacy of the treaty as a substitute for the licensing process

and other requirements under the Arms Export Control Act. With that caveat in mind, below are

questions and concerns about the treaty that require immediate attention from the Senate.

For the full letter: http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/asmp/docum...ement_May21.pdf